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PREFACE 
The idea for t h i s s t u d y came from Prof. Dr. J.R.Th.M. P e t e r s who 
superv i sed my work from t h e very beginning t i l l i t s complet ion, 
although in the meantime he vacated his chair to take up a position 
on the board of the Catholic University of Nijmegen. His successor 
Prof. Dr. C.H.M. Versteegh also became my supervisor. The la te Dr. 
Marie Bemand (Paris) used to read the drafts and to make comments 
and suggestions. I deeply regret her sudden death in St Petersburg on 
the 16th of June 1993. Dr. Richard С Martin (Arizona, USA) also used 
to comment on the drafts and made suggestions, especially with 
respect to the English translation of technical terms. Drs. Vivien A. 
Reid corrected the English text. I am very grateful to them for their 
valuable contributions to the realization of this book. 
For the transcription of the Arabic alphabet I have used the 
following l e t t e r s : ', b, t, 1, g, h, k_, d, d, r, z, s, §, s, d, \, z, c , g, 
f, q, k, 1, m, n, h, w, y. TS marbû^a = a and at (s tatus constructus). 
Article: a l - and ' 1 - . Vowels: a, i, u, 4, I, Q. Diphthongs: ay and aw. 
The spelling of the geographical names mostly follows the 
spelling of Gaube and Leis ten's Die Kernl&nder des cAbbäsidenreiches 
im lO./ll. Jh., although with adjusted Arabic transcription. 
In my translation of passages from the Arabic texts I have 
followed the original text as closely as possible. 
s 
es 
•о 
о 
tra 
INTRODUCTION 
At the end of 1951 en Egyptian scientific expedition was sent to 
Yemen to explore l ibrar ies there in order to find unknown manuscripts 
written by Muctazilite authors. A number of manuscripts were found 
and photographed on the spot. The photographs were taken to Cairo, 
where they are now kept in the National Library (Dar al-kutub). Among 
the manuscripts that were photographed in Yemen was a large 
manuscript that contained volumes IV-VIII, part of volume IX, volumes 
XI-XIV, XVI and XX of a work that was called al-Mugnl fi abuSb al-
tawtytd wa-'l-^adl, or а1-Ми$пГ for short. It appeared to be a 
systematically built-up explanation of the Mu ctazilite doctrine by the 
Mu ctazilite theologian cAbd al-Öabbär2 (d. about 415/1024). From what 
cAbd al-Gabb5r says at the end of volume XX it becomes clear that 
with this volume the work is complete (AfctfnJ XX/2, 257: 16-19). I t i s 
to be regretted that the large Yemen manuscript does not contain the 
whole work, but fortunately volume XV and a part of volume XVII, 
which are missing in this manuscript, have been found in two smaller 
manuscripts·2. The text of a l l the volumes that were available was 
published by several editors in Cairo in the years 1380-1389/1960-
1969. 
Another Muctazilite work that was photographed by the 
expedition in Yemen is éarty al-usQl al-kamsa. The work was already 
known, as some collections of Arabic manuscripts contained copies of 
i t 4 . However, the text of this work had not yet been edited. It was 
only edited in 1965 in Cairo by cAbd al-Karïm ^Utmän, after the Yemen 
expedition. He used two manuscripts for his edition: the Istanbul 
manuscript5 and the Yemen manuscript, the photocopy of which is kept 
in the National Library in Cairoc . eUtmSn attr ibuted the work to cAbd 
al-Gabbâr. He thought that cAbd al-GabbSr's disciple Mânkdïm, whose 
name is also mentioned on the t i t l e page, wrote i t down from cAbd 
al-GabbSr's dictation (.Tacllq, 27: 16-28: 3). However, when studying 
the text, some scholars became aware that MSnkdlm's contribution to 
the work must have been more than only writing i t down. They 
therefore s tar ted to refer to Sarfy al-usul al-kamsa as a commentary 
or paraphrase made by Mankdïm, although they did not give arguments 
for th i s 7 . 
I t was Gimaret0 who convincingly argued that the text edited by 
cUtmân was not a work by cAbd al-öabbär himself but rather a 
cr i t ical paraphrase of a work by him. Gimaret pointed out that a 
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f i r s t indication for this is to be found on the t i t l e page of the 
Istanbul manuscript that cUtmän used as the basis of his edition. I t 
reads: Kitäb ear!? al-uful al-kamsa li-QSdl '1-qudät cAbd al-oabbär b. 
Ahmad al-HamadSnî al-Asad'abSdl al-mutawaffä sanat 4-15 higriyye 
c
ulliqa сал al-sayyíd al-imâm Qawëm al-dm Mânkdîm" e tc . (Гас1Го, 37). 
Gimaret concluded that nculliqa can ... Mânkdîm" means that the work 
was "received" from Mânkdîm, in the sense that i t contains the 
reports of lec tures 3 given by Mânkdîm on a work by cAbd al-Gabbär 
enti t led Sarh aJ-usûJ a l-kamsa'1 ° . This means that the t i t l e of the 
text edited by cUtmSn should be: Ta'llq éarb aJ-usûJ al-kamso1'. 
In cAbd al-öabbär's time, and probably іл Mânkdlm's time as well, 
professors used to dictate their works to their students, so that 
these students wrote down complete books from dictation. But, in 
addition to this , a professor could give lectures for which he made 
lecture notes, or he could teach with the help of one of his own 
works or the work of another master. The students took notes of 
these lectures . This is what the verb 'al iaga *an refers to. The 
record of the notes made by a student was called tacllq or ta^llqa1*. 
A student could use a ta'llq as a book. The difference between a 
commentary and a tacllq was probably that a commentary was dictated 
word by word, whereas a ta*llq contains notes of a lecture that was 
given at the normal ra te of speech. It is likely that Mänkdim gave 
lectures about ^Abd al-GabbSr's Sarh al-υφϋΐ al-kamsa, explaining i t 
and commenting on i t . A student made notes of Mfinkdlm's words and 
the resul t was Ta^Uq àarh aJ-u^öi al-£amsa. 
Among the manuscripts photographed in Yemen by the expedition 
is another work that was also attr ibuted to cAbd al-oabbär at f i r s t , 
but which la ter turned out to be a cr i t ical paraphrase of one of his 
works. The name of this c r i t ica l paraphrase is al-MagmQ* f I 'l-muhlf 
bî-'l-takllf13 and i t consists of four volumes. The text of volume I 
was edited by Houben and, separately, by cAzmi in Cairo, both in 1965. 
Both edi tors at t r ibuted the work to cAbd al-Gabbär'A. Later, 
Gimaret , s produced evidence that al-MagmO* fi 'l-muhlf Ы-4-taklIf is 
also a paraphrase written by Ibn Mattawayh, another disciple of cAbd 
al-Óabbar, of a work by ^Abd al-6abbär enti t led al-Muhlf bi-'l-
takllf1*. The following words appear on the t i t le-page of the 
manuscript that is the basis of the Houben edition: al-Ma¿muc fi '1-
mub.lt Ы-Ч-taklIf lí-QSdS Ч-qudSt Abu Ч-lfasan "Abd al-èabbSr b. 
Ahmad wa-huwa min ¿amc al-èayk al-lmim Abi Muhammad al-(fasan b. 
Ahmad b. Mattawayh. Gimaret has made i t clear that the expression 
"min ¿am' " does not mean "written down from dictation by...", as 
Houben assumed, but rather "composed by..."17'. Another argument put 
forward by Gimaret to defend his opinion that al-Magmu* fi 'l-muhlf 
bi-'l-taklif is a paraphrase is that in the text cAbd al-Gabbfir is 
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referred to In the third p e r s o n ' e . On the bas i s of these and other 
indications in the text , Gimaret 1 3 concluded that al-Magmu* fi '1-
МіфЦ Ы-Ί-takllf i s a paraphrase of cAbd al-Gabbar's al-Mufylj Ы-Ч-
takllf. 
Gimaret referred to Tacllq ¿arti al-usul al-kansa and al-MagmOc 
f I 'l-mufrlf Ы- '1- takllf as paraphrases because in them Mankdim and 
Ibn Mattawayh describe in their own words what cAbd al-öabbar said 
In èarÇ al-usül al-kamsa and al-Mui?I$ bi-'l-takllf, respectively. 
However, these works are not mere paraphrases. Gimaret has made this 
clear by mentioning several passages that show evidence that MSnkdlm 
and Ibn Mattawayh added their own opinions and critical comments to 
what cAbd al-oabbär said and left out what they deemed to be 
superfluous20. 
Mânkdïm's and Ibn Mattawayh's critical approaches to cAbd al-
öabbar's opinions should not be seen as a lack of respect for their 
master. Criticism from disciples was stimulated by the Muctazilite 
masters. This may be a corollary of the great importance the 
Muctazilites attached to independent thinking and reflection inaiar) 
as a way to finding the truth about God and the world. cAbd al-
Gabbâr strongly disapproved of uncritical adherence itaqlld) to the 
opinion of another person or to the doctrine of a school (.Muktasar, 
199: 11-200: 3). He certainly also applied this to his own disciples 
and his fellow Mu^tazilites. He shows this attitude at the end of the 
Mugnl, where he invites his fellow Muctazilites to correct the 
mistakes they may find in the Mugnl: 
But nevertheless I ask from our fellow [Muctazilite]s -
may God give them success in achieving the good things -
who study this book, that they correct the incorrectness in 
it , if i t appears and becomes evident, since return to the 
truth is the way of the faithful (Mugnl XX/2, 257: 12-14). 
It shows that cAbd al-öabbSr was open to correction by his fellow 
Muctazilites. So, when Mankdim and Ibn Mattawayh criticize cAbd al-
Gabbar and correct what they deem to be a wrong opinion, they are 
only doing what they are expected to do as good Muetazllltes. 
Because of his findings that Tacllq äarp aJ-usQJ al-kamsa and al-
Magmii* fi 'l-mufylt Ы-4-taklîf are critical paraphrases, Gimaret*1 
advises that these paraphrastic texts should be used with caution and 
that not all the opinions that are found in them should automatically 
be attributed to "Abd al-6abbar. As a result of Mankdïm's and Ibn 
Mattawayh's critical approach to cAbd al-ôabbar*s texts, it is to be 
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expected that Ta^llq ¿arli al-usdl al-kamsa and al-Magmuc fi 'l-mufylt 
Ы-4-taklIf contain opinions that are their own rather than the 
opinions of cAbd a l -Gabbär" . This ra ises the question of the extent 
to which Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh have inserted their own opinions 
in the two paraphrases. I t is the aim of this thesis to answer that 
question. The answer cannot be known from the paraphrases alone. I t 
is often impossible to separate the opinions of Mânkdïm and Ibn 
Mattawayh from cAbd al-Gabbâr's opinions because i t is not always 
clear where the paraphrase of cAbd al-Gabbâr's words ends and the 
commentary s t a r t s . If the paraphrased works were available, i t would 
be possible to find this out by a simple comparison of the original 
and i t s paraphrase. However, cAbd al-Gabbâr's Sarfy al-usul al-kamsa 
has not been preserved, and only fragments of the original work of 
al-MagmQ^ f S 'l-muÇlt Ы-1-taklSf exist, although not in Arabic script 
but in a Hebrew t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n 2 3 . This means that a method other 
than comparison of the original and paraphrased texts had to be 
found. 
The method I applied in order to single out the opinions that 
Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh inserted in their paraphrases was to 
compare the two paraphrases with cAbd al-èabbâr 's Mugnî, in which he 
expresses opinions on those subjects that are also dealt with in the 
paraphrases. For such a comparison cAbd al-éabbâr 's Mugnî is sui table, 
as i t presents the whole of his doctrine including his opinions on a 
range of subjects. This method of comparing the two paraphrases with 
the MugnT had already been applied by Jan Peters, who compared the 
relevant par ts of Ta=llq àarp al-usdl al-kamsa and al-Magmu* fi '1-
muliTf Ы-'l-taklîf with the Mugnf** and was thus able to single out 
MSnkdïm's and Ibn Mattawayh's opinions on the Christian doctrines of 
the Trinity ( ta j l f i ) and the Incarnation (iitifjäcf). 
However, the use of the Mugnl for a comparison raises the 
question of whether we can assume that the opinions given by cAbd 
al-öabbSr in the MugnS are the same as those given by him in his 
¿art} aJ-usui al-kamsa and al-Mutylt Ы-'l-taklSf. It must be admitted 
that we cannot be completely certain of this . The possibility cannot 
be excluded that cAbd al-Gabbfir changed his mind in the course of 
time so that his opinions in the Mugnl are different from those 
expressed in these two works. At the end of the Mugnl he himself 
alludes to the possibi l i ty that he has changed his opinion on a 
subject when he apologizes for a possible discrepancy between what 
he says at the beginning of the Mugnl and what he says at the end of 
i t and explains that this may be the resul t of a change of opinion 
during the long twenty-year period (360/97O-3S0/99O) in which the 
Mugnl was dictated (Mugnî XX/Z, 257: 15-20). 
We do not know in exactly which period cAbd al-ôabbâr dictated 
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the two works t h a t were l a t e r pa raphrased . As for Sari? al-usui al-
kamsa, i t i s known t h a t cAbd al -Gabbär d i c t a t e d i t dur ing the same 
period as he d i c t a t e d the Mugnl. He s ays t h i s a t the end of the 
Mugnl, where he sums up works t h a t he d i c t a t e d in the same per iod , 
mentioning èarh al-usul al-kamsa a s one of them. Thus, i t i s l ike ly 
t ha t cAbd a l - ô a b b â r ' s opin ions in the Mugnl do not d i f f e r very much 
from those expressed by him in h i s Sari} al-usul al-kamsa. 
Al-Mut}S\ Ы-'l-taklIf i s not mentioned among the works t h a t cAbd 
al-ôabbâr dictated during the same period as the Mugnl and i t i s not 
mentioned among the works that he dictated before the Mugnl e i ther . 
However, i t is evident that i t was an important book, indicated by 
the fact that Ibn Mattawayh made a c r i t ica l paraphrase of i t 2 E . 
Therefore, i t is unlikely that cAbd al-Gabbär mistakenly omitted to 
include i t in the works he referred to at the end of the Mugnl. 
Presumably, he did not mention i t because i t did not yet exist at 
that time. This means that i t was probably dictated la ter than the 
Mugnl and Sari? al-usul al-kamsa. Because of this , i t must be taken 
into consideration that in the Muhlf cAbd al-ôabbâr may have 
expressed opinions that differed from the opinions expressed by him 
in the Mugnl. However, from al-Magmüc f S 'l-mufrît Ы-'l-taklSf i t 
becomes clear that Ibn Mattawayh was acquainted with the contents of 
the Mugnl. For instance, he occasionally reports what cAbd al-ôabbâr 
says in i t · 2 0 . In view of his c r i t ica l a t t i tude , he would point at 
changes in cAbd al-ôabbâr's opinions. Thus, we can assume with great , 
although not complete, certainty that =Abd al-Gabbär's opinions in the 
Mu^Tf were the same as those expressed in the Mugnl, unless Ibn 
Mattawayh reports a change of opinion. 
Another question re la tes to how certain we can be that the 
Mugnl as i t i s found in the manuscripts i s not a paraphrase. It 
becomes clear that this possibil i ty can be eliminated. First ly, that 
the text was dictated by cAbd al-ôabbâr is indicated by the words 
imlS' al-qâtfï Abï '1-Hasan cAbd al-Ôabbër that follow the main t i t l e 
on the t i t l e page of each volume. Unlike the paraphrases, no one 
apart from cAbd al-ôabbâr himself i s mentioned on the t i t l e pages as 
being involved in any way in the production of the work. The 
person(s) who wrote down the MugnS from dictation is /are not even 
mentioned. That this text was dictated by ^Abd al-öabbär i s confirmed 
by cAbd al-öabbär himself at the end of the Mugnl, where he uses the 
word dictation amis') several times in reference to his work on i t 
(.Mugnl XX/2, 258: 1-259: 2). A second indication is the fact that in 
i t , the voice of cAbd al-Gabbär i s always given in the f i rs t person2 7 . 
A further indication is the s tyle of the text of the Mugnl. Monnot 
gives several examples of sentences found by him in volume V of the 
Mugnl that show features that he considers characterist ic of dictated 
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works, such as ruptures of construction, confusing briefness or 
fatiguing prolixity2 0 . Taking all these indications into account, i t 
can safely be assumed that the text of the Mugnl as i t was found in 
the Sanc8' manuscript is not a paraphrase like Taallq ¡tari} al-usQl 
al-kamsa and al-Magmù* fi Ί-muhIt M-'l-taklSf. 
The Discussion of Pain as a Subject of Comparison 
The scope of the two critical paraphrases makes it impossible to 
compare them in their entirety with the M ugni. I therefore decided to 
select one subject and to compare what is said about it in all three 
works. I chose the subject of pain. One of the reasons I chose this 
subject i s that pain is not Just something theoretical but rather 
something that i s known to everybody by his or her own experience so 
that theories about pain can be tested by practical experience. 
Because of this, I thought it possible that MSnkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh 
had developed opinions from their own experiences with pain which 
differed from those held by *=Abd al-öabbar. 
Another reason why I chose this subject is that pain has many 
aspects and as a result of this it concerns several different parts 
of =Abd al-öabbSr's doctrine. Many questions may arise for a person 
who reflects on the phenomenon of pain. If he directs his attention 
to what happens in his body at the moment that he feels pain, he may 
wonder how it i s that he has this kind of experience. Why does it 
hurt when he i s hit? Why does one injury hurt more than another? How 
does the pain stop? And how is i t that some sorts of pain, such as 
headaches, occur without any visible injury? 
Some people may shift their attention from the pain itself to 
the description of the person who is suffering pain. Mostly, pain 
occurs only In a part of the body, but the whole person is 
nevertheless described as "suffering". This description does not apply 
to that part of the body where the pain is located. We speak of "a 
suffering person" and not of "a suffering leg". Why is this? What is 
the relation between the quality of "suffering" and the location of 
pain? This was a question that the Muctazilites dealt with. 
The above questions relate to the suffering of pain, but how 
does one account for the infliction of pain? As pain In general i s 
considered to be a disagreeable sensation that should be avoided, i t 
seems obvious that i t is morally bad to Inflict pain on someone else , 
but does this apply to every Infliction of pain? Are there 
circumstances in which i t is good to inflict pain? For instance, is i t 
good to inflict pain on someone else In order to obtain a profit for 
him or to avert a harm to him? Should he give his consent first? 
A religious person may wonder why pain exists at all in our 
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world, If he considers th is world as created by God, who i s good and 
omnipotent, he may suppose that God could have created a world in 
which nobody su f fers . But our world i s not l ike that. People suf fer 
pain as a r e s u l t of I l l n e s s and d isaster . Are these imposed by God? 
If so , for what reason does He subject His creatures to them? Are 
they meant as a punishment for s in? Why, then, are children and 
animals a l s o made to suffer? Can they have sinned s o that they 
deserve to be punished? 
Religion has always tried to find an answer to the problem of 
pain and suf fer ing in th is wor ld 3 9 . In Islamic theology the problem 
of suffering is usually discussed as part of the larger problem of 
God's omnipotence and human free will. Adherents of the view that God 
has absolute omnipotence hold that God is the only true agent іл this 
world. This implies that not only God's own acts but also all human 
acts are created by God. However, this theory raises a problem: how 
are we to interpret the evil done by humans? If God creates the 
human acts, does this imply that He also creates the evil they do? 
Does this mean that God creates bad actions? 
The Mu'tazilite thinkers strongly objected to the idea that God 
creates human acts. They emphasized that God does no evil at all. 
They referred to this principle as the principle of Justice (cadD. In 
their opinion, al l evil In the world is caused by human agency. In 
support of this view, they defended the notion of human freedom of 
choice. They maintained that the evil done by humans is not God's 
will, but is chosen by these humans by their own will because God 
has given them freedom of choice, which implies that they can choose 
between doing an evil act and not doing it. 
However, the Mu'tazilite principle that God only performs good 
actions raises the question of how to account for i l lness and 
disaster which are thought to have been created by God. Because of 
their adherence to the principle of Justice, the Muctazilites defended 
the opinion that i l lnesses and disasters created by God are good, 
although at f irst sight they seem to be bad as they Involve pain and 
suffering 3 0. 
As the problem of the existence of pain and suffering in this world 
is closely related to the question of the Justice of God, the subject 
of pain is given considerable attention in the Mu¿nl as well as in 
Taelïq Sarlj al-υφΰΐ al-kamsa and al-Ma¿muc ff 'l-muQIf Ы-'l-taklSf. 
The edited text of the Mugnl consists of the fourteen volumes 
that have been discovered3 '. The sequence of subjects in these 
volumes shows that the Mugnl was dictated according to a carefully 
thought out design, so that the twenty-volume work forms a coherent 
whole3 2. The MugnS consists of two main parts: al-Tawfyld <Unity) and 
β 
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al-^Adl ( J u s t i c e ) . The names of t h e s e p a r t s correspond to the two 
main M u c t a z i l i t e p r i n c i p l e s . The subject of pain i s t o be found in the 
second main p a r t , which s t a r t s with volume VI and ends with volume 
XX. I t i s mainly d i s c u s s e d by cAbd al-Gabbar in the second p a r t of 
volume XIII of t h e Mupil iMugnl XIII, 226-568), which i s named a J -
Lutf (Divine Ass is tance) 3 3 because this is the subject that is 
discussed in the f i r s t part of that volume 3 4. In addition, part icular 
aspects of pain are considered briefly in other volumes of the Mugnf 
in the discussion of other subjects. cAbd al-Gabbär mostly does this 
in order to clarify the subject under discussion or to strengthen an 
argument. For instance, in his discussion of the way in which humans 
act cAbd al-Gabbär also discusses how they bring pain into existence. 
This implies that bringing pain into existence is discussed also in 
volume IX3S. 
As opposed to the printed text of the Muftnî that consists of 
fourteen volumes, the printed text of Tacliq èarh al-usul al-jtamsa 
consists of only one volume. There are some indications that MSnkdlm 
not only paraphrased but also summarized cAbd al-Gabbêr's work36. He 
may have done so because the work was meant to be used as a study-
book and therefore should not be too extensive. It is likely that the 
s t ruc ture of Mânkdïm's Ta'llq èarfy al-usul al-kamsa in general 
conforms to the s t ruc ture of cAbd al-GabbSr's ¿arfy al-usul al-kamsa. 
It consists of an introduction and five parts that are named after 
the five Muc tazilite principles (.usui). Although Mânkdïm declares that 
he prefers the system of two principles as i t is followed in the 
Mugnl, he maintains the s t ructure of 'Abd al-GabbSr's Sarty al-usul 
al-kamsa, which is based on the five principles. As for the order of 
subjects within each par t , i t seems that Mânkdïm mostly keeps the 
order as i t was in cAbd al-Gabbâr's earl? al-usul al-kamsa. This is 
indicated by remarks like: "However, he presented i t in this way, so 
we follow him" íTa^líq, 61: 13). Sometimes Mânkdïm disapproved of the 
order chosen by ^Abd al-6abbär. For instance, he says: "The right 
sequence would be to begin with..., but we follow his [cAbd a l -
Gabbâr's] way, so we s t a r t with what he s tar ted with" (Tacllq, 666: 4-
7). However, Mânkdïm sometimes changed the order: "We will answer the 
second question f i r s t , because that su i t s better..." (.Ta^lSq, 409: 5) 
and, "After he, may God have mercy upon him, had explained that God 
cannot be a body, he explained that He cannot be an accident і^агаф, 
but we will f i r s t explain what an accident is" <.Ta-=lSq, 230: 10-11). 
The subject of pain is discussed in the second part, that deals with 
the principle of Just ice (cadJ) (Ta'llq, 299-60Ô). The discussion of 
pain and i t s compensation takes twenty-two printed pages (.Tacllq, 
463-505). Because of the rather limited scope, some aspects of pain, 
such as the generation of pain, are not explicitly discussed in Taclïq 
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βΐ-υφΰΐ al-kamsa. 
Al-Magmüc ΓΙ 'l-mufylf Ы-'l-taklIf is longer than Ta'llq éarp al-
υψΰΐ al-kaasa, but shorter than the Mufinl. At present only two 
volumes of the text have been published, but as the manuscript 
consists of four volumes, i t is likely that the edited text will also 
consist of four volumes. Al-Magmù^ fi 'l-muftlf Ы-'l-taklIf, like the 
MufinI, is divided in two main parts : Unity and Justice. As a sort of 
introduction, an explanation is f i rs t given of God's imposing 
obligations on humans < takllf) and what one must know with respect 
to this subject (Mutilf I, 1-25). This is followed by the f i rs t main 
part, al-Tawhld (Unity), which deals with a t t r ibutes in general and 
the a t t r i b u t e s of God in particular (Muhl\ I, 26-226). The second 
main part, al-^Adl (Justice), which is much longer than the f i r s t 
part, al-Tawhld, s t a r t s at the end of volume I (Muhlf I, 227). The 
main discussion of the subject of pain is to be found in the second 
main part, in the f i rs t fifty-four pages (written on both sides) of 
volume III of the Sancë' manuscript. Although the discussion of pain 
in the Magmù* is not as extensive as that in the Mu£nl, i t deals with 
all the aspects of pain that are discussed in the Mugnl. 
Before comparing the discussions of the subject of pain in the three 
works, I will discuss the schools within the Mu<=tazila and make clear 
that cAbd al-oabbär and his two disciples belonged to the same 
school. Special at tention will be paid to the relation between masters 
and their disciples within the Muctazila with respect to the adoption 
of the doctrine of the master. In the books on Islamic sects written 
by al-Bagdâdï and al-èahrastânï we see that they subdivide the 
Muctazila into several schools, because of the difference of opinions 
among the Mu c tazil i tes. This raises the question of which schools 
existed within the Muctazila and to which school =Abd al-òabbSr, 
Mänkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh belonged. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE MUCTAZILA AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS 
In th i s chapter I w i l l d iscuss the way in which cAbd al-öabbar and 
his d i s c ip l e s Mänkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh thought about the school 
they belonged to. Which names did they use in reference to this 
school , what i s the meaning of these names and why did they prefer 
these names? What did they think about the history of the school and 
the scholars who developed i t s doctrine? 
1. The Name Muctazila and Alternative Names 
Muctazila i s the name given to a group of Muslim thinkers who 
adhered to a spec i f i c doctrine. The word Muctazila i s a co l l ec t ive 
noun and can refer to the group as a whole or to the Individuals 
that form i t . Evidence that the name Muctazila re fers both to the 
group and to individuals i s found in the pronouns that refer to i t . 
Sometimes the pronominal suf f ix -Лия (third person masculine plural), 
referring to the individual Mu c taz i l i tes , i s used 1 . At other times we 
find the pronominal su f f ix -Λί (third person feminine singular), 
referring to the Mu=tazila as a group 2. For the singular the nisba 
form MW'tazilS (Mu ctazil ite> i s used 3 . 
Some of the Muslim opponents of the Mu ctazila called them 
Qadariyya, from qodar "divine determination", because the Muctazil ites 
made an i s s u e of the question of human versus divine determination. 
However, the M u c t a z i l i t e s actual ly rejected the determinist 
standpoint* and therefore they themselves f e l t that the name 
Qadariyya was a term of abuse, which they did not use when referring 
to themselves (Taclfq, 772: 14-776: 19). Not a l l their adversaries 
cal led them Qadariyya. Some of them, l ike al-As c arI (260/S73-324/935) 
(MaqëlSt, 155 f f . ) who had himself been a Mu'tazi l i te , referred to 
them as the Mu=tazila. The A d e r i t e cAbd al-QÄhir b. Tfihir al-BagdSdl 
(d. 429/1037) used both names, referring to them as "al-Qadariyya al-
mw=tazila can al-haqq" (the Qadarites who have separated themselves 
from the truth) (Farq, 67), using Muctazila here in the sense of 
"dissenters". Two other names for the Mu c taz i l i tes are mentioned by 
al -Sahrastanï (d. 548/1153) who says in h is work al-Milal wa-1-nìb.al: 
"the Mu ctazila; they are called 'People of Just ice and Unity' (asJiSb 
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al-cadl ua-'1-tawhid) and they are [also] named 'the Qadariyya' and 
'the cAdliyya' " (Mllal I, 43). 
The term '"adi in the names Ashfib al-cadl wa-'l-tawhld (People 
of Justice and Unity) and =Adliyya refers to the principle by which 
the Muctazilites defend their opinion concerning the question of 
human versus divine determination. The term tawfyld in the name Ashab 
al-cadl wa-'l-tawhld refers to the Muctazilite principle concerning 
the unity of God. The principles of Justice and Unity are the two 
main principles held by the Mu*=tazilites. Because of their defence of 
these two principles they were called "the People of Justice and 
Unity" (açfyâb al-^adl wa- '1- tawhld). 
As various names were given to the Muctazilites, the question 
arises as to which name they used in reference to themselves. From 
the Muctazilite works that are available it becomes clear that they 
used the names Muctazlla and People of Unity and Justice <ahl al-
tawhld wa-1-cadl> or, for short, People of Justice (ahi al-cadl). When 
Unity and Justice are both mentioned in the name, the Muctazilites 
usually mention Unity f irst , as opposed to what al-Sahrastfinl dide . 
An example of the name Muctazila used by a Mu=tazilite to refer 
to the group he belongs to is found in KitSb al-intl^Sr by the 
Muctazilite аІ-Каууа^ <ca. 220/835-ca. 300/913У5. His aim in this work 
was to defend the Muctazila against the attacks of Ibn al-RSwandl (d. 
298/910), a former Muctazilite who later turned against i t s doctrine. 
In another Muctazilite work, MaqSlät al-Islämiyyin, composed by al-
Kayyafs disciple Abu 'l-QSsim al-Balkï al-KacbI (d. 319/931 У, the 
name Muctazila i s used in the heading "Dikr al-Muctazila" that 
introduces the section on them (.Dikr, 61). The name Muctazila also 
appears in the t i t le of cAbd al-éabbar's work Fadl al-ictlzSl wa-
pabaqSt al-Muatazila, in which he describes the Muctazilite doctrine 
(¿-"tiziJ) and the l ives of famous Muetazilites (Fadl, 135). 
What does the word Muctazila mean? Muctazila is a derivation 
from the verb i c tázala. According to Lanee lctazalahu means "he went 
apart, away, or aside; removed; or separated himself; from him, or it". 
This explanation is also found in TahdSb al-lu£a, a lexicographical 
work by al-Azharl (d. 370/980), a contemporary of cAbd al-Sabbar. 
According to this work, i*tazaltu '1-qawm means: "I left them" 
(fâraqtuhum) and "I abandoned them" (tanahhaytu canhum) (Tahdlb, 134). 
From the explanations given by Lane and al-Azhari, i t becomes clear 
that the verb ictazala is related to notions of separation, withdrawal 
and segregation. Not found in Tah¿Sb al-lu$a, but mentioned by Lane, 
i s the expression yactazilu 'l-fyarb, which means "he withholds 
himself, or keeps aloof, from war, or battle". 
Al-Azharl and Lane also explain the name Muctazila. According to 
them, a group of the "Qadariyya" was called "Muctazila" because they 
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maintained that they had separated themselves (.i^tazali?) from two 
factions that were In error: the Ahi al-sunna wa-'l-gam8ca and the 
KSrigites (Kawärig) (Tahdlb II , 134 and Lane 1663/93, 2037). An 
adversary of the Mu=tazila, the Ascarite cAbd al-QShlr b. JShir a l -
Bagdadï (d. 429/1037), says that the Muctazilites were so named 
"because of their withdrawal (ictizal> from the doctrine (qawD of the 
[Muslim] community (шила) by their claim that a malefactor (.fSsiq) in 
the community of the Islam is neither a believer nor an unbeliever" 
(Farq, 6S). These explanations lead to the next question: what exactly 
were the Muctazilites considered to have withdrawn from, resulting in 
their being called Mu ctazila? 
^Abd al-Qähir's explanation of the name Muctazila refers to a 
famous question, but his rendering of i t is quite incomplete. He gives 
a false impression by suggesting that the Muctazilites had rejected 
something about which there was a consensus of opinion within the 
Muslim community9. On the contrary, in early Islam there had been 
disagreement about the s t a tu s of the grave sinner. The KSrigites 
(KawSrig) were of the opinion that a grave sinner's s ta tus was that 
of an unbeliever. Their adversaries <the Murgiltes) believed that a 
grave sinner does not lose his s ta tus as a believer. Al-Hasan a l -
Basrl's opinion was midway between those of the KSrigites and the 
Murgi'ites. He declared that a grave sinner i s a hypocrite 
<munSfiqV°. The term munSfiq refers to a Muslim who pretends to be 
a believer but in his heart is an unbeliever1 ' . The Muc tazili tes ' 
position on this question was somewhat different from that of a l -
Hasan al-Basrl, They declared that the grave sinner is a malefactor 
(.fSsiqV2. They called their opinion on the legal s ta tus of the grave 
sinner "the Intermediate Position" (al-manzlla bayn al-manzllatayrì) 
because their position is midway between declaring that this sinner 
is a believer and declaring that he is an unbeliever. The difference 
between al-Hasan al-Basrï 's term munSfiq and the Mutazilites' term 
fSslq is that being Judged as fSslq could have consequences for 
holding a function. In Islamic law the Judgment that someone is a 
fSslq implies that he is excluded from acting as a legal witness 1 3 , 
making i t impossible for him to perform certain functions in the 
Muslim community1*. 
In a standard account of the origins of the Muctazila, the 
question of the grave sinner i s mentioned as the reason why the 
Muctazila were given their name. It says that the name Muctazila was 
given to cAmr b. cUbayd (d. 144/761) and his companions (a$fiSb) 
because they had dissociated themselves WtazalQ') from the study-
circle of al-Hasan al-Basrl (d. 110/728) after disagreeing with him 
about the s t a tus of the grave sinner. However, Montgomery Watt , e 
came to the conclusion that this story must be a late invention that 
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does not reflect the his tor ical course of events. What, then, was the 
historical course of events? 
The facts about how the Muctazila originated and why they were 
given the name Muctazila are difficult to establish. Several 
scholars 1 e have tr ied to shed light on these questions. Stroumsa17 
tooK into consideration the fact that by the f irs t quarter of the 
second Islamic century ascetics were called "Muctazila". She assumed 
that cAmr and his disciples were called "Muctazila" because they were 
ascetics who had separated themselves from worldly pleasures. cAmr 
then joined WSsil (d. 131/748) with respect to the question of the 
grave sinner and the early followers of both leaders were called 
Muctazila. 
Several scholars assumed that, at f i r s t , the Muctazila was a 
polit ical movement and only later became a theological movement. One 
of those who held this view was Nyberg l e, who made i t clear that the 
name Muctazila was given to those whose position was neutral with 
respect to the quarrels about cAlï's r ights to the caliphate and who 
refused to fight for or against CA1I. Nyberg supposed that WSsil and 
cAmr and their followers were called Muctazila because they were 
politically neutra l . He explained that the question of the great 
sinner has a pol i t ical background and that the polit ical neutrality of 
cAmr and WSsil was expressed In the principle of the malizile bayn 
al-manzile ta/л1 э . 
However, Van E s s 2 0 has pointed out that i t is possible that the 
group round cAmr was already called Muctazila before cAmr joined 
WSsil. He took into account the fact that among the IbSdites the term 
i c tázala meant "renouncing one's allegiance to the imam" and 
speculated that the group of cAmr was called Muctazila because they 
renounced their allegiance to Qurays. He added that this is no more 
than a hypothesis-21. 
How did the Mu c tazili tes themselves explain the name Muctazila? 
The Mu=tazilite al-NSsi' al-Akbar <d. 293/906)=a explained the name 
as "neutralism". In KltSb ιιφϋΐ ai-nifial, at tr ibuted to him, he declared 
that originally Mu ctazila was a name given to one of the two groups 
that kept aloof (î^tazalû') from the "battle of the camel" (36/656). 
This bat t le had i t s origins in the conflict between CA1I on the one 
hand and Talha, al-Zubayr and cÄ'isa on the other hand. According to 
al-NSài', two groups did not take part in the bat t le : one group 
because they deemed i t wrong to kill their fellow Muslims, the other 
group because they did not know which of the two parties was in the 
right. The l a t t e r group was called the "Muctazila". Al-N5si' al-Akbar 
suggests that the group around WSsil b. CA^S' and cAmr b. cUbayd was 
called Muctazila, because WSsil and cAmr declared that they did not 
know which of the two part ies was in the right (.MasS'il al-imäma, 
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Arabic text , 16-17). 
Other Muctazilite authors explained Muctazila as "withdrawal" 
from disobedience to God. One of them is the Muctazilite Muhammad b. 
YazdSd. (probably living in the second half of the third/ninth 
cen tu ry^ 3 who said that the Muctazilites were proud of the name 
Muctazila because in the Qur'ân2* and in the Traditions the verb 
ic taza la, from which i t is derived, only occurs in the sense of 
withholding yourself from what i s wrong (aJ-i^tXziJ min al-àarr). Ibn 
Yazdäd added that , properly speaking, the Companions of the prophet 
Muhammad were the f i r s t Muctazilites (Fa<flt 165: 19-166: 13). 
Al-Balkl explained Muctazila in terms of "withdrawal" from the 
Muslims' disagreements. He pointed out that the opinion that a grave 
sinner is a malefactor (fasiq) is something that a l l agreed on (Dikr, 
64: 11) and said that 
the Muctazila dissociated themselves from al l that they 
[the others] disagreed about and said: "We adhere to what 
they agree about, namely, that they [the grave sinners] are 
to be called malefactors, and we reject what they disagree 
about, namely, calling them unbelievers, believers, 
hypocrites and polytheists" (¿îkr, 115: 5-7). 
According to this explanation, the Muctazilites withheld from taking 
yet another position, choosing instead to focus on what al l Muslims 
agreed upon. 
cAbd al-ôabbâr (d. 415/1024) combines the explanation of Ibn 
Yazdäd. with other explanations. He explains the meaning of Muctazila 
by referring to Ibn Yazdäd, who, as we have seen, pointed out that in 
the Qur'fin i^tizBl means refraining from doing evil. From this , ^Abd 
al-ôabb5r concludes that in fact Muctazila is a name of honour (Fatfl, 
165: 19-24). As for the reason why the Muctazilites were given the 
name Muctazila, cAbd al-öabbSr does not deny the standard account 
that says that cAmr and his disciples <as^íí>)=e were called Mu'tazila 
because they had dissociated themselves tî^tazalu') from the study-
circle of al-Hasan al-Basrl . According to cAbd al-öabbSr's account, 
they were given the name Muctazila by QatSda (d. 117/735), a disciple 
of al-Hasan=G, when they left al-Hasan's circle following cAmr's 
defeat by QatSda in a dispute (Fa<fl, 166: 14-20). 
In addition to this account, cAbd al-GabbSr cites the other 
account that says that Wfisll and cAmr were called Muctazilites 
because they dissociated themselves from the following three groups: 
f i rs t ly , the followers of al-Hasan al-Basrï who said that grave 
sinners are hypocrites, secondly, others who said that grave sinners 
are believers, and thirdly, the Kärigites who said that they are 
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unbelievers. He comments that this account makes It clear that 
i'tlzSl implies dissociation from all the disagreeing Judgments given 
on the grave sinner but not from that about which there was 
consensus, namely, that the grave sinner is a malefactor (.fäslq) 
ÍFadl, 166: 21-25). We have seen that this is the meaning that al-
ВаІкГ gave to i'tizSl. 
«=Abd el-Gabber's disciple MSnkdlm (d. 425/1034) gives a s t i l l 
more detailed account of the origin of the name Muctazila. He says 
that at first =Amr b. cUbayd agreed with al-Hasan al-Basrl that the 
grave sinner is a hypocrite (mun&fiq), whereas Wasil b. CA^S' believed 
that the grave sinner is neither a believer, an unbeliever or a 
hypocrite, but that he is a malefactor. He adds that Wis i l had 
adopted this opinion from Abu Hasim, the son of cAbdallSh b. al-
Hanafiyya. Then, there was a dispute (munSzara) between Wasil and 
cAmr which resulted in cAmr's abandoning his earlier opinion and 
leaving al-Hasan al-Basrl's study-circle. He dissociated himself 
(l*tázala ¿äniban) and so they called him Mu^tazill (Taellq, 137: 6-
13Θ: 5). MSnkdlm ends the account with the words: "and this is the 
reason why the People of Justice (.ahi al-^adl) are named Muctazila" 
(.Ta^Hq, 138: 5), suggesting that People of Justice is the group's real 
name. 
cAbd al-Ôabbâr's disciple Ibn Mattawayh first explains that 
Qadariyya i s the wrong name for the school he belongs to. They 
should not be named after qadar (determination) but rather after ""adi 
(Justice) and tawhfd (unityЯ7, as they defend the belief that God is 
One and Just iMagmQ* I, 443: 13-14). He also cites cAbd al-ôabbfir's 
explanation that being named after ictizSl implies praise. As for the 
reason why they were called Muctazila, Ibn Mattawayh mentions the 
account about cAmr's dissociation from al-Hasan al-Basrl and QatSda's 
words: 'taAmr has become a MuctaziH" IMagmQ* I, 443: 13-16). Ibn 
Mattawayh also mentions the version which recounts how WSsil was 
called Muctazill after opposing the Kfirigites' and the Murgi'ites' 
opinion on what Ibn Mattawayh refers to as "Names and Judgments" 
(al-asmS' wa-'l-ahkSm) (Matfmu* I, 443: 16-17). This "Names and 
Judgments" is another label for the principle of the "Intermediate 
Position" (al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayrùze', as this principle deals 
with the names (asma1) given to a grave sinner and the Judgments 
(.ahkBm) that are implied in these names. 
One conclusion which can be drawn from the accounts of the 
later Muctazilltes such as cAbd al-£abbgr, Mänkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh 
is that, notwithstanding their different explanations of the meaning 
of muctazila, they consider cAmr and Wâsil as the forerunners of the 
group of thinkers that came to be called Muctazila. They accepted the 
standard accounts of the name's origin but rejected the explanation 
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of the name Mu^tazila as "dissociation from the consensus". However, 
i t i s clear that the his tor ical reason for the use of the name 
Mu"=tazila is not known to them. They do not seem to know - or 
pretend not to know - al-NSái' al-Akbar's explanation that Muctazila 
is the name of those whose position was neutral with regard to the 
conflict concerning ^АИ. 
2. The Muctazilite Principles and the Name Ahi al-Tawhïd wa-'l-^Adl 
Although some Muc tazilites had different opinions on several deta i ls 
of Mu c tazil i te doctrine, they a l l adhered to a set of fundamental 
theories. These theories are expressed in "the five principles" (aJ-
υφϋΐ al-kamso**. Mongomery Watt 3 0 thinks that i t was only in the 
time of al-Kayyat <ca. 220/835-300/913), or shortly before, that 
adherence to the five principles became the criterion for being a 
Mu c tazi l i te, although the establishment of these five principles 
probably s tar ted much ear l ier . He thinks i t possible that from the 
time that Abü '1-Hudayl became the intellectual leader of the 
Mu c tazili tes in Basra, there existed a group of Muctazilites who 
adhered, at least nominally, to the five pr inciples 3 1 . Before this , i t 
was less clear who was a Muctazilite and who was not. The name 
Muctazilite was more widely applied and was not restr ic ted to those 
who adhered to the five pr inciples 3 2 . 
It is difficult to find out when the five principles were f i r s t 
recorded. It is possible that Abu '1-Hudayl al- 'Allâf (ca. 135/752-
227/641?) discussed them in his KitSb al-hugfé33, although this is 
not indicated in the t i t l e of his book. However, his disciple Hisâm 
al-Fuwa^I (d. before еЗЗУ3"» i s the author of a work entit led βΐ-ΐ/φϋΐ 
al-kams (Flhrlst, 214). A further work, celled al-usul al-kams, is 
mentioned as one of the works of Òa^far b. Harb (177/793-236/850), 
another of Abu '1-Hudayl's disciples iJabaqSt, 73: 10P S . As these 
works are lost , we cannot be certain whether they dealt with the 
same five principles as they had been defined by al-KayySJ. They may 
have dealt with other principles, such as the five principles 
mentioned by the Zaydite al-Qäsim b. Ibrahim (169/785-246/860>3e. He 
is the author of a short text entit led al-UsQl al-Mamsa but, although 
he was heavily influenced by Muctazilite doctrine, only three of the 
five principles conform to the Muctazilite pr inciples 3 7 . 
The five principles are explicitly mentioned by the Muctazilite 
al-Kayyät (ca. 220/835-ca. 300/913) in his Kitâb al-intlsSr in order 
to define the character is t ics of the Muctazila. According to him, 
Mu c tazili tes are those who adhere to the following principles: Unity 
(tawhid), Justice (cacTJ), the Promise and the Threat <al-wacd wa-'l-
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wa^Sd), the Intermediate Position (al-manzila bayn al-manzîlatayrù and 
Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong lal-amr bi-'l-ma*rûf 
wa-'l-nahy can а1-типкагУ*а. Al-Kayyä{ maintains that whoever defends 
all of these five principles i s a Muctazilite and he adds that 
someone who adheres only to the principle of Justice or only to the 
principle of Unity, or even to both, but who rejects the other 
principles, is not a Muctazilite (Intimer, Arabic text 92: 24-93: 5). 
He uses the term "People of Justice" (ahi al-aodl) with respect to 
those who adhere only to the principle of Justice but not to the 
other four principles. He ins is ts that a Muctazilite adheres to a l l of 
the five principles (Intimar, Arabic text , 92: 16-93: 12). From this we 
may conclude that al-Kayyâ^ thinks that adherence to the principle of 
the Intermediate Position alone is not enough for someone to be 
called a Muc tazilite although the standard accounts say that because 
of this very principle cAmr dissociated himself from al-Hasan a l -
Basrï's s tudy-circle . 
Al-Kayyäfs disciple Abu '1-QSsim al-Balk_I al-Ka^bl34" (d. 
319/931) explicitly says that a person who adheres to the principle 
of the Intermediate Position but disagrees with the principles of 
Unity and Justice cannot be called a Muctazilite. He gives the 
example of Çirâr b. cAmr (ca. 110/729-ca. 200/815), who adhered to 
the principle of the Intermediate Position, but differed on other 
subjects. Thus, al-Balfci does not consider him a Mu=tazilite4° (Blkr, 
75: 3-5). 
Al-Balkl emphasizes the principles of Unity and Justice. This can 
be concluded from his statement: "In our days i*tiz8l has become a 
mark (sima) for whoever defends Unity and Justice (.al-tawhld wa-'l-
c
adl) and does not believe in those theses (maqëlSï) that make an end 
to friendship and impose enmity" (Dikr, 75: 2-3). Al-Balkl mentions a l l 
five Muctazllite principles in his MaqälSt, but he pays less at tention 
to adherence to the other three principles. There may be several 
reasons for th is , for instance, his friendly relations with the 
S ï c i t e s . For several years he was secretary to a Zaydite imam who 
supported the Mu c tazill tes in his empire*1. 
It is likely that the Mu'tazil i tes and the S u i t e s could come to 
terms about the principles of Unity and Justice. If they disagreed, i t 
was probably about one or more of the other three pr inciples 4 2 . The 
S u i t e s may have found the Muctazilite principles of the Promise and 
the Threat and of the Intermediate Position difficult to accept 
because of their poli t ical implicationsA3. It might therefore be as a 
resul t of his close relation to the Zeydites that al-Balkl emphasizes 
the principles of Unity and Justice and refers to the Muctazilltes as 
"those who defend Unity and Justice". For the same reason he may have 
stressed that the Muctazilites of his day did not engage in questions 
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that resulted In the Muslim community spl i t t ing into factions which 
fought each other. By s t ress ing this , he also refuted those 
adversaries of the Mu c tazili tes who explained the name Muctazila as 
dissociation from the doctrinal consensus of the Muslim community. 
The unity of God Is something that a l l Muslims agree on. 
What did cAbd al-GabbSr, who belonged to a la ter generation of 
Muc tazili tes than al-Belkl, think about the name Muctazila and the 
five principles? In his works, cAbd al-6abbSr uses both names, People 
of Unity and Justice (.ahi аі-tawhld wa-'l-cad2> and Muctazila, to 
refer to the school he belongs to, In Fadl al-lctizSl wa-fabaqSt al-
MWtazila he mentions the name Muctazila In the t i t l e of the book and 
several times in the text i t se l f (Fadl, 226: 14· and 19, 226: 12, 272: 
16 etc.) but in this work he also uses the name ahi al-tawhSd wa-'l-
c
adl. For instance, he says: 
Know that there i s consensus and agreement among the 
Muctazila on the principles (υφΰϊ); i t is something about 
which no choices are made and no doubt exists, but they 
have different opinions on derivations (furöc) and 
ambiguities (Subah). Now we shall say in a few words which 
principles the People of Unity and Justice (ahi al-tawhld 
wa-'l-cadl) agree on, distinguishing ourselves from the 
adversaries" (Fadl, 346: 5-9). 
Next, he briefly describes the five principles but i t is striking that 
he stops speaking in the f i r s t person and usually refers to the 
Muctazila as "they", although sometimes he does use the personal 
pronoun "we", for instance, in this sentence: "and therefore, we have 
excluded him from belonging to the People of Justice and those who 
adhere to i t " (fa-li-hñda akragnShu min an yak una min ahi al-^adl 
wa-'1-mutamassikSh bi-hD (Fadl, 34Ô: 27-28). He also speaks of "those 
who disagree with us" (alladSha yukSlifOnanff) (Fadl, 350: 16) and 
"this is what our masters say about Unity" (fa-hBdS qawl naàSyiklnS 
fi Ч-tawhId) (Fadl, 347: 21). But then, the edited text of Fadl al-
i'tlzSl wa-fabaqSt al-Mw°tazila ends with these words: 
...and they therefore defended (qSlQ' Ы) the Intermediate 
Position (al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn). We have 
explained that this is one of the things because of which 
they are called (luqqibQ*) Muctazila, since... (Fadl, 350: 
20-21) (The text ends here as, unfortunately, the rest is 
missing from the manuscript>". 
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Probably cAbd al-6abbSr Is referring here to the early Mu=tazilites such 
as =Amr and WSsil and their a$hSb. It Is not certain whether he also uses 
the name Muctazila in reference to himself and his followers. In an 
attempt to clarify this I studied the names he uses in the Mugnl. 
In the Mu¿nl, cAbd al-SabbSr seldom uses the name Muctazila, but he 
usually speaks of "we", without specifying further whom this refers to. The 
name Muctazila i s mentioned in MugnS VI/2, 3: B. Here, cAbd al-ôabbSr 
declares that there is no disagreement among the Muctazilites (.Mu*tazilà) 
about the fact that the will (.irSda) belongs to the attributes ( s i f í í ) of 
God but they disagree with respect to what this will is . The names he 
mentions next make clear who he means by the Muctazilites. He describes 
the opinions on God's will held by Bisr b. al-Muctamir, al-NazzSm, Abu '1-
Hudayl and Gacfar b. Harb. These Muctazilites lived some generations before 
^Abd al-6abbär. 
The name Muctazila i s also mentioned in Mugnl XI, 3: 8. Here, cAbd al-
Gabbar describes different opinions on the appointed time of death 
(agal)**. He mentions the opinions of the determinists (Mugbira), Abu '1-
Hudayl, "the Muctazila", "some (or: one) of them [the Muctazilites]" 
(.bacduhum) and the opinions of his "masters", whom he refers to as 
"âuyûkunff'. It appears that cAbd al-ôabbSr's masters' opinions on this 
subject differ from those held by those who cAbd al-öabbär refers to as 
"the Muctazila". From this i t can be concluded that cAbd al-ôabbSr 
distinguishes between the Muctazila and his masters. 
The use of the name Muctazila In these two passages leads me to 
suppose that by "the Muctazila", cAbd al-ôabbSr meant specifically the 
early Muctazilites. It i s possible that with respect to the later 
Muetazilites, he preferred to use the name "People of Unity and Justice". 
This would also explain why in the previously cited passage from his Fadl 
al-l*tlzSl wa-fabaqät al-Mu*tazila he refers to the Muctazila as "they" and 
to the People of Unity and Justice as "we". 
I suppose that cAbd al-ôabbar and other late Muctazilites preferred 
to refer to themselves as People of Unity and Justice (People of Justice, 
for short) because of the negative associations the name Muctazila had as 
a result of the unfavourable explanations of this name given by their 
adversaries. The enmity between the Muctazilltes and the Tradltlonlsts 
dated from the time before the Mihna*" but the role that Mu=tazilites 
played in the suppression of the Traditionists during the Mihna-period 
<218/833-234/848>А7' must have intensified this enmity and added to the 
negative associations of the name Muctazila. cAbd al-ôabbar's assertion 
that the name Muctazila i s in fact a name of honour may have been 
prompted by the wish to free this name from its negative associations. 
Another reason for cAbd al-öabbSr's preference for the name People of 
Unity and Justice could be that this name could be applied to people who 
were not strict ly Muctazilites according to al-KayySfs definition as, for 
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Instance, S u i t e s . cAbd al-Gabbär's patron, the vizier al-$ahib b. cAbbâd, 
was a Sl^ite who also adhered to much of the Mu^tazilite doctrine. ^Abd 
al-Gabbâr also had S ï c i t e s among his students, such as the Zaydites a l -
Mu'ayyid bi- ' l lah 033/944-411/1020) and Abu Ч-Qasim IsmS'ïl b. Ahmad a l -
Busti, and the ImSmite al-Sarïf al-Murtadä (355/946-436/1044). It i s 
evident that these è ï ' i t e s did not share the Muctazilite opinions on the 
leadership of the Muslim Community. 
If cAbd al-ôabbâr preferred to use the name "People of Unity and Justice" 
for the Mu c tazili tes for the last-mentioned reason, the question ar ises 
whether he considered al l five principles equally important or whether, 
like al-Balkï, he emphasized the f i r s t two principles. In his works, cAbd 
al-Gabbâr speaks about the Muctazilite principles in different ways. He 
mentions the five classical Muctezilite principles by their names in a 
short work called Kitâb a i -usûl al-kamsa, which was probably one of his 
early worksAe. In the introduction to this work, cAbd al-GabbSr refers to 
the five principles as principles of religion (υψΩΙ al-dln): 
There are five principles of religion: Unity ( tawfyld), 
Justice <.cadl), the Promise and the Threat (al-wa^d wa-'l-
wa
cId), the Intermediate Position ial-manzila bayn al-
manzilatayn) and, Commanding the Right and Forbidding the 
Wrong (al-amr bi-'l-ma^ruf wa-'l-nahy "=an al-munkar) (Vsui, 
BO: 13-14). 
cAbd al-Gabbar adds that anyone who disagrees about these principles 
is in great error and may be called an unbeliever or malefactor (wa-
rubbamë kaf ara aw fasaqa bi-gäüka) (£/söJ, 80: 14-16). However, 
although cAbd al-öabbSr mentions a l l of the five classical principles 
in his introduction, at the end of the work he refers only to the 
principles of Unity and Just ice: 
All this is sufficient for someone who wants to be 
informed in short about a l l of Unity and Justice (U$ül, 96: 
IS). 
In another brief work, called al-Muktafar fi ιιφΰΐ al-dlh and written 
by ,:Abd al-Gabbär at the request of al-Çâhib b. cAbbSd in whose 
service he was from 367/977 to 385/995, cAbd al-èabbâr mentions only 
four principles. These are Unity (.tawbld), Justice lcadD, Prophethood 
Cnubuwwât) and the Prescriptions of Religious Law (áara'í^) Шик tacar, 
197). The subjects that traditionally formed the principles of the 
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Promise and the Threat (.al-waed wa-'l-wa^Id), the Intermediate 
Position (here mentioned with the alternative name, Names and 
Judgments ial-asmS' wa-'l-abk&nù) and Commanding the Right and 
Forbidding the Wrong" (аі-ашг bi~'l-macrüf wa-'l-nahy "an al-munkar) 
are discussed here as part of the principle called the Prescriptions 
of Religious Law" Шик tacar, 272-282). 
In the Mugnl, the last part of which was dictated in Rayy, af ter 
al-SShib b. cAbbSd had made cAbd al-Gabbär a chief judge, he mentions 
only two principles: Unity and Justice. The subjects that were 
originally part of the other three principles are discussed in this 
work under the principle of Justice. 
In Fadl al-i'tizSl wa-fabaqat al-Mu'tazila, which dates from a 
late period of cAbd al-ôabbar's life and which was composed at the 
request of the Kwärizm-s5h Abu 'l-cAbbäs Ma"mun (г. 399-407/1008-
1017V19, cAbd al-ÖabbSr again mentions five Muctazilite principles, 
although the las t two principles are not mentioned by their 
tradit ional names. He says: 
We have explained that i^tlzBl means holding (tamassuk) to 
Unity (.tawhld) and Justice i^adï) and what belongs to i t : 
the defence of the Threat (.al-wa'Id), Prophethood 
(nubuwwSt) and the Prescriptions of Religious Law (aarel"1) 
(Fedi, 213: 11-12). 
Although cAbd al-öabbär mentions five Mu=tazilite principles, he 
makes i t clear that in fact Muctazilism is the adherence to two main 
principles: the principle of Unity and the principle of Justice; the 
other three principles can be considered as part of the principle of 
Just ice. 
Assuming that aJ-tfsuJ aJ-Jramsa belongs to cAbd al-óabbàr 's 
early works, we see that at f i r s t he mentions the traditional five 
Muctazilite principles; then, in al- Muk tacar fi υφΰΐ al-dlh he 
mentions four principles: the two principles Unity (.tawfyfd) and 
Justice (*adl) and two other principles: Prophethood (.nubuwwët) and 
Prescriptions of Religious Law (àarS'lc); then, in the Mu¿nl he 
reduces the number of principles to only two: Unity and Just ice, 
discussing the las t three principles of the traditional five 
principles under the principle of Justice. Finally, in Fadl al-i^tlzal 
wa-fabaqSt al-MW'tazila, a historical description of the Muctazila, he 
again mentions five principles, although he refers to two of them 
with different names. 
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Were Mankdlm's and Ibn Mattawayh's opinions with respect to the name 
of Muctazila and the f ive principles the same as ^Abd al-Gabbêr's? 
MSnkdlm, who adhered to Mu*-tazilite doctrine but who was a l so a 
Zaydlte, mentions the name Muctazila when he discusses the imSmate 
in h is Ta-=lTq éarh aJ-uf£3J aJ-¿aasa 11-QSdI '1-qudBt <=Abd al-Ôabbâr. 
This part of the TaclTq in particular makes clear that he does not 
completely identify himself with the Muctazila, because he says: "And 
the Muctazila opposed what we have chosen..." (Tacllq, 756: 13-14). 
When he discusses the subject further, he refers to the Muetazilites 
as "they", using 'Ve" In reference to himself (Ta'ISq, 756: 15-757: 
IS)610. Yet, apart from this, he appears to consider himself as 
belonging to the Muctazilite school, since in the other parts of 
Taellq éarh aJ-usflJ al-kamsa he often refers to Mu^tazilite masters 
like as Abü <=A1I al-ÒubbS'I and Abü Haáim as "our master" 
(àaykunS¥iì. 
MSnkdlm prefers Muctazilite doctrine to be subdivided Into two 
principles: the principle of Unity and the principle of Justice 
(.Ta^lSq, 123: 13-14). However, as his Ta'llq is based on a work by 
cAbd al-ôabbfir that discusses the five classical principles, he keeps 
to these five principles. Because Mânkdîm was a Zaydlte, he may have 
preferred to use the name People of Unity and Justice instead of the 
name Muctazila. However, as we have seen s a , he uses the name People 
of Justice (ahi al-*adD as an alternative name (Ta'llq, 136: 5). It i s 
not clear why he does not mention "Unity". It may have been for 
reasons of brevity: by merely mentioning "Justice" he makes 
sufficiently clear what is characteristic of Muctazilite doctrine as 
opposed to the doctrines of the Ascarites and the Traditionists. 
Ibn Mattawayh, too, uses the name People of Justice (ahJ al-
cadJ) as a synonym for Muctazila. In his work al-Tadklra fi аЬкВш al-
gawShir wa- 'l-acräd, he refers to "some of the Bagdadl's and others 
from the People of Justice (ahi al-*adl>H (Tadkira, 240: 6). As for the 
Muutazilites of his day, he reports that "he [cAbd al-ôabbSrl 
explained that we name ourselves after Justice and Unity, because we 
assert that He, Exalted be He, is One and Just" (Magma*, I, 443: 13). 
With respect to the Muctazilite principles, Ibn Mattawayh 
reports that there are different opinions on the principles that one 
should know: some say that one should know only Unity and Justice, 
the other subjects being included in Justice; others particularize and 
say that one should know Unity, Justice, the Promise and the Threat 
(al-wa^d wa-'l-wa'ïd), the Intermediate Position (al-manzlla bayn al-
manzllatayn), and Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong (al-
amr bi-'l-ma'rdf wa-'l-nahy can al-munkar); a third group says that 
one should know Unity, Justice, Prophethood (mibuwwBï) and, the 
Prescriptions of Religious Law (sarJÏO (Magma* I, 9: 16-23). Ibn 
THE MUCTAZILA AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS 23 
Mattawayh himself is of the opinion that in the f i rs t place one 
should know Unity, so that one knows the a t t r ibutes of God. Knowledge 
of Justice follows from knowledge of His a t t r ibutes . In Ibn 
Mattawayh's opinion, Justice includes Prophethood, the Prescriptions 
of Religious Law, the Threat and the Promise, the Intermediate 
Position, and Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong (MagmQc 
I, 11: 1-13: 6). 
In conclusion, al-Kayyä^ made adherence to the five principles the 
cri terion for being a Muctazilite. However, s t r i c t application of this 
criterion implied that several thinkers, such as some S u i t e s , who 
sympathized with the Muctazlla but who did not adhere to al l of the 
five principles were not considered part of the Muctazila. I think 
this was a reason why the emphasis was la ter placed on the Unity and 
the Just ice. The principle of the Intermediate Position and the other 
two principles were no longer explicitly mentioned, unless for 
his tor ical reasons. 
As for the name Muctazila, the la ter Muctazilites acknowledged 
the accounts on the origins of the Muctazila in which the name 
Muctazila was related to the principle of the Intermediate Position, 
which means that the emphasis is placed on the adherence to this 
principle and not on the adherence to the principles of Unity and 
Just ice. From al-Balkt's time on, the name Muctazila was s t i l l used by 
the Mu c tazil i tes, but i t was used to refer especially to the early 
Mu c tazil i tes. The la te r Muctazilites themselves and outsiders used 
this name for a his tor ical description of the school, as becomes clear 
from cAbd al-ôabbSr's Fadl ai-ictizáU wa-^abaqSt al-Muctazila and the 
books on sec ts by cAbd al-QShir b. TShir al-BagdSdl <d. 429/1037) and 
al-Sahrastfinl (479/1086-548/1153). In reference to themselves, they 
seem to have preferred the al ternative name People of Unity and 
Justice (.ahi al-tawhld wa-'l-'adl), or, People of Justice (.ahi al-"adD, 
for short . The reason for this may be both the emphasis on the 
principles of Unity and Justice and the negative associations of the 
name Muc tazila after the Mihna-perlod. The la ter Muctazilites' 
emphatic declarations that one should be proud of the name Muctazila 
may be an Indication that this name Indeed had a negative connotion. 
3. Schools Within the Muc tazila 
If "school" is understood in the sense of the definition that says 
that a school is "a body or succession of persons who In some 
department of speculation or practice are disciples of the same 
master, or who are united by a similarity of principles and 
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methods"", then the Muctazila can be said to constitute a school, as 
i t s members were united by a similarity of principles. However, 
although the Muc tazilites agreed on certain principles, there were 
many detai ls about which they disagreed5·*. This raises the question 
whether there were schools within the Muctazila. 
In fact, most modern scholars distinguish two schools within the 
Muctazila, the Basra and Bagdad schools'56, while some others have 
distinguished even more than two s e . The classical books about Islamic 
sects also distinguished several Muctazilite schools. Al-éahrastânî 
(479/1086-54β/1153) divided the Muctazila into twelve schools, each 
with i t s own doctrines Œilal I, 46-85), whereas cAbd al-Qahir a l -
Bagdâdï went so far as to distinguish twenty-two Muctazilite schools 
(.Farq, 67). cAbd al-öabbar is said to have belonged to the Basra 
school57 or, more specifically, to the Baháamiyya, the school of Abü 
Häsim (d. 321/933) ε β . Before discussing these schools and their 
adherents, i t will be necessary to f irst define some terms used in 
Mu c tazil ite works in reference to schools. 
The Term Madhab53 
The noun madhab is a derivative of the verb dahaba. In the 
Mu c tazil i te texts the verb dahaba ilä is used to indicate that 
someone held a certain theory, for instance, in the sentence: "wa-
'lladî yaghabu ilayhl auyükunä Abu '1-Hu¿ayl wa-aktar açhâbihi wa-АЬй 
CA1S wa-АЬй HSèim rahimahum AllSh annahu..." (and the opinion held by 
our masters Abu '1-Hud.ayl and most of his companions and Abü cAlï 
and Abu Häsim, may God have mercy upon them, is that...) (Mugnï VI/1, 
128: 2-3). The meaning of madhab, corresponding to this verb, i s 
"opinion". An opinion can be attributed to en individual or to a whole 
group. An example of an opinion attributed to an individual i s found 
in the sentence: "wa-kana madhabuhu madhab Mu^ammar fi af'al aJ-
tabS'i* IS fi 'l-macSnf' (with respect to the acts of "natures", his 
opinion was that of Mu^ammar, but not with respect to the ma*5nS) 
Cfabaqät, 58: 9-10). Madhab in the sense of opinion can also occur in 
the plural , as in the sentence: "wa-a'dal al-madShlb FI ¿Slika huwa 
mS fa$$alahu QBdl '1-qudSt li-annahu yaqûlif (and the most righteous 
of the opinions on i t i s what the Chief Judge [cAbd al-GabbSrl 
presents because he says...) íMa¿müe II , 340: 5) and in the sentence: 
"wa-lahu madahib lam tantaèir li-qillat IktilStihl bl-'l-^Smma" (and 
he [Tumäma] held opinions that were not spread because of his 
Infrequent intercourse with the common people) (Fadl, 275: 2). 
Madhab can also mean the whole body of someone's opinions. When 
used in th is sense i t means "doctrine", as in the sentence: "wa-huwa 
min al-tabieSn li-maghab Abl "=A1S aJ-auiacassiWh Ialiti' (and he 
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belonged to the followers of the doctrine of Abu cAlï [el-Gubbâ'î]) 
(TabaqSt, 98: 5). Another way to express adherence to someone else 's 
doctrine is to say dahabe madhabahu, as in the sentence: "капа 
yadhabu madhab MWammar" (he adhered to the doctrine of Mu'amnar) 
(Fadl, 267: 12). When madhab is used in this sense, i t may come very 
close to the meaning of "school", as in the t i t l e that al-Balki gives 
to his section on the principal Mu ctazilite scholars: nwa~arbab al-
madShib minhum wo-mu'allifO Ч-kutub..." (and masters of schools [or 
opinions] among them [the Mu c tazilites] and authors of books are...) 
(Dikr, 64: 15). 
When madhab is used in the sense of a set of opinions shared by 
a group of people, i t means "school". Al-Hâkim al-öusamï (413/1022-
494/1100) says about Abu Rasld al-NïsSbürï: "wa-kSna Bagdad! al-
madhab", which can be translated as: "his doctrine was that of the 
Bagdad Mu^tazila" (he belonged to the school of Bagdad) (§arb al-
с
иуйп, 382: 10). The same expression is used by Ibn al-Murtada 
(764/1363-840/1437) (JabaqSt, 116: 3). He also uses the term madhab, 
in the sense of school, when he says of Abu Ί-Qäsim al-Balkï: "He is 
reckoned among the Mu' ;tazilites of Bagdad (Mu^tazilat Bagdad), 
because of his study with Abü '1-Husayn al-Kayyä^ and his support 
for the school/doctrine of the Bagdädls (madhab al-Ba$dädiyyIrun 
(JabaqSt, 88: 6-7). 
The term farfqa may occur as a synonym for madhab in the sense 
of a set of opinions or doctrines, for instance, in al-óuaamï's report 
about AbO '1-QSsim al-Sïrâfï : "he, however, followed the doctrine 
(.kâna calë tarïqaï) of the Iksîdiyya s o , but Abu Ishäq [b. cAyyâ§] 
persuaded him to drop that doctrine (\arlqa~) and to adopt the 
doctrine (fariqa) of our colleagues (afhab.yeì (èarfy al-cuyûn, 328: 
14-15). 
The Term Sayk 
The term èayk can mean "teacher". Ibn al-Murtada says of AbO ^All a l -
éubbS'I: "wa-käna èaykuhu Abé Ya^qüb al-Sahhëm" (and his èayk was 
Abu Yacq0b al-Sahham) (Jabaqët, 80: 5-6). Al-Sahhäm was a teacher of 
AbO cAli as can be concluded from what cAbd al-ôabbSr says: "wa-
c
anhu akada Ч-èayt Abu СА1Г (and èayk AbO cAlï studied with him 
[al-Sahhäml) (Fadl, 280: 13). For "teacher" the word ustSd is used as 
well, for instance in the sentence: wa-kSna AbO CA1S yufaddilu '1-
Balkl calS ustSdihl АЫ 'l-^usayri' (and AbO CA1I [al-ÖubbS'ï] favoured 
al-Balki above his [al-Balkl's] teacher AbO Ί-Husayn [al-KayySf] 
(JabaqSt, 85: 13-14). 
When cAbd al-Öabbär refers to Abu САИ al-Ôubbfi'ï, AbO Hâsim, 
and his own teachers Abu Ishäq b. cAyyäs and Abu cAbdallSh al-Basri 
26 CHAPTER ONE 
in the Mugnl, he almost always pref ixes to their names the t i t l e 
ÈaykunS (our аауЮ. Abü '1-Hudayl i s not frequently mentioned by him, 
but when he does, he usual ly pref ixes the t i t l e èaykunS to his name, 
too (see , for instance, Mugnl IV, 319: 19; Mugnl VI/2, 4: 6, 13 and 
337: 7), although sometimes i t i s found without this t i t l e (.Mugnl XI, 
3: 6 and 9: 3) . However, when cAbd al-ôabbSr refers to other 
Muctazi l i tes such as Bisr b. al-Muctamir, öa c far a l -Iskâf ï , al-Nazzäm, 
and a l -ö8hiz , he g ive s their names without the t i t l e éayJçunS ( see , 
for instance, Mugnï VI/1, 127 and 128, Mugnï VI/2, 3 - 5 , Mugnï IX, 109, 
Mugnï XI, 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 , Mugnï XII, 47, 235 and 306, Mugnï XV, 392, Mugnï 
XX/2, 73 and 80). By g iv ing the t i t l e èaykunS to some Muctazil ites 
and not g iv ing i t to o thers , cAbd al-ôabbSr seems to indicate that he 
respects certain Mu c taz i l i t e thinkers more than others. It may 
indicate that he ident i f i ed himself more with their doctrines than 
with the doctr ines of other Mu c taz i l i tes . One might suppose that cAbd 
al-öabbar only referred to the masters of the Basra Mu^tazila as 
èaykunS, but th i s i s contradicted by his use of this t i t l e to refer to 
Abu 'l-Q&sim al-Belkï , a Bagdad Mu c taz i l l te , who i s sometimes 
mentioned with the t i t l e èaykunS (see, for instance, Mugnl VIII, 4: 1, 
Mugnl XIV, 61 : 9, Mugnï XX/2, 176: 3 and 184: 3) and sometimes 
without i t (for instance: Mugnï XI, 3: 3 , 310: 5, Mugnï XII, 25: 3 and 
41: 3) . Evidently the term èayk i s not used here in the sense of 
teacher, but as an express ion of respect . 
The t i t l e of èayk. as an expression of respect can also be found 
in the way in which cAbd al-öabbSr addressed his disc iple Abu Rasïd 
al-Nïsâburï. When Abu Rasïd became a member of cAbd al-öabbSr's 
s t u d y - c i r c l e , he was already a respected Muctazilite master and an 
author of books (Sarfy al-cuy0n, 382: 10). It i s reported that he was 
the only d i s c i p l e addressed by cAbd al-ôabbâr with the t i t l e èayk. 
(Jabaqât, 116: 8, Sarfy al-cuyOn, 382: 13). 
In the Mugnï, cAbd al-ôabbSr also uses the plural forms 
èuyukunS maëS'ijtunS as an expression of respect when he re fers to 
Mu c taz i l i te m a s t e r s « . (See, for instance, Mugnl VI/2, 145: 16, 346: 5 
and 347: 10, Fatfl, 320: 17). He uses this term not only to refer to 
Abu c Alï , Abu Hfisim and the other Basra Muctazi l i tes , but a l so to 
refer to Mu c taz i l i t e masters who belonged to the Bagdad i ' 
Mu c taz i l i t e s . This becomes c lear from the following sentences: "fa-
ammS aktar al-Ba¿dSdiyyIn min ëuyQkinS fa-iimahum..." (most of the 
Bagdâdls of our masters...) (Mugnl XX/2, 120: 8), mwa-amaS 4-katur min 
èuyOkina al-Ba¿dBdiyySn wa-¿ayruhum fa-innahum yaqQlOna..." (and most 
of our Bagdad! masters and others say...) (Mugnf XX/1, 216: 7). These 
terms cannot be taken here in the sense of teachers, because cAbd 
al-öabb&r himself did not belong to the Bagdad school. 
The expressions èaykunS and SuyQ&unS are also used by MBnkdlm 
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and Ibn Mattawayh. However, there is a difference between cAbd al-
6abbär and his disciples Mankdlm and Ibn Mattawayh with respect to 
how frequently they use the t i t le èaykunS. cAbd al-GabbSr almost 
always prefixes this t i t le to the names of the masters of his school, 
but MSnkdïm uses this t i t le less frequently and Ibn Mattawayh hardly 
uses it at al l . When Mankdlm refers to Basra Muctazilites, such as 
Abu CA1I, Abu Hasim, Abu 'Abdallah and Ishëq b. eAyyas, he sometimes 
uses the t i t l e SaykunS, but half the time he omits the t i t le . When he 
refers to 'Abd al-öabbär, he never uses the t i t le Sayjiunä, but refers 
to him as "the Chief Judge" (qStfl '2-çuçWO. 
Ibn Mattawayh usually leaves out the t i t le SaykunS whenever he 
mentions the names of Muctazilitese 3 . Like Mankdlm, he refers to cAbd 
al-öabbär as "the Chief Judge" and never combines this with Sayk_una. 
However, when he refers to Abu cAbdallSh al-Basrl, he usually adds 
the t i t le al-Sayk (and not SaykunS) to his name (Magmü* I, 121: 15, 
Magma* II, 86: 1, Magma* II, 365: U) . This may be because it was 
customary to speak of al-Sayk Abu 'Abdallah, perhaps in order to 
distinguish him from al-Sayyid Abu cAbdallSh <d. 360/970Г5"*, who was 
one of his students. 
Although 'Abd al-6abbir, Mfinkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh use the 
t i t le SaykunS as an expression of respect, it should not be concluded 
that Mankdlm's and Ibn Mattawayh's omission of these t i t les Indicates 
a lack of respect. cAbd al-öabbär may have used the t i t le SaykunS 
more consistently for personal reasons. While dictating the MugnS, he 
may have considered i t important to express his respect for his 
masters because of certain people In his audience, whereas Mankdlm 
and Ibn Mattawayh may have found this less important. 
If there is talk of the Sayk of a group it can mean the "leader" 
of this group. For example, Ibn al-Murtada says about 'Abd al-öabb8r: 
uwa-ilayhi in taha t al-riySsa f I '1-Muc tazila batte s&ra SaykahS' (and 
later he got the leadership of the Muctazilites, so that he became 
their leader) IfabaqSt, 112: 10-11). This does not mean that Abd al-
öabbär was a political leader. If Sayk. is used in the of leader of a 
group it i s a synonym for raTs. The terms ra'Ss and riySsa, when used 
with respect to scholarship, imply that a certain scholar was 
considered to be the top man among his colleagues, the primus inter 
pares. The term ra'Ts thus entails notions of excellence and 
superiority*«5. When Ibn al-Murtada says of Bisr b. al-Mu=tamir: "He 
was the leader (raTs) among the Mu'tazilites of Bagdad", he means 
that he was the most important scholar among them (.JabaqSt, 52: 7)* e . 
'Abd al-öebbSr uses yet another term for "leader": in his report 
about Bisr b. al-Muctamir, he says that Bier was "the zacim (leader) 
of the Bagdädls among the Muctazila" (Façfi, 265: 9). 
In conclusion, the term Sayk. can mean "teacher" in the l iteral 
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sense, i t can be used as as an expression of respect, and i t can mean 
"master" in the sense of "the most important". 
The Term AshSb 
In the Muc tazilite texts the term sabJi* can be found in i t s plural 
form ashSb in combination with a substantive, for instance, in the 
expressions: açhëb al-^ifât (Intimer, 50), açhâb al-tanësuk (.Mugnï 
XIII, 226: 15) and a$h8b al-nugûm (.TaclSq, 121: 8). These expressions 
refer to groups of people who adhered to specific doctrines 
concerning the a t t r ibu tes of God (.çlfât), the transmigration of souls 
(tanäsuk), and the celes t ia l bodies (.nugum), respectively. 
The term açhëb is also found in combination with a proper name, 
for example in the expressions: a$ha~b АЫ '1-Hudayl (.Dikr, 73: 20), 
a^hâb Wâsil (.Fadl, 252: 8) and açhab Abï -АИ (.fabaqët, 101: 3). The 
question i s , whom does açhëb refer to in this connection? Makdisi" 
came to the conclusion that the a$häb of a certain master were his 
special s tudents who had studied with him on a steady basis and who 
had proceeded to a certain degree in their study; students who had 
only occasionally studied with him would not be counted among his 
a$hSb. 
The term açhëb in the sense of special students is also found 
in al-Gusamï's êarh al-'uyûn. Al-ôuàamï introduces the twelfth 
generation of Muc tazilites as follows: "They are the a$h5b of the 
Chief Judge Abu '1-Hasen tcAbd al-öabbärl and those who studied with 
him iqara'u' calayhl) and with the learned speculative theologians 
(.'ulama' al-mutakallimîn) of his generation" (.¿arh al-'uyün, 362: 5-6). 
We see that al-ôusamï mentions the açhâb of cAbd al-ôabbâr 
separately, which means that he makes a distinction between a$hib and 
other s tudents . By the açhëb of cAbd al-ôabbâr al-Ôusaml cannot have 
meant Muctazilites of ^Abd al-ôabbâr 's own generation because he 
arranged the biographies of Muctezilites according to their 
generations: he gives the biographies of cAbd al-GabbSr and his 
colleagues in one chapter (fabaqa) and the biographies of their 
students in the following chapter (.fabeqa). If, by a$h5b, al-ôusamï 
had meant cAbd al-ôabbâr's colleagues he would have placed them in 
the same chapter as cAbd al-ôabbSr himself and not in the following 
chapter. The same reasoning applies when cAbd al-GabbSr and Ibn al-
MurtadS refer to the açhëb of other Muctazilite masters in their 
biographical works. They mention a part icular master's a$h5b among 
the generation of Mu c tari l i tes that came after that master's own 
generat ion e e . 
Whet qualified students for consideration as a particular 
master's açhëb? We may learn this from what is said about cAbd a l -
THE MUCTAZILA AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS 29 
Gabbär 's ashëb. Some of 'Abd a l -Gabbâr ' s s t u d e n t s a r e e x p l i c i t l y 
mentioned by al-Gusamï as belonging to h i s ashëb. One of t he se 
s t u d e n t s was Abu Raèîd a l -Nî sâbur ï who r epor t ed ly became one of ^Abd 
a l -Gabbär ' s ashëb when he was a l ready a d i s t i ngu i shed scholar and had 
taught h i s own c i r c l e of s t u d e n t s in NïsâbQr (éarh al-'иуйп, 382: 6-
16). Another s p e c i a l s t u d e n t was al-Labbad, descr ibed as one of the 
s e n i o r ashëb (.min mutaqaddimî ashëbihï) and as cAbd a l - ö a b b ä r ' s 
S u b s t i t u t e in teaching (Sari? а1-*иуйп, 383: 6-9). Another s t u d e n t who 
r e p o r t e d l y belonged t o =Abd a l -Gabbär ' s ashëb was the Imâmite a l -
Sar i f a l -Mur tadä , who s tud ied with him in Bagdad where 'Abd a l -
Gabbâr sojourned a f t e r having r e tu rned from the pi lgr image (ëarh al-
•=uyCn, 383 : 10-12) . Abu Ч-QSsim a l - B u s t ï , who acted as ^Abd a l -
ôabbâr ' s s u b s t i t u t e in answering ques t ions and d iscussed with a l -
Bâqi l lânï in h i s p lace , was a l so one of ^Abd a l -öabbä r ' s ashëb (.sarti 
al-cuyün, 365: 14-386: З ^ 3 . Abu Ibrahim I s m a c I l , about whom no o t h e r 
information i s a v a i l a b l e , i s a l s o sa id to have belonged to cAbd a l -
Gabbär's s e n i o r ashëb (Sarti al-^uyOn, 390: 6) . From what al-Gusaml 
says i t becomes c lea r t ha t cAbd a l -Gabbär ' s ashëb had obtained a high 
l eve l of l ea rn ing and could t he re fo re ac t as s u b s t i t u t e s for him and 
take over some of h i s t a s k s . They can hardly be seen as h i s s t u d e n t s : 
they were , r a t h e r , h i s a s s i s t a n t s . 
Although probably not a l l ashäb became the i r m a s t e r s ' 
a s s i s t a n t s , they a l l seem to have f inished t h e i r theo logica l 
educa t ion . They s t ayed with t h e i r mas t e r s for a long period of time 
in o rder to p e r f e c t t h e i r knowledge, and so became known as t h e i r 
m a s t e r s ' ashëb. In the b iograph ica l works i t i s sometimes sa id tha t a 
c e r t a i n person was "ascr ibed" (nusiba) to a ce r t a in master 7 - 0 . Some 
mas te r s were proud when i t became known tha t a famous person was 
one of t h e i r ashëb. Sometimes, they would pay spec ia l a t t e n t i o n to 
p a r t i c u l a r s t u d e n t s to ensure tha t they became t h e i r ashëb. I t i s 
r e p o r t e d t ha t cAbd a l -Gabbär ' s teacher Abu "^Abdallah a l - B a s r ï used to 
v i s i t the h igh -born a l -Sayyid Abu Tâl ib , d i c t a t i n g to him and 
r e p e a t i n g those l e s s o n s t ha t he had given to h i s s t u d e n t s . According 
to a l -Gusamî one of the reasons why Abu cAbdallSh paid so much 
a t t e n t i o n to Abu J ä l i b was tha t he wanted him to be ascr ibed to him 
as one of h i s ashëb (Serb al-^uyun, 372: 16-19). Another example of 
the p r ide a mas te r f e l t in counting an exce l len t man among h is ashëb 
i s found in a r e p o r t about al-KayyS^, the master of AbD Ί-Qäsim a l -
Balkï. Al-Kayyät did not want Abu Ί-Qâsim to v i s i t Abu c Al ï a l -
èubbS'ï on h i s r e t u r n to Kurasän because he was a f ra id tha t a l -Ba lk i 
might be a sc r ibed to Abu CAH r a t h e r than to him (Fedi, 296: 15-297: 
2 and JabaqSt, 67: 19-88 : 2). 
The number of ashëb was a l so a mat te r of p r ide for a mas te r . 
Specia l mention i s sometimes made of the number of someone's ashëb, 
30 CHAPTER ONE 
as in the sentence: "Al-ZubayrI had many a$bBb In Isfahan" CfabaqSt, 
104: 2-3). I t appears that açbSb did not always stay with their 
master. They might go to live in another place and from there 
maintain the relat ion with their master, visit ing him from time to 
time, like al-Ramhurmuzï, one of Abu CA1I al-ôubba'I's a$bSb, who 
travelled several times from Rämhurmuz to cAskar Mukram and visited 
Abu -All (FaçU, 312: 14 and JabaqSt, 98: 6-7). 
It i s obvious that belonging to the a$hSb of a certain master 
implied adherence to his doctrine, at least in general terms. 
Sometimes, a person changed from one master to another. This is 
reported of cAlï al-Aswarï who belonged to the achat of Abu '1-Hudayl 
but who went over ilntaqala^ to al-Nazzâm (Dikr, 73: 20 and fabaqat, 
72: 11-12). This change probably implied that al-Aswärl dropped Abu 
'l-Hudayl's doctrine and began to follow al-Naz2äm*s doctrine. 
The assumption that a master's a$b5b followed his doctrine is 
supported by the way al-As carï speaks of differences of opinion 
among Mu^tazilite groups with respect to certain doctrinal questions. 
He mentions, for instance, five Muctazilite subdivisions, each of 
which had a different opinion with respect to one of the a t t r ibutes 
of God and he refers to these subdivisions7 ' as: açbSb Abi '1-Hudayl, 
eçbSb Bisr b. al-Mu^tamir, açhBb АЫ Musa al-Mirdäd, açbBb al-NazzSm 
and açbSb éa ' f a r b. Harb íMaqSISt, 189-191). This indicates that the 
term a$ba~b was also used with respect to the followers or disciples 
of a certain master in the sense that they adhered to that master's 
doctrine. 
When referring to a group that adheres to the doctrine of a 
part icular master, al-As carI does not always use the term a$häb, 
using Instead the feminine abstract of the adjectival form derived 
from the name of this master, such as "al-Nazzfimiyya" instead of 
açhSb al-Naççam (.MaqSlät, 604: 9). Names of groups of adherents that 
are derived from personal names are also used by al-èahrastSnï. The 
explanation he gives after each name makes clear that by using these 
derived names he does indeed mean the a$ba~b of a particular master, 
such as: "al-ôubbS'iyya wa-'l-Bahsamiyya: a$b&b Abî CA1I Muhammad b. 
eAbd al-WahhSb al-óubbS'I wa-'bnihi Abl H&sim cAbd al-Saläm" (Mllal 1, 
78: 13-79: 1У 2 . The Mu c tazil i tes themselves also used these derived 
names in reference to the a$hSb of a particular person. cAbd al-
oabbär reports of Gaylän: "He had many a$b&b in the d i s t r i c t s of 
Syria. They were called the Gaylâniyya" (façfJ, 230: 7-8). 
In al-öusamï's report on Abu 'l-QSsim al-Sîrfifi, cited ear l ier , 
we find an indication that a$b&b can refer to the adherents to a 
part icular doctrine. Al-öusamI says: "but Abu Ishäq tb. ^AyySsl 
persuaded him [AbO Ί-Qasim] to drop that doctrine [the doctrine of 
the Ik_sïdiyyal and to adopt the doctrine of our a$bSb" (èarh а1-аиуйп. 
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328: 14). A$b.Sb in the sense of "adherents to a particular doctrine" 
also occurs in al-ôusamî's report on *=Abd al-ôabbSr: "He t=Abd al-
öabbSrl is considered to belong to the Muctazila of Basra, to the 
a$häb of Abu H&sim, because of his support (nuçra) for his doctrine 
(jnadftao)." iFadl, 365: 5-6). As Abu Häsim died in 321/933, and cAbd 
al-uabbär was probably born between 320/932 and 325/937, he cannot 
have been one of the graduate students and scholars that stayed with 
Abu Häsim in order to complete their knowledge. So, in this report, 
açhSb means "adherents to a master's doctrine". 
A?hSb can also refer to those who adhered to Muctazilite 
doctrine in general. If used in this sense by a Muctazilite, i t 
acquires the meaning of "colleagues", as, for instance, in cAbd al-
éabbSr's account: 
We now mention those of our a$h&b who are considered to 
belong to the people of law (fiqh) and b,adlt. Perhaps the 
most excellent persons among them or most of them belong 
to our a$h8b. We mention this, because those adversaries 
speak evil about the small number of our a$häb and about 
their being different from the people of law and h.adl± 
(.Fadl, 334: 3-5). 
It is obvious that in this passage, cAbd al-òabbfir refers to 
Muctazilltes in general. Mänkdim, too, means Muctazilltes in general 
when he speaks of "the Bagd&dls among our açÇëb" (Taclïq, 134: 1, 
453: 19, 644: 10 and 690: 2). 
Apart from the explanations already mentioned, a$h5b can also occur 
in the more common sense of "comrade", for instance, in the passage 
where Ibn al-MurtadS speaks about three men from Kur6san who came 
to study with AbO =A1I al-ôubbS'I. Ibn al-Murtada says of one of 
these men: "He followed the path of his two comrades (.çSJflbayhl) with 
respect to Justice and Unity" (.fabaqSt, 101: 11). Thus, one can 
conclude that the meaning of the term açhëb varies according to the 
context in which i t is used. The term can mean graduate students and 
scholars who stay with a particular master in order to perfect their 
knowledge or, more generally, adherents to the doctrine of a 
particular master. In these cases a$hSb can be translated as 
"disciples". The term a^hSb is also used in the sense of adherents to 
a particular doctrine, but it can also mean someone's colleagues or 
comrades. 
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4. Schools Within the Basra Mu°tazila 
When in Mu l~tazil i te t e x t s mention i s made of the M u c t a z i l i t e s of 
Basra and the Mu-=tazilites of Bagdad, i t i s not always c lea r what i s 
being r e f e r r e d to . Sometimes i t seems to be only a geographica l 
ind ica t ion . Abu '1-Husayn al-Kayyät (ca. 220 /835-ca . 300/913) , for 
i n s t ance , speaks of the Bagdad Muctaz i l i t es (MWtazllat Bagdad), but 
he doss not r e f e r to them as a Mu^taz i l i te school shar ing s p e c i f i c 
opinions which a r e d i f f e r e n t from those of o the r M u c t a z i l i t e s . Rather , 
he r e f e r s to them as Muc taz i l i t e s l iv ing in Bagdad (Intimer, Arabic 
tex t 73: 2, 16, 76: 17 and 107: 184. ц
о г
 does he r e f e r t o the 
Mu c tazil i tes» of Basra as a group with shared opinions. In o t h e r 
i n s t a n c e s i t i s obvious t h a t M u c t a z i l i t e schools are meant, as 
opinions held by the M u c t a z i l i t e s of Basra a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 
those held by t h e Mu'-tazi l i tes of Bagdad or o t h e r M u c t a z i l i t e s . For 
i n s t a n c e , a l - N ä s i ' al-Akbar <d. 293/905), a contemporary of аІ-Каууа^, 
refers to the Bagdad Muctazilites (al-Mwtazila al-Bagdädiyyün/ al-
Bagdädiyyun min al-Mu^tazilá) as distinct from other Muctazilites 
because of certain opinions that they shared (MasS'il al-iiaäma, Arabic 
text, 8&: 7, 96: 6 and 97: 16)''~. 
Apart from distinguishing the opinions of the Mu'-tazllites of 
Bagdad and Basra, the opinions of the disciples of a part icular 
master are sometimes also distinguished in Mu'~tazilite tex ts . 
Adhering to the doctrines of their masters, these disciples shared 
belief in specific doctrines, so that they can be seen as forming 
schools within the Bagdad or Basra Muctazila7*, or even completely 
separate schools. For instance, аІ-Каууа^ speaks of "Ibrahim ta l-
Nazzâm] and his disciples" (ashSbuhu) (Intimar, Arabic text, 59: 7 and 
95: 15) and "Bisr b. al-Muctamir and his disciples (asfySbuhu)." 
(Intimar, Arabic text , 59: 7). These disciples followed the opinions of 
al-Nazzâm and Bisr respectively, forming schools that were named 
after these masters. An indication of this is the expression: "a 
Nazzâmite Muctazilite" (Mu'tazill NazzSmI) (IntisSr, Arabic text , 107: 
15). 
As for schools within the Basra Muctazila, al-NSsi' al-Akbar 
distinguishes the opinions of Abu '1-Hudayl "and those who adhere to 
his doctrines" (Abu '1-Hudayl wa-man qSla bi-qawlihî) (MasS'il al-
lmama, Arabic text , 92: 19) from the opinions held by the disciples of 
al-FuwaJi (asbeb al-Fuwa^T) (MasS'il al-lmSma, Arabic text, 99: 14). 
Both Abu '1-Hud.ayl and al-Fuwa^i were Muctazilites of Basra. This is 
an indication that the Mu^tazila was not only subdivided into the 
schools of Basra and Bagdad, but that these schools were themselves 
sometimes subdivided In schools consisting of adherents to the 
doctrine of a part icular master. It is possible that at different 
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times one school dominated the other schools within the Bagdad or 
Basra school, so that the doctrine of the dominant school was 
considered the doctrine of the whole Bagdad or Basra school. 
The conclusion that there may have been schools within the 
Basra Muctazila raises the question of whether 'Abd al-óabbSr and 
his disciples MSnkdlm and Ibn Mattaweyh belonged to such a school. 
5. The Chain of Transmission of Muctazilism 
An indication that ^Abd al-Gabb&r belonged to the Basra Muctazila 
and, in part icular , to a particular school within the Basra Muctazila, 
can be found in his account of the way in which Muc tazilite 
knowledge was transmitted from master to master. In his account, he 
describes a chain (sanad) of authori t ies who transmitted the 
knowledge from one authority to another. The chain only mentions 
Basra Mu e tazil i tes, among them the teachers of cAbd al-öabbSr 
himself. This makes i t clear that cAbd al-öabbSr considered himself a 
member of the Basra-school. 
cAbd al-ôabbâr is not the f i r s t Muctazilite to mention a chain 
of transmission of Muctazilite knowledge. His teacher Abü IshSq b. 
cAyyas also said that the knowledge of the Muctazila was passed down 
by a chain of transmission and he s t a r t s his chain with WSsil and 
cAmr (fabaqat, 5: 11-12). However, i t is reported that AbQ '1-Hudayl 
described a chain of transmission that s tar ted with the Prophet. In 
fact, he le t i t s t a r t with God, as he declared that the Prophet 
learned the doctrine of "Justice and Unity" from the angel Gabriel, 
who brought i t down from God. This means that Abü '1-Hudayl gave 
Muc tazilite knowledge a place that is almost equal to the Qur'Sn. The 
next author i t ies mentioned by him in his chain are: cAlï b. АЫ TSlib, 
Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya, WSsil and cUtmân al-Jawîl . Abu '1-Hudayl 
says that he himself acquired Muctazilite knowledge from cUtm5n a l -
Tawll (.Flhrist, 202). 
These chains of transmission were probably composed with the 
intention of strengthening the legitimacy of Muctazilism against i t s 
opponents. Considering the place given to CAH, i t reminds us of the 
5 ï c i t e chains of imams and the Sufis' spi r i tual chains which indicate 
how esoteric wisdom was transmitted from Muhammad to the l a te r 
Süfïs through ^All b. АЫ TSlib and his descendants. Obviously, the 
Muctazilite chains of transmission reflect l i t t l e historical t ruth, 
especially with respect to the f i rs t authorit ies in the chain. 
It is likely that cAbd al-Gabb6r adopted the names of the f i r s t 
author i t ies in his chain from Abu 'l-Hudayl's chain as he, too, s t a r t s 
the chain with Muhammad. He probably chose the names of the l a t e r 
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author i t ies himself. Each name mentioned in the chain corresponds to 
one generation tfabaqa) of Mu c tazi l i tes in cAbd al-óabbSr's Fa<fl al-
i^tizSl wa-fabaqSt al-Mu*tazUa7B. cAbd al-ôabbSr gave numbers to the 
generations in h is work. Keeping to these numbers, the following 
chain of transmission can be constructed: 
- Muhammad 
1. c Al ï b. Abi TSlib 
2. Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya 
3 . Abu HfiSim b. Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya 
4. Wâsil b. С А Ц ' and cAmr 
5. <=UtmSn al-TawIl 
6. Abu '1-Hudayl 
7. The d i s c i p l e s (açhSb) of Abu '1-Hudayl of whom, according to cAbd 
al-Gabbfir, the most prominent was Abu Yacqüb al-èaljhSm 
β. Abu «=ЛИ [al-Öubbä'H 
9. Abu Hfisim 
10. A group of prominent d i sc ip les of Abu Hfisim, such as Abu CA1I b. 
KallSd, al-Sayjt Abu cAbdallfih al-Basrl and others <Fa<ii, 164: 16-25) 
The f i r s t authority mentioned by cAbd al-Gabbär in the chain i s 
the Prophet, who i s said to have transmitted the knowledge to CA1I b. 
AM TSlib, so that Was i l and cAmr gained their knowledge through 
'Al l ' s family iFaçll, 164: 16-25). Abu cAmr b. АЫ «=Utmän JÇSlid a l -
Xawll i s mentioned as the person who received this knowledge from 
Wfisil (d. 131/746) and cAmr b. <=Ubayd (d. 144/761). He was a d i sc ip le 
of Wfisil, who sent him to Armenia as a missionary for the Muctazila 
iDikr, 67: 8 -10 , FaçU, 251: 4 - 5 , and JabaqSt, 42: 2 -3 ) . L i t t l e i s known 
about him, except for some anecdotes, but AbO '1-Hudayl mentions him 
as h i s t eacher T e . 
The s i x t h authority In the chain i s Abü '1-Hudayl Muhammad b. 
al-Hudayl a l - c Al lS f al-=Abdï <ca. 135/752 - between 226/Ô40 and 
236/850У"7. He was an important theologian. Abu e Al ï al-öubbfi'I 
showed great respect for him, declaring that speculat ive theology 
(.kalSm) began with Abu «1-Huâayl7· (FadJ, 258: 17). 
According to eAbd al-ôabbfir, Abu '1-Hu¿ayl transmitted h is 
knowledge to several d i sc ip les of whom al-SahhSm was the most 
prominent. However, cAbd al-ôabbfir may have mentioned al-Sahh&m as 
the most prominent among them in order to defend h i s assert ion that 
he i s the link between AbO Hud_ayl and Abu "All a l - ö u b b S T » . Abu 
Ya'qOb Yüsuf Ь. ^Abdallah al-5ahhfimeo (ca. 184/800-257/871 ?) does 
not seem to have been an important theologian. Nor was he a prol i f ic 
writer: Ibn al-Nadlm does not mention any work by him (Fihrlst, 220). 
cAbd al-ôabbfir only mentions a commentary on the Qur'Sn by him (FaçU, 
280: 12-13) . Yet, al-èahhfim seems to have been the teacher who gave 
AbO CA1I al-ôubbfi'ï most of h is Mu ctazil ite instruction, s ince no 
THE MUCTAZILA AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS 35 
other Muctazilite teachers of Abu CA1I are known. 
The next authority in the chain is Abu CA1I Muhammad b. cAbd 
al-WahhSb al-ÔubbS'I01. He was born in èubb8 in KüzistSn in 235/649. 
In about 257/871, after al-Sahham had died, he left Basra and went to 
Bagdad but later took up residence in cAskar Mukram in Kuzistan612. In 
о mosque in cAskar Mukram Abu cAlï held public sessions in which he 
taught Muctazilite doctrine. These sessions were open to everybody 
who wanted to ask him questions*3. Abu CA1I also held classes in 
which he taught his special students6·*. His two most famous students 
were his son, Abu Häsim, and Abu Ί-Hasan al-As^arl (260/873-
324/935). Al-As^arl stayed with him for a long period, but when he 
was about forty years old, he abandoned Muctazilism and converted to 
a more traditionalist doctrine. This was the beginning of Ascarism, 
which in later times became a serious rival for Muctazilism. In 
304/915, only a few years after al-AscarI's conversion, Abu CA1I died. 
When Abu CA1I died, his son Abu HSsim eAbd al-Salam b. Muhammad 
b. cAbd al-Wahhab al-öubbS'ï, was only twenty-five years old, 
assuming for the moment that Abu HSsim was born in 277/890. However, 
some biographers mention the year 247/661 as the date of Abü Haáim's 
birth, which means that he was fifty-four years old when his father 
died. This would imply that his father was only thirteen years old at 
his birth0*. As this i s unlikely, it can be concluded that the later 
date of 277/890 i s the correct one. Further evidence in favour of 
this later date is the fact that cAbd al-ôabbSr apologizes in Fa<fl 
al-ictlzSl for mentioning Abü HSsim as the first of the ninth 
generation, the generation of Abü cAlI's disciples. He admits that 
considering his age, he should be mentioned later IFatfl, 304: 5; 
fabaqSt, 94: 3). It can be deduced from this that Abü HSsim was 
younger than most of the disciples of Abu 'All. Abu HSsim seems to 
have spent most of his l i fe in cAskar Mukram and Basraee. However, in 
314/926 he took up residence in Bagdad (Fihrist, 111) and died there 
in 321/933. 
After Abu Häsim, the next authorities in the chain mentioned by 
cAbd al-ôabbSr are Abu HSSim's disciples. Of these disciples, cAbd al-
éabbâr only mentions Abü CA1I b. KallSd and Abu cAbdallSh al-Basrl, 
thus distinguishing these two disciples from the other disciples. At 
this point, cAbd al-ôabbâr's chain of transmission stops, but Ibn al-
MurtadS describes a chain of transmission that continues further and 
includes cAbd al-ôabbSr himself. This chain will be discussed la ter e r . 
The chain of transmission described by cAbd al-éabbSr not only shows 
that he considered himself as belonging to the Basra school, but i t 
also indicates which school within the Basra Muctazila he belonged 
to. In this respect i t is significant that Abü HSáim is named as the 
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authority who received the knowledge from Abu 'All because he was 
not accepted by a l l of Abü cAlï 's a$häb as his successor. After Abu 
•"All's death, his adherents divided into two schools that both claimed 
to continue the tradit ion of Abu CAH. That cAbd al-ôabbâr mentions 
Abu HSsim as the authority who transmitted the knowledge from Abu 
CA1I therefore makes i t clear that he considered himself part of the 
school of Abü Hááim's adherents. 
Before discussing other references to schools within the Basra 
Muctazila, I will consider the conflict concerning Abu 'All 's 
successor, as i t gives important information about the way schools 
were formed within the Muctazila. 
6. The Bahsamiyya/Iksidiyya Conflict 
cAbd al-GabbSr reports that some of Abu cAlï's disciples (a$]?äb) 
refused to acknowledge Abü HSáim as his successor because Abu 
Hfisim's opinions on certain questions differed from those held by his 
father, Abu CAH. cAbd al-Gabbar does not deny that there were 
differences of opinion between father and son, but he denies that 
they were important enough for Abü Has im to be rejected as Abu 
cAH's successor. In his view, they differed only on minor questions 
and this was admissible because i t was considered acceptable for 
disciples to differ from their masters. He gives the example of Abu 
Hanîfa and his disciples laçbSb) (Fafl, 304: 18-305: 1). Ibn a l -
MurtadS adds other examples. He points out that Abu CA1I himself also 
disagreed with Abu '1-Hudayl and al-Sahhäm, and that there was also a 
difference of opinion between Abü 'l-QSsim al-Balkî and his master 
(.fabaqät, 95: 5-6). 
Nevertheless, for some of Abü cAll's a$hSb the disagreement was 
apparently too drast ic and so they turned away from Abü Haáim. One 
wonders, therefore, whether i t is true that the difference of opinion 
between Abu CAH and Abu Hâèim concerned only questions of detail . In 
order to verify th is , we have to rely on reports about them because, 
although they both are the authors of many works, not a single work 
has survived. This i s surprising since the la ter Muctazilites attached 
great importance to their teaching. Fortunately, the opinions of Abü 
cAlí and Abü Has im are frequently quoted by cAbd al-èabbSr, who 
refers to them even more than to his direct masters, Abü IshSq b. 
cAyyâé and Abu ^Abdallah a l -BasrP" . Abü 'All 's and Abü Hááim's 
opinions are also found in the works of non-Muctazilites, such as a l -
As^arl's MaqSlöt al-Islämiyyln. However, when Muc tazili tes ' opinions 
are described by opponents whose object i t was to refute Mu^tazilite 
doctrine, i t must be taken into account that their rendering might 
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not be re l iable . 
From the opinions of AbO CA1I and Abu HSsim as they are quoted 
in the works of cAbd al-Gabbär and other authors, an impression can 
be formed about their teachings6*. Kuàaym'ao has described the 
general principles of Abu 'All 's teaching on the basis of these 
quotations. He examined quotations by Abu 'All in both Asserite and 
Mu'tazili te sources and compared Abu cAll's opinions with those of 
Abu HSsim that he found in the same sources. Kusaym concluded that 
there i s no doubt that Abu Häsim disagreed with his father on 
certain essent ia l points of Muctazilite doctrine511 such as the theory 
of modes of being (afywaïf21 and the doctrinal question of what one 
can be blamed for. 
Abu 'Al l ' s disciples reacted differently to the difference of 
opinion between father and son. 'Abd al-öabbär reports that some of 
them fully or part ial ly agreed with Abu Hasim, whereas others 
refrained from expressing an opinion on the disagreement between 
father and son. However, cAbd al-éabbSr thinks that some of Abu 
' A l l ' s disciples exaggerated their support for AbO 'AH because they 
finally declared that Abu Häsim was an unbeliever <Fad"I, 305: 11-13 
and JabaqSt, 95: 15-96: 1). Reacting to the rejection of his opinions, 
AbO. Häsim wrote books in which he refutes the opinions of his 
adversaries among AbO 'Al l ' s disciples (Fatfl, 305: 13 and fabaqSt, 96: 
1). 
It is likely that öawäbät al-$aymari (Answers to al-Çaymarî)** 
was one of Abu Häsim's refutations of his adversaries. Abu cAbdallah 
Muhammad b. cUmar al-Saymarl (ca. 234-/Ô46-315/927) reportedly 
remained loyal to Abu 'All and his host i l i ty towards Abu Hâsim 
reached such a pitch that he called him an unbeliever and tried to 
win Abu HSsim's supporters round to his point of view, but they 
refused to take his side (fabaqät, 96: 15-18). Before becoming AbO 
'Air 's disciple, al-Saymarl had studied with Muctazilite masters of 
Bagdad, such as аЬКаууй^ (Faifl, 306: 15-16 and fabaqSt, 96: 12-13). 
He then stayed with Abu cAlï in 'Askar Mukram for a long period. He 
was about the same age as Abu 'AH and seems to have been a man of 
influence among Abu 'Al l ' s disciples. Ibn al-Nadîm reports that AbO 
CA1I used to refer to him as "our master (éaykunS) AbO 'Abdallah" 
CFihrlst, 219). As we have seen, the use of the t i t l e èayk is a sign 
of respect. Al-Saymarï was well versed in Abu 'All 's teachings and a 
fervent adherent to his doctrines. He defended Abu 'All 's opinion, as 
becomes clear from his refutation of al-Balkï's KitSb al-nlhäya fi '1-
aslah 'ale Abl 'All in which al-Balkl refutes AbO cAH's doctrine of 
the optimum (al-aslaJ?> (.Fihrist, 219). 
Al-Saymarl rejected the innovations that were introduced by AbO 
Häsim5"*, breaking with him and returning to Bagdad, probably shortly 
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after Abu cAlT's death (Faç/i, 309: 6). I t may be that in Bagdad a l -
Çaymarï claimed to be the new leader of the Basra Muctazila. This 
would explain why Ibn al-Nadlm says that al-Çaymarl became leader of 
the Mu=tazilites of Basra after Abu cAlî had died*5. In fact, a l -
Çaymari had a l l the necessary qualifications for the leadership: he 
had reached a respectable age and was generally known as a great 
scholar3*. It must have been a b i t t e r experience for him when Abu 
HSsim succeeded Abu eAlï and thus got the position that he possibly 
thought he himself was be enti t led to. That Abü HSsim was much 
younger than el-Çaymarï probably exacerbated the situation, since i t 
must have been difficult for al-$aymari and other senior disciples to 
accept such a young person as their master. This may also have been 
a reason, quite apart from his refusal to accept Abü Haáim's 
innovations, for al-Caymarl's host i l i ty towards him. 
Nevertheless, Abü Hfiàim had disciples, among them those 
disciples of Abü CA1I who had decided to accept him as their new 
master. We do not know how many they were. cAbd al-ôabbSr mentions 
one of them by name, Abü '1-Hasan al-FarzawI. He is reported to have 
sympathized with Abü HSsim and to have disapproved of the host i l i ty 
that was shown by many of Abü cAlI's disciples towards Abu HSsim 
(FaçfJ, 296: 2-4). 
This means that after Abü cAlï 's death there were two groups: 
f i rs t ly , Abü ^All's former disciples who, sticking to his doctrine, 
refused to accept Abü HSsim and possibly recognized al-Çaymarl as 
their new leader and, secondly, those disciples who accepted Abü 
HSsim as their new leader. It is conceivable that both groups 
considered themselves as the continuation of Abü "All's school9"7. We 
do not know the name by which the two groups were known in the 
period after Abü cAll 's death, but i t is certain that a generation 
la ter there were two rival schools, called the Ikàïdiyya and the 
Bahsamiyya, within the Basra Muctazila. 
The Iksïdiyya was named after Abü Bakr Ahmad b. CA1I b. Ma'gür 
al-Ikáíd (or: al-Iks5d) (about 263/876-320/932>э , a disciple of al-
Çaymarl, who had stayed with him for a long period (FadJ, 309: 6). He 
had adopted his master's host i l i ty towards Abu HSsim and was a 
fanatical adversary not only of Abü HSsim, but also of his disciples, 
who were called the Bahsamiyya or the BahSsima'*3. Ibn al-Ikéld was 
the author of a book on the points of difference between Abü HSáim 
and Abu CA1I , 0° Ifabaqêt, HO: 13). He was not only an expert in the 
field of Mu c tazili te doctrine, but also a jur is t and a grammarian101. 
The only unfavourable thing mentioned in connection with him was his 
zealous opposition to the Bahsamiyya (fabeqSt, 100: 7-9). 
The enmity between the IkSIdiyya and the Bahâamlyya was 
intense. Ibn al-Ikäld and his disciples were not the only fanatics; i t 
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appears that there were also fanatics among AbO HSsim's disciples, 
like AbO 'l-Qäsim al-SIrfifl, who lived in Basra. Originally, he had 
been a follower of the Ikáldiyya, but Abu Isl^ Sq b. cAyyfis, the teacher 
of cAbd al-öabbär, had persuaded him to leave the Iksïdiyya and 
become an adherent to the Bahàamiyya. After joining the Bahsamiyya, 
he is reported to have become "a sword" against the Iksïdiyya (Fadl, 
326: 14-15). Another fanatical adherent to Abu Häsim was Abu Ahmad b. 
АЫ
 cA118n, a disciple of Aba cAbdell5h al-Basrl (.JabaqSt, l i t : 13-15). 
The discord between the two rival schools became so vehement 
that, in Basra, the vizier of the Buyids Abu Ί-Qäsim b. Sa:d al-
ls fahânï'03 organized a meeting for the followers of both schools in 
order to reconcile them (.Fadl, 329: 1-3). A dispute (munâçara) was 
held between the representatives of each of the two groups'o a , the 
Iksïdiyya being represented by their leader Abu cAbdallâh al-
Habasï""1 and the Bahsamiyya by Abu 'l-Qäsim al-SIrfifl, mentioned 
above. eAbd al-öabbär was one of those who attended the meeting. He 
reports that Abu 'l-Qäsim al-SïrSfl rebuked al-Habasï in the presence 
of all his school's followers. cAbd al-öabbär does not reveal who 
ultimately prevailed (Fadl, 328: 13-329: 10 and JabaqSt, 107: 15-106: 
4). 
After some time, perhaps as a result of this meeting, the enmity 
between the Iksïdiyya and the Bahsamiyya became less intense. cAbd 
al-öabbär reports that when he met Abu Ahmad b. Salma, one of al-
Saymari's disciples, in cAskar Mukram, he s t i l l was a fanatical 
adversary of the Bahàamiyya, but that later he became more moderate 
(.Fadl, 333: 5-9). The same thing is reported about cAlï b. =IsS al-
Rummanl <d. 364/994), who at first was an adversary of the 
Bahsamiyya and wrote a work in which he systematically refuted Abu 
Häsim's al-MasS41 al-Ba$dSdiyyBV °*. It is said that he later became 
milder towards Abu Häsim and his followers (Fadl, 333: 2-4). 
It is not clear whether the Iksïdiyya as a separate school 
within the Basra Muctazila continued to exist. cAbd al-öabbär and 
other Muctazilites, like Ibn Mattawayh and Ibn al-Murtadä, do mention 
the Iksïdiyya'o e , but although the Asserite cAbd al-QShir b. TShir al-
BagdSdl (d. 429/1037) was a contemporary of cAbd al-öabbSr and might 
have heard about them, he does not mention the Ikâïdiyya in his book 
on the Muslim sects . When he discusses Abu CA1I al-öubbä'I and the 
éubba'iyya, he says: "The Basrian Muctazilites in his time adhered to 
his [AbO cAll's] doctrine. Then, after him, they went over to the 
doctrine of his son Aba HSsim" IFarq, 110). He does not seem to have 
known that there was a conflict about AbO cAlI's successor. For 
outsiders, i t may not have been clear which different schools existed 
within the Muctazila. However, he does know of the Bahsamiyya and 
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that this was the school of cAbd al-Gabbär. Of Abu Häsim and the 
Bahsamiyya, he says: 
Most of the Muc tazilites of our time adhere to his [Abu 
Hääim's] doctrine because of the propaganda of tal-Cähib] 
Ibn ^Abbäd, the vizier of the Buyids. They are called "the 
Dammiyya", because of their opinion on the [question 
whether someone] deserves blame (dammV °7 for what he has 
omitted to do (.Farq, 111). 
cAbd al-Qadir al-Bagdädi's reference to al-Çâhib b. eAbbad1oe, <=Abd 
al-Gabbär's patron, makes clear that he is referring to the 
Muctazilite school to which cAbd al-öabbär belonged, the Baháamiyya. 
According to him, this school had become the dominant Muctazilite 
school in his time. 
7. The Leadership of the Bahsamiyya after the Death of Abu Häsim. 
It is not clear who succeeded Abu Häsim as leader of the Bahsamiyya 
after his death in 321/933. cAbd al-Gabbär's chain of transmission of 
knowledge does not inform us about this , tel l ing in the last part 
only that 
from Abu Häsim, the [Muctazillte] knowledge was received 
by a group of well-advanced [disciples] (.mutaqaddlmuri), 
such as Abu CA1I b. Rallad, al-áayk Abu cAbdallâh al-Basrî 
and others; then, in a comparable way, [ i t was transmitted! 
into our time (Fadl, 164: 23-25). 
If cAbd al-öabbSr had mentioned one disciple of Abu Häsim, i t is 
likely that he would have been the new leader of the Bahsamiyya 
after Abu Hasim's death. However, he says that a whole group 
transmitted the Muctazilite knowledge received from Abu Häsim. By 
mentioning two people by name, Abu cAlï b. Kalläd and Abu cAbdalläh 
al-Basrï, he leaves i t uncertain who was the leader. 
Unlike ^Abd al-öabbär, Ibn al-Murtadä mentions in his chain of 
transmission the name of only one authority who transmitted the 
knowledge from Abu HSsim. His chain of transmission includes the 
following names: 
[9] Abu Häsim and his generation (fabaqatuhu) 
С 10a] Abu Ishäq b. cAyyäS 
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[10Ы Abu 'Abdallah al-Basrl 
[ Ц ] 'Abd al-Gabbär CJabaqSt, 7: 5-7). (The numbers before the names 
have been added by me In accordance with the generations of 
Mu'tazil i tes these masters belong to.) 
From Ibn al-Murtadä's chain i t can be concluded that Abu Ishäq 
became the leader after Abu Häsim. If this is r ight, it ra ises the 
question of why 'Abd al-öabbär did not even mention Abu Ishäq's name. 
If we compare Ibn al-Murtadä's chain of transmission with 'Abd a l -
Gabbär's, we see that the name of Ibn Kallâd, the f i rs t of AbO Häsiro's 
disciples mentioned by cAbd al-öabbär, is missing. On the other hand, 
Abu 'Abdallah al-Basrl , mentioned by 'Abd al-6abbär as the second 
person in Abu Häsim's group of disciples, is presented as the only 
disciple of Abu Ishäq who received the Mu'~tazilite knowledge and who 
in his turn transmitted this knowledge to 'Abd al-Gabbär. The strange 
thing is that , according to what Ibn al-Murtada' himself says in his 
fabaqat al~Muctazila, Abu Ishäq b. 'Ayyäs and Abu cAbdallSh al-Basrï 
belonged to the same generation of Mu'tazil i tes. Why did Ibn a l -
Murtada present Abu IshSq as the one who transmitted the knowledge 
to Abu 'Abdallah? Before answering this question, I will f i rs t give 
the biographies of the persons mentioned in both chains. 
Ibn Kallâd C?-?) 
Abu CAH Muhammad b. Kallâd1 °* was a disciple of Abu Häsim. His dates 
are unknown110. In his Fadl al-l^tlzSl wa-tabaqSt al-mu"tazila cAbd 
al-öabbär assigns him the f i rs t place in the generation of the 
disciples of Abu Häsim. As cAbd al-Gabbär usually classifies the 
masters within each generation according to their age 1 7 1 , i t is likely 
that the date of Ibn KallSd's birth was ear l ier than that of Abu ' 1 -
Qäsim Ibn Sahlawiyya and Abu 'Abdallah al-Basrí, who are mentioned 
after him. 'Abd al-Gabbär says that Ibn Kallâd f i rs t studied with AbO 
Häsim in cAskar Mukram but that after Abu Häsim took up residence in 
Bagdad, he too moved to Bagdad to study with him <.Fa<fl, 324: 4-6). 
This must have been after 314/926, since i t was in this year that 
Abu HSèim moved to Bagdad. He is said not to have attained the rank 
of master (.àayk) (Façil, 324: 11-12 and fabaqat, 105: 9-10). We are 
not told why he never attained this rank. Did he die at a young age? 
Did he stop being a Muctazilite? Yet we know that he had students, 
as Abu 'Abdallah al-Basrï is said to have started his study of 
Mu'tazi l i te doctrine with him. 
Ibn Kallâd reportedly was the author of two works: KitSb al-υφθΐ 
and KitSb al-¿ar¡?. This las t work seems to have been his own 
commentary <.êarii> on the f i r s t work. For some unknown reason he did 
not complete KitSb al-υφΰΐ and i t was la ter completed by cAbd al-
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Gabbñr112, who Is also the author of a commentary on this work113. 
This i s an Indication that KltSb al-υφαΐ was considered to be an 
important work, even though Ibn Kalläd had not completed it . From 
this i t can be concluded that Ibn Kalläd was well versed in 
Mu'tazilite doctrine even though he never attained the rank of £ayk. 
Abu IshSq b. 'Ayyâè С?-?) 
Abu Ishâq Ibrahim b. cAyyä§ al-Basrl11 A was the first teacher who 
instructed cAbd al-öabbär in Mu'tazilite doctrine. Although he must 
have known him well, cAbd al-öabbär does not mention the dates of 
his birth and death. In his Fadl al-l*tiz51 wa-fabaq&t al-muctazila, 
he discusses Abu Ishäq as fourth person of the Mu'tazilites of the 
tenth generation, directly after Abu 'Abdallah al-Basrl, which may 
imply that he was younger than Abu cAbdaliah. 
Although Abu Ishäq is reported to have met AbQ HSsim, he is 
said to have studied first with Abu CA1I b. JÇallSd and then with AbO 
'Abdallah al-Basrl. He was already teaching Mu'tazilite doctrine 
before 321/933, while Abu Häs im was s t i l l alive. This can be 
concluded from the report that one of his students, AbO '1-Hasan b. 
al-Nag Ih, left him to study with AbQ Ha Sim in Bagdad (.JabaqSt, 109: 
11-12) and, as we know, Abu Häsim died in 321/933. 
cAbd al-öabb&r, who studied with AbQ Ishflq, describes his master 
as an ascetic who never engaged In idle pastimes, devoting his whole 
l i fe to learning. He travelled from place to place in the district of 
JÇûzistân, teaching in Tustar, 'Askar Mukram, Ahwäz, al-Ubullah (a town 
near Basra) and Basra itself. It seems that he did not teach in 
Bagdad because people reportedly travelled from Bagdad to ¡CuzistSn to 
study with him (.Fadl, 326: 6-B). cAbd al-öabbär says that Abu Ishaq 
was the author of books that contained refutations and answers to 
questions, but he does not mention these books by name (Fadl, 328: 
10-11) , 1 B . 
Abu "Abdallah βΙ-ΒβφΠ (289/902 or 293/905 or 308/920 - 369/979) 
According to Ibn al-Nadlm, Abu 'Abdallah al-Husayn b. CA1I al-Basrl1 1 β 
was born in Basra. Although cAbd al-6abb8r studied with AbQ 'Abdallah 
and must have known him well, he gives less information about his 
dates than Ibn al-Nadïm. He does not mention AbO *= Abdallah 's 
birthplace, saying only that he belonged to the people of cIr8q iFadl, 
324: 13). cAbd al-öabbBr does not give his date of birth, either. 
According to Ibn al-Nadlm, Abu 'Abdallah was born in Basra in 308/920 
(Flhrist, 222), but others say that he was born in 293/905 or 
289/9021 1 7 \ 
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cAbd al-ôabbSr says that Abu 'Abdallah f i rs t studied with Ibn 
JÇallâd and then with Abu HSsim (Fadl, 325: 11-12). Ibn al-Nadlm also 
mentions Abu 4-Q5sim b. Sahlawiyya as his professor (ustäd) (Flhrlst, 
222). Ibn Sahlawiyya was a disciple of Abü HSsim11*. We do not know 
in which period Abu ^Abdallah studied with Abu HSsim but i t must 
have been before 321/933, the year in which Abu HSsim died. If cAbd 
al-Öabbär's report that Abu =Abdalläh studied with Abu HSsim is 
correct, i t would prove that Abu AbdallSh's date of birth was one of 
the two ear l ie r dates (289/902 or 293/905). If he was born in 
308/920, he would only have been thirteen years old when Abu HSsim 
died. As he f i r s t studied with Ibn (Callad, i t would imply that he 
s tar ted to study Muctazilite doctrine when he was younger than 
thirteen. Since this is unlikely, i t is more probable that Abu 
cAbdallah was born in 269/902 or 293/905 than in 308/920. 
cAbd al-ÔabbSr reports that Abu 'Abdallah dictated from the 
year 330/941 unt i l his death (Fadl, 325: 17-18). If we accept that he 
was born in 289/902 or 293/905 this would imply that he s tar ted to 
dictate when he was about forty years old. It is unclear what his 
occupations in the preceding period were. He possibly devoted a l l his 
time to study. cAbd al-ôabbSr reports that he studied Islamic law 
with the prominent Hanafite legal scholar Abu Ί-Hasan al-Karkî (d. 
340/952) for a long period. Al-Karkl was himself a Mu*=tazilite and 
had many Mu c tazil i tes among his s tudents 1 1 B . Abu cAbdallfih died in 
Bagdad in 369/979 (Flhrlst, 222 and Fedi, 325: 18). 
We return now to the question of who became the leader of the 
Bahsamiyya after Abu Hfisim's death. Ibn al-Nadïm informs us that in a 
la ter period Abu ^Abdallah became the leader of his "colleagues" (wa-
ilayhl btahat riySsat ashablhl f I casri/ji), not specifying which 
Mu^tazilite school he means (Flhrist, 222). As Ibn Nadlm previously 
said that Abu cAbdallah adhered to the doctrine of Abu HSsim (madhab 
АЫ HSèlm), i t must be concluded that he means that Abu 'Abdallah 
became the leader of the Bahsamiyya. Abu cAbdalläh s tar ted to dictate 
in 330/941. It i s therefore unlikely that he was already considered 
to be the leader of this school before that date. However, by the 
year 330/941 Abu HSsim had already been dead for nine years. This 
means that Abu ^Abdallah did not become leader any earl ier than nine 
years after the death of Abu HSsim. 
This s t i l l leaves unanswered the question of who was the leader 
of AbO HSsim's school in the f i r s t nine years after his death. The 
other disciple of Abu Häsim mentioned by cAbd al-óabbSr in his chain 
of transmission is Ibn ¡Callad. However, i t i s unlikely that he became 
the leader of the Bahsamiyya in the period between Abu HSsim's death 
and Abu c Abdallah's leadership, as he reportedly did not at tain the 
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rank of èayk. Ibn al-Murtana's chain of transmission seems to provide 
an answer to the leadership question because i t suggests that Abu 
IçhSq b. =Ayyáá was the leader of the Bahsemiyya in the period 
between Abu CA1I and Abu ^Abdallah. He had not studied with Abu 
Häsim himself, but he belonged to the Bahsemiyya and already had 
students before Abu Häsim died. It is therefore possible that he 
became the leader of the Bahsemiyya after Abu Hasim's death. 
If Abu Ishaq became the leader of the Bahsemiyya after Abu 
Hasim's death, then why does cAbd al-ôabbâr not mention him in his 
chain of transmission? The reason for this may be that Abu cAbdalläh 
was not a student of Abu Ishâq's. Rather, they were two colleagues, 
the one teaching in Basra and other towns in Kûzistân, and the other 
in Bagdad. It is therefore unlikely that Ibn Ishaq transmitted the 
Mu'-tazilite knowledge to Aba cAbdalläh. Ibn al-Murtada may have 
disregarded this and presented AbO Ishäq as the one who transmitted 
the knowledge to Abu ^Abdallah because he knew that Abu Ishaq was 
the leader of the Bahèamiyya in the period between AbO Hasim's death 
and Abu cAbdalläh's leadership. 
As for the leadership of the Bahèamiyya after the death of AbO 
'Abdallah, according to Ibn al-Murtadä's chain Abu 'Abdallah 
transmitted the Muctazilite knowledge to cAbd al-Gabbar. cAbd a l -
ôabbâr's appearance in the chain does not pose problems. It is known 
that he studied with Abu cAbdallSh in Bagdad for a long period and 
la ter became the leader of the Muctazila (ëarfr al-^uyOn, 365: 11 and 
Jabaqat, 112: 10-11). His being mentioned as the leader of the 
Muctazila as a whole and not only of the school of Abu Häsim may be 
due to the fact that Abu HSsim's school became the dominant 
Muctazilite school, as is reported by cAbd al-Qähir b. TShir a l -
Bagdâdî (Milal Ba¿d. 129: 10-11). 
&. Conclusions on the Schools Within the Mu^tazila 
The Mu^tazila as a whole can be distinguished from other theological 
schools such as the As-=ariyya and the Mfituridiyya. Yet the Muctazila 
was not a homogeneous group, Rather, i t consisted of diverse groups 
of thinkers following the doctrines of part icular Muctazilite masters. 
However, these masters based their doctrines on theories of their 
predecessors. If they formed their doctrines on the basis of theories 
of the same predecessors, for instance, the early Muctazilites of 
Basra, their doctrines showed s imilar i t ies . These similar i t ies make i t 
possible to speak of the Basra school within the Muctazila. The same 
is true of those Muctazilites whose doctrines can be traced back to 
the early Muctazilites of Bagdad. This means that there existed a 
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Basra school and a Bagdad school within the Mu-'tazila. However, they 
may be subdivided Into schools consisting of the adherents to the 
doctrines of particular masters. 
As we do not have at our disposal Muctazilite biographical 
works by Bagdad! Muctazilites after the period of al-Balkï, we have 
little information about possible schools within the Bagdad school. I 
therefore had no option but to base my conclusions about the 
Muctazilite schools on the information about schools within the Basra 
school contained in the biographical works by cAbd al-Gabbar, al-
Hakim al-Guàami and Ibn al-Murtadâ, Basra Muctazilites themselves. It 
becomes clear that after a school leader's death, the leadership was 
usually taken over by his most eminent disciple. If this new leader 
was not accepted by all the former leader's adherents, a school might 
fragment into new schools, each following its own leader. This 
happened to the school of Abü cAlï, which split into the school of 
Abu Häsim and the school of al-Saymarl. A new school could also be 
formed by an important disciple dissociating himself from his 
master's school during that master's life-time, as the result of a 
serious disagreement with him. If that disciple was followed by 
others who adhered to his doctrine, this might be the start of a new 
school that elaborated the doctrine of the school it had separated 
from. Abu 'All's disciple al-AácarI started the Asserite school in 
this way after separating from Abu CA1I, Just as Wäsil is said to 
have started the Muctazilite school after dissociating himself from 
al-Hasan al-Basrl. 
The different schools were not equally successful, one school 
often surpassing others in different periods. This may have happened 
because of the high standard of learning of a particular master's 
school or because of the support this master received from a ruler. 
It is conceivable that if one school became dominant, the other 
schools did not disappear at once. They may have continued to exist 
in the background for some time without attracting any attention, 
finally losing all their followers to the dominant school. This may 
have happened to the Ik.áídiyya. 
It becomes clear from the above that, even though in many cases 
the schools were named after the master they followed at a 
particular moment, this master had built on the doctrines of his 
predecessors. The schools of both the Bahsamiyya and the Ikkildiyya 
can be seen as a continuation of the GubbS'iyya, Abü cAlï's school, 
whose doctrine was built on that of AbQ Hudayl. The school of cAbd 
al-Gabbar and his disciples can be referred to as Baháamiyya because 
its doctrine is a continuation and an elaboration of AbQ HSàim's 
doctrine. On the other hand, it would not be wrong to refer to it as 
GubbS'iyya, because Abu HSsim based his doctrine on that of his 
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father Abu CAH al-óubbS'I. However, the name éubbS'iyya is less clear 
because the Ikàîdiyya can also be referred to as Gubba'iyya, as they 
also adhered to Abu =A1I al-GubbS'I's doctrine. The need to 
distinguish between these schools makes i t necessary to refer to each 
of them by a specific name. 
The school of cAbd al-ôabbâr was a continuation of the 
Bahsamiyya, but in order to distinguish between the Bahàamiyya of the 
period before cAbd al-öabbär and the la te r Bahàamiyya of cAbd a l -
ôabbâr and his disciples, I will refer to the la te r Bahàamiyya as the 
Rayy Muctazila, since Rayy is where cAbd al-6abbSr trained most of 
his disciples. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE RAYY MU=TAZILA 
In th i s chapter I w i l l g ive the biographies of some prominent members 
of the Mu ctezi la of Rayy. Apart from cAbd al-éabbfir, Mankdlm Saadïw 
and Ibn Mattawayh, who are the authors of the three t ex t s under 
study, I w i l l a l so g ive the biographies of Aba Rasld al-NIsSbürï, who 
became the leader of the Muctazila of Rayy af ter cAbd al-GabbSr, and 
of Abu Ί-Husayn a l -Basr ï , who dissoc iated himself from the school of 
cAbd al-6abbär and became the leader of a new Mu c tazi l i te school . 
There are few i f any reports about their l i v e s . The information about 
them which does e x i s t deals primarily with their scholarly 
achievements and hardly ever with the p o l i t i c a l s i tuat ion during 
their lifetimes. Yet i t is likely that political events in those days 
did Influence their l ives, especially when a new ruler came to power 
whose attitude towards the Muctazila was different from the previous 
ruler's. I will therefore also shortly describe some political events 
that took place during the lifetimes of these Muctazilltes, even 
though the effects of these events on their lives cannot be known 
with certainty. 
1. CABD AL-ÔABBÂR1 
cAbd al-Karlm cUtman has written an extensive biography of cAbd al-
óabb&r based on a study he made of several sources2. I will mainly 
rely on his biography for my description of the l i fe of cAbd al-
ôabbar. cU"iman gives a survey of the known3 t i t l es of works by eAbd 
al-eabbär, presenting them in a thematic order*. He explains that he 
decided not to present them in chronological order because in all but 
a few cases the date of =Abd al-ôabbar's works is difficult to 
determine. The date of some of them is known because at the end of 
the Mugnï cAbd al-öabbBr mentions works he dictated before he 
started dictating that work and also works he dictated during the 
twenty years it took him to dictate the Mugnl Œugnî XX/2, 256: Π ­
Ι 4 and 4-7). Some other works can be dated on the basis of other 
information, but for most of the works the period in which they were 
dictated or written remains unknown. 
In this study I will consider each period of eAbd al-öabbSr's 
l i fe and mention those works that are known to have been dictated 
48 CHAPTER TWO 
during i t . This means that works that cannot be dated will not be 
mentioned. For a complete survey of cAbd al-Gabbär's works the reader 
should refer to the l i s t in cUtmän's study*. 
cAbd al-Gabbär's youth 
Abu '1-Hasan cAbd al-ôabbâr b. Ahmad b. cAbd al-óabbSr b. Ahmad b. 
al-Kalïl al-Hamadânï al-Asadäbäd! was born in about 320/932, in 
Asadäbäd, a town s i tuated 54 kilometres west-southwest of Hamadän on 
the road that connects Bagdad, Hamadän and Rayye. In the fourth/tenth 
century Asadäbäd was a populous city with a mosque and good 
markets7. In 319/931, Hamadän had been conquered by the Ziyärid 
prince MardSvig&, who was murdered in 323/935 by his own Turkish 
troops*. A long drawn out bat t le followed during which the Buy ids 
occupied a large part of the Ziyärids' terr i tory, leaving to them only 
the Caspian provinces ' 0 . The Buyids originated from the Caspian 
province of Day laman and adhered to êï^ism. In a short time they 
succeeded in extending their control over cIräq, Küzistän, Kirmän and 
Fars. Control over their t e r r i to r i e s was divided among three brothers: 
Mu°izz al-Din ruled c I räq, Rukn al-Dawla ruled Gibäl and cImâd a l -
Dawla ruled Fars and Küzistän. This means that during cAbd a l -
ôabbâr's youth Asadäbäd, which was situated in oibäl, was ruled by 
Rukn al-Dawla. The provincial capital of öibäl in this period was 
I s fahan ' ' . 
I t seems that cAbd al-Gabbär originated from a poor family '2 . 
He s tar ted his rel igious studies in his home town Asadäbäd, where he 
studied hadït, aäf i , ; i te law and other subjects. With respect to 
theology, cAbd al-éabbar is said to have f i rs t adhered to the 
Ascarite school ijabaqat, 112: 3 ) 1 Э . Like many students in his t i m e 1 4 , 
he left his home town after completing his in i t ia l studies. He 
travelled from town to town, studying with famous scholars to 
broaden his knowledge. I t i s known that he stayed for some time in 
Hamadän, Isfahan, cAskar Mukram and Basra ' e . 
Around 346/957 cAbd al-Gabbär was in Basra collecting £ a d i T e . 
Basra was one of the important cultural centres of the Buy id empire 
and a centre of Mu'tazi l i te learning. In 336/947 i t had been 
conquered by the BQyid Mucizz al-Dawla, who took up residence in 
Bagdad and made his son, al-HabasI, governor of Basra. Al-HabasI had 
a great in te res t in culture and collected a library with fifteen 
thousand volumes'7 . Apart from this library, Basra had a Mu^tazilite 
library which had been founded by Ibn Suwflr141. According to cUtmän'a, 
i t was in Basra that cAbd al-6abbär abandoned his former creed and 
became a Mu c tazil i te. He s tar ted to study Muctazilite doctrine with 
the famous Basrian scholar Abu Ishäq b. "^Ayyâè20. 
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cAbd al-ôabbâr in Bagdad and RSmhurmuz 
From Basra cAbd al-ôabbâr travelled to Bagdad. It is not known when 
he arrived there, nor when he left Bagdad again to stay in RSmhurmuz 
or another town in Küzistän. However, in 346/957 he was s t i l l in 
Basra and in 360/970 he was in Rämhurmuz. It can therefore be 
concluded that his stay in Bagdad must have been sometime between 
these two dates, although he probably did not remain there the whole 
time. The s i tua t ion in Bagdad in those years was turbulent. There 
were frequent clashes between the Sunnite and èr=ite factions that 
sometimes ended in heavy fighting, burning, and looting, as happened 
in 346/959 and 349/9602 1 . In Bagdad cAbd al-ôabbâr became a student 
of Abu ·= Abdallah al-Husayn b. 'Al l a l -Basrr 2 2 . 
Al-ôusamï says that cAbd al-ôabbâr stayed with Abu 'Abdallah 
for a long time during which he compiled many books (¿arh al-cuyun, 
366: 5-6). It is likely that the t i t l e s of some of these books are 
mentioned among the works that cAbd al-ôabbâr says he dictated 
before he s t a r t ed to dictate the Mu¿ní IMufni XX/2, 258: 11-14). 
These works are: 
- Naqd al-lumac 2 Э . This is a refutation of al-As'arl 's KitSb al-
luma*. 
- KitSb а1-аита<Рл. This is a work on legal theory and methodology 
(usui al-fiqtù. cAbd al-Gabbär is also the author of a commentary on 
i t =* (TabaqSt, 113: 11). 
- Taqrlb a J - u s û F ' . 
- Tahdlb al-Sarb*7. I t i s not clear which àarh is meant here. 
- KitSb al-mabsQf**. 
- Èarh al-gSmi* al-ça/Çlr*9. This is a commentary on Abu HSsim's al-
ÖSmi* al-çaglr3"*. 
- KitSb а1-піпВуа*л. This is a work on legal theory and methodology 
(usui al-fiqh). 
These are probably only the most important of cAbd al-ôabbâr's 
works from the period before he s tar ted to dic ta te the Mu¿nl and i t 
i s worth noting that among them are KitSb al-^umad and KitSb al-
nihSya, two important works on legal theory and methodology. 
•=Abd al-ôabbSr left Bagdad in 360/970 at the la tes t . This can 
be concluded from the fact that in 360/970 he s tar ted to dictate the 
Mu¿ní in Rämhurmuz. Perhaps he was s t i l l in Bagdad in 356/967 when 
the BSyid Mucizz al-Dawla died and was succeeded by his eldest son 
cIzz al-Dawla. I t i s not known why cAbd al-6abbfir did not continue 
his stay in Bagdad, although the difficult economic situation there 
may have been a reason for his departure. Life had become hard in 
Bagdad in those days: the price of food was extremely high and i t 
seems that in 358/968 many of the ci ty 's inhabitants left for Mosul, 
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Syria and KurSsSrv". cAbd al-ôabbSr may a l s o have l e f t the c i ty for 
fear of a famine 3 3 . For whatever reason, cAbd al-òabbfir travel led 
from Bagdad to the province of &üzistan. 
At the time of cAbd al-öabbSr, Muctazilism was widespread in 
the province of £uz is tan . cAskar Mukram, where Abu CA1I al-GubbS'i 
and h is son Abu HSàim had l ived, was a centre of Muc taz i l i sm 3 * . This 
town had a Mu c taz i l i t e l ibrary which, l ike the one in Basra, had been 
founded by Ibn Su war. In th is library students could study 
Mu c taz i l i te doctrine3 6 1 . Other places in jCQzistan with important 
Muctazil i te communities were RSmhurmuz, Tustar, Süs and ôundaysabQr 
(Qikr, 112-113) . <=Abd al-ÓabbSr taught Muctazil ite doctrine in cAskar 
Mukram and RSmhurmuz (.Sarh al-^uyOn, 366: 7). As we have seen, in 
360/970 he s t a r t e d to d ic ta te the Mugnl in the mosque of Abu 
Muhammad cAbdallâh b. al- cAbbas al-RSmhurmuzI in RSmhurmuz iéarh al-
*uyün, 366: 7 -8 and Jabaqät, 98: 9 -10) . During the time that -=Abd a l -
éabbSr was in KuzistSn he kept in touch with Abu cAbdallfih. This can 
be concluded from the report that AbO cAbdaliah's books used to reach 
cAbd al-éabbar unt i l he s e t t l e d in Rayy CfabaqSt, 107: 5 - 6 ) 3 6 . 
cAbd al-ÖabbSr Chief Judge of Rayy 
Rukn al-Dawla, who had ruled over ÔibSl s ince 335/947, died in 
366/976. It was his wish that after his death control of his 
territory should be given to two of his sons, Mu'ayyid al-Dawla, who 
should rule over Rayy and Isfahan, and Fak,r al-Dawla, who should rule 
over HamadSn and DInawar. However, Fakr al-Dawla was not content with 
his share and tried to seize Rayy as well. Thereupon, he was driven 
away by a third brother, cAdud al-Dawla, who ruled over Fars and 
Kuzistfin at that time and resided in SIrfiz. Fakjr al-Dawla took refuge 
in Curasan, which belonged to the territories of the Samanlds. cAdud 
al-Dawla gave Fair al-Dawla's territory to Mu'ayyid al-Dawla, who thus 
gained control over the whole of öibSl, although this was on 
condition that he acknowledge the supremacy of cAdud al-Dawla3T. 
At f irst , Mu'ayyid al-Dawla retained Rukn al-Dawla's vizier but 
after some time he replaced him with his own secretary, al-Sfiljib b. 
cAbbfid. Because a chief Judge is appointed by the vizier, a new chief 
judge was needed in Rayy, so al-SShlb looked for a person able to 
perform this Important function. He may already have set his mind on 
a Muctazilite Judge for this post since i t is reported that he 
approached AbO cAbdallSh al-Basrl for his advice. Reportedly, Abu 
^Abdallah first sent him Abu Ishaq al-NasIblnl (or al-NasIbl), one of 
his disciples, but al-SShib did not want him3e. Then Abu cAbdallah 
sent eAbd al-6abb8r, another of his disciples, who was accepted (al-
WSfl Ы-4-wafaySt XVIII, 32: 3-12). Al-Sahib and <=Abd al-öabbSr 
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possibly knew each other already. They may have met In Isfahan, when 
al-Çâhib was s t i l l Mu'ayyid al-Dawla's secretary39 . 
cAbd al-Ôabbar became the chief Judge of Rayy in 367/977. The 
splendid certificate of his appointment was written by al-$Shib 
himself -0. It states that cAbd al-öabbar was appointed as chief Judge 
of Rayy, Qazwln, Abhar—ZangSn, Suhraward, Qumm and Dunbäwand 
(Damawand). He supervised the Judges in the northern half of the 
province of öibfil and was allowed to appoint Judges as his 
representatives in the towns of the district. 
cAbd al-Gabbar's patron, al-$Shib b. cAbbSd, had been educated 
as a secretary and had an intellectual interest in a variety of 
subjects. Although he was not educated as a theologian and lawyer 
like ^Abd al-éabbSr, he engaged in philosophical and theological 
questions. His biographers disagree about which theological doctrine 
he adhered to. It seems that he considered himself to be a 
Muctazilite, although he followed èï=ite doctrine with regard to the 
theory of the imamate. His works include books on Muctazilite 
theology*'. Ibn al-MurtadS seems to have regarded him as a 
Muctazilite, since he mentions his name among the Muctazilites of the 
generation of cAbd al-öabbar ÍJabaqSt, 115: 11-13). Mankdlm's regard 
for al-ÇShib as a theologian was such that he mentioned al-Çâhib's 
opinion on one of the Muctazilite questions (.Ta'llq, 494: 17-18). 
Al-Çâhib favoured Muctazilism and probably for this reason 
appointed a Muctazilite as chief Judge. He wanted to propagate 
Muctazilism, not only among the learned but also among the common 
people*2. With this objective in mind, he held meetings in which he 
discussed theological subjects with the people, speaking in the 
vernacular. In addition to this, he sent missionaries to the bazaars 
in order to promulgate Muctazilite doctrine -3 . It seems that cAbd al -
öabbur supported al-$Shib in his aspirations. It i s said that he, too, 
sent Muctazllite missionaries to Hanafite communities In the 
region". A work like al-Mukta$ar f Ι υφΰΐ al-dJh, which cAbd al-
ôabbar wrote at the request of al-$5hib, may have been intended for 
missionary act ivi t ies . 
Al-ÇShib promoted science and literature as well and Invited 
many scholars and men of letters to his court in Rayy. Among them 
were famous poets, such as al-Sarlf al-Radl (d. 406/1016) and Ibn al -
Haggag (d. 391/1001)Λ β. Al-ÇShib himself was also active in the 
literary field. He wrote poems, anecdotes, and studies on literature 
and lexicography". It is not known whether cAbd al-ôabbSr regularly 
visited the sessions íma¿Slis) that al-ÇShib held at his court, but it 
is certain that he attended some of them, perhaps those sessions In 
which al-$8hib educated secretaries4 7 . This can be concluded from 
what cAbd al-öabbar says at the end of the Mugnl. He explains that 
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there is a difference in s ty le between the f i r s t part of the Mugnï 
and the las t part because the las t part was dictated in Rayy, where 
he attended al-Çàhib's sessions*®. 
When Mu'ayyid al-Dawla died in 373/9&3, al-Çâhib proposed that 
Fakr al-Dawla, the expelled brother of Mu'ayyid al-Dawla, be accepted 
as the new ruler of Gibâl. Having been driven away, Fakr al-Dawla had 
lived in exile in the empire of the Samanids. When Fakr al-Dawla came 
from Nisabur and took up residence in Rayy, el-Çâhib became his 
vizier**. This change of rulers did not affect al-ÇShib's position 
much, nor that of cAbd al-Gabbâr. 
During the period that cAbd al-òabbàr was a chief Judge, he 
stayed in Rayy most of the time, although he sometimes visited 
neighbouring towns. In spi te of his duties as chief Judge he found 
the time to dic ta te many books. He completed the Mugnï, which he had 
s tar ted in 360/970 before he became chief Judge. When the Mugnï was 
finished in 380/990, he sent i t to al-$ähib. In reply, al-ÇShib sent 
him a l e t t e r in rhymed prose written in his own handwriting50 . 
The Dictation of the Mugnï 
As cAbd al-èabbâr dictated the twenty volumes of the Mugnï over a 
period of twenty years (360/970-3Ô0/990), one would expect him to 
dictate one volume a year. However, at the end of volume XX of the 
Mugnï cAbd al-6abbär says that the major part (jnucfaauAu) of the 
Mugnï was dictated during Abu eAbdalläh's l i fe* 1 . Abu cAbdall5h a l -
Basrl died in 369/979, as =Abd al-Gabbfir himself says in his 
biography of Abu c Abdallah in Fa$l al-ictizBl va-fabaqät al-Muc tazlla 
(.Faa"l, 325: 18). If cAbd al-ôabbâr dictated one volume a year, he 
should have dictated about nine volumes during Abu cAbdall8h's l i fe . 
This is nearly half of the Mugnï and not the major part of i t . 
This may be an inaccuracy on cAbd el-èabbâr's part , but i t i s 
more difficult to explain his remark about the blessings he put af ter 
the name of Abu ^Abdallah in the Mugnï. He says that at the 
beginning of the Mugnï he added the blessing for the living to the 
name of Abu cAbdallSh al-Basrl , whereas in the las t part he added the 
blessing for the deceased to his name. He explains that he did this 
because when he s tar ted to dictate the Mugnï In 360/970 Abu 
'Abdallah was s t i l l alive but he had died by the time the Mugnï was 
completed in 380/990 (Mugnï XX/2, 258: 8-11). The blessings meant by 
cAbd al-6abbâr are the blessings "May God make his l i fe long" (a f a" Ja 
'llSh baqB'ahu), which is placed after the name of living persons as a 
sign of respect, and "May God have mercy upon him" (rahimahu 'Hah), 
which is placed after the name of deceased persons. 
cAbd al-öabbSr's remark about the blessings placed after Abu 
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cAbdallñh's name leads one to assume that In the f i r s t nine volumes 
of the Mu¿nl, Abu cAbdallah's name will be found with the blessing 
for the living. However, an investigation shows that as early as 
volume IV, the f i r s t available volume of the Mugnl, the blessing for 
the deceased "May God have mercy upon him" appears after the name of 
Abu cAbdallah1", although one would have expected him to have been 
alive when that volume was dictated. I have not been able to find a 
satisfactory explanation for this anomaly. The reason for placing the 
blessing for the deceased after Abu cAbdallSh's name in volume IV 
cannot be that this volume was dictated after 369/979. This i s 
contradicted by ^Abd al-ôabbâr's statement that most of the MugnX 
was composed during Abu c Abdallah 's l ife. However, there is a remark 
that seems to indicate that the greater part of the MugnS was 
dictated after cAbd al-óabbár had become a chief Judge. In volume 
VI/2 of the Mugnï cAbd al-ÔabbSr says that he heard al-Sahib b. 
cAbbad giving his opinion on a theological question. He refers to him 
as al-SShib a l -ôa l ï l , adding to his name the blessing "May God make 
the l ife of his Highness long" (adSma 41äh ^uluwwahu) <Mu¿nI, VI/2, 
4: 12). The fact that cAbd al-Gabbär says that he heard al-Çahib 
express his opinion and the respectful way In which he speaks about 
him suggest that when he dictated volume VI/2, he was already a 
chief judge in Rayy. 
It is possible that cAbd al-óabbSr dictated the volumes of the 
Mufinî In a different order. Perhaps he dictated the later volumes of 
the Mu¿nS f i r s t , so that they were dictated when Abu cAbdallah was 
s t i l l al ive. This i s , however, most unlikely, since cAbd al-6abbär 
sometimes refers In the la te r volumes to preceding volumes. Yet even 
if we suppose for a moment that volumes XI-XX were dictated f i r s t , 
so that they were dictated during Abu cAbdallah's l i fe, we would 
expect his name in these volumes to be followed by the blessing for 
the living. However, this Is not the case. In those parts of volumes 
XI-XX that I worked through, I found his name only with the blessing 
for the deceased53 . Sometimes I found i t without any blessing6"* but 
no conclusion can be drawn from this , as the names of Abu Hfiáim and 
other masters also sometimes appear without a blessing**. In none of 
the passages that I studied did I find Abü cAbdallah*s name with the 
blessing for the living. Thus, the occurrence of his name with the 
blessing for the deceased In volume IV of the Mugnl and cAbd a l -
GabbSr's remark that he dictated most of the Μνφιΐ when AbQ 
cAbdalläh was alive cannot be explained by suggesting that the 
volumes of the Mugnl were dictated in a different order. 
Another explanation for the blessing for the deceased after Abu 
'Abdalläh's name might be that the copyist of the Mugnl manuscript 
changed the blessing after Aba ·= Abdallah's name when he copied the 
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Mugnl, more than β century a f t e r AbO 'Abdullah's d e a t h " . I t Is known 
that b l e s s i n g s a f ter names were sometimes changed. When Sulaymfin b. 
Nasir b. Sa c Id ( s i x t h / t w e l f t h century) wrote an abridgement of AbO *1-
Husayn a l - B a s r l ' s KitSb al-mw=tamad f I usOi al-fiq^7, he sa id that 
he changed the b l e s s i n g "May God make h i s l i f e long" íafála 'llSh 
baqS'ahu) a f t e r the name of QSdl Ί-qudfit <cAbd a l -ôabbar) to the 
b l e s s ing "May God have mercy upon him" (rafyiaahu 'llSh> because cAbd 
al-6abbar had died by then. Sometimes SulaymSn forgot to change t h i s , 
s o that the or ig ina l b l e s s i n g "May God make h i s l i f e long" has been 
maintained in some p l a c e s in the abridgment U4uctamad I , 23 , note 4·). 
However, i t should be noted that th i s change of b l e s s i n g s was done 
when a work was rewri t ten and i t i s not at a l l certa in that a copy i s t 
would d e l i b e r a t e l y change something when he was making a copy of a 
work. That the copyis t of the MugnS did not change the b l e s s i n g s 
a f t e r the name of a l -Sah ib [b. =AbbSd] i s further evidence that i t i s 
unl ikely that he changed the b l e s s i n g s a f t e r Abu c Abdallah's name. In 
the manuscript, el-Sahib's name appears with the blessing for the 
living IMugnS, VI/2, 4: 12, Mu$nl XX/2, 25Ô: 16-19), although he had 
died by the time the copy was made in 606/1210. 
Then, why did cAbd al-ôabbSr maintain that he dictated most of 
the Mufnl during the lifetime of Abu 'Abdallah? I must admit that 
this is something I cannot explain. 
At the end of the Mugnl, cAbd al-iabbar mentions books that he 
dictated in the same period as the MugnS Œugnl XX/2, 256: 4-7). 
These works are: 
- Sari} ai-usuJ al-kamsa. This work should not be confused with 
MSnkdlm's critical paraphrase of l t s e . As we have seen, the work that 
was paraphrased by Mankdlm is a commentary made by cAbd al-éabbSr 
on one of his earlier works, KitSb aj-υψθΐ al-kamseP9. 
- èarfy aJ-aagáJíf50. This i s a commentary on al-MaqSlSt, a work by 
Abu Ί-Qäsim al-Balkl*1. 
- BaySn al-mutaàSbih f S 'l-QurW**. This i s an explanation of 
difficult passages in the Qur'an. 
- KitSb aJ-ictimi<fa. 
- Sari? al-gawSmie. It i s likely that one of the collections (¿awaml*) 
referred to is Abü Malm's al-öämi* а1-каЬй*л, but it is not clear 
what the other collections are. We have seen that cAbd al-öabbfir 
dictated a commentary on Abü HSáim's other collection, al-ò&mi* al-
?aglr, in the period before the dictation of the Mugnl**. 
- Kitëb al-tagrXd**-. 
- Sarb. kaèf al-a'rSd*7. 
- a part of Sarfy adab al-gadaF*. The t i t le indicates that Éarfy adab 
al-gadal must be a commentary on a work on the rules of disputation, 
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entitled Adab al-¿adal. It Is not clear who was the author of this 
Adab al-$adal. It Is known that Ibn al-Rfiwandï is the author of a 
work called KltSb adab al-gadal and that there is another book on 
this subject in which al-Balk.1 corrected mistakes that he discovered 
in Ibn al-RSwandl's bookes. cAbd al-Gabbär's commentary may be on one 
of these two works, although it is also possible that i t is a 
commentary on an earlier work on disputation by himself70. 
- answers to questions. cAbd al-ôabbar says that in this period he 
also composed answers to questions. Al-ôusamI (Sarh al-*uyun, 368: 9-
11) and Ibn al-MurtadS iJabaqSt, 113: 12-13) mention works by cAbd 
al-ôabbar that contain answers to questions posed to him. Most of 
these works are named after towns, for instance, al-RSziyySt after 
Royy, al-^AskariyySt after cAskar Mukram, and al-NIsëburiyyët after 
NIsäbQr. They were probably given these names because the questions 
were posed by inhabitants of these towns. 
cAbd al-oabbär's al-Muktasar fi usui al-dm probably also dates 
from the period in which he was chief Judge because he wrote this 
work at the request of al-$ähib. cAbd al-ôabbar does not mention it 
among the books he dictated between 360/990 and 360/990. It is 
therefore possible that he dictated it after he finished the Mugnl, in 
the period 380/990-385/995. Al-Muktasar f I usui al-dSn is a rather 
short work on Muctazlllte doctrine, presumably meant for laymen who 
adhered to Muc tazilism7 ' . 
The t i t l e s of the works mentioned make it clear that in the 
period 360/970-385/995 cAbd al-ÔabbSr composed all kinds of works, 
including an extensive "summa theologica", commentaries on classical 
Muctazilite texts and on some of his own works, works on specific 
subjects of speculative theology, and a work on the Qur'fin. However, 
none of the works from this period seem to deal with legal subjects. 
This is surprising since, as chief judge, one would have expected him 
to have dictated works on law like the two Important works KitSb al-
cumad and KitSb al-nihBya which date from before the Mugnl. 
The End of the Judgeship 
Al-$3hib died in 385/995. In accordance with his wishes, he was 
buried in Isfahan. It is said that =Abd al-ôabbar refused to 
pronounce the funeral prayer of remission for his sins and that Fakr 
al-Dawla arrested cAbd al-ôabbSr for this and fined him heavily7-2. I 
think that this i s a historically inaccurate story, fabricated by cAbd 
al-ôabbar's adversaries on the basis of his opinion that one is 
punished for one's sins unless one really repents of them and that 
there is no intercession for sinners. Even if cAbd al-ôabbSr's 
convictions were so strong that he refused to say the funeral 
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prayer 7 3 , which I doubt, i t is more likely that his arres t and the 
seizure of his properties were the result of the loss of al-SShib's 
patronage, so that he was no longer protected against Fakr al-Dawla's 
actions, Al-Sähib's heirs were no safer from Fakr al-Dawla's actions 
than cAbd al-öabbär and i t i s unlikely that Fakr al-Dawla would have 
defended al-Sahib's honour while at the same time confiscating his 
property and showing his discontent with him. Fakr al-Dawla 
confiscated al-Sahib's property7 ,4, possibly because he was in urgent 
need of money, apparently the reason why, some years earlier he had 
arrested the commander of the army and confiscated his possessions7 5 
and why several officials lost both their positions and their 
properties after al-Sähib's death, and cAbd al-öabbär was probably 
dealt with in the same way as these officials. 
I t is not known when cAbd al-öabbär was released but i t is 
certain that he was not re-established in his position of chief judge 
under the new vizier appointed by Fakr al-Dawla after al-Sähib's 
death. This could not have been the result of his adherence to 
Muctazilism or the Säf i c i te school of law, as the new chief judge of 
Rayy, Abu '1-Hasan cAlï b. cAbd al-cAzIz al-Öurgänl7«, was, like cAbd 
al-öabbär, a Muctazilite and a Säfi c i te IfabaqSt, 115: 4-5 and Sar$ 
al-"uyOn, 380: 11-12). Relations between the new chief Judge and cAbd 
al-öabbär were apparently good, since cAbd al-öabbär said the funeral 
prayer for al-öurganï when he died in 392/1002 (.Sari) al-'uyOn, 380, 
note 83). 
Fakr al-Dawla died in 387/997, only two years after al-Säljib. 
After his death rulership was divided between his eldest son Magd 
al-Dawla in Rayy, and his youngest son Earns al-Dawla in Hamadän. 
However, both sons were minors at the time, so Fakr al-Dawla's widow 
al-Sayyida Sir ín ruled over öibäl as their regent'"7,. She acknowledged 
the supremacy of Bahä' al-Dawla in Bagdad. When Magd al-Dawla70 came 
of age, he did not take over the rulership because his mother refused 
to give up power and continued to rule in his name So, Magd al-Dawla, 
who had been educated by the philologist and grammarian Ibn Far i s , 
occupied himself with his study and his harem. It seems that he had 
an in teres t in Muctazilism, эілсе cAbd al-öabbär wrote a work for 
him, al-Ma¿dI, named after him73 . 
The economic s i tuat ion in Rayy was bad during the regency of 
al-Sayyida and pol i t ical instabi l i ty was perhaps one of the main 
reasons for th is . Unceasing war efforts were needed to ward off 
at tacks from outside and to suppress internal uprisings. Magd a l -
Dawla had to renounce a part of his terr i tory in the west, where 
Zangan and several other towns were occupied by an Âd_arbaygân 
dynasty. Shortly after 398/1007 al-Sayyida made the Kurdish prince 
ôa cfar cAlä' al-Dawla b. KäkGya governor of Isfahan, but this was a 
THE RAYY MU-TAZILA 57 
mistake since cAlä' al-Dawla soon succeeded in making himself 
independent00. The rule of al-Sayyida did not come to an end unt i l 
she died in 419/1026-1029. 
cAbd al-öabbSr died some years before her, having lived to a 
very old age. He had been about sixty years old when he lost his 
position of chief Judge in 385/995. He lived for another thirty years, 
devoting his time to teaching and writing or dictating books. He 
spent most of this time in Rayy, although he visited Bagdad in 
389/999 on his way to Mecca to perform the hagg. On the way back, he 
stayed in Bagdad for some time to teach3 1 . We have seen that one of 
those who studied with him during this stay in Bagdad was the 
Imamite theologian al-Sarïf al-MurtadS"23. cAbd al-GabbSr also visi ted 
other places, such as Qazwïh in 409/1018*3, cAskar Mukram, and 
Isfahan, where he taught his own books'^. When he grew old, he began 
to suffer from gout. I t is said that once, when he needed to go out 
but was unable to do so because of the gout, sar l fs (descendants of 
the Prophet) carried him on their shoulders <$arb al-^uyun, 369: 8-9). 
This i l l u s t r a t e s their great respect for him. 
*Abd al-Gabbfir used to transmit knowledge by both dictation and 
teaching, but apparently he spent more time teaching than 
dictating6*11. When teaching, he may have taught one of his own books. 
Teaching by means of a book became frequent in the fifth/eleventh 
century, whereas dictation was used less often, although i t was not 
completely dropped. The students may have had copies of the work 
that was taught and the master would read this work and explain i t 
to themee . One of the works that cAbd al-öabbSr taught in this way 
was al-Mublt Ы- '1- taklSf. This can be concluded from a remark made 
by Ibn Mattawayh who, in his cr i t ica l paraphrase of this work, says 
•and he [cAbd al-öabbSr] said when he taught this book lal-Mufyif Ы-
•l-taklin..." (wa-q&la fi tadrîs hädä 'l-kltäb....) Œagmu* I, 184: 
11)β 7 ' . The teaching was not always done by cAbd al-öabbär himself. 
We have seen that al-Labbäd, one of his best graduate students 
Cestii»), would be his subs t i tu te <kallfa> in teaching (Serb al-^uyun, 
383: 8 and JabaqSt, 116: 15) θ θ . 
As said before, in the las t period of his l ife cAbd al-GabbSr 
also wrote or dictated books. We know the t i t l e s of some of them. 
These are: 
Tatblt dais 41 al-nubuwwé**. This deals with Muhammad's 
prophetship. According to a notation in the book itself, cAbd a l -
Gabbâr wrote this work in 385/995 э о, the year in which he lost his 
position as chief Judge. 
- al-Mag-df1 . As we have seen, this work was written for Magd al-
Dawla. As Magd al-Dawla was s t i l l very young when Fakr al-Dawla died 
in 367/997, i t is likely that i t was written for him after this date, 
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when he had come of age. 
- Fadl al-i^tizSl wa-fabaqSt ai-Mu* tazilá**. This work contains a 
short summary of the Muctazilite doctrine and biographies of famous 
Mu^tazilites. cAbd al-òabbar composed i t at the request of the 
KwSrizm-èSh ΜβΊηΟη II (г. 390-407/1000-1017) (Fadl, 137-138). 
c Utman 9 S concluded that i t was composed between 38β/99β and 
407/1016. This work was a source for both al-óuèamï's Sarh al-'uyun 
and Ibn al-MurtadS 's fabaqät al-Muc tazüé**. 
- al-AmSlï fi Ч-hadSt, or, NizSm al-fawS4d wa-taqrlb al-muräd li-1-
rS'id. Presumably cAbd al-GabbSr dictated this work after Fadl aJ-
i*tiz31 wa-fabaqSt al-Mwtazila because at the beginning of that work 
he says he will compile a work on hadlt (Fadl, 213: 15). This work on 
hadlt, is probably what la te r became al-AmëlI f I 'l-hadít35. 
^Abd al-óabbër's Death 
There is no agreement among cAbd al-Gabbar's biographers on the 
exact date of his death. Some say that he died in 414/1023 and 
others give the date as 416/1025, but the majority mention the year 
415/1024**. It is reported that eight sar l f s participated in the 
prayer for the deceased at his funeral. One of them was MSnkdlm 
Sasdlw3,,( the author of Taclfq ¿arh al-υφΰΐ al-£amsa. Another 
participant was Abu 'l-cAbbfis al-Sammän, the chief Judge of Rayy at 
that time. He was a Muctazillte and one of the disciples (a$häh) of 
cAbd al-ôabbfir but, unlike ^Abd al-èabbar, he followed the Hanafite 
school of law iSarh al-'uyOn, 391: 2 and note 129). The funeral was 
also attended by Abu Rasïd al-NîsabQrl96, who, as we have seen, 
became the leader of cAbd al-ôabbir 's school-after his death. 
2. Abu Rasld al-NIsäbOrl 
As already mentioned, al-Sayyida ëlrln died in 419/1026, a few years 
after the death of cAbd al-Gabbär. After her death Magd al-Dawla at 
last got the opportunity to rule but, because his mother had always 
kept him out of s t a t e affairs , he had had no practical experience at 
ruling and, unable to maintain order, was forced to ask a 
neighbouring ru ler , Maljmud of Gazna, for assistance. Mahmud willingly 
took up this invitation and came to Rayy with his army in 420/1029 
but, instead of helping Magd al-Dawla, he dethroned him and took 
possession of his terr i tory®9 . Having occupied Rayy, Mahmud sacked 
the city, killed many ci t izens and sent the treasuries of Magd a l -
Dawla, among them fifty camel-loads of books, to Gazna, the capital of 
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his empire. 
Mahmud dealt severely with the Carmathians, the BS{inites and 
the Muctazilites who lived in Rayy. In his report on the capture of 
Rayy that he sent to Caliph al-QSdir in Bagdad he announced that he 
had cleared Rayy from Ba^inite and heretic propaganda and had burnt 
the Mu*=tazilite, philosophical and Sï c i te books that he had come 
across ' 0 0 . He added that the leaders of the Muctazila and the 
extremist SIca were carried off to KurSsSn together with Magd al-
Dawla and his son 1 0 1 . 
Mahmud's severe attitude towards Sl c i tes and Muctazilites may 
have been a demonstration of his loyalty to the cAbbSsid caliphs in 
Bagdad. The caliph al-Qädir (r. 361/991-422/1031) strove to 
strengthen the position of the orthodox Sunnites by issuing a 
proclamation in 408/1017 in which he commanded theologians to remain 
aloof from the Muctazila. The proclamation also forbade speculative 
theology (Ігаіая) and the teaching or discussion of Mu'tazilism 
(I'tizSD and ImSmism (.raff). Those who failed to observe this ban 
would be punished. Because of this proclamation, the Hanafite lawyer 
Abu cAbdallfih al-Saymarl (d. 436/1045) had to renounce his 
Muctazilism in order to be appointed as a Judge in Bagdad'0*. In 
420/1029, several years after the proclamation, Caliph al-Qädir had 
three letters officially read in his palace in which he again rejected 
Muctazilism and SFism1 0*. 
Maljmud*s banishment of the Muctazilites and his report on the 
actions he had taken in Rayy against the Carmathians, the BB^lnites 
and the Muetazilltes can be seen as responses to the caliph's 
proclamations. He might have hoped to win the caliph's favour by 
presenting himself as a fighter for orthodox Sunnite Islam. It is 
possible that he wanted the caliph's legal and moral approval of his 
expansionist policies, which had Involved questionable actions such as 
the deposition of Magd al-Dawla and the occupation of his 
territory'0*. 
After occupying Rayy, Mahmud placed it under the rule of his 
son Mascud and commanded him to subjugate the neighbouring 
dynasties. Obeying this order, Massud first defeated the Daylamlte 
Salar. Then, in 421/1030 he captured Hamadan and Isfahan from the 
Kurd CA18' al-Dawla b. KBkOya, the former Buyid governor'0'. When his 
father Mahmud died In the same year, Massud marched to NlsäbOr and 
claimed the throne'0 6 . Ibn K8kuya made use of his absence to occupy 
Rayy, but this did not last long'OT. He was soon driven out again by 
a force dispatched by Mascud and for several years after this, Rayy 
was ruled by Mas=Qd's governors. It was a turbulent period in which 
the governors of Rayy repeatedly fought Ibn KäkQya. Another 
disruptive factor was the presence of groups of Oguz Turks who 
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raided the d i s t r i c t . In 428/1037 or 429/1038 Rayy was attacked by 
two of these groups 1 0 0 , In the same year Ibn Kfiküya at las t 
succeeded in occupying Rayy, but he ruled over i t for only a short 
period because he died in 433/1041 1 o e . Soon after his death, Rayy was 
occupied by another r is ing power, the Seljuks. 
By then, about fifteen years had passed since the death of cAbd 
al-öabbär. What had happened to his school during this turbulent 
period? Al-Gusamî and Ibn al-Murtadë report that the leadership 
iriyäsä) of the Muctazila after the death of cAbd al-GabbSr passed to 
Abu Rasïd Sa-=ïd b. Muhammad b. SacId al-Nïsâbûrl1 1 0 (.éarh al-'иуйп, 
382: 11-12 and JabaqSt, 116: 4). In the preceding chapter, we saw1 1 ' 
that this leadership did not imply polit ical leadership but i t meant 
that a f ter cAbd al-ôabbâr 's death Abü Raáld was regarded as the most 
outstanding of a l l living Muctazilites. He also became cAbd a l -
Gabbär's successor as master of his school (earl? al-euyim, 382: 13-
14). 
Who was Abü Rasïd? His date of birth is not known but he was 
probably born in the second half of the fourth/tenth century, 
although before 360/970 1 1 : г . At f irst, Abü Rasïd adhered to a 
Mu c tazili te school of the Bagdädian tradit ion. When he was already an 
acknowledged scholar and author of books he went to Rayy to study 
with *=Abd al-Gabbâr, who is said to have received him most 
favourably, and he became one of 'Abd al-Gabbâr's disciples (as^jib) 
(Sarfy al-=uyun, 382: 11 and JabaqSt, 116: 3-4). Abü Raèïd's arr ival in 
Rayy must have preceded the death of al-SShib b. cAbbäd in 385/990 
since he said that he saw the Zaydite Mu'ayyad bi- ' l läh at al-SShib's 
scholarly meetings (tfadS'iq, 266: 1-4). 
The relat ionship between Abu Rasïd and cAbd al-eabbär was 
almost that of two colleagues. Ibn al-MurtadS reports that one day 
'Abd al-ôabbSr was asked to compile a book on opinions CfatSwS) in 
speculative theology ikaläa) that could be read and commented on, as 
was done in law (flqh). However, cAbd al-GabbSr was busy with other 
books and he therefore passed the request on to Abü Rasïd, who 
thereupon compiled DîwSn aJ-usui (fabaqát, 116: 10-13 and Sari} al-
с
иуйп, 382: 18-383: 2). 
After staying with cAbd al-öabbSr for some time, Abü Raèïd went 
back to NïsSbür, where he had a study-circle (^aJqa) of 
theologians1131 (¿ar^i al-cuyOn, 382: 18 and JabaqSt, 116: 9-10). He 
la ter returned to Rayy, where he remained unt i l his death (èarfy al-
c
uyQn, 382: 14-16). He also visited uurgfin, perhaps on his Journey to 
or from NIsabDr. I t is reported that he made a new version of Dîwân 
al-υφΰΐ in Gurgan, because people there had objected to the sequence 
of the subjects in the f i r s t version that he had composed in Rayy. In 
the f i r s t version he discussed the subject of substances (gawâhir) 
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and accidents (.acr5tf> before discussing the unity itawhld) and the 
Justice (-"atfJ) of God. In the new version the sequence of subjects 
was changed, so that the subjects of substances and accidents were 
discussed at a la ter stage (èarfy аі-^иуйп, 383: 2-5). 
Abu Rasïd was in Rayy when cAbd al-öabbär died in about 
4-15/1024. This can be concluded from the fact that he is mentioned 
among the mourners at cAbd al-öabbär's f u n e r a l ' 1 Л . Assuming that Abu 
Raáld was born before 360/970, he must have been at least fifty-four 
when he became the new leader of the school after cAbd al-öabbär's 
death. We do not known how much longer he lived after this because 
the date of his death is unknown11E'. I t is possible that five years 
later , in 420/1029, he witnessed the occupation of Rayy by Mahmud. If 
so, he probably was not among the Muctazilite leaders who were 
banished by MahmQd because el-ôusamï says that Abu Ras Id stayed in 
Rayy unt i l he died (.¿arfj al-^uyûn, 382: 14-16). It is possible that he 
went into hiding. We can only speculate about the last part of his 
life because the biographers are s i lent about i t . 
3. Abu '1-Husayn al-Basrl 
Another of cAbd al-öabbär 's important disciples was Abu '1-Husayn a l -
Basrl Muhammad b. c A l ï 1 , e , who was born in Basra. He studied with 
cAbd al-öabbär in Rayy, but he also studied philosophy with Ibn a l -
Samh (d. 418/1027) in Bagdad11T. Like =Abd al-Öabbär, Abu '1-Husayn 
was both a theologian and a jur i s t but, unlike cAbd al-öabbär, he 
followed the Hanafite school of law1'*1. He spent most of his l i fe in 
Bagdad, where he taught and wrote or dictated books on Muc tazilite 
theology and on law. It i s likely that he had already s tar ted to 
teach before 4 1 5 / 1 0 2 4 ' , e . We have seen that in 408/1017 Caliph a l -
Qädir had issued his proclamation in which he forbade the teaching of 
Muetazilism. Abu '1-Husayn apparently did not observe this 
prohibition. 
The doctrine of Abu '1-Husayn120 differed at several points 
from the doctrine of cAbd al-öabbär. Al-Häkim al-öusamï and Ibn a l -
Murtfldä report that the Bahsamiyya121 felt an antipathy towards Abu 
'1-Husayn, accusing him of the adoption of theories from the 
philosophers and the refutation of arguments of the Muctazllite 
masters in a way they could not approve of (.èarfy al-cuyQn, 387: 15-
18, and fabaqSt, 119: 2-4). Points of difference between cAbd a l -
Öabbär and Abu '1-Husayn are mentioned by al-Sahrastfinl (479/1086-
548/1153) in his book about religions and sec ts . In his judgment, Abu 
'1-Husayn was a philosopher who presented his doctrine to the 
Muctazilites as if i t was speculative theology (kalen) IMilal I, 85: 
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3_9-)is-*_ Fakr ai-Dm al-RazI <543/l149-606/1209) considered the 
followers of Abu '1-Husayn to form a Muctazilite school separate from 
the Bahsamiyya and referred to this school as al-Husayniyya 
(.FtlqedSt, 45). 
These observations indicate that because of a divergence of 
opinion between master and disciple, the school of cAbd al-öabbSr 
spl i t into two schoo l s l 5 3 , the Bahsamiyya and the Husayniyya. The 
same thing had happened before, when the school of Abu cAlï sp l i t 
into the Bahsamiyya and the Iksïdiyya, but with this difference: there 
are no reports about hos t i l i t i e s between the Baháamiyya and the 
Husayniyya. The school al-RSzï refers to as "Bahsamiyya" was probably 
the school of cAbd al-ôabbar's successor Abü Rasïd al-NIsSbûrl and 
his followers. Others may have followed Abu '1-Husayn al-Basrï, 
forming a new Muc tazilite school. 
Adherents to the school of Abu '1-Husayn included Mahmud a l -
MalShiml al-KwSrizmI1-rA, who is considered the most prominent of Abu 
'1-Husayn's disciples. Two of Abu '1-Husayn's other disciples were Aba 
CA1I b. al-Walid <d. 478/1066), who at f i rs t had been a disciple of 
cAbd al-ôabbSr but who had la ter become a disciple of AbO '1 -
Husayn l a s , and Abu '1-QSsim b. Barhan (d. 456/1064), who lived in 
Bagdad 1 г в . A la te r adherent was TaqI al-DIn a l-Nagranl 1 2 7 , who lived 
in the sixth/twelfth century. In his work he refers to AbO Husayn al-
Basrl and Rukn al-DIn al-Kwärizml12β as being his masters. Ibn a l-
Murtadl says that AbQ '1-Husayn and his disciple al-Malfihiml were 
followed by many of the la ter theologians and by most of those 
Imämites who adhered to Mu c tazi la 1 2 e (JabaqSt, 119: 9-11). There were 
also Zaydites who partly adhered to Abu '1-Husayn's doct r ine 1 3 0 . 
4. Mánkdlm ëasdïw 
A contemporary of Aba RaSId and AbO '1-Husayn was the Zaydite sarlf 
Abu '1-Husayn Ahmad b. Abi Häsim Muhammad al-Husaynl al-Qazwínl131 , 
who was named "Mfinkdlm" and whose surname was "Sasdîw". He was a 
disciple of the Zaydite imam al-Mu'ayyad b i - ' l i a h , 3 a and stayed with 
him in Langfi in Daylamin where al-Mu'ayyad Ы-'llSh had his residence. 
Like many other Zaydite theologians, they both felt attracted to 
Muctazilite theology1 э э . When al-Mu'ayyad died in 411/1020, Mânkdïm 
said the funeral prayer for him and then departed for Rayy to study 
Muctazilite theology. It is not clear how long he stayed there, but 
we know that he was in Rayy when =Abd al-ôabbSr died (in 415/1024, 
414/1023 or 416/1025) as he is mentioned among the sarlfs who 
attended his funeral. In 417/1026 he was back 1л Langa, where he 
tried unsuccessfully to be accepted by the Zaydites as their imSm. He 
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may have returned to Rayy after this failure because i t i s known 
that he died there in 425/1034 , Э А . By then the pol i t ical s i tuat ion 
had changed in Rayy because i t was under ôaznavid rule from 420/1029 
to 429/1036. We have seen that Mahmüd took action against the 
Muc tazilites in Rayy, but i t is not known whether this affected 
MSnkdlm. 
It is not clear whether MSnkdlm ever studied with cAbd a l -
éabbâr himself. He was probably trained in Muctazilism by his master 
al-Mu'ayyad, who himself had studied with Abu cAbdall8h al-Basrl and 
later with cAbd al-ôabbfir. I t is possible that MSnkdlm attended 
lessons given by eAbd al-öabbSr when he was in Rayy after 411/1020, 
although by then cAbd al-SabbSr was more than eighty-five years old 
and perhaps for that reason was no longer engaged in teaching, 
plagued as he was by gout. 
As we have seen 1 3 *, MSnkdlm is the author of a c r i t i ca l 
paraphrase (ta^Hq) of ^Abd al-òabbSr's Sari} aJ-usuJ al-jtamsa. This 
paraphrase probably dates from the time after cAbd al-ôabb&r's death 
because at the very beginning cAbd al-öabbSr*s name is mentioned 
with the blessing for the deceased <Гас1Гд, 39: 4). It seems to have 
been a widely used work on Mu c tazil ite doctrine since several copies 
have survived up to the p r e s e n t ' a e and a commentary on i t was 
written by al-Muhall l 1 3 7 ' . It is not known whether MSnkdlm had 
students but, as he composed a work like Ta'lïq éarfr aJ-usöJ al-
kamsa, i t i s likely that he did teach Muctazilite theology. However, 
we do not know the names of any of his students. Nor is i t known 
whether he is the author of any works other than Ta*lSq Sarfy al-υψθΐ 
al-jçamsa. 
Although MSnkdlm was a Zaydite13"*, in the Tacllq he usually 
identifies himself with the Muetazila, to whom he refers as the 
People of Just ice. We have seen that he refers to them as "our 
companions" (a^Sbuna) and he often places the t i t l e "our master" 
(.éaykunS) before the name of a Muctazilite master. He distances 
himself from the Muetazila when he discusses the lm&mate, Juxtaposing 
Zaydite and Mu c tazili te opinion on this subject and using the 
expression "in our opinion" (*indana~) with respect to the Zaydite 
opinion amd referring to "the Muc t az i l i tes" and "they" with respect to 
Mu<=tazilite opinion (Ta*lfq, 753: 17-754: 16). 
5. Ibn Mattawayh 
In 434/1042, some years after the death of MSnkdlm, Rayy was 
occupied by the Seljuk Tugril-beg. The Seljuks were a group of Oguz 
Turks who had moved into &urSs5n and had occupied the towns Marw, 
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Harät and NïsSbür before they captured Rayy. After i t s occupation, 
Rayy became the capital of Tugril-Beg's empire unti l he made Isfahan 
the capital in 442/10501 3*. In 447/1055 Tugril-beg occupied Bagdad 
which meant the end of the empire of the BQyids. 
In Bagdad Tugril-beg was acknowledged as sultan by Caliph a l -
QS'im who had succeeded his father al-Qâdir in 422/1031. Al-Qä'im 
continued his father 's t radi t ional is t polit ics and, like him, he 
forbade the teaching of Muctazilism. In 433/1041 he held a meeting in 
his palace with BagdSdian scholars and ascetics, where his father's 
proclamation against Muctazilism and Sï^ism was read again and a l l 
those present had to sign it1·"·0. However, despite his loyalty to the 
caliph, Tugril-beg seems to have left the Muctazilites undisturbed, 
perhaps because of his preference for the Hanafite school of law, to 
which most of the Muctazilites belonged1 * ' . He disliked Sâficism, 
hence his host i le a t t i tude towards the As'=ariyya, most of whom were 
ès f i^ i t es ' ·* 2 . Because of his preference for the Hanafite school, 
Tugril-beg appointed Hanafite Judges and built new mosques for the 
Hanafites, such as the new congregational mosque in Rayy1 ·". In 
Nîsâbûr he founded the madrasa al-Sul^äniyya, in which Hanafite law 
was taught1*·*. 
As a resu l t of Tugril-beg's preference for the Hanafite school, 
the position of the Mu c tazili tes improved. In Nîsâbûr the Muctazilite-
Hanafite Abu '1-Hasan CA1I b. al-Hasan al-Sandall (d. 404/1091) 
enjoyed good rela t ions with the Seljuk government. He occupied the 
position of preacher (kaf!bVAS at the Old Congregational Mosque in 
NïsSbür for nine years. Another Muctazilite who had an official 
function under the Seljuks was Abu Bakr Muhammad al-N5sihî (d. 
484/1091). He had specialized in Hanafite law and was appointed as a 
judge, f i r s t in NïsSbür and la ter in Rayy1Ae. We do not know whether 
he also taught Muctazilism in Rayy. It is known that in the early 
Seljuk period Mu c tazili te theology was taught in Rayy by the 
t radi t ionis t and Juris t IsmS'ïl b. CA1I al-SammSn (d. after 
447/1056) ,4 : ' · and by al-Mursad bi- 'llSh Abu '1-Husayn Yahyfi (d. 
477/1084). Al-Mursad bi- ' l lSh was a Zaydite Jurist who combined 
Muctazilite theology with Zaydite law1 A e . One of his students was 
Abu Muhammad IsmS'ïl b. cAlï al-FarrazSdl who, like Mânkdïm, was the 
author of a tacllq on cAbd al-GabbSr's SarÇ aJ-usuJ aJ-iraasa1 л 9 . 
Their presence in Rayy is evidence of the fact that in the early 
Seljuk period there were Zaydites in Rayy who studied Mu ctazilite 
doctrine. 
Although the early Seljuks themselves did not adopt a hard line 
against the Mu c tazi l i tes, there was in those days b i t ter enmity 
towards the Mu c tazi l i tes from tradi t ional i s t Sunnites, especially from 
their adherents among the common people. In Bagdad both the 
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Mu^tazilites and the As c arites were attacked several times by mobs 
that supported t radi t ional i s t Sunnism 1 6 0 . 
One of the Mu c tazi l i tes who probably lived in the Gaznavid and early 
Seljuk periods was Abu Muhammad al-Hasan b. Ahmad b. Mattawayh 1 S 1 . 
It is not known whether he lived in Rayy during this period because 
the dates and places of his birth and death are unknown, as is 
information about where he lived. Some1*2 say he died in 469/1076, 
o t h e r s 1 * 3 in 468/1075. Madelung1 & л thinks that neither of these 
dates is rel iable and that he may have died ear l ier . Al-Gusamï's 
assertion that Ibn Mattawayh studied with cAbd al-Gabbär idarase 
r
-alä QSdî Ί-qudäi) is one of the few indications of when he lived 
(Sarh al-^uyun, 389: 15). That Ibn Mattawayh did study with cAbd a l -
Gabbär himself seems to be confirmed by remarks he made in his 
works. Sometimes he refers to what cAbd al-Gabbâr said in his 
lessons, for instance, "he said when he taught this book..."1*6 
(Ма£дйс I, 184: 11). This suggests that he personally attended 
lessons given by cAbd al-Gabbär about the Magmu·1 Ы-4-taklíf, 
although he may be simply reporting what he heard others say about 
these lessons. 
If Ibn Mattawayh did study with cAbd al-Gabbär, this was 
probably when cAbd al-GabbSr was a very old man and Ibn Mattawayh a 
young student . He seems to have been younger than cAbd al-ôabbfir's 
other s tudents , something which can be deduced from the place he is 
given in the generation (.pabaqa) of cAbd al-Gabbär's students in a l -
Gusamï's Sarfy al-cuyun, which usually mentions the persons belonging 
to the same pabaqa in a loose chronological order1 s s . Since Ibn 
Mattawayh is mentioned as cAbd al-Gabbär's second to last student, 
this indicates that he was probably younger than the other students. 
Another Indication for Ibn Mattawayh's young age is the place he 
is given in a chain of transmission of Muctazilism described in the 
introduction to Abu Muhammad IsmäcIl b. ·=Α1ϊ al-Farrazádí 's 
commentary (ía cJiq) on cAbd al-Gabbär's Sarfy al-υφθΐ al-kamsa, Al-
Farrazâdî i s said to have obtained his knowledge of Muctazilism from 
Muljammad b. Mazdak1ST, who had obtained i t from Ibn Mattawayh, who 
had obtained i t from Abu Raéïd al-Nîsabûrl, who had obtained i t from 
cAbd al-Gabbär, who had obtained i t from Abu cAbdalläh al-Basrl and 
so on 1 B e . Although this chain is not considered historically 
rel iable1 S 9 , i t shows that al-Farrazâdï considered Ibn Mattawayh as a 
student of Abu Reàïd al-NïsSbûrï. We do not know whether Ibn 
Mattawayh really was one of Abü RaéWs students but, whatever the 
case, his place in the chain of transmission shows that Ibn Mattawayh 
was considered to be younger than Abu Raaïd. This chain of 
transmission p also shows that Ibn Mattawayh belonged to the 
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Bahèamiyya as i t was continued by Abu Raèïd and that he did not 
belong to the Husayniyya. After Abu Rasïd's death he probably became 
the leader of Bahèamiyya, as can be concluded from the chain of 
transmission. 
It i s not known whether Ibn Mattawayh lived in Rayy. He may 
have had to live elsewhere because of Mahmüd of ôazna's host i l i ty 
towards the Mu c tazil i tes and extremist S u i t e s there. If he did live 
in Rayy during the ôeznavid rule , he may have had to hide his 
Muctazilism unt i l 434/1041, the year in which the Seljuks gained 
control of Rayy. It is known that in the early Seljuk period 
Mu c tazili te theology was taught in Rayy by some Muctazilites and Ibn 
Mattawayh may have been one of them. 
Ibn Mattawayh was not a Zaydite: his opinion on the imSmate 
differed from the Zaydite opinion. This can be concluded from the 
t i t l e of a work written by the Zaydite QSdï Gacfar in which he 
refutes Ibn Mattawayh's opinion on the imSmate. The t i t l e of the work 
is : K. al-naqd cal5 finito magati* al-mutilf fl-mS kälafa flhi al-
zaydiyya min beb al-imäma'1*0 (Refutation of the opinions on the 
imSmate by which the author of Magmüc al-MuÇIf opposed the 
Zaydiyya). Yet, Ibn Mattawayh had Sr=ite sympathies because he is 
said to have confirmed the superiority of CA1I over Abu Bakr in his 
Kitäb al-klfäya but he seems not to have been an Imâmite â l ^ i t e ' 6 1 . 
The following works by Ibn Mattawayh are known: 
- al-Magmu* f I 'l-mufylf bi-'l-takllf. As we have seen, this work is a 
c r i t i ca l paraphrase of cAbd al-öabbar's al-Mufylt bi-'l-takllf. From the 
fact that Ibn Mattawayh sometimes adds the blessing for the deceased 
to ^Abd al-öabbSr's name , e 2 , i t can be concluded that the Magmu* was 
composed af ter 414/1023. In volume II of the MagaO' (II, 35: 10) AbQ 
Räsid al-NIsäbürl 's name is mentioned with the blessing for the 
deceased but, as i t is not known when he died, no conclusion can be 
drawn from this with respect to the years in which the MagmO* was 
composed. 
- al-Ta¿kira fi ahkSm al-gaw&hir wa-'l-acrSd. Two al ternative t i t l e s 
of this work are Risala fi la f If al-kaläm and al-Tadkira fi cilm al-
kaläm (Ta^kira, 1 7 - 2 0 ) і е з . As the f i rs t t i t l e indicates, this work 
deals with substances and accidents. 
- al-Klfëyai&*. This work has been mentioned above. 
- Kitäb al-ta^rlr***. 
- Ta*llq al-ifyS^a i s possibly also a work by Ibn Mattawayh. There is 
an anonymous manuscript with this t i t l e in the library of al-óàmi·1 
al-КаЫг in Sanofi' and Ibn Mattawayh is mentioned as the possible 
a u t h o r ' e e . 
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6. The Mir=tazila from the Fifth/Eleventh to the 
Eighth/Fourteenth Century 
The last generation of Muctazilites mentioned by al-Gusaml and Ibn 
al-Murtadä is the generation of ^Abd al-ôabbâr's students. That they 
do not mention Muctazilites from a later generation is an indication 
that they knew of no later famous Muctazilites. Certainly, there were 
s t i l l Muctazilites after =Abd al-Gabbär's students had died but 
adherence to Muctazila decreased. In BagdSd Muctazilism gradually 
disappeared, although in the sixth/twelfth century Mu^tazilite 
theology was s t i l l taught by some Hanafite scholars1 6 7 . There were 
s t i l l Muctazilites in Rayy in the first half of the sixth/twelfth 
century. One of them was a chief judge who followed the Hanafite 
school of law 1 s e . 
At the beginning of the sixth/twelfth century the Seljuk sultans 
favoured the èsfi^ites and Ascarism, but sultan Massud b. Muhammad 
(r. 529/1134-547/1152) favoured the Hanafites again, as Tugril-beg 
had done earlier. However, Maljmud's preference of Hanafism did not 
imply that he favoured Muctazilism. Rather, he supported Mfiturldism 
and wanted the Muctazilites to accept MSturldism. However, when they 
refused to do so, he did not take action against them169 as he had 
against the As'arites1"70. It seems that he tolerated Muctazilism 
because the Muctazilites were mostly Hanafites. This may have been 
the reason that Mu=tazilite doctrine was s t i l l taught in Rayy and 
Bagdad during this period, although probably only on a small scale. 
At the end of the sixth/twelfth century Muctazilism s t i l l 
existed, but i t was clearly losing ground1T'. A district in which 
Muctazilism survived for a long time was KwSrizm, where it had 
already existed in cAbd al-öabbSr's time - he wrote his Fadl al-
ictizBl wa-fabaqät al-MuŒtazila at the request of the KwSrizm-sSh 
Ma'mün II. A well-known ]£wSrizmian Muctazilite was el-ZemaksSrl 
(467/1075-538/1144), who wrote a famous commentary on the Qur'fin17-2. 
In the last half of the sixth/twelfth century Fakr al-DIn al-RSzï 
(543/1149-606/1209), an Ascarite theologian from Rayy, visited 
Kwarizm and Transoxania where he engaged in disputes with the 
Muctazilites1 т э . In FtlqSdSt firaq al-muslimln va- 'l-muérliln, a 
short work on sects, he says that, of all the Muctazilite groups 
(.firaq) that he has described, only the adherents (a$fr&b) of Abu 
Hisim and the adherents of Abu '1-Husayn al-Basri have survived 
(FtlqSdSt, 45). It can be concluded from this that, by then, the 
Muctazilite school of BagdSd, which had continued the doctrine of Abu 
'1-Qasim al-Balkl, had disappeared altogether. The Muctazilites living 
in Bagdad probably belonged to the Husayniyya or the Bahsamiyya. 
In &wfirizm Muctazilism continued to exist until at least the 
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eighth/fourteenth century. The traveller Ibn Baffuta (704/1304-
779/1377) reported that when he visited the town KwSrizm shortly 
before the year 734/1334, a group of prominent people came to v i s i t 
him. They informed him that the prevailing doctrine among them was 
Mu° tazilism, although they did not openly profess i t because the 
ruler, Sultan özbeg (a Mongol prince, Khan of the Golden Horde, r. 
712/1312-742/1341), and his governor were orthodox Sunnites (Rillet 
Ibn Batfüta, 360). By then Mu"=tazilism was on the verge of 
disappearing, as can be concluded from the silence of sources about 
Muctazilites living la te r than the eighth/fourteenth century1"7·*. The 
hosti le a t t i tude of the ru le rs of JCwärizm towards Muctazilism, as 
described by Ibn Baffufa, makes i t unlikely that even here 
Muctazilism survived much longer. 
However, Muctazilite principles survived in another way, not as 
a separate doctrine, but within the doctrine of the Zaydites of 
Yemen. We have seen that some Zaydites in the Caspian provinces 
pertly adopted Mu c tazil i te doctrine. They took their doctrine with 
them to Yemen, where Zaydism continues to exist up to our time. This 
explains why manuscripts of Muctazilite works can be found in 
l ibrar ies in Yemen. Muc tazilite ideas also survived, but on a smaller 
scale, within the doctrine of the Imfimite èr=ites, especially in their 
legal theory and methodology. The Imâmite theologian al-Sayk. al-Mufld 
0=Alam al-HudS) (d. 1043/1022) and his disciple Abu òa ' far al-MurtadS 
(èayJL al-TS'ifa) (d. 436/1044), who both studied with -=Abd al-Öabbär, 
adopted many Muctazilite opinions1 7 6 . Through al-Murtadä's disciple 
Sayk al- jQsI <d. 459/1067) Muctazilite ideas found acceptance in 
Imâmite theology 1 7 e . 
7. Conclusion 
It seems that the Mu^tazila of Rayy achieved their greatest number 
of adherents under ^Abd al-óabbSr, as can be concluded from the many 
Muc tazili tes who are said to have studied with him iSarff al-cuyun, 
365: 10-11). Without doubt, the support of the BQyid vizier al-Sähib 
b. cAbbSd, who favoured Muctazilism, stimulated the growth of the 
school of Rayy. When al-SShib died, the Muctazilites lost their 
pol i t ical support and their position was weakened. The si tuat ion 
became even more unfavourable when Rayy was occupied by the 
Gaznavid MaljmOd, who disapproved of Muctazilism. Although there is no 
exact information about adherence to Muctazilism in those days, i t is 
likely that Mahmüd's a t t i tude had a negative influence. In Bagdad the 
position of the Muetazlla had at an earlier stage deteriorated as a 
resul t of the proclamations of the caliphs al-Qädir and al-QS'im. I t 
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is clear that adherence to Muctazilism was diminishing in the second 
half of the fifth/eleventh century, although Muctazilite theology was 
s t i l l taught. Muctazilism continued to exist in KwSrizm, but even 
there i t may have disappeared af ter the eighth/fourteenth century. 
As a resu l t of the scarcity of information about the Muctazila 
of Rayy we do not know exactly what the relationship between cAbd 
al-öabbär, Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh was. Ibn Mattawayh seems to 
have belonged to a younger generation than MSnkdlm, although they 
are both mentioned as students of cAbd al-ôabbâr. They were 
undoubtedly his disciples in the sense that they belonged to his 
school and adhered to his doctrine. However, i t is not known with 
certainty whether they studied with cAbd al-öabbSr personally. If 
they attended lessons given by cAbd al-6abbSr himself this must have 
been when he was already very old. Nevertheless, Mânkdïm and Ibn 
Mattawayh had a thorough knowledge of cAbd al-Gabbar's doctrine, as 
becomes clear from their c r i t ica l paraphrases. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE ONTOLOGY AND PERCEPTION OF РАШ 
1. The Existence of Pain 
cAbd al-èabbër Introduces the subject of pain in volume XIII of the 
Mugnï with a short survey of different non-Muctazilite and 
Muctazilite opinions on pain and suffering. Then he turns his 
at tention to the question of how we know that pain exists1 . I t 
becomes clear that he is not concerned with the actual existence of 
pain, but rather with establishing (ItbBt) the existence of pain in 
general. The point i s whether pain is a really existing thing or 
whether we suffer because of the absence of something that we need. 
Closely related to this question is the question of how we know the 
existence of things. If we declare that something exists , what 
arguments can be put forward to prove this? How can we know things 
and what are rel iable ways to knowledge? 
As for perceptible things, i t can be argued that the fact that 
they are perceived proves their existence, if i t is taken for granted 
that perception i s a re l iable way to knowledge. However, some 
philosophers, such as the Sceptics, deny that perception is a rel iable 
way to knowledge. They maintain that perception cannot be trusted as 
we are sometimes deceived by our senses. They point out that we may 
see things that do not really exis t , such as mirages. cAbd al-öabbSr 
appears to have been acquainted with the Sceptics' opinion on this 
matter that in his time was adhered to by people to which he refers 
as Sophists2 . He declares that if a Sophist (Saflsjël) is asked about 
perception as a rel iable way to knowledge, he would say: 
I don't believe the perceived things (.mudrakSt), and my 
soul Cnafs) i s not quie t 3 about what I believe concerning 
their existence, or the difference between black and white, 
sweet and sour, long and short , small and big (Mugnl XII, 
42: 20-43: 1). 
cAbd al-6abbär disagrees with the Sophists. He is convinced that 
perception is a re l iable way to the knowledge of things. Discussing 
the question of how we know that pain ex is t s , he says: 
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Know, that there Is no clearer way to the knowledge of a 
thing (¿a/0 than perception UdrSk). When something Is 
perceived, there is no need for an indication (dalli) in 
order to establish i t s existence Ufu¿nl XIII, 229: 19-20>*. 
In this context, "thing" (.Say1) means anything that can be known, 
irrespective of whether it i s material or ljnmaterials. 
In the quoted passage, cAbd al-6abbar mentions two ways of 
acquiring knowledge about something. One way is the perception of the 
thing in question. When something is not perceptible, i t must be 
known in another way. In that case it can be known by deduction. 
According to cAbd al-ôabbâr's theory, deduction implies that one 
reflects on something that i s already known by perception or by 
deduction. Whereas perception is directed at the thing to be known, 
reflection (ла^аг)* is not directed at the thing to be known itself, 
but at another thing, which is already known, and that functions as 
an indication (dalHP of the thing to be known. 
Pain is perceptible. Therefore, *=Abd al-ôabbSr declares that in 
order to known whether pain exists it is not necessary to reflect on 
something else that functions as an Indication of i t s existence. The 
existence of pain is known by perception because a person who is In 
pain perceives pain in his body. However, we should note that cAbd 
al-öabbar only says about the existence of pain that i t i s not 
necessary for us to reflect on something else. He does not say that 
this also holds for knowledge about other aspects of pain, such as 
the way In which pain comes Into existence. 
Mänkdlm enumerates seven sorts (anwSc) of perceptible things, pain 
being one of them. He declares that as these things are perceptible, 
i t is not necessary to prove their existence; only the details related 
to them need to be proved <ГасІГд, 92: 9-12). As for Ibn Mattawayh, 
he declares that pain i s one of the most distinct perceptible things, 
and that because of this, i t s existence can be established without an 
indication idalSlá)* ŒafmQ* III, fol. За). From this i t can be 
concluded that Mänkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh agree with eAbd al-öabbar 
that the existence of pain is known by perception. 
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2. cAbd al-GabbSr's Opinion that Pain Is a Ma'nä 
Once the existence of pain has been established, the question ar ises 
as to what kind of thing pain i s . cAbd al-öabbar, MSnkdïm and Ibn 
Mattawayh agree that pain is a perceptible thing, but what i s i t 
exactly that i s perceived? cAbd al-éabbar says that what is perceived 
is a macnS, but what does he mean by ma^nS? And what does he mean 
when he reports that his master Abu Ishfiq b. =Ayyäs9 denied that 
pain is a ma^nS? (Mugnî DC, 59: 9). Before answering the question of 
what cAbd al-èabbfir means by ma^nâ, i t will be useful to briefly 
consider his theory about the s t ructure of beings In this world10 . 
In cAbd al-öabbär 's theory, material things (objects) consist of 
substances igawShirVл and accidents (.acrä<f). The accidents inhere in 
the substra te (mafyalï) that is formed by the substances and give the 
objects their forms and appearances. In a substance several accidents 
can inhere, but a substance must always have In i t the accident of 
spat ial occupation (taifayyuzV* and the accident of i t s mode of being 
(kaum) a t that moment. The mode of being of a substance takes Into 
consideration whether i t i s separated from another substance or i s 
Joined with i t . The mode of being of a substance also takes into 
consideration whether the substance is moving or Is at res t . Whether 
a substance is separated or Joined with another substance, and 
whether or not i t is moving is determined by the accident of the 
mode of being that inheres in i t at that moment. The substance's 
other qual i t ies are determined by other accidents. 
This makes i t clear that the term "mode of being" (Jrawn) derives 
from philosophical discussions about objects and how they are buil t 
up. However, cAbd al-ôabbâr does not make a clear distinction between 
the philosophical and physical aspects. The two aspects are often 
mixed, so that philosophical terms are used to describe a physical 
real i ty . For instance, in his discussions of pain he uses the term 
"mode of being" also to refer to Injuries in living bodies, taking 
into consideration that one of the modes of being is separation and 
that an injury in a living body implies that separation exists In the 
wounded part of this body13. This may lead to a particular way of 
arguing. For instance, when he defends his opinion that pain is a 
perceptible ma=nS and explains that i t is the pain that i s perceived 
and not the Injury, he says: "Is not separation (.tafrlq) a mode of 
being (irawn) that happens in a particular way? A mode of being 
cannot be perceived1*, so how can someone distinguish between i t s 
[the separation's] subs t ra te (mafyalX) and the other substrates?" 
(.Mugnl XIII, 262: 9). An explanation for cAbd al-GabbSr's mixing of 
philosophical and physical aspects may be found In the value he 
attaches to perception as a source of knowledge. The problem that 
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confronts him Is how to incorporate into Muctazilite cosmology, based 
as i t is on philosophical reflection, that which is known by 
perception about things such as pain. This may lead to a mixture of 
physical and philosophical aspects. 
According to cAbd al-Gabbâr's doctrine, some accidents can 
inhere in any subst ra te , but other accidents need a special subst ra te 
for which certain conditions must be fulfilled. In other words, some 
accidents can inhere in a subst ra te only if certain other accidents 
simultaneously inhere in i t . For instance, the accident of the power 
of acting can only exist in a living being. This implies f i rs t that i t 
needs a subst ra te in which the accident of composition (ta'llf) 
inheres, so that the atoms together form a body. Secondly, this body 
must have a special s t ructure in order to be the body of a living 
being, which implies that the accident for this s t ructure must inhere 
in i t . Thirdly, in order to be living, the substrate must have the 
accident of l i fe in i t . Only if a l l these accidents inhere in the 
substra te can the accident of the power of acting inhere in i t i s . 
The Concept Ma^nS 
Let us return to what cAbd al-GabbSr means when he says that pain is 
а ша
с
ла\ In the Mugnl, cAbd al-oabbâr uses the term ma^nS in 
different senses. Sometimes he uses i t with i t s common meaning, 
"sense" or "meaning", He also uses the term ma^nS to refer to that 
which transmigrates from one body to the other, as is believed by 
those who defend the doctrine of the transmigration of souls 
(.tanäsuk) (Mu¿nl XIII, 379: 18-380: l ) l e . However, when he speaks 
about issues such as the qual i t ies of beings and the way in which 
these qual i t ies come into existence, i t is obvious that he uses the 
term ma^nS in a different sense. 
Several mutakalllmun, and not only Muc tazilites, used macnë as a 
technical term with a specific meaning17. What this meaning was 
exactly, and how i t can be adequately translated are questions which 
have occupied the minds of scholars studying the works of these 
mutakallimurfe. Frank studied the term masna~ as i t is used by several 
mutakallimun in order to clarify i t s technical meaning in the kalBm 
in genera l 1 9 . At the end of the f i r s t part of his ar t ic le , having 
given examples from the Mugnf and other works, he concludes that: 
Many other examples may be found but these few will more 
than suffice to demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt 
that the term ma^nS, in this technical sense, means an 
immediate, intr insic causal determinant20 . 
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His Interpretation of macnS has been adopted by several scholars , but 
in a later article Frank21 expressed some dissatisfaction with his 
first interpretation because, he said, it was based on the texts of 
later authorities, and might not hold for writers of the earlier 
period. 
Daiber made an extensive study of the theological-philosophical 
system of the Muctazilite Mucammar b. =Abbfid al-Sulamï (d. 215/830). 
In this study he describes the specific meaning of the term ma'nS in 
Mu°ammar's philosophy where шасла" refers to an entity that 
determines something and which itself is determined by another maena~, 
so that there is a chain of ma'Bnl. Daiber points out that other 
authors may not use the term ma'nñ in this sense. With respect to 
Mu<"-ammar's and cAbd al-ôabbar's use of the term macnä, he says: 
Im Hintergrund dieser Interpretation der ma^Snl als 
wesenhaft bestimmende und gleichzeitig durch weitere 
да
с
алІ bestimmte Ursachen der Schöpfung ist Pretzls2 2 
Erklärung der macSnI als Synonym für *ilal "Ursachen", die 
übrigens bereits ^AbdalgabbSr, al-Mu&nl V, S. 253, 9 f. 
gebracht hat, unzureichend. Denn sie verabsolutiert unter 
Mißachtung des Wesens des Mucammarschen jnecan.F-Theorie 
eine Spezifikation der mas8nl in der Schöpfungslehre. 
Parallelstellen können nur dann kombiniert und zur 
gegenseitigen Deutung herangezogen werden, wenn ihre 
Bedeutung im Gesamtsystem klar i s t 2 9 . 
It i s therefore necessary to study cAbd al-öabbSr's works and find 
out which meaning macnS has in his works. 
Descriptions of the meaning of macnS as i t was used by cAbd al-
ôabbSr can be found in monographs on him. I will now quote 
definitions and translations of macnS by Peters, Monnot and Bernand 
as found in their monographs on cAbd al-Gabbar. Peters translates 
та*пВ as "qualifier" and he explains i t s meaning as: 
Ma*nS: qualifier, accident which causes something to be 
entitled to a quality. When I use the word "qualifier", I 
do not use it in i t s grammatical sense, but, literally, as 
that which makes something to be qualified, to be entitled 
to a qualification2·*. 
Monnot concludes that macna~ means "accident": 
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Peut-être, en somme, la macnS n'est-elle autre que 
l'accident ел tant qu'il est cause d'une attribution et 
raison de validité d'un attribut?2 6 . 
The meaning "qualifier" is given by Bemand, as well, but she gives 
more definitions of ma^na. She distinguishes the following meanings 
of ma^na: (in French) 1. "entité causale", "cause qualifiante", 
"synonyme de ^illa"; 2. "réalité incorporelle; 3. "accident spécifique"; 
4. "signification", "sens"2s. Of the first meaning "qualifier", she 
says: 
La qualification $ifa ou fyukm est ce que les muctazilites 
disent d'un existant. Elle désigne, chez celui-ci , une 
qualification qui n'existe pas en soi, mais qui est dans 
l'existant accidentellement et en vertu d'autre chose que 
lui. Cette chose est la cause (.ma^nS) de cette 
qualification27 . 
However, the studies that these three scholars made of the works of 
cAbd al-GabbSr did not take into account that lTaclIq] ¿агф al-υφθΐ 
aJ-jrajDsa and al-MagmQ* f I 'l-mufyl\ Ы-4-taklIf are not cAbd al-
ôabbfir's original works but rather, critical paraphrases made by 
MSnkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh. This means that these scholars' 
conclusions with respect to the meaning of maenB were not only based 
on examples from cAbd al-öabbSr's original works but also on 
examples from the two paraphrases. Given the multiplicity of the 
senses in which macnS is used, the possibility cannot be excluded 
that MSnkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh used the term in a different sense. 
To find out whether or not Mfinkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh used the 
term macnS in a different sense than cAbd al-óabbfir, I will f irst 
examine which meaning cAbd al-ôabbSr himself attributes to the term 
and, next, the meaning that Mankdlm and Ibn Mattawayh attribute to 
i t . I shall follow the method that Frank applied in his study30 on 
the term maenS. He traced passages from the Mugnl and other works in 
which the term maena~ was used, and compared them In order to find 
out which sense the term was used in. I will do the same with 
passages from the Mufinl, the Tacllq and the Ma¿mOc. 
A passage to which Frank2*, Daiber30 and Monnot31 refer for the 
meaning of ma^nB is Mu$nl V, 253: 4-15. In this passage cAbd al-
Gabbfir does not give his own definition of macnë but he enumerates 
several meanings of macna known to him. This description of the 
meanings of та"=пВ forms part of his discussion on whether i t i s 
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permissible to describe God as being a ma^nS**. He points out that 
this depends on what is understood by ma^nS. He reports that Abu 
'All al-ôubbâ'ï rejected the description of God as being a ma^nS and 
argued that ma<=nS means "meaning". Understanding macnä in the sense 
of "meaning", Abu CA1I denied that i t is permissible to describe God 
as being a macnS. However, he considered that i t was permissible to 
say that God is mainly, in the sense that God is meant, when God is 
spoken of in speculative theology ikalSm) and in the Traditions 
iakbérí (Mugnî V, 253: 4-8). cAbd al-Oabbár's report does not make 
clear whether i t must be concluded that Abu cAlï only knew macna in 
the sense of "meaning" and in no other sense. 
In the passage in question, cAbd al-Gabbâr goes on to discuss 
other meanings of the term macnS in order to see whether яасла" in 
one of these other senses can be applied to God. He mentions the 
sense in which macnS is used by the mutakallimun and says: 
The mutakallimun are acquainted with the use of this term 
in reference to causes CJJaJ) [of qualifications], as they 
say: "a moving being (al-mutaftarrik) is moving by virtue of 
a ma
c
nS\ and equate this with saying: " i t is moving by 
virtue of β cause ( c iJia)". In this sense i t ima^nS is not 
used with reference to God, either (MugnXV, 253: Э-11). 
cAbd al-öabbär goes on to say: 
And sometimes i t is said about something whose existence 
has been established (.al-éay' al-mutbaf): "it is a ma^nff', 
like we say: "composition (ta'lîf) is а таспЗ'. 
cAbd al-oabbär adds that when macnS is used in this broad sense, i t 
cannot be denied that God is a ma'nS (MugnlV, 253: 12-15). 
We see that °Abd al-oabbär acknowledges that ma^na can have 
the sense of "cause (cilZa> of a qualification" and that i t can also 
mean "something whose existence has been established" ial-àay' al-
mutbaf). The question that has to be answered is whether or not he 
himself uses ma^nä in these two senses. It is clear that he uses 
ma'nS in the sense of "something whose existence has been 
established" because of his use of the pronoun "we" when he says: 
"like we say: 'composition is a macnë' ". But we now have to see 
whether he also uses ma'nS in the sense of "cause (.^lllai of a 
qualification". 
In volume IV of the Mugnï, cAbd al-6abbar discusses the subject 
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of desire. He explains that we are "feeling a desire" (muètahl) by 
virtue of a ma'nB that exis ts in us, and this ma^nS is a desire 
(èahwa)33. cAbd al-GabbSr argues as follows: a person finds himself 
in the s t a t e of "feeling a desire" (muâtahl) for something af ter he 
was not in this s t a t e . There must be a cause for this change: there 
must be something that has brought about the s t a t e of "feeling a 
desire". The only possibili ty i s that this s t a t e is caused by the 
existence (wugud) of a macna in this person. This ma'-nS can only be a 
desire (éahwa) (Mugnî IV, 19: 17-20). In this argument cAbd al-óabbar 
uses яа
с
ла in the sense of "cause of a qualification", because the 
existence of the ma'nâ desire i s the cause of this person's being 
qualified as "feeling a desire". At the same time the existence of 
desire i s established by this method. Desire can be referred to as 
"something whose existence has been established". Therefore, in this 
passage macnS means "cause of a qualification" but i t can also mean 
"something whose existence has been established". 
In a similar way, cAbd al-öabbSr speaks about the existence of 
will (irada) and reflection (in the sense of contemplation). At the 
beginning of the chapter on "One of us is •willing' (murld) by v i r tue 
of а л а ^ З ' 3 * , he declares that the cause (^iJJa) of a person's being 
qualified as "willing" is the existence of а ша^ла" in him. 
Know that what proves this, i s that he becomes "willing" 
(murld) Cto do or to have] a part icular thing, although he 
[also] could be not so, his other s t a t e s (sa'ir afywälihf) 
not being different. So there must necessarily be a macn¿ 
by vir tue of which he becomes "willing" (Mugnl VI/2, 24: 3 -
5)... And so i t i s proved true that he is "willing" in 
virtue of a cause Cilia) (Mugnl VI/2, 24: 9). 
Although in this passage cAbd al-GabbSr does not specify what this 
cause i s , he la ter defines It as a will (irSda) (MugnIVl/2, 25: 12). 
Speaking about reflection (naçar), cAbd al-éabbSr explains that 
we reflect by virtue of the existence of а та^ла" in us, and this 
ла'ла" i s "reflection" (ла^аг). 
Know, that a reflecting [person] (al-nSçir) finds himself 
"reflecting" (nBçir) because he becomes aware of the 
difference between his being "reflecting" (nSclrì and the 
other s t a t e s (ahwSD by which he is characterized; Just as 
he becomes aware of the difference between his being 
"convinced" (muctaqld) and his being "willing" (murld). 
There is nothing clearer (açhar) than [the s ta te ] we find 
ourselves in. [This i s so] because with respect to the 
76 CHAPTER THREE 
strength of the knowledge of i t , i t i s analogous to whet 
is perceived5^, If this is r ight, and if we know that he 
only becomes "reflecting" by virtue of а шаспа - since he 
has become thus although he could be "not reflecting" -
then, just as i t is necessary that he is "willing" by 
virtue of a aa'nS, and is "convinced" (mw=taqid) by virtue 
of a ma^nS, he must be "reflecting" by virtue of a cause 
Millar (Mugnl XII, 5: 3-9). 
cAbd al-Gabbär asser t s that we are "feeling a desire", "willing" or 
"reflecting" by virtue of the existence of a ma^nä in us. This ma^na 
is a desire, will or "reflection", respectively. If this ma'nS ex is ts 
in a person i t is the cause Cilia) of his being qualified as "feeling 
a desire", "willing" or "reflecting". From 'Abd al-Gabbar's use of the 
terms macnS and cilla, i t becomes clear that in the passages 
discussed ma'në means "cause <ci2Ja> of a qualification". But desire, 
will and reflection are things whose existence is established by 
comparing two s t a t e s we find ourselves in. It is therefore not 
excluded that in the discussed passages ma^nS can also mean 
"something whose existence has been established". 
It may be possible to gain a bet ter understanding of what cAbd a l -
óabbar means when he uses the term яасла" if we consider what he 
denies in relat ion to i t . According to cAbd al-ôabbâr, the quality of 
•perceiving" is not caused by a ma'nä3*. His opinion on this subject 
becomes evident from the t i t l e of the chapter: "On [the fact] that i t 
is not true that a perceiving person lal-mudrlk minnSl perceives by 
virtue of a perception iidrakV'. Firstly, he focusses on seeing, which 
is only one way of perceiving. He explains that a sighted person with 
sound eyes must Inevitably see a visible thing as soon as no 
hindrances (mawSni^) exist between his eyes and this visible thing. 
He must see this thing except if he is prevented from this by a 
hindrance (for example, by the eyelid, when the eye is closed), or by 
a defect of the eyes 3 7 . ^Abd al-éabbSr explains that a sighted person 
does not need the existence of a cause (c±Iia) in him that brings 
about his seeing (Mugnl IV, 50: 2-3). 
This means that , according to cAbd al-GabbSr's theory, there i s 
a difference between seeing and feeling a desire. His theory Implies 
that we become "feeling a desire" as soon as a desire exis ts in us. 
The existence of a desire in us i s the cause (ciJJa) of our feeling a 
desire. If the desire i s absent, we do not feel a desire. However, 
things are different with respect to seeing. According to his theory 
we do not need the existence of something like "vision" in us in 
order to see. Therefore, cAbd al-GabbSr declares that vision (ruy-a) 
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Is not a ma'nB and he adds: "And we have explained that, If Vision' 
(ruya) were a ma*n&, It would be a kind of act (.¿Ins al-fl*!)"*" 
(Mugnl IV, 50: 13). Clarifying what he means by this, he explains that 
If "vision" were an act, we could choose not to do this act, so that 
it would be possible for us to be near something visible and yet not 
see it . However, this is not possible: we cannot choose not to see a 
visible thing; we must see i t , unless we create a hindrance between 
us and the visible thing, for instance, by closing our eyes. 
Having explained that "vision" is not a macnS, cAbd al-uabbSr 
declares that in a comparable way perception in general is not a 
ma^nS. This implies that we must perceive a perceptible thing, unless 
we are prevented from doing so; our perceiving is not the result of 
the existence of a ma^nS in us <.Mu¿nITV, 55: 7-20У3®. 
"Unawareness" (sahw) is another thing which cAbd al-ôabbSr says 
is not a macnä. However, his reasoning here is different than for 
perception. He points out that "unawareness" is the absence of 
knowledge or conviction, and not the opposite of knowledge or 
conviction. If "unawareness" were a ma^nS, a person would find 
himself in the state of being unaware. However, as cAbd al-óabb5r 
points out, there is no such state. The only thing that can be said 
with respect to someone who is unaware of a particular thing is that 
he does not know (or is not convinced of) that which he is said to be 
unaware o f " . cAbd al-éabb&r argues that if there is no state, there 
can be no cause of the state, and so "unawareness" i s not a macnS. 
When cAbd al-Gabb&r says that perception is not to be called 
maacnS' because we are qualified as "perceiving" without perception 
existing in us, i t becomes clear that in this context he uses the 
term ma=nä in the sense of "cause of a qualification". But it also 
becomes clear that the existence of perception cannot be established 
by comparing two states we find ourselves in. With respect to 
"unawareness" cAbd al-öabbar says that "unawareness" is not a macna~ 
because it is to be considered as the absence of knowledge or 
conviction, which means that "unawareness" is not an existing thing. 
From this we may conclude that in this context he negatively uses 
macnS in the sense of "something whose existence has been 
established", but as he denies that there is a state of "being 
unaware" he also uses it in the sense of "cause of a qualification". 
cAbd el-Gabber's discussion of pain gives additional information about 
what he means by the term macnS. He refers to pain as a perceptible 
ma*n&. This means that the existence of pain need not be established 
by comparing two states we find ourselves in. cAbd al-GabbSr 
describes how the existence of pain is established: 
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We hnow that we f e e l pains in our limbs (fi abcSdlnS), just 
as we f e e l warmth and coldness in objects (agsäm), nay, 
even clearer. Therefore, the ex is tence of a perceptible 
macnS must be es tabl i shed. We know that th i s ma^nS cannot 
be the body i t s e l f , nor one of the things that happen [at 
that moment to the body] such as a separation [injury] or 
pressure or something e l s e . So, the ex is tence of a 
perceptible genus (gins mudrak), d i f ferent from the other 
accidents (sä'ir al-a'rSd), must be establ i shed (MugnS XIII, 
230: 4 -9 ) . 
No comparison i s made between the s t a t e s of being in pain and not 
being in pain: the ex i s tence of pain i s establ ished by the direct 
perception of pain. 
cAbd al-öabbär denies that the ex is tence of pain in us i s the 
cause that we are qual i f ied as "suffering". He explains that 
We do not say that a suffering [person] (al-Slim) i s 
suffering by v irtue of a ma^nS in rea l i ty (fi Ч-tiaqîqa), 
as th i s would contradict what we have said b e f o r e 4 1 , but 
we e s tab l i sh (nutbltu) the existence of a ma'nS that the 
suf fer ing [person] perceives with aversion inufur fab'ihl): 
he i s suf fer ing (Slim) because of i t [the aversion] (Mugnl 
IV, 55: 10-11) . 
According to cAbd al-öabbär we are qualif ied as suffer ing (¿lim), not 
because of the ex i s tence of the macnë of pain in us but rather 
because we fee l an aversion inufur) for what we perceive. This 
aversion i s the reason why we suffer . It i s the cause of the s t a t e of 
suffer ing that we find ourselves in when we fee l pain; pain alone 
does not cause a s t a t e * 3 . Explaining that the macnä of pain can a l s o 
e x i s t in inanimate things, cAbd al-öabbSr says: 
What we have said before offers the reason why pain can 
e x i s t in a l l subs tra tes (mahSll): because i t belongs to 
what does not n e c e s s i t a t e a s t a t e (liai) to a l iv ing being. 
Thus, i t i s comparable with the other accidents (a'rad) 
(MugnS VII, 36: 16-17) . 
In this and the previous passages reference i s made to accidents. 
cAbd al-öabbär mentions the ma^nS pain as being comparable with an 
accident (carad). We have already seen that accidents determine the 
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quali t ies of the subst ra te they Inhere in. It Is evident that 
according to cAbd al-öabbar's theory, the "accident" of pain 
determines the quality of i t s substrate , so that there is pain in 
that part of the body. We should remember that the substra te in 
which this accident inheres is not the whole body, but only that part 
of the body in which the injury exis ts . Because of this , the accident 
does not determine a quality or s t a t e for the person as a whole, but 
only a quality for the substra te that forms a part of the body. cAbd 
al-ôabbâr says: 
We know that the separation (îftirëq) [the injury] does not 
necessi tate CIS yugibu) a s ta te (ψίΙ> for the composite 
body, because i t characterizes the substrate. If there were 
not a perceptible ma'nä, i t would not be possible to make 
a distinction between the two parts Cof the body: one with 
pain and the other without pain] (Mufnl XIII, 231: 9-11). 
It is therefore likely that when cAbd al-Gabbar uses the term ааспё 
with respect to pain, ma'na means "accident". Although both cillS and 
"~-ara$ (accident) are the cause of a qualification, there is a 
difference between between both terms. The term carao* (accident) 
refers to something incorporeal that inheres in a substance, giving 
i t a certain quality. The term 'ilia refers to something incorporeal 
that exis ts in a living being and is the cause of a qualification for 
the living being as a whole, although i t inheres in only a part of 
it* 5 1 . For instance, the accident of knowledge inheres in the subst ra te 
of the heart ( g a i o ) " , but i t is a cilla at the same time, because the 
result of the existence of knowledge in the heart is that the whole 
composite body is described as "knowing". 
However, there are accidents that are not the cause of a 
qualification ( ciJ2a). Mankdlm declares that "there are two sor t s of 
accidents: accidents that are a e i i l a and accidents that are not a 
'ilia" <.TaclIq, 231: 16). I t can be concluded from this that not every 
accident i s a c i i i a . On the other hand, not every cilla is an accident. 
I t i s known from cAbd al-óebbar*s doctrine on the quali t ies of God 
that i t i s possible that a c i i i a i s not an accident ieara<f> because i t 
exists without a subs t ra te : if the cilla concerns a quality of God, i t 
is out of the question for i t to exist in a substrate , as God is 
immaterial. Therefore, God's quali t ies must exist without a substra te 
to inhere in. Yet, the cause of a such a quality is a ciiZa. When cAbd 
al-Gabbär declares that God is "willing" (murfd) because of a 
temporal will, he refers to this will as "cause of a qualification" 
(-'ilia) or rna'nä**. 
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From the passages that we have seen, it can be concluded that 
cAbd al-Gabbâr sometimes equates ma'nB with cilla (the cause of a 
qualification) and at other times with ^aracf (accident). This means 
that he uses the term ma^nB in a broader sense than ciJJa and cara<j 
because i t embraces both these terms. Perhaps he sometimes preferred 
to use the broader term ma ЬВ instead of the terms *"iiia or ^aratf 
because he did not want to specify whether he meant a cilla or a 
r
ara$. Discussing a part icular quality he may have preferred to use 
the term macnâ, as a quality can be the resul t of the existence of 
either a "=llla or a ^ara^. The conclusion that cAbd al-Gabbar used 
ma^nS as a term that embraces 'Illa and cara<f agrees with Frank's 
findings. Although he found that macnS was commonly employed as a 
synonym for ^ага^, he noticed at the same time that i t was used in a 
broader sense than 'aratf: ma'nS was used in reference to al l sor ts of 
accidents, whereas *ara<f was only used for accidents that inhere in a 
material substrate· 1 *. He concluded that ma'nä is a broader term than 
c
ara<j. 
However, we have see*7 that cAbd al-öabbSr also uses the term 
ma^nS when referring to that which transmigrates from one body to 
anotherA e . What does ma^nS in this sense have in common with ma^nB 
in the sense of cílla or cara<f? Gimeret** pointed out that ліасла" in 
the sense of c i J ia or *-ага$ refers to something incorporeal. That 
which transmigrates, too, is incorporeal. So, what c iUa, cara$ and 
that which transmigrates have in common is that a l l three are 
incorporeal 5 0 . This agrees with the meanings of ma^nS given by 
Bernand. 
A close reading of the whole Mu¿ní i s needed, tracing a l l the 
places where cAbd al-óabbSr uses the term ласла", in order to 
formulate a final definition of the meaning of maenS in that work. As 
this is impossible in the framework of the present study, a 
provisional conclusion must suffice. On the basis of the foregoing 
analysis of the Mu$nl, I reached the conclusion that in i t s broadest 
sense, ma
c
nB means "incorporeal thing". This seems to be what cAbd 
al-ôabbSr had in mind when he said that ma<=nS sometimes can mean 
"something whose existence has been established" (.al-èay' al-mutbaf). 
However, from the passages that have been quoted i t appears that he 
usually uses i t in a more res t r ic t ive sense. In such cases macnB 
means either "cause of a qualification" (ciJJa) or "accident" (caradX 
It is a term that i s broader and less dist inct than these two terms 
and includes more possible meanings*1. 
After having discussed the meaning of the term ma^nS as i t is used 
by cAbd al-öabb5r, I will consider whether MSnkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh 
use macn& in the same sense. 
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Mankdlm uses the term ma*nB in the sense of "cause of a 
qualification" when he explains how to establish the existence of 
something incorporal, such as a desire iàahwa). He points out that if 
we become "feeling a desire" ímuétahD when it is also possible that 
we are not "feeling a desire", there must be some "specifier" 
(mu/ras^is) which causes us to be so. In this case the "specifier" is 
the existence of a ma"nS in us and this ma*nS is a desire (Taclïq, 
93: 2-5). This makes clear that Mankdlm uses the term ша^пВ in the 
sense of cause of a qualification112. He uses macna in the sense of 
accident (.^arad) when he discusses the "modes of beings" (Ta'llq, 95: 
и - 1 5 ) е э . 
As for Ibn Mattawayh, he uses ma'-na in the sense of cause of a 
qualification (ciJJa) when he discusses the existence of the power to 
act Iqudra). He declares that a person is able to act (.qBdir) by 
virtue of the existence of a ma^nS in him and this яа^ла is the 
power to act iMagmu" II, 21: 14-22: 2 ) " . When Ibn Mattawayh explains 
that God is "willing" (murfd) by virtue of a temporal will (lrBda 
fedita) he refers to this will both as a ma'nS and a cilla (MagmOc I, 
282: 3, 5, 12, 19). The term ma*nB is also used by him in the sense 
of "accident", for instance, when he discusses the "modes of being" 
(Afflano* I, 33 ff.)**. 
It can be concluded that Mankdlm and Ibn Mattawayh, like cAbd 
al-öabbSr, use macnB as a broader technical term that Includes both 
the terms =illa (cause of a qualification) and carad (accident). In 
their works I have not found an example of the use of яасла" In the 
sense it was used by cAbd al-GabbSr with reference to the 
transmigrating soul. 
We now return to the question of what *Abd al-Gabb&r means when he 
says that pain is a perceptible macnS. With respect to pain, таЬВ 
does not mean "cause of a qualification" (ciJJa), as pain is not the 
cause of a qualification for the living being as a whole, as cAbd al-
eabbär asserts. This means that here macnS means accident (caraçf). It 
i s an accident that inheres in a substrate. We will s e e " that this 
substrate is the body of a living being. One of the questions that 
cAbd al-GabbSr discusses concerning the ma^nS pain is whether i t can 
also exist in an inanimate object67. 
Before focusing on whether or not Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh 
agreed with cAbd al-Gabb5r that pain is a perceptible шаслА, I will 
describe the opinion of cAbd al-ôabbSr's teacher Abu Ishaq b. cAyySs 
as an example of another Muctazilite theory about what pain is . 
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Abu IshSq's Opinion that Pain is not a MacnS 
That i t is not self-evident that pain is a ma'nS becomes clear from 
what 'Abd al-öabbar reports about his teacher Abu Ishâq b. ^Ayyâè. 
•=Abd al-Gabbar says that Abu Ishâq denied that pain is a macnâ. How 
are we to understand this statement? Did Abu Ishâq deny that pain is 
the cause of a qualification or did he deny that i t is an accident? 
cAbd al-öabbär reports that 
Abu Ishâq b. cAyyâs, may God have mercy upon him, used to 
deny [the existence of] pain absolutely. He used to say 
that i t is not а яасла\ but that a living being suffers 
(.ya'lamu) if the soundness of i t s body ceases iidä ba ¡ala t 
sihhat ¿ismihï) and the life disappears from i t , [that is 
to say], from that place (wa-btafat al-hayät canhu can 
dälika 'l-mavdi*)**. Then he suffers, just as he suffers if 
he perceives something bi t ter , although he does not 
establish the existence of a perceptible ma'nS (Mugnl IX, 
59: 9-11). 
Aba Ishäq seems to have been of the opinion that we suffer from the 
absence of "soundness" isihha)**, when this temporarily disappears 
from a part of our body as the result of an injury. This implies that 
we do not suffer because something new comes into existence in a 
part of our body, but because of the absence of something that we 
need. Abu Ishâq therefore says that pain is not a ma^na. He did not 
deny that people suffer when they are injured but rather he denied 
that something new, a ma^nS, comes into existence. His saying that 
pain is not a macnS is comparable with cAbd al-ôabbâr's saying that 
"unawareness" i s not a ma"=nS. 
In another passage, cAbd al-Gabbär reports that Abu Ishâq said 
that we suffer when the body is injured, because in that case 
soundness disappears and the balance of the body is disturbed: 
Our Sayk AbQ IshSq, may God have mercy upon him, used to 
say that the pain that comes into existence (hsdip in the 
body [of a human being] i s not a ma^nS. The human being 
rather suffers at the moment that a separation is made in 
his body because [at that moment] i t s soundness (.sihhaì 
disappears and the balance of his body (I'tidSl ¿ismihD is 
disturbed (.Mugnl IV, 29: 7-9). 
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"=Abd al-GabbSr himself does not use the concept of balance li*tidal) 
in his theory of pain. It is possible that Abü IshSq derived the 
concept of the balance of the human body from the medical theory on 
pain that was current in his time. This theory implied that in the 
human body there are four humours: blood, phlegm, yellow bile and 
black bile. They are mixed with one another in different quant i t ies . 
The part icular blending of the four humours in a person was called 
"temperament" imizëg)*0. If these elements are present in a r ight 
proportion to each other, the organic body is "balanced" (mu* tadiD*·'1 . 
Abu Ishäq probably believed that we suffer when the balance of the 
humours in our body is disturbed. This must be the "disappearance of 
soundness" to which he refers in the foregoing passage. 
Abu Ishâq's denial of the existence of pain as a ma^nS leads us 
to ask why his opinion was so different from ^Abd al-öabbär's 
opinion. Ibn Mattawayh reports that Abu Ishäq formed this opinion 
because he was not able to find an adequate answer to a question 
concerning the generation of pain. Ibn Mattawayh thinks that this i s 
no reason to deny the existence of pain. 
If there is ambiguity liâkëï) concerning some of i t s [the 
pain's! questions, this should not be made a reason to deny 
i t [the existence of pain! completely, as i t is said about 
Abu Ishfiq - may God have mercy upon him. His opinion on 
pain was that i t Is to be attributed to a disturbance of 
the balance (.zawSl al-lctida~I>. He denied that there is a 
perceptible ma^nS because he accepted a wrong reasoning 
(¿иЬЛа)ег which we will explain later (MagmF III, fol. 3b). 
Mënkdlm's and Ibn Mattawayh's Opinions on Pain Being a Macnä 
Although cAbd al-ôabbSr had studied with Abu Ishäq, he did not adopt 
his teacher's opinion that pain is not a macnë. cAbd al-éabbSr saw 
the implications of denying the existence of a perceptible thing. He 
pointed out that Abu Ishâq's opinion that pain is not a macnS may 
lead to the denial of the existence of a l l perceptible things IMugnl 
IX, 59: U - 2 0 , Mu$nï Vi, 29: 16-20)«э. =Abd al-Gabbär's rejection of 
his teacher's opinion ra ises the question of whether Mânkdïm and Ibn 
Mattawayh adopted =Abd el-ôabbâr's or Abu Ishâq's opinion on this 
point. 
Mânkdïm declares that pain Is a perceptible accident ісагаф 
<.Ta*lTq, 92: 8-10). However, i t is not certain whether he, like cAbd 
al-Gabbär, refers to pain as a macnê because I did not find any 
86 CHAPTER THREE 
passage in which he explicitly does so. However, this could be 
because MSnkdïm does not discuss pain as extensively as cAbd a l -
GabbSr. As for Ibn Mattawayh, he explicitly rejects Abu Ishäq's 
opinion on pain. Like cAbd al-öabbSr, he argues that denying that 
pain is a perceptible ma'nS may lead to the invalidation of a l l 
perceptible things6*. Like cAbd al-öabbSr, Ibn Mattawayh refers to 
pain as а шасла". Having explained that the existence of pain is 
established by means of perception, he concludes: "So there must be a 
ma'nä here and this Ima'nSi is the pain" (Magmuc III, fol. За). 
In conclusion, cAbd al-öabbär refers to pain as a perceptible ma^nS. 
From several passages in the Mugnî we may conclude that he uses 
ma
c
nS as a term that can mean either "cause of a qualification" 
(.'ilia) or "accident" (аагаф. As he asserts that the existence of the 
ma'na pain in a person does not result in a qualification for this 
person, i t is evident that with respect to pain he uses mabS in the 
sense of accident. Monkdim and Ibn Mattawayh uses the term ma'nS in 
the same sense as cAbd al-Gabbär. With respect to pain, Ibn Mattawayh 
used the broad term та^ла", but MSnkdïm uses the more specific term 
"araci (accident). However, from the fact that MSnkdïm does not apply 
the term macnS to pain, we may not conclude that he thinks, like Abu 
IshSq, that pain is not а ша'пЗ. From MSnkdïm's reference to pain as 
an accident (""агаф i t is clear that he disagrees with Abu IshSq. The 
reference to pain as an accident means that MSnkdïm thinks that pain 
is something that really ex i s t s , whereas Abu IshSq says that someone 
who is injured suffers , not because something new comes Into 
existence in a part of his body but, rather, because the balance of 
his body is disturbed. Ibn Mattawayh explicitly rejects Abu Ishäq's 
opinion. Thus i t can be concluded that with respect to the opinion 
that pain is β perceptible ma'nS there Is no difference to speak of 
between cAbd al-éabbSr and his two disciples. 
3. How Pain is Perceived 
eAbd al-Gabbär asse r t s that pain is a perceptible ил слі, but how does 
he think about the actual perception of pain? It Is known that 
perceptible things are perceived by different sense organs and that 
each sense organ has a special s tructure. Sounds are perceived by the 
ears, objects by the eyes, smells by the nose, tastes by the tongue. 
Pain is a perceptible thing but by which sense organ is i t perceived? 
cAbd al-öabbär says that pain does not require a sense organ 
with a special s t ructure (Ылуа aaAsusa) In order to be perceived: i t 
can be perceived by any part of the body on condition that there i s 
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l ife (haySt) in that part of the body iMugnl IV, 38: 3, Mugnl XI, 336: 
4). This condition also holds for all parts of the body that are used 
for perception: each sense organ can only function if l i fe inheres in 
it. *=Abd al-6abbSr establishes a strong connection between life and 
perception, making the ability to perceive by means of that part of 
the body the criterion by which he distinguishes living parts of the 
body from l i fe less parts. As a result, he considers hair, bones and 
blood as l i fe less parts of the body because it is not possible to 
perceive things by means of them (Mufini XI, 335: 13-18). 
That pain can be perceived by any living part of the body, 
whatever i t s structure, is a feature that pain shares with another 
category of perceptible things: warmth (.¡parSra"). However, in one 
aspect the perception of pain differs from the perception of 
temperature: we can perceive warmth that exists in someone else's 
body, whereas we can only perceive pain that exists in our own body 
Œu$nî XIII, 260: 4 and 256: 9). 
The "instrument" of sense by which pain is perceived is that 
part of the body in which this pain appears (Mugnl XIII, 260: 3-9). 
cAbd al-ôabbâr considers this a feature distinguishing pain from all 
other things (Mu$nl XIII, 256: 8-13). According to his doctrine 
physical pleasure (iadrfa) has the same feature: it i s also perceived 
by means of that part of the body in which it appears. This does not 
contradict his assertion that the perception of pain by that part of 
the body in which it appears is a feature specific to pain. According 
to cAbd al-ôabbir's doctrine, pain and pleasure are the same kind of 
thing. We will see that i t i s his opinion that the only difference 
between pain and pleasure is the emotion they are perceived with. 
MSnkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh agree with cAbd al-ôabbar that it i s a 
distinctive feature of pain that i t i s perceived by that part of the 
body in which i t exists . They express their opinion thus: pain is 
perceived "by the substrate of l i fe in the substrate of life" (bi-
modali al-fyayët fi mafyall al-fyaySt), thus emphasizing that there must 
be l i fe in that part of the body in which pain is perceived (.Ta"lSq, 
175: 2, MagmO' I, 131: 21; Magma* II, 33: 21, MagmQ* III, fol. За and 
b). Like cAbd al-ôabbar, MSnkdîm adds that we can only experience 
pain that exists in our own body <TaelSq, 480: 5-6). Ibn Mattawayh 
does not mention this aspect, but he draws attention to the fact that 
pain can only exist in a substrate: i t cannot exist without a 
substrate to inhere in U4agmQc III, fol. 4b). cAbd al-Gabbar does not 
explicitly mention this aspect of pain, but without doubt, his opinion 
is the same as Ibn Mattawayh's. This can be concluded from his 
assertion that perceptible things cannot exist without a substrate to 
inhere in <Mu¿nI VII, 26: 4-5). 
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4. Раіл and Pleasure 
It has already been mentioned that cAbd al-óabbSr considers pain and 
pleasure to be the same kind of thing. According to him, the 
difference between pain and pleasure l ies not in what they are but in 
the emotion with which they are perceived. That which is perceived is 
given a different name because of the difference in emotion. When 
something that can be pain or pleasure is perceived with aversion 
(nufur al-fab') i t is called pain, but if i t is perceived with desire 
(éahwa) i t i s called pleasure. We have seen that according to cAbd 
al-6abbfir, we suffer not because of the existence of the ma'nä pain 
in our body, but because of our aversion to what we perceive. Had we 
perceived this ma'nS with desire (éahwa), we would instead have 
experienced pleasure*6 (Mugnl IV, 15: 12-17, 17: 3-12). cAbd al-ÖabbSr 
explains i t thus: 
When he has an aversion (капа nSfir al-tab'') to i t , he 
suffers because of i t , and i t is called pain (alam); but if 
he desires i t , he enjoys i t , and i t i s called pleasure 
(ladda). The class (gins) is not different, but the name is 
different (Mu$nl DC, 54: 20-22). 
It should not be concluded from this that cAbd al-6abbSr means that 
some people enjoy suffering, as masochists do. I t i s cAbd al-öabbfir's 
opinion that when we set pain and pleasure apart from the emotions 
with which they are perceived, they are one and the same thing and 
he therefore says that they are the same class156, (¿ins) of things 
(.Mugnî DC, 54: 21 and Mugnî XIII, 255: 12-13). 
In order to strengthen his argument that pain and pleasure are 
one class of things, cAbd al-öabbär mentions actions that can cause 
both pain and pleasure, such as exposing oneself to intense cold 
(bard ëadîd), warming oneself at a fire (IsfilS'), submerging oneself 
in lukewarm water, or scratching a part of the body that is affected 
by scabies (garab). The resul t of these actions can be experienced as 
pain or as pleasure (Mugnl XIII, 243: 3-5). Scratching a healthy part 
of the body hur ts , but someone suffering from scabies6,7 who 
scratches the itchy part of his body affected by scabies enjoys the 
scratching and experiences this not as pain, but as pleasure. This 
implies that the same macná can be experienced as pain or as 
pleasure (Mugnl IV, 17: 17-19). 
Opponents may object to cAbd al-öabbfir's theory that pain and 
pleasure are one class of thing by pointing out that there is no 
word to denominate*·® this class and that i t is therefore doubtful 
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whether such a class exis ts . This objection takes into consideration 
the relation between words and the existence of things. Can we know 
that something exists if we cannot denominate i t? cAbd al-Gabbär 
thinks that this i s indeed possible. He explains that the lack of a 
denomination for a thing is not a reason to conclude that this thing 
does not exis t . He argues that , notwithstanding the lack of a 
denomination <ciMra) for the class of pain and pleasure, the 
existence of this class can be known because i t has a predicate 
($ifa> by which i t distinguishes i tse l f from a l l other things. He 
points out that each thing, perceptible as well as imperceptible, is 
known by a specific feature by which i t is distinguished from other 
things. As for the class of pain and pleasure, i t s unique quality is 
that i t is perceived by means of the living substra te in which i t 
appears. As soon as we know that a certain thing is perceived by 
means of that part of the body in which i t appears, we know that we 
are dealing with something that belongs to the class of pain and 
pleasure, even though we cannot name this class (.MugnS XIII, 255: 16-
256: 10). However, whatever belongs to this class can be given a name 
as soon as we know the emotion i t is perceived with. 
cAbd al-ôabbSr's theory implies that if we perceive something 
belonging to the class pain and pleasure and we feel a desire for 
what is perceived, we experience pleasure; if we feel an aversion to 
i t , we suffer. This raises the following question: is i t possible to 
perceive something belonging to the class pain or pleasure without an 
aversion to i t or a desire for i t , so that we experience that which 
is perceived as neither pain nor pleasure? cAbd al-Gabbär admits that 
this is indeed possible. He explains that if this happens, we know 
from the way i t i s perceived that i t i s something that belongs to the 
class of pain and pleasure, although we cannot denominate i t (Mugnï 
XIII, 257: 1-6 and 256: 3-7). 
It may appear strange that something can be perceived and yet 
cannot be given a name. cAbd al-6abbfir points out that such a thing 
may also happen when we tas te food. When we tas te mixed food, we 
perceive a mixed flavour. From the way i t is perceived, we known that 
we perceive a flavour, but we cannot denominate this flavour. This 
makes i t clear that the lack of a denomination for a perceived thing 
is not a reason to deny i t s existence (Mugni XIII, 255: 1-9). 
MSnkdïm agrees with cAbd al-ôabbar that pain and pleasure form one 
class (gins) and that something belonging to this class is called 
pain if i t is perceived with aversion and pleasure if i t is perceived 
with desire (Ta-=llq, 289: 6-7 and 175: 12-13). Ibn Mattawayh also 
considers that pain and pleasure are one class of things and that the 
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difference between them concerns the name and not the aa^nS (MagmQ0 
III, fol. 4a). 
Questions about Pain and Pleasure 
'Abd el-GabbSr's theory of pain and pleasure leads to the question of 
whether i t is possible to perceive as pleasure that which normally is 
painful. We have already seen that Abd al-ôabbâr gives examples of 
actions, such as exposing oneself to intense cold, that can resul t in 
pain or pleasure. Depending on the circumstances and the quantity of 
what one is exposed to, the resul t of such an act can at one time be 
perceived with aversion, so that i t is experienced as pain, and at 
another time with desire, so that i t is experienced as pleasure. 
However, does cAbd al-ôabbSr consider i t possible that someone who is 
dismembered experiences this as a pleasure? It should be taken into 
account that the question is not whether he enjoys suffering, but 
whether he experiences as pleasure that which is normally experienced 
as pain. 
cAbd al-òabbSr does not deny that, in theory, i t is possible for 
someone to experience his dismemberment as a pleasure, but he denies 
that this can normally happen. He asser t s that the "usage" ('=Sda')&9 
does not allow this . Like many things in this world, pain and pleasure 
do not occur at random but always happen in the same way which is 
normal for them. cAbd al-ôabbSr admits that deviations from the 
"usage", the usual way in which things happen, can occur, but only in 
times when prophets appear7 '0 <.Mu$nI XIII, 24-1: 16-17). He therefore 
concedes that i t is possible for somebody to be dismembered without 
experiencing pain, but he points out that usually such a thing does 
not happen because i t would contradict what is normal for pain 
(.Mugnl XIII, 242: 1-2). 
cAbd al-öabbSr adds that if someone experienced his 
dismemberment as a pleasure, this pleasure would be overpowered by 
additional sorrow. He argues that such a person would not only feel 
pleasure but also, simultaneously, sorrow (¿aam) because of the 
realization that he will be physically disfigured, and this sorrow 
would outweigh any pleasure he fe l t . cAbd al-öabbSr is convinced that 
people who are in full possession of their mental faculties must feel 
sorrow about the loss of their limbs because they need them as 
instruments. As long as their limbs are sound, they can obtain 
pleasure and profi ts using their limbs. Having lost them, this i s no 
longer possible Œugnl XIII, 243: 10-13). 
Mänkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh do not discuss the question of whether 
something which is normally painful can be perceived as pleasure, but 
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Ibn Mattawayh does pay at tention to a related question. He points out 
that when we feel pain we cannot change this into a feeling of 
pleasure because we cannot change our aversion into desire. In his 
opinion, we ourselves cannot create an aversion or desire, as only 
God can create these things (MagmQc I, 433: 28-434: 3). cAbd a l -
uabbär does not mention this aspect but there is no reason to 
suppose that he would have disagreed with Ibn Mattawayh. 
Another question to be asked is whether i t is possible to perceive 
something of the class of pain and pleasure without experiencing any 
pain or pleasure at a l l . cAbd al-öabbfir believes that this is possible 
because he takes i t for granted that human beings can be without 
aversion or desire. However, the Muctazilites differed about th i s . 
Some of them, probably including Abu CA1I al-ôubbfi'ï and his son Abu 
HöSim71 , were of the opinion that a living being must always feel 
either aversion or desire. This idea seems to have resulted from 
their interpretat ion of the theory of opposite accidents. According to 
this theory, some accidents continue to exist and only disappear when 
opposite accidents appear in the substrate they inhere in. At that 
moment, the f i r s t accidents must disappear because accidents that are 
each other 's opposites cannot exist together in the same subs t ra te : 
they exclude each other. As for accidents that do not have opposites, 
they disappear of themselves7 2 . 
This means that the question here is whether or not desire and 
aversion are each other 's opposites. Does desire only disappear when 
aversion appears, and vice versa, so that one is never without e i ther 
of them? Or, are they not each other's opposites, so that i t i s 
possible that someone is sometimes without ei ther of them? cAbd a l -
ôabbSr asse r t s that the l a t t e r i s indeed possible. He explains that 
living beings can be without any desire or aversion because l i fe does 
not imply desire and aversion. He argues that if l i fe implied desire 
and aversion, a living being would always desire a l l desirable things 
or feel an aversion to a l l things one can feel an aversion to and 
there would be no difference between the living beings with respect 
to this . From the fact that things are not that way, cAbd al-6abbSr 
concludes that i t is possible for a living being to feel neither 
desire nor aversion (Mugnl ΧΠΙ, 244: 10-17). 
cAbd al-éabbSr then argues that if we can be without desire or 
aversion, i t i s possible that we perceive something belonging to the 
class of pain and pleasure without feeling a desire for what we 
perceive or an aversion to i t : we Just perceive i t . In that case, that 
which is perceived is not called pain or pleasure. He adds that the 
belief that living beings can be without desire or aversion also 
explains why they may differ from each other with respect to their 
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experiences of pain and pleasure (MugnS XIII, 242: 10-13 and Mugnl 
IV, 17: 16-17). He does not explain what he means by this remark, but 
i t i s likely that he refers to the fact that one person does not feel 
pain in a s i tuat ion in which another person does feel pain. 
MSnkdlm does not discuss whether i t i s possible for something 
belonging to the class of pain and pleasure to be perceived without 
pain or pleasure. Ibn Mattawayh agrees with cAbd al-Gabbâr that this 
is indeed possible but i t is not clear whether he also agrees with 
cAbd al-Gabb5r that i t is possible for a human being to feel neither 
desire nor aversion. He explicitly applies this to God, declaring that 
when something of the class pain and pleasure is perceived by one 
who is considered to be without desire or aversion, this тасла" is not 
called pain or pleasure (Magmü* III, fol. 4a)731. By "one who is 
considered to be without desire or aversion", Ibn Mattawayh means 
God. According to Muc tazilite doctrine, i t is impossible for God to 
feel a desire for or an aversion to something, as this would imply 
that God has needs and this would conflict with His omnipotence. Yet, 
because God perceives a l l perceptible things, He also perceives that 
which belongs to the class of pain and pleasure. But Ibn Mattawayh 
emphasizes that although God perceives what belongs to the class of 
pain and pleasure He is not described as feeling pain or pleasure, as 
He does not perceive this class with aversion or desire <Ma¿mü* III , 
fol. 4a). 
Another question is whether i t is possible to feel pain and pleasure 
at the same moment. The question discussed by cAbd al-öabbSr is not 
whether something of the class of pain and pleasure that happens in 
one part of the body can be experienced as pain and pleasure at the 
same moment74, but rather whether it is possible to experience pain 
in one part of the body and pleasure in another part . This question 
is raised because i t implies that one can have an aversion to a 
part icular thing and at the same moment a desire for the same sort 
of thing. cAbd al-ôabbfir believes that i t i s indeed possible to feel 
pain and pleasure at the same moment. He makes this clear by the 
example of a man who scratches a part of his body that is affected 
by scabies (.garab) and experiences pleasure as the result of this 
scratching. However, if he at the same moment scratches one of his 
healthy limbs, he experiences pain. This means that he experiences 
pain and pleasure at the same moment IMugnî XIII, 259: 1-6). cAbd a l -
éabbâr also considers i t possible for something to be experienced at 
one moment as pain and at another moment as pleasure, or that i t may 
experienced by one person as pain and by another as pleasure (Mu¿nl 
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XIII, 257: U-258: 11). Mankdlm and Ibn Mattawayh do not discuss this 
questionTS . 
In conclusion, ^Abd al-Gabbar, MSnkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh agree that 
pain and pleasure are in fact the same sort of thing and that the 
difference between pain and pleasure is only in the emotion with 
which they are perceived. When a person perceives something of the 
class of pain or pleasure in his body and he has an aversion to that 
which he feels, he suffers and what he perceives is called pain. When 
he perceives the same sort of thing and feels a desire for i t , he 
enjoys what he perceives and calls i t pleasure. cAbd al-öabbSr 
considers i t possible for someone to perceive something belonging to 
the class of pain and pleasure without any aversion or desire, 
although in that case what is perceived cannot be given a name. cAbd 
al-Gabbâr also discusses some questions that are evoked by the idea 
that pain and pleasure are the same sort of thing, but that they are 
perceived with different emotion. These questions are not discussed 
by Mankdïm and Ibn Mattawayh only discusses one of them. He asse r t s 
that i t is possible to perceive that which belongs to the class of 
pain and pleasure without aversion or desire because this means that 
God can perceive these sor t s of things without actually experiencing 
pain or pleasure. 
I t can therefore be concluded that no disagreement existed 
between cAbd al-ôabbâr, Mankdïm and Ibn Mattawayh about pain and 
pleasure being the same sort of thing. Mänkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh may 
not have discussed the special questions concerning the perception of 
pain and pleasure because these questions are very theoretical . They 
may therefore have considered them less significant and may have 
omitted them for reasons of brevity. However, i t is equally possible 
that, for the same reasons, cAbd al-ôabbâr himself did not discuss 
these questions in Sarh al-υψΰΐ al-kamsa and al-Muhl} Ы-'1-takllf, so 
that Mânkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh did not discuss them in their c r i t i ca l 
paraphrases of these works ei ther . 
CHAPTER FOUR 
HOW PAIN COMES INTO EXISTENCE 
After having explained what pain i s and how i t i s perceived, cAbd e l -
Gabbär d i scusse s the way in which pain comes into ex i s tence . He f i r s t 
considers whether pain i s something that can be produced by human 
beings in a short chapter that i s called FI anna 'l-'lbSd yaqdiruna 
calS '1-Släm ÍMugnf XIII, 271: 2). Speaking about divine and human 
act ing, cAbd al-Gabbfir u se s the verb fatala, yafcalu (to do; to act) 
which I mostly w i l l t rans late as "to produce" in order to avoid 
expressions such as "to do pain". According to h is doctrine, only a 
l imited number of acts (afcá\I, plural of flcD in th i s world can be 
done by human beings; the production of things l ike colours, smel l s , 
and l i f e , i s not poss ib le for humans: only God can produce them1 ). 
Defining what human beings are able to produce, cAbd al-éabbSr re fers 
to what Abu ' A l l el-ÖubbS'I and Abu HBsim said on th i s subject. They 
said that human beings can do two sorts of actions: firstly, "acts of 
the limbs" (afcSl al-gawëriÇ) such as movements (.fyarakSt), different 
sorts of pressure il'timadSt), composition ita'llf), different sorts of 
pain (Slam) and sounds (eshtft), and, secondly, "acts of the heart" 
(.af=Sl al-qulOb) such as thought (flkr), will Orada), conviction 
(lctiqSd) and "the opposites of conviction", and remorse inadem) 
(.Mufol IX, 13: 13-16). By "the opposites of conviction" *Abd al-GabbSr 
means things such as doubt, assumption and suspicion which he 
regards as opposites of conviction because they exclude each other if 
they concern the same subject3. This enumeration makes i t clear that 
cAbd al-öabbär considers pain as something that can be produced by 
humans beings. 
1. Generated pain 
cAbd al-öabbfir asserts that human beings can only produce pain in a 
way that he refers to as "generation" Itawlld). According to his 
doctrine, human beings can produce things in two ways. Some things 
such as pain, sounds and composition can only be produced by them by 
way of generation. A second group of things can be produced by them 
only directly (mubtada'an - "begun"), by which eAbd al-Gabbfir means 
that they produce something inside themselves without first producing 
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something else: they directly start producing the thing Itself. The 
will is an example of this second group of actions: according to cAbd 
al-Gabbfir's doctrine, a person who wants to do something produces in 
him- or her-self the will to do that thing. A third group of things 
can be produced in both ways: either directly ("from Inside") or by 
generation <"from outside") (Mugnl IX, 13: 16-19). An example of this 
third group is movement. We can move our own arms or legs from 
inside, but we also can move objects from one place to another. 
When cAbd al-G-abbSr says that human beings can only produce 
pain by generation, he means that we are not able to produce pain In 
our body directly, "from inside", but only "from outside": we have to 
press a knife or something else against our body, causing a wound In 
it (.Mugnl IX, 127: 19-22). It i s only in this indirect way, by first 
causing a wound, that we can produce pain In our own body or in 
someone else's body. According to cAbd al-GabbSr's doctrine, pain is 
generated by the injury. He therefore refers to the Injury as the 
cause
3
 (.sabab) of the pain. Nevertheless, the pain is considered to 
have been produced by the person who moved the knife and caused the 
injury because, according to cAbd al-Gabbfir's doctrine, he who 
produces a cause (fa^iJ alsabab) must also be he who produces i t s 
effect ifSell li-1-musabbab) (.Mugnl ГХ, 139: 20-21). This i s the 
result of the close relation between a cause and i t s effect. Once a 
cause has been brought Into existence, it must generate i t s effect, 
unless it i s prevented from doing so by hindrances that impede 
generation". Producing something by means of the process of cause 
and effect Is called generation (tawlld)* In Muctazilite doctrine. 
Mfinkdîm probably agreed with eAbd al-ôabbâr that humans can only 
produce pain by means of generation, although he does not explicitly 
say so. As for Ibn Mattawayh, i t Is clear that he agreed with cAbd 
al-öabb&r. According to Ibn Mattawayh it i s impossible for humans to 
produce pain In a direct way (.IbtldS'an). He distinguishes two means 
of direct production: "immediate" (.mubSSaratarù and "like creation" 
í=alS wagh al-i&tirB*). He describes the immediate method of direct 
production as follows: "the power (qudra) of acting produces 
something in the substrate In which it Inheres". This makes it clear 
that this method refers to acts that we do "from Inside", In our 
substrate, such as moving our own limbs. The other way of direct 
production, "like creation" (calS wagh al-lktirS*), i s only possible 
for God6 because that which Is produced In this way is made directly 
"from inside" In someone's body7, not by this person himself but by 
someone else. Ibn Mattawayh points out that humans are not able to 
produce pain by either of the two methods of direct production 
(.Magaü* III, fol. 6a). 
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2. $Ща 
In cAbd al-Gabbär*s discussion of the generation of pain, two terms 
are often used by him. These are the terms $ihha and vahé. In what 
follows, at tention will f i r s t be given to the meaning of the term 
f-іЛЛа. In those parts of the Mufinl that I have studied, I have not 
come across a definition of this term, however, what cAbd al-6abbâr 
means by i t becomes clear from the way in which i t is used13. I t 
appears that in reference to living bodies, the existence of $ihha in 
a body means that i t is intact and without injury. This can be 
concluded from cAbd al-Gabbâr's assertion that ?ihha exists in the 
body of a living being if this body is free from defect (.sallm min 
al-Sfa); disappearance of a living body's soundness implies that a 
deficiency (.iktilSl) comes into existence in a part of this body 
(.Mugnl XIII, 269: 12-14). Used in this sense, sihha only applies to 
living beings. cAbd al-GabbSr emphasizes this by specifying that the 
soundness he refers to is needed for l i fe CaJ-fiAAa aliati tabtSgu 
ilayhä Ч-haySf) Œugnî IX, 52: 23). He adds that this soundness 
cannot be perceived, which implies that i t s existence is known by 
deduction (.MugnS XIII, 262: 11). It is difficult to find an adequate 
translation for this term. As a living being whose body Is without 
defect i s described as being sound, even though he may feel i l l , I 
have chosen to t ranslate the term $lbha not as "health" or 
"healthiness", but as "soundness". 
In cAbd al-öabbär's time the term siAAa was also understood in 
senses other than that described above. This can be concluded from 
definitions of çihha given by Mankdïm and Ibn Mattawayh. In order to 
refute an opinion of the BagdSdian Mu=tazilites, Mankdïm mentions 
three possible meanings of $lhha, the f i rs t of which is "composition 
In the sense of having healed" (al-ta'lìf min ¿ihat al-ilti'Sm) 
<Ta*Hq, 392: 4) 3 . Composition is a term that i s used in cAbd a l -
GabbSr's cosmology to indicate that two substances or atoms are 
connected to each other, so that they form one subs t r a t e 1 0 . The word 
ilti'Bm is the verbal noun of the verb lltabma, which means "being 
repaired", "being connected" or "having healed (wound)". This meaning 
of fibha, "composition in the sense of having heeled", conforms to the 
sense in which ?ibba i s used by cAbd al-GabbSr because in both cases 
i t refers to the intactness of a living body without any injury. 
The second meaning of $lhha mentioned by Mankdïm Is "the 
balance of the mixture" (i'tldSl al-mizBg) (Ta^llq, 392: 4). This is 
the sense in which i t was used by physicians in Mankdïm's time. This 
becomes clear from another part of the TaclSq where Mankdïm explains 
that by the "balance of the mixture" the physicians iaflbbS') 
understand the balance of "the four natural dispositions" ( fabiïc): 
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warmth iharSra), coldness (burOda), wetness (rufuba) and dryness 
(.yabusa) (.Ta^llq, 154: 15-18). For these physicians "balance of 
mixture" meant that the four humours were in balance1 1 . 
The third meaning mentioned by MSnkdïm is "the cessation of 
il lnesses and sicknesses" (.zawSl al-amräd wa-'l-asqSn) (Taclfq, 392: 
4-5). This was probably the sense in which slhha was understood by 
the common people. 
Mânkdïm does not explicitly say in which of the three senses he 
himself uses the term ?il?ha. However, I think i t likely that when he 
says that "a blow [generates] pain on condition that the ?іф£а 
disappears" (Taclfq, 339: 10) 1 2 , he uses sihha in the same sense as 
cAbd al-öabbSr, that i s , in the sense of the intactness of a living 
body. 
Ibn Mattawayh, too, mentions three possible meanings of çlhha: 
f i rs t ly , the cessation of i l lness and the cessation of pain (zawSl al-
saqam wa-zawal al-Slam) <.Magmuc II , 31: 14); secondly, the balance of 
the temperaments that are called "the natural dispositions" <.ictidäl 
al-amziga aliati yu'abbaru 'anhS bi-'l-\abS'i') iMagmü" II , 31: 16); 
thirdly, composition that exists in the substrate of l i fe (al-ta'llf 
al-mawgQd ГГ mahall al-hayät) (.Ma¿mOc II , 32: 3). This conforms to 
Mânkdlm's description of the three senses in which $ihha i s used. The 
sense in which Ibn Mattawayh himself uses this term becomes clear 
from his definition of this term: "ipihha is a term for composition 
existing in the substra te of l i f e" 1 3 IMagmQ* III, fol. 5a). Thus, he 
also uses the term in the sense of "soundness", the intactness of a 
living body. 
3. Waha1* 
WahS is a verbal noun derived from the verb "w-h-f that , according 
to Kazimirski1*, means "being burst" or "being torn" (French: être 
crevé, déchiré). Kazimirski t ranslates wahS i t se l f as "crack", 
"fissure", "burst", "rupture" (French: fissure, rupture, solution de 
continuité, crevasse, déchirure). Brunschvig1* translated this term 
with the French word "lésion" which corresponds with the English 
"lesion". As for an English translation of wahS, Pe te rs 1 7 translated 
i t as "cleavage", whereas Katz Hecker translated i t as "infirmity"10 
or "weakness"1 s . In view of the way 'Abd al-ôabbfir uses the term, I 
have chosen to t ransla te wahS as "lesion", as i t is clear that he 
uses this term to refer to a separation made in the body of a living 
being, so that i t is injured. By translating wahB as "lesion", we also 
distinguish i t from other related terms used by cAbd al-öabbSr, such 
as separation (tafrlq or iftirSq) and wound igurh). 
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Defining what is meant by a lesion iwahS), cAbd al-GabbSr 
refers to Abu Hasim al-Gubbä'I and says that "by в lesion (wahS) he 
[Abu Häaim] means a separation iiftlraq) upon whose occurrence the 
soundness (si£.(ja) needed by life disappears, and not a separation 
that does not have this effect«20 (Mugnï IX, 52: 23-24). cAbd al-
ôabbâr does not provide a definition of his own: he probably agrees 
with Abu HSsim's definition of a lesion. This definition makes it 
clear that a lesion is distinguished from other kinds of separation 
by the simultaneous disappearance of soundness. cAbd al-ôabbâr makes 
the occurrence of this special feature the condition for the 
generation of pain, saying that pain is generated on condition that 
soundness disappear from the substrate (MugnT IX, 54: ІЗ-ІбР1. This 
implies that not every separation generates pain. 
To defend his assertion that it is possible that a cause only 
generates an effect if a special feature is present, cAbd al-Gabbär 
refers to sounds. According to his doctrine, sound is generated by 
pressure (.Intimad), although only by a certain type of pressure. He 
considers that knocking on an object is a form of putting pressure on 
it. Only pressure on an object in the form of a knock (mufSkka) 
generates sound; other kinds of pressure do not generate sound. cAbd 
al-öabbär argues that, similarly, not all kinds of separation generate 
pain: pain is only generated by separations that have the special 
feature that their occurrence implies the disappearance of soundness. 
This means that a separation does not generate pain if soundness 
continues, because in that case it cannot generate pain: it is 
prevented from doing so because the condition for the generation has 
not been fulfilled U4u¿nl IX, 163: 22-23). 
If soundness continues in a part of a living body which has a 
separation, this separation should not be referred to as lesion, 
because a lesion is a separation at whose occurrence the soundness 
disappears. This may be the reason why 'Abd al-öabbar also uses the 
term "separation" (iftlrSq/tafrlq') in reference to that which 
generates pain. In volume DC of the Mugnl (Mugnl ΊΧ, 52: 16-59: β), he 
almost exclusively applies the term lesion (wahS) when he discusses 
the generation of pain, whereas in volume XIII of the MufinS he often 
uses the term separation (tafrïq) instead. For instance, at the 
beginning of the chapter that deals with the generation of pain 
(.Mugnl XIII, 272-275), he says that pain is generated by a separation 
(.tafrlq) on the condition that soundness disappears: "Know, that what 
is correct is that it [the pain] is generated by a separation (tafrtq) 
on the condition of the disappearance of soundness" {Mu¿nl XIII, 272: 
3>. Yet, in this volume he also uses the term lesion (.wahS), for 
instance, when he explains that pain is generated by a lesion (MufrnI 
XIII, 260: 10). 
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Although =Abd al-Gabbär mostly uses the terms lesion (waha~) and 
separation (.tafrTq) with reference to that which generates pain, he 
sometimes uses a third term. This term is "mode of being" ikawn). An 
example of the use of this term can be found in volume VI/1 of the 
Mu¿nl, where cAbd al-aabbär says that "... i t is an established fact 
that i t [the pain] is generated by the mode of being (irawn) that is 
the lesion і аЬЮ" (Mugnl VI/1, 169: 6-7). The mode of being meant 
here by cAbd al-6ebbSr is separation (iftiraq) which indicates that 
two substances are separated rather than connected to each o t h e r 2 2 . 
We have seen 2 3 ' that "mode of being" drawn) is a term used by cAbd 
al-öabbär to indicate the relation that a substance has to another 
substance (connected to i t or separated from i t ) and whether i t i s 
moving or at r e s t . cAbd al-öabbSr's referring to an injury as a "mode 
of being" is an example of his mixing philosophical and physical 
aspects, as observed ear l ie r 2 *. 
The term "mode of being" (¡sawn) is also used by Mfinkdïm and Ibn 
Mattawayh in reference to that which generates pain. MSnkdlm uses 
this term when he refutes the suggestion that pain is generated by 
"modes of being" iakwän) (Ta'llq, 91: 19). I have not come across any 
use of the term lesion (vahS) in those passages of the Ta'llq that 
deal with pain and human acts . This was to be expected in view of 
his opinion on the generation of pain that will be discussed l a t e r . 
Ibn Mattawayh sometimes uses the term "modes of being" іак /ВпУ**, 
but a t other times he uses the terms lesion <.va$a~) and separation 
(.tafrïq). Like cAbd al-oabbär, he defines a lesion <.waha~) as a 
separation that comes into existence in the body of a living being 
but, unlike cAbd al-6abbar, he does not mention the simultaneous 
disappearance of the soundness. He says that pain is generated by a 
separation (.tafrfq) that comes into existence in the body of a living 
being, "and this is what we refer to as 'lesion' (vani)216" WagmQ' 
III, fol. 6b). 
4-. The Process of Generation 
As we have seen, cAbd al-ôabblr says that pain is generated by a 
specific sort of separation in a living body. This separation i s the 
result of pressure íic timad) that is put on the body. This means that 
in cAbd al-ôabbar's opinion the process by which pain is produced 
consists of the following s teps: f i rs t ly , pressure is put on the body; 
secondly, the pressure generates a separation (lesion) in the body; 
thirdly, the separation generates pain Œugnl XIII, 273: 140. In his 
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art ic le on cAbd al-Gabbär's theory of pain, Brunschvig2"7 presents the 
process of producing pain as follows: 
í c timad -» wahS (= tafrïqi -» alam 
(pressure -» lesion (= separation) н pain) 
This makes clear that although i t is impossible to produce pain 
without the use of pressure, i t is not the pressure that generates 
the pain, but rather the lesion ((/аЛа). 
cAbd al-Gabbâr advances several arguments to support his 
opinion that the lesion, and not something else, generates the pain. 
From these arguments i t is possible to learn how he thinks about the 
relationship between cause (sabab) and effect imusabbab) in the 
process of generation (tawlld). It becomes clear that in his opinion 
two related things only can be cause and effect if the cause can 
also exist separately from the effect. 
cAbd al-öabbär makes i t clear that a lesion (.wahS) can be the 
cause of pain because a lesion can exist without the simultaneous 
existence of pain. He argues that a lesion is a separation itafrlq') 
and separations can exist without the simultaneous existence of pain 
(Mugnl IX, 52: 24-53: 8). A lesion does not need ClS...yaJ?iSg US> the 
simultaneous existence of pain because i t does not imply the 
existence of pain. To clarify what he means, cAbd al-Gebbar gives the 
example of a substance igawhar). Substances always have some mode of 
being; they are moving or immobile, juxtaposed to another atom or 
separated from i t . They cannot exist without having a mode of being. 
Put differently, the existence of a substance Implies the existence of 
a mode of being (kawnXMugnS IX, 53: 4 -6H e . cAbd al-Öabbfir points 
out that this i s different for a lesion and pain: the existence of a 
lesion does not imply the existence of pain. This means that a lesion 
can be the cause of pain. According to his theory of generation a 
cause (sabab) can be prevented from generating i t s effect (nusabbab) 
so that a cause can exist without i t s effect. This means that two 
related things cannot be in a cause and effect relationship if the 
f i rs t can only exist in co-existence with the other. 
cAbd al-GabbSr's theory of generation se t s s t i l l other 
conditions for the relationship between cause and effect, one of 
which is that the effect must come into being during the existence 
of the cause. This implies that i t is impossible for an effect to 
come into existence if i t s cause is non-existent, for instance, if the 
cause disappeared before the effect came into existence. A further 
condition is that the quantity of the effect must be commensurate 
with the quantity of the cause. Lastly, the process of generation 
must always be the same. 
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cAbd al-GabbSr explains that the lesion generates pain and 
meets a l l of these conditions iMugnl IX, 52: 16-16). He points out 
that generated pain i s always found together with a lesion (.Mugnl DC, 
52: 17). This means that the lesion meets the condition that i t 
generates i t s effect during i t s existence. It is impossible for the 
the disappearance (nafy) of soundness (si££a) to generate pain 
because things that do not exist cannot generate effects: their non-
existence <cacfajn) prevents their doing so (.MugnS XIII, 274: 10-11). 
cAbd al-öabbär also rejects the idea that before i t s disappearance 
the soundness generates pain but on condition that i t will disappear 
after having generated the pain. In rejecting this idea, he argues 
that i t is not correct to say that something must become non-
existing in order to be able to generate i t s effect (Mugnl XIII, 275: 
1 and Mugnl IX, 55: 24). 
As for the condition that the quantity of an effect i s 
commensurate with the quantity of a cause, cAbd al-öabbSr points out 
that lesions and pain meet this condition because "when the injuries 
Increase, the pain increases" (wa-matS zBdat al-¿lrSI?St zSdat al-älSm) 
(Mugnl XIII, 272: 7-8). cAbd al-èabbar adds that some people maintain 
that i t is pressure rather than a lesion which is the cause of pain 
because they take into consideration that a heavy blow causes intense 
pain and a soft blow causes l i t t l e pain. They conclude from this that 
pain is commensurate with the blow, so that the blow must be the 
cause of pain. cAbd al-öabbär refutes this , arguing that if the blow 
(the pressure) was the cause of pain, two equal blows would always 
generate an equal quantity of pain. However, if someone is hit in a 
hard part of his body there is a small separation (tafrfq) and l i t t l e 
pain, but if he is h i t equally hard in a soft part there is a large 
separation and the pain is intense (.Mufinl XIII, 272: 5-7). This means 
that the pain is commensurate with the separation and not with the 
pressure, thus i t must be concluded that i t is not the pressure but 
the separation which is the cause of the pain. 
cAbd al-ôabbSr does not say explicitly that the relationship of 
a lesion and pain also meets the condition that generation must 
always happen in the same way, but the words "in one way" lcalä 
farlqa w&fyida) in the last sentence of the following passage seem to 
make clear that this condition is also fulfilled. Summarizing, cAbd 
al-6abbSr says: 
...it is proved that the lesion (.wahS) generates pain 
because i t is always found together with pain, and i t [the 
pain] is found in a quantity that i s commensurate with the 
lesion. Were i t [the lesion] not i t s generator, this would 
not be necessary for i t [the pain] in one [and the samel 
102 CHAPTER FOUR 
way (.Mugnl IX, 52: 17-10). 
cAbd al-ôabbâr 's opinion that a lesion generates the pain conforms 
with one of Abu Hâsim's opinions on this subject. Abu Hâêim took into 
consideration that a blow to a soft part of the body is more painful 
than a blow to a hard part and therefore concluded that i t is the 
lesion and not the pressure which generates pain (.MufínX ΓΧ, 52: 19-
22). Thus, in his book al-Ôëml' 2 Э he said that pressure (.i* timed) 
generates a lesion (wahS) in the body and this lesion generates the 
pain (Mugnl IX, 136: 11-14). However, cAbd al-Gabbar reports that in 
Abu Hâsim's works other opinions on the generation of pain are 
found30: in al-Abvab3' Abu Hááim said that i t is possible that 
pressure generates both pain and a lesion and in another part of the 
same work he said that pain is generated by pressure and not by the 
"mode of being" (irawn) (by which he means separation) (Mugnl IX, 138: 
14-15). As we do not know the chronological order of Abü Hâsim's 
works, i t i s not clear which of these opinions was the last to be 
held by him. 
However this may be, cAbd al-Gabbâr is of the opinion that 
pressure on a body generates a lesion, and that this lesion generates 
pain. As for MSnkdïm, he adopted one of Abu Hâsim's other opinions: 
the opinion that pressure generates the pain. In his discussion of 
the generation of acts in general (Ta^llq, 387-390), MSnkdïm does not 
consider the generation of pain, nor does he explicitly discuss this 
subject elsewhere. However, when discussing other subjects, he does 
make some remarks on the generation of pain. For Instance, he 
comments that when someone h i t s someone e lse , the quantity of pain 
is commensurate with the quantity of the blow (.fa-inna '1-alam yaqacu 
bi-fyasab al-darb al-mawgud min gihatihï). He argues that there is 
l i t t l e pain if the blow is light but that there is intense pain if the 
blow is heavy (.Ta^llq, 338: 3-4). From this we may conclude that he 
is of the opinion that pressure (the blow), and not a lesion, 
generates pain. There is evidence that he rejects the idea that a 
lesion generates the pain, as he denies that pain is generated by 
"modes of being" (akwBrí) and asser ts that "a human being Cal-qSdir 
bl-'l-qudra) can only produce something in something else by means of 
pressure (i'timScfl" (Ta-'llq, 91: 19-92: 1). This conforms with Abü 
Hâsim's opinion in al-AbwSb. 
Ibn Mattawayh agrees with cAbd al-Gabbâr that a lesion (.wahS) 
generates pain. In his argument, he refers to the case of the two 
equal blows given to a soft and a hard part of the body, resulting in 
different quant i t ies of pain. When cAbd al-Gabbâr discussed this 
subject, he did not explain why the separation in a hard part of the 
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body Is smaller than the separation In a soft place. Ibn Mattawayh 
does give an explanation, pointing out that if someone puts equal 
pressure on a soft and a hard part of someone's body, the separation 
in the hard part is hindered by i t s sol idi ty. As a resu l t , the 
pressure does not generate as much separation in this part as i t 
would have in a soft part , and the lesion (vahâ) is smaller. In 
consequence, there is less pain in the hard part than in the soft 
part (Wa^ fflö-- III , fols. 6b, 7a). 
From Mankdïm's and Ibn Mattawayh's opinions on the generation 
of pain i t can be concluded that Ibn Mattawayh describes the process 
of the generation of pain in the same way as cAbd al-èabb6r. MSnkdlm 
describes i t differently, rejecting the idea that a lesion generates 
pain. However, he does not mention that this was cAbd al-ôabbSr's 
opinion and that his own opinion was different. Thus, one wonders why 
he did not mention th is . Did cAbd al-éabbSr in his Sari? aJ-us£U al-
kamsa defend a different opinion on the generation of pain? Did he 
say there that pressure generates pain and did he change this opinion 
in the Mugnî? If so, why did MSnkdlm not mention this? I did not find 
an answer to these questions. 
5. The Problem of the Two Needle-Pricks 
What seems to contradict cAbd al-ôabbSr's theory on the generation of 
pain is the fact that two needle-pricks are equally painful. How can 
i t be explained that when a strong person pricks someone else 's body 
with a needle this hur ts Just as much <or maybe even less) as when 
the prick is given by a weak person? According to Muc tazilite 
thinking, we are able to act by virtue of the power (qudra) that 
inheres in the subs t ra te of our limbs. The quantity of this power 
defines the proportions of the acts we can perform using our limbs 
(.Mugnl DC, 1β: 16). I t implies that a strong person can put more 
pressure on an object than a weak person. 
This i s important for the generation of pain. We have seen that 
a lesion (waha~> is caused by pressure (і сііла"Л. We have also seen 
that a condition for the relationship of cause and effect i s that the 
effect i s commensurate with the cause. This implies that the greater 
the pressure, the greater the lesion. Thus, pain that resu l t s from 
pressure applied by a strong person must be greater than pain that 
r e s u l t s from pressure applied by a weak person because, the larger 
the lesion, the greater the pain. If this is r ight, then how can i t be 
explained that a needle-prick is equally painful, whether given by a 
strong or a weak person, and that the prick given by the weak person 
may even hurt more? 
104 CHAPTER FOUR 
In volume ХШ of the Mugnl, cAbd al-6abbär discusses this 
question. He points out that the quantity of power that inheres in 
someone's limbs only determines the absolute limit of what can be 
achieved by using these limbs. However, i t is not necessary for a 
strong person to use a l l his strength when giving a prick - as a 
matter of fact, this also holds true for a weak person (Mufinl XIII, 
233: 5-7). 
I t is possible that notwithstanding his weakness, a weak 
person pricks the needle in the body of a living being32 
in such a way that i t penetrates in i t s length (tdlan) and 
breadth (.carçlan) and that the strong person does i t 
differently, so that what actually is produced by the 
strong person is as much or less than what is produced by 
the weak person Œugnï XIII, 233: β-10). 
This means that cAbd al-èabbfir calls into question the correctness of 
the premise that a prick given by a strong person resu l t s in a larger 
lesion than the prick given by a weak person. He points out that a 
strong person who does not use his full strength may produce a 
lesion that is as large as or even smaller than a lesion produced by 
a weak person. 
After giving his own solution to this question, cAbd al-öabbSr 
describes, without rejection, what Abu Hâàim said about this i s sue 3 3 . 
Abu Hâèim did not abandon the idea that a strong man's act must be 
more effective than a weak man's. According to cAbd al-ôabbâr, he 
declared that when a strong person pricks someone's body with a 
needle, he makes more par t ic les of separation (agzS' aJ-tafrfq)3* than 
a weak person. Abu Häsim then weighed how much soundness disappears 
against how much separation there i s . He considered separation as 
consisting of par t ic les (.agzä1) of separation. He said that if the 
soundness that disappears does not correspond to the quantity of 
par t ic les of separation, as in the case of the strong person pricking, 
this means that some par t ic les of separation cannot generate pain. 
The shortage of disappearing soundness implies that for them the 
condition of disappearance of soundness is not fulfilled and a 
condition not being fulfilled prevents a cause from generating i t s 
cause. Only those par t ic les of separation for which the condition of 
disappearance of soundness has been fulfilled can generate pain. This 
means that in his opinion, the quantity of pain is determined by how 
much soundness disappears and not by the quantity of separation 
<.Mu¿nI XIII, 233: 11-236: 11, Mugnî IX, 55: 1-13 and Ma¿m0' III, fol. 
7b). His solution for the question of the two needle-pricks is that 
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they are equally painful because in both cases the same quantity of 
soundness disappears. 
cAbd al-ôabbSr observed that Abu Hâèim's opinion raises some 
questions. For instance, if separation consists of part icles of 
separation does this mean that pain is generated by part icles of 
separation working together? (Mugnl ΓΧ, 56: 15-57: 6 and Mugnl XIII, 
234·: 1-2). If so, this would mean one thing (pain) is generated by a 
number of causes working together, which conflicts with the 
Mu^tazilite principle that for each act there can be only one agent 
(.fS^iï)3*. Abu HSsim said that his idea that pain is generated by 
some par t ic les of separation did not contradict this principle 
because, in his opinion, the disappearing soundness is not divided 
into par t ic les and, as one soundness disappears, one pain is 
generated Œugnï XIII, 233: 16-18). 
A diff icult point in Abu HSsim's solution i s how to explain that 
i t is indeed possible that the disappearance of soundness does not 
concern a l l par t ic les of a separation, but only some of them. 
Apparently, Abu Hâsim did not think that the quantity of disappearing 
soundness i s commensurate with the quantity of separation. His 
opinion may have been that the quantity of disappearing soundness 
depends on the natural disposition of the person in question, since 
people differ from each other in their sensi t ivi ty to pain. This can 
be concluded from his remark that when the same quantity of lesion 
iwahS) ex is t s in two persons, a different quantity of soundness may 
disappear, so that in one person more pain is generated than in 
another Œufril IX, 55: 13-17). 
Although in the Mugnl cAbd al-ôabbSr describes Abu HSsim's 
solution to the question of the two needle-pricks without rejecting 
i t , i t i s possible that he la ter rejected i t . This would explain why 
Ibn Mattawayh in the MagmQ* fi 'l-mufrìf Ы-Ч-taklîf says that cAbd 
al-öabbSr did not agree with Abu Häiim and rejected the idea that 
only a part of the separation generates pain. Ibn Mattawayh reports 
that: 
What the Chief Judge <Q8dI Ί-qudat) chose was that i t 
[Abu HSsim's opinion on this question] is not correct, as 
the s i tuat ion (fy&!) of one of the two [secondary] causes is 
the same as the s i tuat ion of the other, so that i t [the 
f i r s t one] i s not more enti t led (avia) to generate than the 
other (.MagmQ* I I I , fol. 7b). 
In the MuÇIf Ы-'l-taklIf Abd al-ÔabbSr may have rejected Abu HSáim's 
solution, arguing that the condition of the disappearance of 
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soundness Is fulfilled for the to ta l separation, and not for only a 
part of i t . As the Mufylt was probably composed after the Mugnl, i t is 
possible that cAbd al-GabbSr expressed opinions different from those 
in the Mugnl because he had gained new insights . 
Ibn Mattawayh rejects Abu HSáim's solution to the question of the two 
needle-pricks, using the argument reportedly put forward by cAbd a l -
GabbSr in the Muh.ït bi-'l-takllf. He argues that i t is impossible that 
when two "causes of generation" (sabab) are in the same si tuat ion, 
one generates i t s effect and the other does not. However, Ibn 
Mattawayh explains this by referring to qualification and causes of 
qualification. He argues that i t is impossible that when two "causes 
of a qualification" ( c iJJai in) are in the same si tuat ion, one of them 
causes a qualification and the other does not. In his argument Ibn 
Mattawayh draws a paral le l between the cause (c i i la) of a 
qualification (hukm) and the cause isabab) of an effect (Magmü* III, 
fol. 7b). However, I doubt whether these two kinds of cause are 
comparable because a cilla must cause a qualification and cannot be 
prevented from doing so, whereas a sabab can by prevented from 
generating i t s effect . 
Ibn Mattawayh also objects to the premise that two needle-
pricks are equally painful. He thinks that one may say: "It is 
impossible to prick in such a manner that the two pricks are equally 
painful. Rather, we may find that the prick of the strong person 
hurts more, or the other way round" Ша$іайс III , fol. 7a). Or one may 
say: "Rather, we find that the prick of the weak person hurts more 
than the prick of the strong person because the strong person pricks 
with a steady hand C=alS samt al-lstlqSma) and the weak person does 
not prick in this steady way because of his weakness, and so pain is 
generated at the sides of the needle-prick" (.MagmQ* III , fol. 7a and 
b). 
Notwithstanding his objections to the premise that the two 
needle-pricks are equally painful, Ibn Mattawayh t r i e s to find a 
solution to the question that s t a r t s from the idea that the two 
pricks are indeed equally painful. For his solution he takes into 
account the duration of the prick. He considers that i t is possible 
that the weak person takes more time (more time particles (avqifí) 
for the prick and produces something of which the total quantity i s 
equivalent ImuqSblD to what is done by the strong person in less 
time (Ma#mûc III , fol. 7a and Tadklra, 311: 13-15). 
Apart from this solution, Ibn Mattawayh gives another solution 
to the question in which he s t a r t s from the idea that the strong 
person and the weak person take the same time for pricking the 
needle and that the strong person's act is more effective than the 
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weak person's. To explain that the two needle-pricks are equally 
painful, Ibn Mattawayh takes into account that pain and pleasure are 
the same sort of thing and that which is experienced as pain is so 
because i t is perceived with aversion. He considers i t possible that 
the two needle-pricks are equally painful because they they are 
perceived with an equal quantity of aversion (.nufOr): "if the aversion 
(.nufOr) is equal, the suffering (ta'allum) i s equal, and if the 
aversion increases, the suffering increases" (MagmO'° III , fol. 7b). 
It should be noted that in the l a t t e r solution Ibn Mattawayh 
does not speak of equal pain (alami, but of equal suffering 
(.ta'allum). His solution implies that he thinks two different lesions 
can produce equal quant i t ies of pain because, in spite of the 
difference in quantity of pain generated by them, i t provokes equal 
quanti t ies of aversion3"5. However, Ibn Mattawayh does not explain why 
the aversion i s equal. Nor does he explain how to bring the idea that 
the quantity of pain is commensurate with the quantity of aversion 
into line with the theory of generation. The strange thing is that 
Ibn Mattawayh does not mention *=Abd al-öabbar's solution that the 
strong person does not use a l l his power when he gives the prick. Did 
he omit i t because he rejected this idea? Did cAbd al-èabbar himself 
decide not to mention i t in al-Mu^If bi-'l-takllfi I cannot answer 
these questions. 
It i s therefore uncertain whether MSnkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh 
agreed with cAbd al-öabbSr on the question of the two needle-pricks. 
Mânkdîm does not discuss th is question. As for Ibn Mattawayh, we may 
conclude that the solutions he mentions in а1-Ма£лшс fi '1-шиі)Ц Ы-
Ч-taklIf were different from cAbd al-GabbSr's solutions in the Mugnl. 
The question of the two needle-pricks may seem to be an unimportant 
question but had cAbd al-ôabbnr not been able to answer i t , his 
opponents could have used this to challenge him about his doctrine on 
pain3 7 . This becomes clear from cAbd al-éabbSr's introduction to this 
question in which he presents the question as being raised by 
opponents who refute that pain is a perceptible ma^nS that can be 
produced by humans by means of the process of generation (.Mugnl 
XIII, 232: 14-18). 
6. The Duration of Pain 
We have seen a e that in cAbd al-GabbSr's cosmology, objects in th is 
world consist of substance and accidents (а*гёф. All accidents are 
temporal, but some of them are continuous (bSql) and some are not. 
Continuous accidents exist as long as they are not annihilated by the 
appearance of their opposites in the same substrate . Thus, for 
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instance, the modes of being (akwSn) form two pairs of incompatible 
accidents. A substance cannot exist without a mode of being, so the 
accident of i t s present mode of being has to pers is t until i t s 
opposite comes into existence. This means that an atom continues to 
be immobile as long as the accident of immobility inheres in i t . But, 
as soon as the accident of movement, the opposite of the accident of 
immobility, comes into existence in the subst ra te , the atom becomes 
moving. The accident of immobility ceases to exist because of the 
existence of i t s opposite, the accident of moving, in the atom. 
Likewise, the two other modes of being, contiguity and separation, are 
each other 's opposites. When one of them comes into existence in the 
substra te , the existence of the other one comes to an end. 
Accidents that do not have an opposite cease to exist of their 
own accord3*. According to cAbd al-Gabbar pain is such an accident 
iMugnS DC, 62: 17). But if pain is not continuous, then why does the 
pain from a stab or a blow continue for some time? Why does i t not 
stop immediately? cAbd al-Gabb&r's opinion is that the pain continues 
because the injury does not generate pain only once, but goes on to 
generate pain continually, as long as i t ex is ts (MugnS XIII, 237: 1-8). 
That i t is indeed possible that an effect, such as pain, comes 
into existence continually, as long as the cause pers i s t s , is made 
clear by cAbd al-Gabbär with the example of "permanent pressure" 
(.Intimad lSzlm)A<>. Permanent pressure means pressure that resul ts 
from the weight of an object. Permanent pressure generates i t s effect 
not only at the moment that i t comes into existence but for as long 
as the pressure pe r s i s t s . Like a l l causes (.asbäb), whether or not they 
are continuous, permanent pressure must generate i t s effect, unless 
i t is prevented from doing so Wu&nS XIII, 237: 4 - 7 ) л 1 . A condition 
that is not fulfilled also prevents a cause from generating i t s 
effect but as long as the condition is fulfilled and no other 
hindrances exist , the cause must generate the effect. This holds for 
pain as well. ^Abd al-óabbSr therefore argues that as long as the 
wound l a s t s , the condition of the disappearance of soundness is 
fulfilled and so the cause, the lesion, must continue generating i t s 
effect, the pain: 
As long as the wound (^гггф) las t s , the pain must happen 
over and over again Upälan bacd hëî) [generated] by the 
f i rs t incision itaqfl*) iMugnl XIII, 237: 7-8). 
Opponents may have argued that the condition for the generation 
of pain is only fulfil led when the pain comes into existence and not 
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after that because soundness disappears only once. To such an 
objection cAbd al-ôabb&r answers thet 
nobody can say: "If i t [the f i r s t incision] generates [pain] 
on the condition that the soundness (sAJLjia) disappears, 
then how·12 can i t [the incision] generate during i t s [the 
incision's] continuance? Uiufrnl XIII, 237: 9-10). 
cAbd al-Gabbär explains that the incision can indeed generate pain 
during i t s continuance 
because the soundness is disappearing (.muntafi) both when 
i t [the incision] continues to exist and when i t [the 
incision] comes into existence, so i t must generate in both 
s i tuat ions (Mugnl XIII, 237: 10-11). 
According to ''Abd al-Gabbär, soundness disappears not only at the 
moment that the wound is made, but also after this moment for as 
long as the wound exis t s . The disappearance of soundness does not 
stop: i t continues disappearing as a heavy object continues exerting 
pressure ("permanent pressure") on the place where i t l ies (.Mugnl 
XIII, 237: 11-13). Because of th is , the wound continues generating 
pain for as long as the soundness has not returned. 
However, the last ing pain does not stay as severe as i t was 
immediately after the wound was made. The pain becomes l e s s , 
although from time to time i t s severity may increase and the pain 
may again become as severe as i t was in the beginning. How can this 
be explained? If the f i r s t incision continues to generate pain, should 
not the pain be equally severe a l l the time? cAbd al-éabbar thinks 
that the pain lessens and that i t s severity fluctuates because of 
differences in the quantity of disappearing soundness. In his opinion 
the quantity of generated pain is commensurate with the fluctuating 
quantity of disappearing soundness. However, he does not explain why 
the quantity of disappearing pain f luctuates. He does explain that at 
times the pain becomes less because some soundness has returned, and 
at times the pain becomes the same as i t was in the beginning 
because some returned soundness has disappeared again (Muftnl XIII, 
238: 10-12). He deems i t possible that the one time a smaller 
quantity of soundness disappears than the other, so that the quantity 
of disappearing soundness varies from time to time. But why does 
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some soundness return and disappear again? "Abd al-Gabb&r does not 
explain this . 
Abu Häsim held a different opinion on the question of why pain 
continues af ter a stab or blow. According to cAbd al-Gabb8r, Abü 
HSsim said that the reason why a living being continues to be in pain 
is that the cause of the pain comes into existence recurrently. As 
opposed to cAbd al-öabbêr, he did not believe that soundness 
continues to disappear. Instead, he believed that the lesion (.waha) 
continues to come into existence for as long as the pain l as t s . From 
the fact that the quantity of pain varies from time to time he 
concluded that i t was impossible that pain at a later instance was 
s t i l l generated by the f i r s t cause (sabab). He thought that if each 
new occurrence was generated by the f i rs t cause, there could not be 
such a variation in the quantity of pain (.Mugnî DC, 164: 10-1+ and 
Mutfni XIII, 238: 1-2). 
Abu HSsim therefore concluded that the variation in the quantity 
of pain was the resul t of the variation in the quantity of the wound 
(.gurh). He considered i t possible that as long as soundness is 
absent*3 , the s t a t e of the wound varies, in the sense that the cause 
(sabab) of the pain repeatedly (fySlan bacd bSD comes into existence. 
He said that this was possible because of renewed "induced pressure" 
(Intimad mu¿ta lab). Induced pressure is pressure that is generated in 
an object, for instance, by throwing i t . Such pressure does not 
pers is t , as opposed to "permanent pressure" (latinad läzim) which, as 
we have seen, is pressure that resu l t s from the weight of a heavy 
object*·*. Abu Hâsim thought that this induced pressure can be the 
resul t of a human*15 or divine act. To explain this he mentioned 
pressure on burned par ts of the body or on parts of the body where 
an amputation has been carried out (.Mugnl XIII, 23Ô: 1-6). We have 
seen that Abu Häsim reportedly said in one of his works that i t is 
pressure rather than a lesion which generates pain. This may refer to 
his opinion on the duration of pain in existing wounds. However, i t i s 
not quite clear to me what he thought about the pressure and the 
wound in this respect. Likewise, I do not know what he means by 
pressure that is the resu l t of a divine act. 
cAbd al-GabbSr seems not to have been sat isf ied with Abu Hfiâim's 
opinion that pain continues to exist because the lesion repeatedly 
comes into existence. He himself thought i t possible that the lesion 
las t s and repeatedly generates i t s effect for as long as i t ex i s t s , 
but would Abu HSáim have approved this? cAbd al-ôabbSr says that , as 
he could not remember In detai l Abu Haáim's teaching with respect to 
this , he asked Abu = Abdallah about i t . Abü •= Abdallah answered cAbd 
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al-GabbSr that i t is possible, but that he himself considered i t more 
likely that the lesion only generates pain while i t comes into 
existence because i t i s a condition for the generation of pain that 
soundness disappears. In his opinion, soundness only disappears at the 
moment that the lesion comes into existence, but not when the lesion 
continues to exist (Mugnl IX, 164: 1-7). 
Abu cAbdallSh's answer makes clear that the problem l ies in the 
condition for the generation of pain, namely, that the lesion only 
generates pain if soundness disappears. If this i s understood in the 
sense that soundness only disappears at the moment that the lesion 
comes into existence, i t implies that after this moment the lesion 
stops generating because the condition is no longer fulfilled. cAbd 
al-öabbär's solution for the duration of pain is that the soundness 
continues to be disappearing so that the condition for the generation 
of pain is fulfilled both when the lesion comes into existence and 
during i t s continuance. 
Mánkdlm does not discuss the duration of pain, so i t is not known 
whether he agreed with cAbd al-öabbfir. As for Ibn Mattawayh, he 
agrees with ^Abd al-oabbär about pain not being continuous. He 
argues that pain lessens with time, although no opposite (.çlldd) 
occurs (.Magmu* III, fol. 4a). He explains that the appearance of an 
opposite is inconceivable because pain does not have an opposite: 
pleasure is not the opposite of pain (Ma¿mus III, fol. 4a). We have 
seenAe that pain and pleasure are considered to be the same sor t of 
thing; the difference between them concerns the emotion they are 
perceived with. If pain, having no opposite, was continuous, i t s 
existence would only end when i t s substra te ceased to exis t . Ibn 
Mattawayh concludes from this that pain cannot be continuous (MagnO* 
III, fol. 4a). His opinion that pain is not continuous implies that he 
believed that pain is repeatedly generated. In volume I of the Magmuc 
he says that pain is something that is generated only once by i t s 
cause so, for i t s continuance, the cause must be renewed (Magmu^ I, 
424: 5-7). From this we may conclude that he agreed with Abü Hfiáim 
about this question, although he does not explicit ly cr i t ic ize cAbd 
al-öabbSr's opinion. 
Just as in the case of the question of the two needle-pricks, i t 
was important for cAbd al-öabbSr to find an answer to the question 
of the endurance of pain, however difficult this may be. Had he not 
been able to answer this question, his opponents could have used this 
to refute his opinion that pain generates from a lesion (.Mufinf XIII, 
236: 12-13). Ibn Mattawayh, answering this question did not adopt 
cAbd al-öabbär 's solution, which is that the soundness continues to 
be disappearing. Instead, he agreed with Abu Has im as to why pain 
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continues after a blow has been Inflicted: i t s cause is renewed. He 
did not think that the f i r s t cause continues to generate pain, as was 
cAbd al-Gabbär's opinion. Ibn Mattawayh's disagreement with ""Aba a l -
Gabbär implies that he did not adopt an innovation introduced by cAbd 
al-Gabbär but maintained the original teachings of the Bahsamiyya 
with respect to this question. 
7. The End of Pain 
We have seen that according to cAbd al-Gabbär, the lesion continues 
to generate pain after a stab or blow has been inflicted. The 
quantity of generated pain varies because the disappearing soundness 
fluctuates and the quantity of pain is commensurate with the 
quantity of disappearing soundness. According to eAbd al-öabbär, this 
also explains why pain stops after some time: as the wound heals 
soundness is no longer absent; the condition for the generation of 
pain is no longer fulfilled and the cause is prevented from 
generating i t s effect. Pain is not continuous, so i t stops of i t s own 
accord as soon as i t s cause stops generating i t . This means that as 
soon as soundness has completely returned, there is no pain anymore 
(.Mugnl XIII, 237: 12-H) . 
When explaining why pain stops, cAbd al-Gabbär says only that 
the cause stops generating pain because the condition for generation 
is no longer fulfilled. He does not explain why the existence of the 
cause, the incision in the body, ends. Probably, he does not explain 
this because the healing of a wound is a physical matter that is 
difficult to explain in a philosophical way. MSnkdîm does not discuss 
the end of pain at a l l , whereas Ibn Mattawayh only says, like cAbd 
al-Gabbär, that pain stops because soundness has returned so that 
the condition on which modes of being iakwäri) generate pain is no 
longer fulfilled <.Magmuc III , fol. 8a and b). 
6. Pain Brought into Existence by God 
cAbd al-öabbär and Ibn Mattawayh share the opinion that pain does 
not need the simultaneous existence of a lesion. This implies that 
pain can exist in a part of the body without the existence of a 
lesion in that part of the body iMu$nï XIII, 232: 7-6). cAbd al-Öabbär 
therefore asse r t s that pain can exist together with soundness. An 
example of such pain is internal pain which one feels without being 
able to discern the cause by which i t is generated. This pain exists 
although nobody has put pressure on that part of the body and 
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soundness continues to exist in i t . No one could have produced this 
pain because, as cAbd al-6abbär has made clear, humans only can 
produce pain by f i r s t applying pressure. This pressure generates a 
lesion and the lesion generates pain. 
This means that the sor t s of pain that exist without lesion, 
such as i l lnesses <.amra~d), cannot be produced by humans. This leads 
cAbd al-Gabbär to conclude that they can only be produced by God. In 
order to make clear that i t is possible that things happen inside the 
body which are produced by God, cAbd al-Gabbär gives the examples of 
the involuntary movements of a person who trembles or who is part ly 
paralyzed (.maflüg), and of the movement of throbbing a r te r i es . He 
asser ts that these movements are produced by God and that they have 
in common with pain produced by God the fact that we cannot avoid 
them. For another piece of evidence that pain can be produced by God, 
cAbd al-öabbär refers to the Qur'än in which i t is said that God 
t r ies <,yamfyana~) his worshippers by i l lnesses (Mu¿nl XIII, 367: 11 -U) . 
The sor t s of pain that exist without the existence of a lesion 
are produced by God directly icalS ¿ihat al-lbtldät; He need not 
f i rs t produce a lesion in the body in order to create pain. That God 
produces pain in a direct way does not imply that He is not able to 
produce pain through generation, as humans do. cAbd al-Gabbär 
believes that everything we can do through generation, God can do in 
two ways: e i ther through generation or directly (.mutawallidan wa-
mubtada'an) (.Mugnl XIII, 276: 2-4). God is able to bring pain into 
existence by f i r s t bringing into existence the cause (.sabab) that 
generates pain (Mu¿nl XIII, 366: l -β). This cause generates pain 
because a cause generates i t s effect, regardless of which agent 
produces i t . 
However, what does cAbd al-öabbär mean when he says that God 
is able to produce pain through generation? Does he believe that God 
is only in theory able to do so, or does he believe that God actually 
produces pain in this way? Is i t possible to find an example of such 
pain? cAbd al-öabbär mentions an example of pain that i s actually 
produced by God through generation, although the pain that is brought 
into existence does not occur in this world, but in the hereafter*7 : 
It is conceivable that in the Hereafter, the Exalted One 
brings pain into existence in the people in Hell which is 
generated by the pressure ii" timad) of the f ire IMugnï IX, 
111: 10). 
cAbd al-Gabbär explains that i t is known that God will punish the 
people in Hell through fire. The effect of fire on a living body is 
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seen as pressure on the body, which generates a separation which in 
turn generates pain (Mugnl IX, 112: 10-13). 
There is no doubt that Mânkdïm agrees with ^Abd al-Gabbar that pain 
which ex is t s without a lesion is produced by God. Like cAbd a l -
öabbär, he argues that if there is pain although no pressure 
(Intimad) is fe l t , this pain is produced by God (Te'llq, 91: 14-92: 1). 
Ibn Mattawayh is of the same opinion: God is the only One who can 
produce pain directly "like creation" ibl-tarlqat al-iktirS11) (MagmOc 
III, fol. 6a and b). He explains that there need be no lesion for pain 
produced in this way and argues that if such pain required the 
existence of a lesion, i t would imply that a bad headache or gout 
require the existence of a large separation because the quantity of 
separation has to be commensurate with the quantity of pain. But 
because th is i s not the case, i t proves that pain produced by God 
does not require the existence of a separation iMagmu* III, fol. 8a). 
Mânkdïm does not discuss the question of whether God also 
produces pain through generation. As for Ibn Mattawayh, he agrees 
with cAbd al-6abbar that God is able to produce pain through 
generation. Like ^Abd al-òabbSr, he is convinced that God can produce 
through generation whatever we can produce (.Magma* III, fol. 6a). He 
is of the opinion that in this world (al-dunyS) God produces pain 
directly, but in the hereafter (.al-Bkira) He also produces pain 
through generation. Ibn Mattawayh gives the same example as cAbd a l -
Gabbâr of the punishment of people in Hell through fire {MagmQc I II , 
fol. 6b). 
9. The Scorpion Sting 
From the foregoing i t becomes clear that *=Abd al-6abbar recognizes 
two categories of pain: pain produced through generation and pain 
produced directly by God. The notion that pain can be produced by God 
is applied by cAbd al-èabbàr in order to answer the question of why, 
when we are stung by a hornet (zunburì or a scorpion <caqra&), we 
experience severe pain although the separation in our body made by 
the st ing is very small. This seems to contradict the rule that 
generated pain is commensurate with the lesion that generates i t . 
'Abd al-óabbSr's answer is that the pain generated by the 
separation is increased by additional pain brought into existence by 
God. According to him, i t is the normal course of events CBda) in 
cases like this that pain from God is added to the pain generated by 
the separation - 6 1 . This additional pain is produced directly and not 
through generation. The quantity of this additional pain can 
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therefore vary: i t may be more at one time than at another time. I t 
is even possible that the additional pain does not come into 
existence at a l l , whereas the pain that is generated by the lesion 
must always come into existence. The lesion must generate i t s effect, 
unless i t is prevented from doing so. This means that a scorpion 
sting always hurts because the separation made by the sting always 
generates pain. The quantity of this generated pain is always the 
same. However, the quantity of additional pain may vary and therefore 
the tota l quantity of pain felt by someone who is stung by a 
scorpion varies <.Mu¿nI IX, 53: 9-14). 
Mänkdlm agrees with cAbd al-óabbár that the pain of a scorpion s t ing 
consists of pain generated by the separation and of additional pain 
produced by God. He argues that the pain that is the resul t of a 
scorpion st ing is such that i t cannot be produced by a creature 
alone; the additional pain must be produced by God (.Tacllq, 91: 14-
17). 
Ibn Mattawayh does not discuss this question in his chapter on 
how pain is brought into existence Wagmu* III , fols. 6a-9a). Instead, 
he discusses i t in another chapter that deals with the compensation 
of pain and, from what he says, i t becomes clear that he takes for 
granted that the pain generated by the s t ing is increased with pain 
from God (MagmQ* III, fol. 37a). 
I t can therefore be concluded that cAbd al-öabbar, MSnkdïm and 
Ibn Mattawayh agree that the pain we feel when we are stung by а 
hornet or a scorpion consists of pain generated by the lesion and 
additional pain brought into existence by God, 
10. Can Pain Exist in Inanimate Objects? 
There was some difference of opinion among the Mu^tazilltes on the 
question of whether pain can exist In an inanimate object (£ала"Лл в. 
It is not clear why they considered i t necessary to discuss this . Had 
the question i t s origin in early theological discussions on the 
Punishment in the Grave? There was disagreement among the 
mutakallimOn as to whether or not the dead are punished in their 
graves. Al-As^arl says that most people believed that the dead are 
punished in their graves; only the Mu c tazi l i tes and the KSrigites 
(.Kawärig) rejected this {MaqSlSt, 430: 10). However, It i s clear that 
cAbd al-oabbär, Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh do not discuss the 
question of whether or not pain can exist in inanimate objects in 
order to apply to the Punishment of the Grave60 . They probably 
discuss this because opponents may use this question to refute the 
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theory of generated pain. 
Mânkdlm does not deny that there wi l l be a Punishment of the 
Grave C-adSb al-qabrí^1 , although he be l i eves that this punishment 
wi l l not take place before the interval between the two b las t s of the 
trumpet on Judgment Day (Ta'lSq, 733: 15-16) . He explains that the 
dead must be brought back to l i f e in order to be punished, s ince the 
punishment of an inanimate body i s impossible and inconceivable. One 
might have expected him to defend this opinion by arguing that pain 
cannot e x i s t in inanimate bodies. However, although he bel ieves that 
pain cannot e x i s t in inanimate objects , he does not mention this when 
he says that the dead must be brought back to l i f e . This indicates 
that the question of whether or not pain can e x i s t in inanimate 
objects was not d iscussed by him in reference to the Punishment of 
the Grave. 
According to cAbd al-Gabbär and Ibn Mattawayh, Abu HSsim f i r s t said 
that pain cannot e x i s t in inanimate bodies but he later changed h i s 
opinion, saying that i t i s p o s s i b l e " . In this context, cAbd al-öabbär 
does not speak of "pain", but of the "class of pain" (.gins al-alam). 
He explains that Abu HS§im said that when this c lass e x i s t s in 
inanimate objects , i t i s not cal led pain: that which belongs to th i s 
c lass i s only cal led pain if i t i s perceived with aversion (Mugnl TX, 
62: 23-24- and 164: 17 -21 , Mugnl XI11, 274: 2 -3 and Tedklra, 321: 16-
322: 2). 
*-Abd al-GabbSr shares Abu HSáim's opinion on the question of 
whether pain can e x i s t in inanimate objects , assert ing that th i s i s 
poss ible . He argues that in order to ex i s t the ma*nS pain only needs 
a substrate (mahalï). This means that i t can e x i s t in any substrate , 
including that of an inanimate object. He agrees with Abu Hâaim that 
in that case i t i s not called pain (.MugnS XIII, 252: 7-8 and Mugnl 
VII, 36: 15-19) . 
Some opponents of cAbd al-ôabbar may have objected to h i s 
opinion on the grounds that we cannot know anything about the 
ex is tence of pain in inanimate bodies because we cannot perceive th i s 
pain and that i t therefore makes no difference whether i t e x i s t s or 
not. But cAbd al-öabbär points out that if the ma^nS pain e x i s t s in 
an inanimate object , we do know something about i t : we know that i t 
would be called pain i f i t ex is ted in a l iv ing substrate and was 
perceived with aversion. cAbd al-öabbSr compares the ex is tence of 
pain in an inanimate object with the ex i s tence of the power to act 
(.qudra) in someone who i s prevented from acting. Although such a 
person, because he i s hindered, cannot do anything that humans 
usually do, i t i s wrong to say that the power to act does not e x i s t 
in him: we know that he would do whatever i t i s possible for humans 
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to do if he were not prevented from doing so. ^Abd al-GabbSr says 
that In the same way, one should not say that we cannot know 
anything about pain in an inanimate object, nor that there is no 
difference between i t s presence (.wugQd) in the inanimate object and 
i ts absence (cadam) IMugnl XIII, 252: 7-15). 
This ra i ses the question of who can know the existence of pain 
in an inanimate object, as we cannot perceive i t s existence. cAbd a l-
ôabbSr answers that when this ma^nä exis ts in an inanimate object, i t 
is perceived by God (Mugnl XIII, 252: 1&-20). According to Mu^tazilite 
doctrine God perceives all perceptible th ings 5 3 , so He also perceives 
pain. cAbd al-Gabbär points out that the fact that only God perceives 
pain in an inanimate object, while we ourselves cannot perceive i t , is 
no reason to deny that this pain exis ts . For instance, we cannot 
perceive pain in someone else 's body because we can only perceive 
pain in our own body, yet we do not therefore deny that this pain 
exis ts . 
cAbd al-öabbär explains that the reason why we cannot perceive 
pain in another body, whether this body is animate or inanimate, is 
that the subs t ra te in which the ша'пв inheres is not part of us. Pain 
is only perceived by the living body in whose living subst ra te i t 
inheres. We would be able to perceive i t in another body if the 
substrate in which the pain inheres could become part of our 
substrate. Since this i s impossible, two living beings cannot perceive 
each other's pain. It is not because of the masna~, but because of the 
impossibility of their sharing one substrate CMugnS XIII, 253: 6-10). 
By these arguments eAbd al-öabbär defends his opinion that the 
ma'nS pain can exist in an inanimate object but that i t s existence is 
known only to God. He alone can perceive i t : God can perceive every 
pain. However, i t should be noted that according to cAbd al-öabbär's 
doctrine this does not imply that God feels pain. What i s perceived 
by God is only the таспа~: aversion is impossible for God and this 
inaine is therefore not called pain because i t is not perceived with 
aversion. Thus, God can never be described as "being in pain", 
although He perceives the pain we suffer (Mugnî XIII, 384: 15-16). 
cAbd al-öabbär does not discuss how the macnä pain is brought 
into existence in an inanimate object. He only reports that Abu HSsim 
said that a separation can generate this class (¿ins) in each object. 
This seems to be in contradiction with the theory that says that pain 
is generated on condition that soundness (sii¡i$a) disappear. Soundness 
does not apply to inanimate objects, but only to living bodies, 
something which Abu HSsim conceded, but he added that this only 
concerns the expression and not the essence of that which is meant 
by soundness. In his opinion, soundness means that there is 
"connection" Cta'lTf) in the substrate of a living being, and 
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connection also applies to the substrate of an inanimate object. 
According to Abu Haèim, this implies that the condition for the 
generation of pain is fulfilled if one speaks of the disappearance of 
connection instead of the disappearance of soundness (Mugnî IX, 164: 
lß-165: 5). However, we may observe that by equating soundness in a 
living body with connection in an inanimate object, Abu Has im does 
not take into account that there is an important difference between 
living beings and inanimate objects. A separation (lesion) in the body 
of a living being disappears after some time and soundness re turns . 
This does not happen to inanimate objects: the separation continues 
to exis t . Does this mean that the separation continues to generate 
(the class of) pain? Abu Hâsim does not discuss this aspect. 
Although the question of whether or not pain can exist in an 
inanimate object was a theoretical question, i t was a question that 
was given at tent ion. Even MSnkdïm, who only indirectly discusses the 
generation of pain, considers the question of whether pain can exist 
in an inanimate object important enough to give an opinion on i t . His 
opinion differs from Abu HSsim's and cAbd al-GabbSr's as he declares 
that pain cannot be generated in an inanimate object. He argues that 
pain is generated on the condition that soundness ($Цфа) disappears 
and soundness only applies to living beings <Tac2Iq, 339: 8-11). The 
view that pain cannot exist in an inanimate object was not an 
innovation introduced by Mânkdïm. Abu CA1I al-GubbS'î had already 
argued that pain needs l ife for i t s existence and therefore cannot 
exist in a l i fe less substra te , and so had Abu HSsim at f i r s t before 
he changed his mind (Mugnì VII, 36: 20-21, MugnS IX, 164: 16-17 and 
Tadkira, 321: 18). 
Ibn Mattawayh's opinion on this question is not clearly 
expressed in the Magmu^·*. He remarks that if i t were not for the 
condition that soundness must disappear for generation to take place, 
i t would be possible for pain to exist in inanimate objects whose 
parts have been separated from each other (Magmu* III , fol. 7a). From 
this i t can be concluded that he rejected the idea that pain can 
exist in an inanimate object which has a separation. Probably, his 
opinion was that pain can only exist in an inanimate object, if this 
pain is directly brought into existence by God (.Magmu* III, fols. 4b, 
5a). Consequently, this remains a theoretical possibil i ty, because how 
can we know the existence of this pain? There is not even a 
separation in the inanimate object that can be an indication of the 
existence of this pain. Ibn Mattawayh is aware of this , because he 
says: "We have spoken about what is possible (maqdur) [for God] and 
not about what is existent (mawgud)" (Magma* III , fol. 4b). 
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Summarizing, we may say that cAbd al-GabbSr refers to Abu Hâsim who 
said that pain can inhere in every substrate, although it is not 
called pain when it exists in an inanimate object because it is not 
perceived with aversion. cAbd al-óabbSr explains that the existence 
of pain in an inanimate object implies that i t cannot be perceived by 
us; God is the only one who can perceive i t . Ibn Mattawayh probably 
agreed with cAbd al-öabbSr that pain can exist in inanimate bodies, 
but he added that this is only possible if it is produced by God 
directly. Mânkdïm disagreed with cAbd al-ôabbSr. He thought that pain 
cannot exist in inanimate bodies, arguing that pain cannot be 
generated in an inanimate object because the condition that soundness 
must disappear is not fulfilled. 
11. Conclusion 
The questions raised by issues like the equally hard blows to hard 
and soft parts of the body, the two needle-pricks, the scorpion sting 
and whether pain can exist in an inanimate object forced cAbd al-
öabbär and his disciples to reflect deeply on their theory of the 
generation of pain, so that they were able to defend this against 
opponents. MSnkdlm did not pay attention to the issues of the equally 
hard blows and the two needle-pricks. This may explain why he did 
not adopt cAbd al-ôabbSr's opinion that pressure generates a lesion 
which, in turn, generates pain. He omitted the lesion and said that 
pressure generates the pain. Ibn Mattawayh did adopt cAbd al-öabbSr's 
opinion. 
MSnkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh both agreed with *=Abd al-öabbSr that 
the pain resulting from a scorpion sting consists of generated pain 
which is increased by pain brought Into existence by God directly In 
the substrate. MSnkdlm did not adopt cAbd al-Gabbfir's opinion that 
pain can exist in an inanimate object, whereas Ibn Mattawayh seems to 
have developed his own opinion. 
cAbd al-ôabbSr discusses the way In which pain is brought into 
existence to make clear that pain is the result of either human or 
divine actions. This serves as a preliminary to his discussion of the 
Judgments on the Infliction of pain in which he defends God's 
infliction of pain on creatures and maintains that this does not 
contradict the justice of God. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
JUDGMENTS ON INFLICTING PAIN 
Before directing our at tention to cAbd al-GabbSr's, MSnkdïm's and Ibn 
Mattawayh's opinions on how to judge the infliction of pain, I will 
discuss their theories on good and evil. From their discussions of 
this subject, i t becomes clear that their object i s not to set up an 
ethical system to be applied to human acts but rather to show that 
a l l God's acts are good. However, how can we judge God's acts? Does 
what applies to human acts also apply to divine acts? cAbd al-ôabbâr, 
Mânkdîm and Ibn Mattawayh think that i t is indeed the case. 
1. The Analogy Between Divine and Human Acts 
cAbd al-6abbär believes that God is not known by intui t ive knowledge 
or by perception. This means that knowledge about God must be 
acquired1 . The question is how this can be done as, in his view, God 
is far above the world in which we live. We can perceive the world in 
which we live with our senses, whereas the divine world is hidden 
from u s a . cAbd al-èabbâr therefore refers to the divine world as "the 
absent" (.al-gë'ib), whereas he uses the term "the present" (al-sa~hid) 
for the world in which we live. However, although God belongs to the 
absent world (al-gä'ib), He acts in the present world (.al-SShld). In 
cAbd al-óabbar 's opinion, God's acts in the present world function as 
indications idalS'il) from which knowledge about Him can be acquired 
by means of reflection inaiar). This method of acquiring knowledge 
about God is called al-istidlSl Ы-4-sShid calS 'l-fS'ib (using 
indications found in the present world for drawing conclusions about 
the absent world) 3. 
Closely related to the method in which knowledge of God is 
acquired from evidences in this world is the method in which this 
knowledge i s acquired by drawing an analogy between this world and 
the absent world. This is called h.aml al-$S'ib "=alB '1-èBhid or qiySs 
al-g-S'ib c aiä Ч-éñhíd (drawing an analogy between the absent world 
and the present world)*. This method is applied by cAbd al-GabbSr, 
MSnkdlm <.Та*Щ, 152: 3, 307: 2, 372: H-16 et al) and Ibn Mattawayh 
(.Magmu* I, 165-169). cAbd al-GabbSr explains that knowledge about a 
particular predicate (Ism) of God is acquired by applying to the 
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absent world (.al-gê'ib) what is known about this predicate from the 
present world (al-àShld) íMu¿n! VII, 210: 7-9 and MugnI VIII, 233: 16-
234: 2). In his opinion, the correctness of Judgments with respect to 
the absent world can be proved by the some arguments as are used 
with respect to the present world (Mu¿ní VI/2, 269: 4-6). 
In his discussion of pain inflicted by God, cAbd al-èabbar 
frequently uses the method of "drawing an analogy between the absent 
and the present world". Those ways of inflicting pain which are good 
can be learned from the present world. '"Abd al-Gabbär therefore f i r s t 
describes which human ways of inflicting pain are good and why they 
are good. Having done th is , he discusses the subject of God's 
infliction of pain, drawing an analogy between this world and the 
absent world in order to make i t clear that God's infliction of pain 
is good because i t i s done in a way which is good. 
2. Terms Used in Reference to Good and Bad 
Before discussing cAbd al-èabbàr 's , MSnkdlm's and Ibn Mattawayh's 
opinions on whether inflicting pain is good or bad, I will explain the 
meaning of some terms used by them in reference to good and bad. In 
his discussions of good and bad, cAbd al-ôabbSr uses binary terms 
such as kayr (something good) and sarr (something bad), basan (good) 
and qablb (bad)B, nafc (profit) and darar (harm). 
Kayr - Sarr 
When cAbd al-óabbSr refers to good and bad things that happen to 
people, he uses the terms kayr (something good) and éarr (something 
bad). He re la tes the good and bad that happen to people to profit and 
harm, taking into consideration that what happens to people usually 
has aspects of both profit and harm. In some cases, profit prevails 
and, in other cases, harm. -=Abd al-öabbär therefore describes kayr as 
"good profit" (al-nafe ai-frasari) and êarr as "bad harm" (al-darar al-
qablb) (Mugnl V, 45: 11-12). What he understands by good profit and 
bad harm becomes clear from his descriptions of profit and harm. cAbd 
al-Gabb&r characterizes profit as pleasure imaladda. pi. maladd) and 
joy (.surur), which may happen immediately or at some time in the 
future. cAbd al-ôabbSr therefore adds that not only things that are a 
pleasure or β joy, but also things that lead to pleasure and Joy are 
considered to be a profit. However, something is a profit on condition 
that I t does not entai l a harm that outweighs i t . cAbd al-6abbSr 
therefore describes kayr not just as "profit", but as "good profit". 
Harm is characterized by cAbd el-GabbSr as pain (alam, pi. Slam') 
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and sorrow (¿amm, pi. ¿итйт"). Similarly, as he did with respect to 
profit, he includes in harm not only those things that are pain or 
sorrow but also those which lead to pain or sorrow. However, when 
pain or sorrow are outweighed by a greater profit they are not 
considered as àarr. cAbd al-èabbfir considers that something is a real 
harm for someone only if i t does not involve a profit which is 
greater than the harm. He therefore adds "bad" when he describes the 
meaning of éarr, thus characterizing sarr as "bad harm" (Mugnl IV, 14·: 
3-5). 
We see that cAbd al-öabbär associates good (jcayrí which happens 
to someone with pleasure and happiness experienced by this person. 
Similarly, he associates bad (àarr) which happens to someone with the 
experience of pain and sorrow. He declares that one and the same 
thing (eey*> can occur in such a way (wa¿tí> that i t is something good 
(kayr), but i t can also occur in such a way that i t is something bad 
(àarr) (Mu¿nl V, 45: 9-10). That i s , sometimes we may experience a 
part icular thing as bad because i t harms us. At other times the same 
thing may happen to us but then i t may be something good because i t 
involves a profit for us. We will see that pain is such a thing. Pain 
may happen to us without bringing us any profi t , yet i t may also lead 
to a profit greater than the paine . 
¡¡lasan - Ç>aMh 
'Abd al-ôabbfir uses the terms {lasan and qablfy in reference to 
actions that resul t in good (jcayr) or bad (àarr> happening to 
someone. The resul t of such an action may concern the person who 
acted or someone e lse . cAbd al-6abbär uses the terms good (¡¡asari) 
and bad (даЫф) not only in reference to the actions themselves, but 
also to their r e s u l t s . For Instance, in his discussion of the 
infliction of pain, we find a chapter entitled "Chapter on that pain 
is not bad because i t i s harm and what Is connected with this" (Fasi 
ΓΙ anna '1-alam IS yaqbufyu li-annahu (farar wa-më yattasllu bi-^iliira)) 
(Mugnl XIII, 293: 1-2). This evokes the question of how to translate 
the term qabift. HouraniT, describing 'Abd al-èabbSr's ethical terms In 
his study of the ethics of cAbd al-ôabbSr, t ransla tes qablrj as "evil". 
Frank" t ransla tes qabHj as "ethically bad" and Fakhry5» as "bad", 
whereas Pe te r s 1 0 t ransla tes qabB) as "evil". Mohammed1' also 
t ransla tes qabS} as "evil", but adds that qabB) is only the equivalent 
of evil if i t is used in a moral sense; if qabSh is used in a non-
moral sense, he considers i t bet ter to t ranslate i t as "bad". I have 
chosen to t ransla te qablfy as "bad", without the addition of 
"ethically" or "morally" because in several cases cAbd al-6abbSr uses 
the term qablfy in a non-moral sense, for instance, when he describes 
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harm done by animals as qablh. He also uses qabO} in reference to 
unwise acting, when he describes useless acts as qablh. 
r
-Abd al-6abbar declares that an act is described as bad (qablb.) 
if i t s agent deserves blame (efamm) for I t , "if i t stands alone" (.Ids 
•nfarada) (Mugnl VI/1, 7: 6). Hourani12, translating ids bfarada as 
"taken in isolation", supposed that cAbd al-éabbâr added these words 
"to make an exception for peccadilloes and white l ies by a person who 
is on the whole of good character and performance". This seems to be 
contradicted by cAbd al-ôabb&r's opinion that telling a lie is 
intr insical ly bad1 3 . The explanation for cAbd al-âabbâr's addition of 
the words "if i t stands alone" is found in the last part of Hour ani 's 
suggestion. cAbd al-éabbSr uses the expression "if i t stands alone" 
with respect to bad acts that are t r ivial UfugnIVI/1, 26: H-16) . He 
points out that when someone does some good acts and some other 
t r iv ia l acts that are bad, this person does not deserve blame if the 
praise for his good acts is equal to, or more than, the blame for his 
bad ac ts . In that case the blame for his bad acts is "neutralized" by 
the praise for his good acts (.Mugnl V, 34: 11)1A. However, that the 
agent of the bad acts does not deserve blame does not mean that 
these acts are not bad. Had he not done the good ac ts , but only these 
bad acts , he would be blamed for doing the bad acts . cAbd al-öabbär 
therefore adds "if i t stands alone", when he says that the agent of a 
bad act deserves blame for doing such an act. This means that 
Hourani's suggestion is correct, although i t refers not only to 
peccadilloes and white l ies , but to all kinds of t r iv ia l acts that are 
bad. 
This means that i t depends on the circumstances whether or not 
the agent of a bad act is to be blamed. We will see in the discussion 
of acts that are not done intentionally that cAbd al-óabbàr describes 
some of these acts as being bad, although the agent of such an act 
does not deserve blame. This concerns cases in which someone Is 
unintentionally harmed. The agent does not deserve blame because the 
act is not done Intentionally. eAbd al-oabbär describes these acts as 
bad because of the harm involved. 
cAbd al-6abb§r says that i t is a characteris t ic of an act that 
is described as good (pasan) that i t s agent does not deserve blame 
for doing i t . As good is the opposite of bad, and praise is the 
opposite of blame, one might expect cAbd al-GabbSr to say that an 
act i s good when i t s agent deserves praise (.madh). However, this 
description would not cover all acts that he describes as good. 
Indeed, one deserves praise for doing certain kinds of good acts . In 
cAbd al-Gabbfir's opinion one deserves praise for doing what i s 
recommended (nadb), desirable (muraggab flhï) or obligatory (w&gibV*. 
However, one does not deserve praise for acts that are permissible 
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(.mubähV* (Mugnf VI/1, 7: U-Ô: 1, and MugnS XIV, 16: 11). As one is 
not blamed for doing them either, cAbd al-Gabbär considers 
permissible acts good: they fulfil the requirement that one does not 
deserve blame for doing them. 
3. The Grounds on Which Acts are Good or Bad 
According to cAbd al-Gabbär, whether an act i s good or bad depends 
on several factors such as the profit and harm the act involves and 
whether or not permission has been given. He refers to the 
combination of factors that determine whether an act is good or bad 
as the way (waghV* in which the act Is done. He points out that 
acts cannot be described as good or bad merely on the grounds that 
they belong to a part icular class of acts. For instance, i t is wrong 
to say that every infliction of pain is bad just because i t i s 
infliction of pain. cAbd al-Gabbär thinks i t possible to inflict pain 
in such a way that this act is described as good. Yet, cAbd al-Gabbär 
considers that there are some actions that cannot be done in such a 
way that they are good: i t is always considered bad to do them. These 
acts include: tel l ing a l ie Ikadib), committing an injustice (^иія), 
commanding someone to do a bad thing (amr Ы-qabHf), ignorance (¿ahi) 
(by ignorance he means a concept that is not in accordance with 
truth), and the will to do something bad (IrSda li-qablh) (Mu¿nl VI/1, 
10: 16-17). 
To explain that an action can be done in different ways, cAbd 
al-öabb&r gives the example of making a statement: the same 
statement can be at one time in accordance with real i ty and at 
another time not in accordance with real i ty. I will explain what cAbd 
al-6abbâr means by taking as an example the statement: "Ahmad is in 
the house". If the person who makes the statement knows that Ahmad 
is in the house, the statement is true, but if he knows that Ahmad is 
not in the house, the statement is a l ie . cAbd al-ôabbar refers to 
whether or not the statement is in accordance with real i ty as the 
"way" Iwagh) in which the statement is made. He is of the opinion 
that if i t i s known that a statement is not in accordance with 
real i ty and thus a l ie (kadib), i t is also known that making this 
statement is bad. 
A statement can also be a command. cAbd al-ôabbar declares that 
if i t is known that this command concerns the performance of a bad 
act, i t . is also known that making this statement is bad. Similarly, if 
i t is known that a part icular act is an injustice (уиіл), i t is also 
known that this act is bad. This is so because the acts mentioned by 
cAbd al-ôabbar are intr insical ly bad acts. The Arabic words that are 
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used to describe these acts have a meaning that entails the Judgment 
that they are bad. For instance, describing a particular act oí 
injustice as a good act is impossible because i t is a contradiction in 
terms. The act in question is either an injustice, which means that i t 
cannot be good, or i t is a good act, which means that i t cannot be an 
injustice. 
'"Abd al-6abbär also recognizes a category of acts that cannot 
be judged as good or bad iMugní VI/1, 7: 4-5). There was a difference 
of opinion among the Basra Mu^tazilites about the Judgment on acts 
that are done by a sleeper inä'im) or absentminded person <sffAI),e, 
people who are not aware of their ac t ions 1 3 . Some said that these 
acts are neither good nor bad. At f i rs t sight the question of whether 
the act of a sleeper or absentminded person is good or bad may look 
t r ivial . However, the real issue here is not the act of a sleeper or 
absentminded person but the reason why an act is bad. A sleeper acts 
without intention, yet his act may imply harm or profit to someone 
else. What i s decisive for the judgment passed on an act: the 
intention of i t s agent or the resul t of the act? 
Abu CA1I al-ÖubbS'ï and Abu Häsim said that al l acts by 
sleepers and absentminded people are neither good nor bad, because 
they are done without any intention or awareness that the act is 
good or bad <Иі#пГ VI/1, 11: 15-17, Mu^ni XIII, 304: 6-7). This means 
that Abu cAlï and Abu Häsim considered the intention of the agent to 
be the deciding factor. Even if someone in his sleep or 
absentmindedly harms someone else by unintentionally striking him 
with his f i s t , they did not regard this as bad because the harm is 
done unintentionally iMugnl VI/1, 80: 2-5). 
The Iksïdiyya held an opinion very close to that of Abu CA1I and 
Abu HSsim: they considered that an act is bad because of the agent 's 
will (.irada). Ibn Mattawayh refuted their opinion, pointing out that 
the reason why an act is bad cannot be the agent's will. He argued 
that i t i s bad to will something bad. If this act were bad because of 
the agent's will, i t would imply that the f i r s t will is bad because of 
a second will, and that th is second will i s bad because of a third 
will, and so on and on IMaginO* III , fol. 10b). 
Abu ^Abdallah al-Basrl and Abu Ishâq b. cAyy6s, teachers of cAbd 
al-ôabbâr, considered that the resul t of an act was the decisive 
factor. They declared that when someone in his sleep or 
absentmindedly harms someone e lse , his act is bad even though i t is 
done unintentionally. They admitted that sleepers and absentminded 
people can do acts that are neither good nor bad, such as speech and 
slight movements. They considered that the acts mentioned belong to в 
category of acts that can be done in a good or in a bad way if they 
are done by one who is aware of his acting. On the other hand, there 
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Is a category of acts that are Injust ices if they are done knowingly. 
They pointed out that acts included in this las t category cannot be 
good ac t s because they are intr ins ica l ly bad. Abu 'Abdallah and Abu 
Ishäq therefore said that s l eep and absentmindedness cannot have a 
bearing on their judgment: they are always bad, whether they are done 
intent ional ly or unintentional ly. However, they declared that s l eep 
and absentmindedness do have a bearing on the blame attributed to 
the agent of a bad act . Someone who harms another person in h is 
s l eep or absentmindedly should not be blamed for his act , even if 
this act i s described as bad (MugnS XIII, 311: 14-17, MugnSVl/l, 11: 
16-12: 9). 
^Abd al-öabbSr declares that he prefers the opinion of Abu 
••Abdallah and Abu Ishäq in this question to that of Abu CA1I and Abu 
Häsim (.Mugnl XIII, 311: 14-21) . ^Abd al-Gabbär carries i t even further 
than Abu 'Abdallah and Abu Ishäq. He agrees with them that if the 
act of a s leeper or absentminded person harms someone e l s e , this act 
i s bad, although i t s agent should not be blamed for doing i t . He adds, 
moreover, that if th i s act involves a profit for someone e l s e , i t i s a 
good act , although the s leeper or the absentminded person does not 
deserve praise for doing i t . cAbd al-òabbSr mentions as an example 
the act of someone who, in h is s l eep , scratches someone e l s e , so that 
the other person experiences pleasure as a result of the scratching 
(MugnS VI/1, 12: 10-11) . 
Considering the judgments given on acts , Mânkdïm <7ac2Jq, 326: 5-327: 
9) and Ibn Mattawayh (Magmuc I, 230: 23 -231: 25) c lass i fy acts as bad 
(.qabih) a c t s , good (.frasan) acts and acts that are neither good nor 
bad. Like ^Abd al-Gabbar, they take into consideration whether or not 
blame i s deserved. With respect to acts done by s leepers and 
absentminded people, Ibn Mattawayh agrees with cAbd al-6abbar. In h is 
opinion these acts are not judged as good or bad, unless they involve 
harm or prof i t . If such an act harms someone e l s e , i t i s described as 
bad; i f i t involves a profit for someone e l s e , i t i s described as 
good, but the agent does not deserve blame or praise for doing i t · 2 0 
íMa¿mü' I, 230: 23 -231: 6, MagmQ* III, fo l . 10b). 
Mânkdïm, too, a s s e r t s that there are acts that are not judged as 
good or bad, such as "slight movements and insignif icant talk; they 
are done by the absentminded and no praise i s given for them" 
(Ta-'Jrq, 326: 6 -9 ) . He adds that "no praise i s given for them", but 
th i s remark i s not relevant; i t i s s e l f - ev ident that one does not 
deserve praise for doing something that i s neither good nor bad. This 
may be an indication that Mânkdïm summarized °Abd al-GabbSr's 
or ig inal t ex t , omitting the discussion of profit and harm involved in 
these ac t s but retaining the remark on praise. It therefore does not 
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become clear whether, in this question, he follows the opinion of Abu 
·=Α1ϊ and Abu HSsim, or that of cAbd al-ÔabbSr. 
4. Kow to Know Whether an Act Is Good or Bad 
We have seen that , with respect to acts that are done 
unintentionally, ^Abd al-ôabbSr takes into consideration the harm and 
profit they involve. With respect to acts that are done intentionally, 
he not only takes into consideration the harm and profit they 
involve, but also other factors such as permission that has been 
given to do a part icular act. When these factors are known, i t can be 
known by reason whether a part icular act i s good or bad. However, we 
will see that this does not mean that cAbd al-öabbär disregards what 
is disclosed in the divine revelation. He acknowledges that God's 
revelation may disclose that a part icular act is permitted by God, or 
that i t involves a profit or harm that is not known by reason. 
Reason 
When cAbd al-6abbfir a sse r t s that i t i s known by reason (.*aqï) 
whether a part icular act i s good or bad, he opposes the opinion of 
the "Compulsionists" (MugbiraP' on this question. The 
"Compulsionists", among whom cAbd al-ôabbSr includes the As cari tes , 
believe that i t i s known from God's revelation and rel igious law 
whether an act is good or bad iMu£nS XIII, 2β2: 7-12). This implies 
that acts are good or bad because of a divine command or 
prohibi t ion 3 2 . cAbd al-ôabbfir refutes th is , arguing that an action 
cannot be good only because i t i s done on someone else 's command. Nor 
can an act be bad only because someone has prohibited i t . He rejects 
the opinion of those who argue that God is the Lord and Master 
(ffliJüry23 and that a divine prohibition is therefore the reason why 
an act i s bad (Mugnl VI/1, 102: 9 - U ) . 
To support his argument, cAbd al-öabbfir f i r s t explains that in 
our world the quality of the agent does not define whether an act is 
good or bad. When two different agents do the same act with the same 
intention and with the same resu l t , both acts are good or both acts 
are bad because they are done in the same way (.uagh). He considers 
it impossible that the act of one of them could be good and the act 
of the other bad. I t i s the way (.wagh) in which an act i s done which 
determines whether i t is good or bad. He adds that someone who 
distinguishes between the acts of two agents on the basis of their 
quality might conclude that committing an injustice (culm) is bad if 
the injustice is done by η human, but good if i t is done by a prophet 
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or an angel. This i s impossible, according to cAbd el-Gabbñr, because 
injust ice i s always bad, regardless of whether i t i s done by humans 
or by prophets and angels (Mugnì VI/1, 125: 11-19). The quality of 
the agent does not have a bearing on this matter. Applying this to 
the other world, cAbd al-GabbSr points out that when an act of God 
i s good because i t i s done in a particular way, the act of a human 
being that i s done in the same way (wagh) must a lso be good (.Mugnf 
VI/1, 59: 16-60: 1). 
After having explained that the quality of the agent has no 
bearing on whether an act i s good or bad, cAbd al-GabbSr argues that 
if ac t s were bad because of a divine prohibition (.nahy), every 
prohibited act would be bad, not only acts prohibited by God but a l s o 
acts prohibited by man. In that case, i t would be possible for an act 
to be good and bad at the same time. This would happen if the act 
was commanded by one person and prohibited by another person <MugnI 
VI/1, 102: 4 -6 ) . By these arguments ^Abd al-Gabbar refutes that a 
divine command or divine prohibition defines whether an act i s good 
or bad. 
Revela tion 
cAbd al-Gabbär's opinion that we know by reason whether an act i s 
good or bad does not imply that he disregards what i s said in God's 
revelat ion (.alsam') about good and bad acts . In h is view, th i s 
confirms what i s already known by reason. He argues that when we 
know by reason that an act i s an injust ice (^uira), we know that th i s 
act i s bad, even before we have learned this from God's revelation 
(Mu¿ní XIII, 309: 18-310: 3). However, there may be discrepancies 
between what we learn by reason and what we learn by revelation. How 
to explain this? In cAbd al-GabbSr's opinion, the cause of these 
discrepancies i s that God's revelation d i s c lo se s aspects of a 
particular act that cannot be known by reason. For instance, i t may 
d i sc lose that an act i s permissible <£aiiD because God has given 
permission to do i t , which cannot be known by reason <ca<jJan) (Mugnl 
VI/1, 32: 3 - 7 ) . <=Abd al - íabbSr g ives the example of the slaughtering 
of l ives tock . By reason, one may conclude that this act i s forbidden 
(fflflj¡j^ tJr). However, the disclosure of God's permission in His 
revelat ion provides additional information that says that slaughtering 
l ivestock i s permissible, which implies that this act i s good (Mu$nî 
VI/1, 64: 11-12) . In Chapter Six we will see on which grounds i t i s 
good, according to cAbd al-GabbSr, that God permits the slaughtering 
of l ivestock. 
The same applies to some other acts that the re l ig ious law 
describes as a re l ig ious duty, which means that they are obligatory 
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(wägib). One who does not know God's revelation, may not consider 
these acts to be obligatory. For instance, in God's revelation i t i s 
disclosed that prayer (çalSD is obligatory, which means that 
performing the calât i s a good act. However, someone who does not 
know God's revelation may think differently. cAbd al-èabbSr explains 
that in His revelation God has promised to reward those who perform 
prayer. Thus, performing the palät leads to a profit . In cAbd a l -
öabbSr's opinion the profit that can be obtained is so great that 
because of the very knowledge about this profit people would 
conclude by reason that performing prayer must be obligatory. ^Abd 
al-6abbär says that they would say: 
Had we known by reason that we obtain an enormous profit 
if we perform prayer, that i t induces us to choose to do 
what is obligatory and that we deserve a reward (tawab) 
for i t , we would have known by reason that i t is 
obligatory (Mugnî MI/1, 64: 14-16). 
Someone who knows God's revelation knows the reward or punishment 
that God will give for part icular acts . If he knows that he can 
obtain a profit (the reward) or can be harmed (by the punishment), he 
knows by reason, weighing profit against harm, whether i t i s good or 
bad to do these acts . This means that i t i s not because of a divine 
command or prohibition that these acts are considered good or bad 
but because of a divine reward or punishment. This may ultimately 
amount to the same thing. However, cAbd al-ôabbar's theory does not 
imply arbi t rar iness on God's part . We will see that he believes that 
God's acts are in accordance with what reason considers to be good. 
How to Know Whether a Particular Act of Inflicting Pain is Good 
When eAbd al-ôabbër discusses whether inflicting pain is good or bad, 
he does not r e s t r i c t this to physical pain; he also includes causing 
sorrow. According to him, sorrow (gammi i s a "conviction" (i^tiqäd) 
someone has. He uses the term conviction (l^tiqSd) as a general term 
that comprises knowledge ('ilm) and assumption (саппУ2*. A sorrowful 
person (mugtamm) i s therefore described by him as one who "knows or 
assumes that a harm has happened or will happen to him" (Mugnf IV, 
15: б-б) 2 *. The counterpart of sorrow is joy. Joy (surûr) is the 
knowledge or the assumption that a profit (nef) is acquired or will 
be acquired (Mugnî IV, 15: 5). cAbd al-Gabbâr declares that causing 
someone sorrow is comparable with inflicting pain on this person 
since both acts are good or bad on the same grounds (Mugnî IV, 16: 
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1-8). He mentions harm (ç/arar)2* as being something that is pain 
ialam) or sorrow (gamm) or leads to pain or sorrow. (Mugnl IV, 14: 4, 
Mu¿ní XIII, 298: 10-11). All three terms - harm, pain and sorrow -
occur in his discussion of the infliction of pain. Although he mostly 
gives examples of the infliction of pain, i t is clear that what he 
says concerns sorrow as well. Similarly, Mânkdlm mostly speaks of 
pain, but from examples he gives i t becomes clear that he includes 
sorrow, although he does not explicitly say s o 2 7 . Like cAbd al-Gabbâr, 
he also uses the general term harm (forar). As for Ibn Mattawayh, he 
devotes a special chapter to the subject of sorrow (.¿•аштУге' but in 
his discussions he mostly speaks of pain. 
The method followed by cAbd al-óabbSr in order to find out 
whether a part icular act of Inflicting pain or sorrow is good or bad 
is f i r s t ly to find out whether this act should be called an injustice. 
We have seen that committing an injustice is one of the acts that he 
considers intr insical ly bad. This means that as soon as an act i s 
known to be an injustice, i t is also known that this act is bad 
because injustice can only ever be bad. It is cAbd al-ôabbar's belief 
that adults of sound mind have "necessary knowledge" ( ' і і я cfarörf) of 
this , that i s , knowledge that necessarily exis ts in an adult of sound 
mind, in the sense that he or she cannot be without this knowledge23". 
When cAbd al-Gabbär says that i t i s "necessarily" known that 
injustice CfuJjD) is bad, i t implies that no reflection (ла^аг) is 
needed for knowing this ÍMu¿ní XIII, 301: 3-6). However, one must 
f i r s t reflect in order to know whether or not a particular act i s an 
injustice and take into consideration the circumstances, and the harm 
and profit i t involves. It i s possible, after reflection, to conclude 
that what at f i r s t sight seems to be an injustice is in fact a good 
act. cAbd al-ôabbâr calls knowledge that i s the resul t of reflection 
"acquired knowledge" (C1LD muktasab) (.Mugnl XII, 67: 19-68:4). 
A part icular act of inflicting pain may at f i rs t sight seem to 
be an injustice. However, as cAbd al-öabbSr points out, i t must be 
ascertained whether this act is Indeed an injustice. If reflection on 
the aspects of this act leads to the conclusion that i t is indeed an 
injustice, i t is also known that doing this act is bad <.Mu¿nI XIII, 
305: 2-6 and 307: 1-7)30. Thus, before discussing the different 
aspects of inflicting pain, i t is useful to f i rs t consider what cAbd 
al-ôabbSr understands by injustice (¿UJJB). 
?uln> 
^Abd al-GabbSr defines injustice in a negative way by mentioning 
those cases in which doing harm is not an injustice. He says that 
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Injustice is every harm (tfarar) that 
- does not involve a profit <.nafc') that outweighs it, 
- does not avert a harm greater than it, 
- is not deserved 
- and is not done on the assumption that it has one of 
the mentioned aspects (wugiih) Wu$nl XIII, 298: 8-9) 
This definition is formulated briefly and it is therefore not 
complete, standing in need of explanation. From the definition alone, 
wrong conclusions may be drawn about cAbd al-Gabbâr's understanding 
of injustice. For instance, it might be concluded from the last point 
that doing harm is not an Injustice if it is done on the assumption 
that the harm is deserved. Yet we will see later2" that cAbd al-
ôabbfir rejects this. 
bAbd al-óabbar gives a more extensive description of injustice 
in order to explain how it can be known whether a harm done by 
someone to someone else is an Injustice. He says that we know that 
the harm inflicted is an injustice if it is known that 
- 'Amr [the harmed person] does not deserve to be hurt 
and Zayd [the person inflicting the harm] does not have 
the right to punish the other; 
- he [the harmed person] is safe from great harm or 
fear32· so that it is not possible that a greater harm is 
averted in this way; 
- the harm is not inflicted on him [the person harmed] 
with the intention of providing him with a profit (лаЛО, 
nor is there is any evidence of a profit; 
- the harm is not done on the assumption (^алл) [that this 
harm will provide the harmed person with] a profit nor [on 
the assumption that this harm has] one of the other 
aspects (wugah) mentioned Œugnî XIII, 306: 12-16). 
In this description some aspects are added that are not mentioned in 
the first definition, such as the remark that the harm is an injustice 
if the harming person does not have the right to inflict the harm 
deserved. On the other hand, some aspects that are present in the 
first definition are omitted, such as the condition that the profit or 
the averted harm must be greater than the harm that is done. In the 
discussion of the different aspects of inflicting pain the purport of 
what is mentioned in these definitions will be made clear. 
MSnkdïm's definition of injustice differs slightly from cAbd al-
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Gabbär's definition. He declares that injustice (?иія) is every harm 
(tfarar) that 
- does not involve a profit, 
- does not avert a harm, 
- is not deserved, 
- is not done on the assumption that i t has the two 
aspects mentioned f i r s t , 
- is not judged as if i t is done by the harmed person, 
- is not Judged as if i t is done by someone other than the 
one who inf l ic t s the harm (TacJi"o, 345: 10-12). 
Like eAbd al-Gabbär in his second definition, Mânkdîm does not 
mention that the profit and the averted harm must be greater than 
the harm that i s inflicted. However, at the end of his definition he 
mentions two aspects that are not mentioned by cAbd al-öabbär. What 
they imply will be discussed l a t e r 3 3 . We will see that although cAbd 
al-Gabbär does not mention these aspects in his definition, his 
opinion on them does not differ from Mênkdïm's. 
As for Ibn Mattawayh, his definition of injustice is not 
complete e i ther . He gives the following definition of injustice: 
injustice i s harm iclararì that 
- i s without a profit that outweighs i t , 
- or i s without the aversion of a harm that outweighs it 
- or is done to someone who does not deserve i t (Magmu* 
III, fol. 9a). 
We see that he does not mention harm done on the assumption that i t 
provides the harmed person with a profit greater than the harm or 
averts a greater harm to him. Yet, from his discussion of the 
infliction of pain, i t becomes clear that he thinks that in that case 
inflicting harm is not an injustice even if the profit does not 
eventuate or the harm is not averted. <Magmuc III, fol. 10a). 
Although the definitions of injustice given by cAbd al-6abbâr, 
Mânkdîm and Ibn Mattawayh differ from each other, it should not be 
concluded that they disagree on what injustice i s . The main reason 
for the difference between their definitions is that none of these 
definitions fully renders what they think about those aspects that 
prevent the infliction of harm being considered an injustice. 
JUDGMENTS ON INFLICTING PAIN 133 
Useless Acts 
From cAbd al-Gabb&r's definition of injustice we may conclude that 
inflicting a harm that entai ls a profit outweighing the harm, or that 
averts another harm greater than the harm suffered, is not an 
injustice but a good act (Mugnl XIII, 3 H : U ) . The profit must 
outweigh the harm. If the profit is less than the harm, cAbd a l -
éabbSr maintains that inflicting this harm is an injustice. Similarly, 
if the harm averted is less than the harm suffered, the act i s 
considered an injustice. But what about inflicting harm that en ta i l s a 
profit equal to the harm, or that averts an equal harm? Is this act 
an injustice or not? 
cAbd al-GabbSr does not describe such an act as an injustice. 
Yet, he considers i t a bad act because, in his opinion, i t i s a 
useless act <.саЬа£Рл (Mu¿nl XIII, 314: 13-15 and 331: 6-β). He 
explains that when the profit i s equal to the harm, i t is as if the 
act is not done. He gives the example of someone who disposes of 
something in order to obtain the same thing. His act is without any 
advantage (.fä'ida) and is therefore a useless act (caòaJ) <Mu¿nI XIII, 
331: 8-10). 
cAbd al-öabbär gives some other examples of useless ac ts . For a 
good understanding of these examples i t is necessary to know that he 
regards i t as a harm to have someone do hard work. This harm is 
compensated for by the payment the worker gets for his work. An 
example given by cAbd al-öabbar of a useless act is that of someone 
who engages a workman to refresh the open air because he wants to 
provide the workman with a dinar (Mu$nS XIII, 395: 10-11). I t i s 
important that the employer's intention is to provide the workman 
with money. He could have given the money to the workman as a gif t 
without making him do useless work, reaching his aim (giving money) 
in an easier way. The employer's act i s therefore described as 
useless. cAbd al-ôabbâr also gives the example of someone who pays 
a workman to pour out water from one side of the sea to the other 
side (Ku^nr XIII, 312: 6-7). 
The acts mentioned are by no means an Injustice as the workman 
is paid for his work. Yet they are bad because they are superfluous. 
The resu l t of these acts can be achieved in another, easier way. cAbd 
al-ôabbâr therefore defines a useless act (cabaf) as "every act that 
is not done by i t s agent with the intention of doing i t in a 
reasonable way" (waghan ma^qûlaiù Œugnl XI, 191: 3-*). He emphasizes, 
however, that acts done by sleeping or absentminded people are not to 
be considered as useless acts , although they are not done in a 
rat ional way. These acts are done unknowingly, whereas the 
character is t ic of a useless act is that i t is done knowingly iMu¿nS 
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VI/1, 11: 5 - l l ) 3 S . 
Although cAbd al-ôabbâr considers that useless acts do not 
involve injustice, he does not describe them as good acts. Had he 
described them as good acts, this would have had consequences for 
his discussion of acts done by God. It is evident that cAbd al-uabbSr 
discusses the subject of good and bad acts in this world in order to 
apply this to the acts of God3e. If he said that useless acts are 
good, i t could be concluded that some of God's acts are useless. We 
will see later3'7' that this would subvert cAbd al-öabbär's theory of 
divine compensation for suffering. 
Mânkdlm defines a useless act (cabeJ> as "every act that the agent 
does without a compensation that is equivalent to it" ikull ficl 
yafcaluhu 'l-fB'il min dim 'iwad mitlihD (Ta*lîq, 5 U : 17). This 
definition is not quite clear. To explain what he means, Mânkdlm 
gives the example of someone who battles all kinds of danger in 
order to make small gains, although he could have earned these gains 
in a easier way <TaclIq, 514: 16-19). Mânkdlm does not explain how 
his definition applies to this example. Nor does he explain this for 
his second example of a useless act. This concerns someone who pays 
a workman to pour water from one river into another for no purpose 
<.Ta*lIq, 493: 6-9, 514: 19-20). What is the compensation in these 
examples? My impression i s that Mânkdlm's definition of useless acts 
and the examples he gives are incomplete. 
Ibn Mattawayh describes a useless act (cafca_f> as a superfluous 
act. He says that i t i s an act that is done knowingly In order to 
achieve something that can be achieved without doing this act 
Œagmu* III, fol. 9b). To explain this Ibn Mattawayh refers to 
examples of useless acts given by Abu cAlï al-ôubbS'I. One of them 
concerns someone who pays to have the open air refreshed; the other 
example describes someone who pays to have water poured from one 
side (of the sea) to the other without any benefit to himself. Ibn 
Mattawayh adds that he himself considers that these acts are bad 
because they are useless acts, but that Abu CA1I al-ôubbi'ï considers 
them bad because they are an injustice (?иіл). Abü CA1I argues that 
these acts are an Injustice because the employer harms himself by 
spending money for a work of no use <MagmOc III, fol. 9a and b). Ibn 
Mattawayh does not explain his opinion. He probably considers these 
acts useless because the result (fresh air or having water at a 
certain place) can be achieved without someone imposing the task of 
refreshing air or pouring water. 
In another example mentioned by Ibn Mattawayh the employer's 
intention is different from that in the two examples mentioned 
earlier. In this example the employer's objective is to provide the 
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worker with a profit and so he makes him do unnecessary work. Ibn 
Mattawayh explains that the employer's act is useless because he cen 
achieve his objective by giving him the money as a gift (MagmQ* I I I , 
fol. 9b). Ibn Mattawayh gives two other examples of useless acts . The 
f irst is of someone who has a dinar to spend. He sel l s this dlnfir for 
dirhams, although he can buy the same with the dirhams as he could 
have bought with the dïnSr. The other example is of someone who 
travels to Egypt to make a gain of ten percent, although he could 
make the same gain in his own country or in a nearby country without 
travelling so far (MagmOc III , fol. 9b). What is described in these 
examples does indeed fall under Ibn Mattawayh's description of a 
useless act: an act that is done knowingly in order to achieve 
something that can also be achieved without doing this act. 
From the examples given by Ibn Mattawayh we may conclude that 
he agrees with cAbd al-ôabbSr with respect to useless acts . This 
becomes especially evident from his clear description of a useless 
act. Mânkdïm's description of a useless act is less clear, but we 
should not conclude from this that he disagrees with cAbd al-öabbSr. 
His discussion of useless acts i s probably incomplete. 
5. Good Infliction of Pain 
cAbd al-òabbfir a sse r t s that i t i s possible to inflict harm (pain or 
sorrow) in such a way that the act in question is judged as a good 
act. Such an act must not be an Injustice or a useless act: i t must 
belong to the exceptions that he has mentioned in his definition of 
injustice. This means that doing harm can only be good by exception: 
in general i t i s a bad act. We have seen that cAbd al-öabbSr says 
that doing harm is an injustice unless this harm 
- involves a profit greater than the harm, 
- averts a harm greater than the inflicted harm, 
- is deserved, or 
- is done on the assumption to be as mentioned before 
(tfitfnX XIII, 296: 8-9 and 316: 4-6). 
In what follows each of these four exceptions will be discussed. 
Pain that Involves a Profit 
Inflicting pain is good if i t provides the harmed person with a 
profit that outweighs the pain. To explain th is , cAbd al-öabbSr gives 
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the example of someone who disposes of his garment In order to 
obtain money for It (Mugnl XIII, 316: 3-8). His act is good if the 
harm of missing the garment is less than the profit (the money) that 
is obtained. cAbd al-Gabbär therefore takes into consideration how 
much this profit i s . If a large sum of money is obtained, the act of 
disposing of the garment i s good, because the harm of missing the 
garment i s outweighed by the profit. If a small sum of money is 
obtained, the act is bad because the profit obtained by possessing 
the money is not enough to outweigh the harm of missing the garment. 
According to cAbd al-éabbâr this example shows that the basis 
for deciding whether the act of disposing of the garment is good or 
bad is the quantity of the profit , and nothing else. The act is good 
only if the profit outweighs the harm. He emphasizes that i t is not 
enough for the profit to be equal to the harm. If harm and profit are 
equal i t is a useless act (^abat) and, like al l useless acts , i t is 
bad IMugnl XIII, 331: 4-10). 
The example just mentioned concerns harm that someone willingly 
does to himself. If the harm is done to someone else other aspects 
must also be taken into consideration. The profit must not only 
outweigh the harm, but the act must be done with the intention of 
providing a profit and, if the harmed person is an adult of sound 
mind, he must give his consent to be harmed for this profit. In the 
example above the agreement to s e l l the garment for a certain sum of 
money implies that the owner gives his consent to be "harmed" by the 
buyer in order to obtain this profit . The act of the owner is good 
because the profit obtained outweighs the harm; the act of the buyer 
is good because the owner has given his consent beforehand to be 
"harmed". 
It would have been a different matter if the garment was taken 
from the owner without his consent or, put differently, if the 
garment had been stolen from him. "=Abd al-oabbär asser ts that 
s teal ing is bad. There is profit involved In this act: however, the 
profit is for the agent of the act, the thief, but not for the victim. 
This profit is not to be taken into consideration because i t does not 
fulfil the condition that the profit must be obtained by the harmed 
person and not by the person inflicting harm. It is clear that i t i s 
bad to harm someone else In order to obtain a profit for oneself 
(Mugnl XIII, 396: 15-17 and 345: 7-β). Compensation for the loss of 
the garment does not turn the theft of a garment into a good act, 
although the compensation is a profit for the owner. Turning the 
theft into a good act is impossible because of the thief 's intention 
when he s to le the garment, which was to obtain a profit for himself. 
I t was not his intention to provide the harmed person with a profit 
in the form of compensation. Even if this had been his intention, his 
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act would be bad because the harmed person did not give his consent 
beforehand. cAbd al-öabbSr adds that , apart from this , there is 
another reason why his act would be bad: the compensation for a 
stolen garment is normally equal to i t s value. Thus, the profit for 
the owner of the garment is equal to the harm. This does not meet 
the condition that the profit must outweigh the harm Œugnî XIII, 
320: 7-20). 
This places ^Abd al-ôabbâr in an awkward position. His purpose 
in discussing these questions is to draw an analogy between the 
present world and the absent (divine) world. If he f i r s t declares that 
doing harm without consent is bad, how can he explain that God's 
imposing i l lnesses and pain on His creatures without obtaining their 
consent beforehand is good? In the present world an adult of sound 
mind i^äqll) has to give his consent to be harmed. Only children, 
madmen and animals are not asked for their consent, cAbd al-ôabbâr 
considers i t good that their caretaker inflicts pain on them in those 
s i tuat ions in which he would deem it good to infl ict this pain on 
himself. He does not need their consent, because they are put into 
his care and he knows what is best for them. If the pain leads to a 
profit greater than the harm, i t is good to inflict pain on them. 
Some Mu c t az i l i tes 3 a said, indeed, that the relation between God 
and humans is like the relation between a caretaker and those who 
are put into his care. God created them, giving them life, and is 
therefore in the best position to know what is good for them. When 
God imposes i l lnesses on them, He does not have to ask for their 
consent to be harmed if this harm leads to a profit for them that 
outweighs the harm (Mugnl XIII, 454: 17-455: 9). This solution is 
rejected by cAbd al-ôabbâr because in his opinion i t conflicts with 
the theory that God imposes obligations on humans. He argues that 
this presupposes that these humans are adults of sound mind, 
otherwise i t would be wrong to impose obligations on them. That they 
are adults of sound mind implies that they should give their consent 
to be harmed. 
cAbd al-ôabbâr therefore presents a different solution. He has 
thought out a s i tuat ion in which i t is good to harm an adult of 
sound mind, even though he has not given his consent beforehand. This 
i s the case if the compensation for the harm is so great that i t is 
indisputable that a l l adults of sound mind, different as they are, 
would choose to bear this harm to obtain the compensation that is 
awarded for i t . He gives the example of someone who is compensated a 
thousand dinar for having to stand up after being seated. In his 
opinion, someone who is awarded such compensation and yet refuses to 
bear the harm for i t must be considered as not being of sound mind 
(.Mugnl XIII, 322: 15-17). If, then, a caretaker infl icts pain on him 
138 CHAPTER FIVE 
without his consent, the act of the caretaker is good because of the 
profit i t involves for this person iMugnl XIII, 321: 9-19, 322: 9-16, 
401: 1-12). 
Which of the two mentioned solutions is chosen by Mfinkdlm and Ibn 
Mattawayh? MSnkdïm opts for cAbd al-Gabbär's solution. He describes 
the same s i tua t ion as ^Abd al-óabbSr: someone has to stand up and is 
given an enormous sum of money as compensation for his trouble 
CTa'lIq, 492: 5-13). Ibn Mattawayh opts for this solution as well and 
emphasizes that i t is only good to infl ict pain without f i rs t 
obtaining consent if the compensation is so great that i t is certain 
that a l l adults of sound mind would choose to bear i t (Magmu* III, 
fols. 26b, 27a, 28b). 
It i s obvious that the solution of cAbd al-Gabbâr, MSnkdïm and 
Ibn Mattawayh implies that among humans i t is almost never good to 
harm another without his consent if this person is an adult of sound 
mind. In rea l i ty , i t is almost Impossible to meet the condition that 
the profit must be so great that every adult of sound mind would 
choose to bear the pain for i t : people are very different with 
respect to the profit for which they choose to bear pain. Only God, 
who i s omniscient, can know the amount of compensation which will 
suffice. cAbd al-SabbSr (Mugnl XIII, 400: 14-18), Mânkdlm (Ta'llq, 492: 
14-22) and Ibn Mattawayh (MagmQ* III, fols. 27b, 28a), a l l point this 
out. 
Inflicting Pain in Order to Avert another Harm 
Another exception to the rule that doing harm is bad concerns harm 
that is done to avert another harm. For the harm to be good, the 
harm averted must be greater than the harm suffered. 'Abd al-GabbSr 
explains th is by giving the example of someone who hurts himself 
walking through thorns in order to escape a predatory animal or a 
fire. I t is considered good that he hurts himself in this way because 
he would suffer more pain if he was torn to pieces by the predatory 
animal or was burned by the fire. cAbd al-GabbSr gives other 
examples as well, such as undergoing a severe treatment in order to 
shorten the duration of an i l lness, or exerting oneself by working in 
crafts or trade in order to avoid poverty or the fear of poverty 
(Mugnl ΧΙΠ, 335: 6-8). cAbd al-ôabbar also adds that reflection 
inaiar) in order to acquire knowledge of God is good because i t 
averts a harm: by taking the trouble to reflect one gets rid of a 
great fear that is evoked by one's inner voice (kSflrY39 and the urge 
to know t ru th (MuffnlXin, 335: 8-10). 
These examples refer to someone who exposes himself to harm in 
JUDGMENTS ON INFLICTING PAIN 139 
order to avoid being exposed to another harm. The problem here is 
that the averted harm does not happen, precisely because it is 
averted. Is it good to suffer harm to avert a harm that is only 
expected to happen? Answering this question, cAbd al-GabbSr 
distinguishes between a threatening harm that already exists and a 
threatening harm that is assumed will come into existence but which 
does not yet exist. 
According to cAbd al-GabbSr, adults of sound mind ^uqelS1) know 
intuitively ( M-'adirar) that it is good to avert an existent harm by 
means of another existent harm if that harm is less than the averted 
harm (Mugnï XIII, 355: 10-12). There was some difference of opinion 
as to the reason why this is good. Some said that bearing the chosen 
harm is good because it leads to a profit, namely, Joy isurur) about 
the greater harm being averted. cAbd al-èabbSr rejects this, arguing 
that this amounts to saying that bearing the harm is good because it 
stops sorrow (¿amai) about the threatening harm. In his opinion, this 
is wrong because it is the threatening harm itself that is averted 
and not the knowledge of it, the fear of it, or the psychological 
picture of it iMugnl XIII, 336: 10-16). Only in those cases in which 
the averted harm does not yet exist but is likely to come into 
existence does he deem it possible to say that fear of the harm is 
averted. However, he prefers to say that the harm itself is averted 
(.MugnlXIll, 337: 19-338: 2). 
It is only if the averted harm is greater than the chosen harm 
that it is good to bear the chosen harm. The quantities of the two 
harms must therefore be weighed against each other. cAbd al-ôabbar 
admits that in many cases it is difficult to know the quantity of an 
averted harm, especially if it does not exist yet and is only 
expected to happen. It is therefore difficult to know with certainty 
whether the averted harm is greater than the chosen harm. For this 
reason cAbd al-Gabbar deems it necessary that there be a great 
difference in quantity between the averted harm and the chosen harm. 
In his opinion, it is only good to choose an existent harm in order 
to avert an expected harm if the expected harm is much greater than 
the chosen harm Œugnl XIII, 342: 9-343: 2). 
Evidently, it is bad to expose oneself to a great harm in order 
to avert an insignificant harm. cAbd al-éabbar considers this an 
injustice (fula) because the chosen harm is greater than the harm 
averted. In his opinion, it is also bad to choose to bear a harm in 
order to avert an equal harm because in that case it is a useless 
act <cabat). However, if it concerns a harm that averts an expected 
harm that is equal to the chosen harm, he does not consider it a 
useless act but an injustice because the harm to be averted does not 
exist but the chosen harm does exist <.Mu¿n¡ XIII, 342: 3-8). Anyway, 
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it is bad to expose oneself to harm in order to avert an equal 
quantity of harm, whether th is is considered a useless act or an 
injustice. 
Mânkdlm gives some examples of exposing oneself to pain in order to 
avert another harm. He mentions some medical treatments, such as 
making an incision in the ears (ëart al-udnayrù, cupping U}igSm&), and 
bloodletting (fasd) iTaclïq, 464: 14). As for Ibn Mattawayh, he briefly 
repeats what cAbd al-ôabbSr says about harm by means of which 
another harm is averted, neither crit icizing cAbd al-Gabbär nor adding 
his own solutions (.MagmQ" I II , fols. 12b, 19a and b). 
Inflicting Deserved Pain 
On certain conditions i t i s good to inflict pain or sorrow on someone 
who deserves a punishment (.ciqSb), blame (damm) or a reproof llawm). 
Doing such a thing is good because the person on whom the pain or 
sorrow are inflicted deserves th is . It should not be concluded from 
this that cAbd al-6abbur considers it good to take justice into our 
own hands. We have seen that in his second definition of injustice, he 
says that harming someone else is not an injustice if that person has 
deserved this harm and the person inflicting harm has the r ight to 
punish him. In the example he gives of deserved pain, he prudently 
speaks not of physical pain but of sorrow, and not of punishment but 
of blame: 
I have explained that i t is good that we blame someone 
who has wronged (.asSb) us or has committed terr ible deeds 
of evil , although that blame and the fact that the blame 
is deserved sadden him, annoy him and affect his heart 
(Mugnl XIII, 344: 4-6). 
cAbd al-öabbSr gives an example of sorrow felt by someone who 
deservedly is blamed. To make clear that the blame is deserved, he 
speaks of " ter r ib le deeds of evil" (qabS'iJp ^açîma') committed and of 
blame expressed by the person who is wronged. In his opinion, we 
known intui t ively ibi-farïqat al-idtirSr) that in this case i t is good 
to blame the wrong-doer, even though he is hurt by the blame (MugnT 
XIII, 344: 9). Although one might think of physical pain inflicted on a 
criminal when cAbd al-èabbSr speaks of deserved pain, he does not 
mention the hadd punishments·40 as an example of deserved pain. 
Apparently, he does not mention them because they are imposed on 
God's command, as disclosed in the revelation. The command means that 
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i t i s God who punishes, although the punishments are carried out by 
humans. cAbd al-Gabbar therefore gives an example of deserved pain 
(sorrow) inflicted by humans on their own in i t ia t ive . 
There are some respects in which deserved pain differs from 
pain that involves a profit or averts a harm. cAbd al-GabbSr points 
out that pain which involves a profit or averts a harm is mostly 
self- inf l ic ted. A person chooses to bear such pain. If this pain is 
inflicted by someone e lse , the suffering person himself has given his 
consent to be harmed*1. eAbd al-Gabbär points out that with respect 
to deserved pain quite the opposite is true: the deserved pain is 
inflicted on someone without asking him for his consent. 
cAbd al-Gabbâr considers i t bad to punish oneself (Muftnï XIII, 
344: 15-17). In his opinion, i t is even bad to expose oneself 
voluntarily to punishment: on the contrary, he considers i t good to 
escape punishment. Evidently, this is related to his opinion that we 
s t r ive to obtain profit and try to avert harm. cAbd al-öabbar 
considers that punishment is of no use for the one to be punished 
and that his exposure to punishment is therefore a useless act 
С'вЬвр which, like a l l useless acts is bad. In his view, escaping a 
deserved punishment i s a good act because in this way the person to 
be punished averts a harm to himself <.Mu¿nI XIII, 290: 16-IS; see 
also Mugnî XIII, 413: 13-15). 
Does th is mean that cAbd al-éabbSr, himself a Judge, considers 
that escaping punishment is legally permissible? He reports that some 
ju r i s t s did, indeed, declare i t permissible for a judge to refrain 
from the infliction of a fyadd punishment if the guilty person avoids 
punishment by flight (harab) or repentance (tawba) (.Muftnl XIII, 432: 
6-7). cAbd al-6abbSr himself does not completely agree with them. He 
does agree with them about flight from the punishment. However, he 
does not think that a badd punishment should be abandoned if the 
guilty person repents; i t is his opinion that in that case, the 
religious leader (іяал) must s t i l l infl ict the hadd punishment even 
though the repentance implies that the guilty person no longer 
deserves to be punished (.Mugnî XIII, 409: 16-18). The £add-punishment 
should then not be seen as a punishment but as a t r i a l (ші£ла) from 
God CMugnS XIII, 40S: 15-16). We will see l a t e r 4 2 that =Abd al-Ôabbâr 
believes that the pain of a badd punishment given to one who repents 
is compensated for by God (Mu¿ní XIII, 461: 15-16; Mugnl XIII, 493: 
11). 
cAbd al-ôabbSr indicates another point of difference between 
deserved pain and pain that involves a profit or averts a harm. As we 
have seen*3 , in order to know whether the la t t e r pain is good, 
quanti t ies of pain and profit or averted harm must be weighed 
against each other. cAbd al-6abbfir declares that this does not hold 
142 CHAPTER FIVE 
for deserved pain. In his opinion, the infliction of deserved pain is 
good by the mere feet that i t Is deserved and i t is therefore not 
necessary to take into consideration whether or not the quantity of 
the offence is greater than the quantity of the punishment (Mu¿ní 
XIII, 347: 1-6). Does cAbd al-Gabbar mean that giving a heavy 
punishment for a t r iv i a l offence is a good act? He does not explain 
this further, but refers to his discussion of "the threat [of hell]" 
(aJ-ura^rd)·**. Since I have been unable to trace the discussion he is 
referring to, I can only speculate about his opinion on the quantities 
of offence and punishment. I think i t unlikely that he considers it 
good to severely punish someone for a t r iv ia l offence. His opinion 
probably should be explained as follows: one who commits a t r iv ia l 
offence only deserves a light punishment; if he were punished 
severely this would be an undeserved punishment and, consequently, a 
bad act because Inflicting pain is only good if i t is deserved. 
Like cAbd al-Gabbar, Mänkdim and Ibn Mattawayh explain that 
inflicting pain is good if i t is deserved by giving the example of 
sorrow about being blamed iTa'ISq, 464: 15-16, MagmO' III, fol. 13b). 
Mänkdim only briefly mentions that Inflicting deserved pain Is good, 
whereas Ibn Mattawayh's discussion is more extensive; he appears to 
fully agree with cAbd al-Gabbär on this subject. Like cAbd al-6abbSr, 
he thinks that the quant i t ies of offence and punishment need not be 
weighed against each other once i t is known that the punishment is 
deserved IMagmQ* I II , fol. 10a). Like cAbd al-Óabbar, he does not give 
a further explanation. 
Assump tion 
What about exerting oneself in order to obtain a profit which does 
not eventuate? Or choosing to bear a harm in order to avert a 
greater harm, but that harm still is not averted? Are these acts then 
bad? This question concerns the certainty of knowing. We humans 
cannot know with certainty what will happen In the future; we can 
only assume that certain things will happen. As cAbd al-GabbSr 
asserts the omniscience of God, he obviously does not discuss these 
questions with the intention of applying them to God's acts; for him, 
it is an established truth that assuming does not apply to God but 
only to humans. 
Referring to the different kinds of knowledge, cAbd al-6abbSr 
uses the terms istlqSd (conviction), ciim (knowledge) and сяпп 
(assumption). The meaning of these terms can be clarified as follows: 
someone has a conviction (ictiqSd) about something if he considers it 
to be true. His conviction may be in accordance with reality or not. 
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In the latter case his conviction is a wrong conviction, for which 
*Abd al-GabbSr uses the term ignorance <.#ahl> (Mu¿nl XIII, 352: 6-7). 
If his conviction appears to be in accordance with truth it is called 
knowledge (cilra). How can we be certain that a conviction we have is 
in accordance with reality? According to cAbd el-òabb8r, we are 
certain that something is in accordance with reality if we feel in 
ourselves a "tranquillity of soul" (sukOn al-nafs) that we do not 
feel when we are not certain of this·16. This tranquillity exists in 
us, for instance, when we are certain that something exists because 
we have seen it with our own eyes. The "tranquillity of soul" is 
missing when we only have an assumption (^алл) about something, for 
Instance, when something i s supposed to happen in the future. cAbd 
al-uabbSr therefore says that we do not have knowledge ( с і ія) of, but 
only an assumption (^алл)*в about, what will happen in the future. 
In cAbd al-ôabbar's opinion it is good to inflict pain in order 
to obtain a profit that does not exist at that moment, but which it 
is assumed will eventuate in the future. To illustrate this, cAbd al-
öabbfir again takes up the example of disposing of a garment for a 
dïnSr. This act is considered to be good, regardless of whether the 
dinar i s spent at that moment or later. According to cAbd al-ôabb&r 
there i s only certainty about the profit if the money is spent at 
once. If the dinar is spent later, it is assumed that the profit will 
eventuate; i t does not exist at the moment when the owner disposes 
of his garment. This means that in many cases when pain Involves a 
profit, the profit i s not known with certainty because i t will happen 
in the future. Yet suffering the pain for it is considered good. cAbd 
al-ôabb&r mentions as examples trade and labour that are done in 
order to obtain gains. Another example involves exertion in the 
search for science, culture or exquisite things. At the moment 
someone decides to harm himself like this, the profit has not yet 
happened and cannot be known with certainty, yet his act is 
considered to be good because i t is assumed that i t will yield him a 
profit in the future íMu¿n! XIII, 348: 3-9). 
It i s possible that a profit that is assumed to happen in the 
future does not happen at all. This Implies that a harm is Inflicted 
that does not lead to a profit that outweighs It. It i s also possible 
that a harm i s chosen in order to avert a greater harm but that the 
harm intended to be averted happens after all. Must these acts be 
judged as being bad? eAbd al-öabbar does not think so. On the 
contrary, he considers them good acts, notwithstanding the harm they 
Involve. What, then, makes these acts good? It cannot be the profit 
because there i s no profit, nor the averting of harm because harm is 
not averted. cAbd al-6abbar explains that these acts are good because 
of the assumption (?опл) someone has at the moment that he chooses 
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the pain, namely, that the pain will involve a profit or avert a harm 
{Mugnî XIII, 348: 12-13). However, he makes this conditional: i t is 
only good to Inflict pain if the assumed profit i s much greater than 
the pain suffered <Mu¿nS XIII, 349: 1-7 and 362: 3-12). 
The examples that cAbd al-óabbfir has given above concern self-
inflicted pain. Is i t also good to inflict pain on someone else on the 
assumption that i t will provide him with a profit in the future or 
that i t will avert an expected harm? In 'Abd al-Gabbar's opinion this 
is good, but only if the other person has given his consent to be 
harmed. No exception is made for a profit that is so great that every 
adult of sound mind C-aqiD would choose to be harmed in order to 
obtain i t : he considers that harming an adult of sound mind without 
his consent is bad when i t concerns a future profit , however great 
this profit may be Wugnî XIII, 357: 11-14). However, in cAbd a l -
Gabbär's opinion i t is good if someone harms living beings who are 
not in full possession of their mental faculties and are put into his 
care, when he assumes that this will lead to a profit for them in the 
future or that i t will avert an expected harm (Mu£ni XIII, 362: 1-6). 
Opinion diverged on the question of whether or not it is good to 
infl ict pain that is assumed to be deserved. Evidently, the question 
is not whether i t is good to punish someone for an offence i t is 
assumed he will commit in the future but rather whether i t is good 
to punish someone on the assumption that he has already committed an 
offence. A different kind of assumption is therefore involved: there 
is uncertainty about something, not because i t has not happened yet 
but because i t is unclear what exactly has happened. 
In =Abd al-öabbär's opinion i t is not good to inflict pain on 
the assumption that i t i s deserved. He declares himself in agreement 
with Abu cAlî al-Gubbâ'ï, who was of the opinion that assumption 
cannot take the place of knowledge with respect to deserved pain. In 
Abu ^Alï's opinion, inflicting deserved pain is only good if i t is 
known with certainty that the pain is deserved. However, he 
reportedly made an exception for blame, considering i t good to blame 
someone on the assumption that this person deserves to be blamed. He 
explained that this act is good, not because of the blaming person's 
assumption <^алл) but because of the profit that the blamed person 
derives from the blame: the blame may prevent him from committing 
the offence for which he, perhaps undeservingly, has been blamed 
<.Mu$nI XIII, 363: 3-7). 
His son Abu Häsim is reported*7, to have said that i t is good to 
Inflict pain even if i t is only assumed that the pain is deserved 
(Mugnl XIII, 363: 13-14). This evidently referred to blaming someone, 
as he argued that i t is difficult to know with certainty whether the 
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blame is deserved: in many cases in which blaming is considered good 
the blame is, in fact, based on assumption rather than knowledge 
(.Mugnï XIII, 363: 14-364: 6). Abu HSsim disagreed with Abu cAlï that 
in those cases blaming is good because it leads to a profit. Abu 
Hâsun took into account that the blame is not given with the consent 
of the one who is blamed. As we have seen, harming an adult without 
his consent to obtain a future profit for him is not good. He 
therefore concluded that blaming in those cases cannot be good 
because of a profit and that it must therefore be good because of 
the assumption that it is deserved Ши&пІ XIII, 364: 6-10). cAbd al-
öabbär rejects Abu Häsim's opinion. He is convinced that the 
infliction of deserved pain is only good if it is known that it is 
deserved (.Mugni XIII, 365: 12-20). 
Mânkdîm and Ibn Mattawayh both follow 'Abd al-Gabbar's opinion with 
respect to the infliction of pain on the assumption that it involves 
a profit, averts a harm or is deserved. In MSnkdïnTs opinion, 
inflicting pain with the intention of obtaining a greater profit or 
averting a greater harm is good, even if the profit is only assumed 
to happen or the harm is only assumed to be averted. He disagrees 
with Abu HSsim on pain that is assumed to be deserved. It is his 
view that the infliction of deserved pain is only good if it is known 
with certainty that the pain is deserved. He points out that someone 
who inflicts pain on someone else on the assumption that the pain is 
deserved is not free from committing an injustice which, in his 
opinion, amounts to committing an injustice <Ta*liq, 464: 5-β). 
Ibn Mattawayh agrees with cAbd al-èabbâr that it is good to 
bear pain for a profit that outweighs the pain, both if the profit 
happens at once and if it is assumed to take place in the future; the 
same holds for pain that averts a harm Magma* III, fol. 13b). In his 
opinion, assumption cannot take the place of knowledge with respect 
to deserved pain. He uses the same argument as Mânkdîm: someone who 
acts on the assumption that the pain is deserved is not free from 
committing an injustice (MagmQ* III, fols. 13b, 14a). 
From the preceding, it becomes clear that cAbd al-GabbSr, 
Mânkdîm and Ibn Mattawayh are all of the opinion that inflicting pain 
is good even if it is only assumed rather than known with certainty 
that it involves a profit which outweighs the pain, or that averts it 
a harm greater than the harm suffered. They also agree that it is 
bad to inflict deserved pain unless it is known with certainty that 
it is deserved. 
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6. Some Particular Cases of Inflicting Pain 
Saving Someone and Harming Him 
We have seen that according to cAbd al-GabbSr, it is good to avert a 
serious harm by bearing a trivial harm. But what about someone whose 
hand is broken while he is being saved from drowning·*13? Is saving 
him in this way good because a serious harm (drowning) is averted by 
a trivial harm (breaking the hand of the drowning person)? However, 
the drowning person may be saved without breaking his hand. Although 
this question concerns a theoretical case which it is hard to imagine 
ever happening in reality, it was already a point of discussion in 
AbD -All al-GubbS'I's time (Magmu^ III, fol. 9b). 
The question of saving someone from drowning by breaking his 
hand has different aspects. With respect to the drowning person 
himself, it can be asked whether his exposing his hand to be broken 
is good. A^bd al-6abbar's opinion is that this is good if he assumes 
that this is the only way to be saved. cAbd al-ôabbfir argues that 
the act of the drowning person can be compared with the act of 
someone who has his hand amputated for fear that the gangrene in it 
will spread to the rest of his body. Having his hand amputated is 
good in this case because the person assumes that the amputation 
will avert the greater harm of dying from gangrene. Similarly, the 
act of the drowning person is good if he assumes that the only way 
to be saved is by exposing his hand to be broken (Mugnl XIII, 340: 1-
3). 
However, in cAbd al-ôabbSr's opinion the drowning person's act 
is bad if he knows that he can be saved without having his hand 
broken. Again, cAbd al-6abbar compares the drowning person's act with 
the act of someone who has his hand amputated because of gangrene. 
If the person with gangrene knows that he can be saved from gangrene 
without having his hand amputated it i s bad of him to have his hand 
amputated. Similarly, if the drowning person knows that he can be 
saved without exposing his hand to be broken yet s t i l l exposes it to 
be broken, his act i s bad (.Mugnl XIII, 340: 3-5). 
This concerns the act of the person who is drowning. As for the 
person who saves him and breaks his hand, cAbd al-ôabbâr is of the 
opinion that if the rescuer intentionally breaks the drowning person's 
hand, it is good of him to do so, even if he were able to save him 
without breaking i t . ""Abd al-ôabbfir explains that if the rescuer 
breaks the hand for a purpose (garad) it means that he assumes that 
there is an advantage in saving the drowning person in this way. 
However, cAbd al-ôabbfir considers that his act is bad if he breaks 
the hand for no purpose, because In that case it is a useless act 
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<<aba_t)A* iMugni XIII, 340: 5-9). We have seen s o that according to 
him every act that is not done with the Intention of doing i t in a 
reasonable way is a useless act and useless acts are bad. 
cAbd al-ôabbfir's opinion on this question differs slightly from 
Abu "-'All al-ôubbfi'ï's. In Abu cAll's view, breaking the hand of the 
drowning person although he could be saved without breaking his hand 
is a bad act on the rescuer's part. He argued that the rescuer harms 
himself because he will not receive thanks and praise from the person 
he has saved. Abu ^All considered that the rescue altogether is not 
an injustice because the profit for the drowning person (being saved) 
outweighs the harm (his broken hand). However, he added that the act 
of the drowning person who exposes his hand to be broken is bad 
because it is a useless act l^abaf) (Magmu* III, fol. 9b). We have 
seen that in cAbd al-ôabbfir view the act of the drowning person is 
good if he assumes that this i s the only way he can be saved. 
It i s uncertain whether Mankdlm agreed or disagreed with fAbd al-
ôabbfir on this question because I did not come across any reference 
to it in the Ta'llq. As for Ibn Mattawayh, he only reproduces Abu 
CA1I al-Ôubbfi'ï's opinion (.MagaQ* III, fol. 9b). He does not describe 
or discuss cAbd al-ôabbar's opinion, nor does he give his own opinion 
on the question. 
Inflicting Pain on Someone in Self-Defence 
Many people will consider that i t i s good to defend oneself against 
an attack by someone else, even if i t means that the attacker is 
harmed*1. Yet, on what grounds is self-defence a good act? In cAbd 
al-ôabbfir's opinion it i s bad to harm someone else in order to gain a 
profit for oneself. He thinks that, similarly, it Is bad to harm 
someone else for the purpose of averting a harm to oneself. He 
argues that this is known by reason, which says that it is not good 
to take someone's bread (harming him in this way) to appease one's 
own hunger (averting harm to oneself) (.Mugnl XIII, 341: 6 - 7 ) " . Does 
self-defence not imply that we harm someone else in order to avert a 
harm to ourselves? 
Presumably cAbd al-öabbfir in his function as a Judge often 
dealt with cases of self-defence. Answering the question of whether 
it is good to harm someone else In self-defence he takes into 
account whether It is necessary to use violence In order to avert the 
attack, He concedes that it is good to inflict pain in self-defence, 
but only if it is impossible to ward off an attacker without 
inflicting pain on him. He emphasizes that if it Is possible to fend 
off the attacker without harming him there is an obligation to do so. 
148 CHAPTER FIVE 
The same holds for an attack that can be warded off with only s l i g h t 
harm to the attacker. cAbd al-6abbar considers that i t i s bad to harm 
the attacker more than i s necessary: i t should not be the defender's 
object to harm the attacker. If possible, he must try to stop the 
attacker by keeping him off with his hands and if he can keep him 
off without the use of violence, he should do so (Mugnl XIII, 340: 
16-341: З ^ 3 . 
In cAbd al-Gabbñr's opinion, i t i s not bad to harm someone in 
s e l f - d e f e n c e i f th is i s the only way to ward off an attacker. He 
be l ieves that th i s act i s good because the attacker himself chooses 
to be harmed: at the moment that he decides to attack someone, he 
a l so chooses to expose himself to harm from the attacked person 
acting in s e l f - d e f e n c e . Thus, harm done in se l f -de fence should not be 
seen as harm inf l i c ted by the person attacked but rather as harm 
inf l i c ted by the attacker on himself ŒitgnS XIII, 341: 4-6) . 
Mânkdlm's opinion on this question i s not known to me because I did 
not come across any discuss ion of pain Infl icted in se l f -defence in 
the Taclfq. As for Ibn Mattawayh, I found that he d i f fers with "=Abd 
al-Gabbâr about why se l f -de fence i s good, although he does not 
e x p l i c i t l y reject cAbd al-öabbSr's opinion. Ibn Mattawayh d i scusses 
the case of someone who does not only harm the attacker but even 
k i l l s him in s e l f -de fence . However, apparently he does not refer to в 
human attacker but to an animal. He bel ieves that the defender should 
try to s top the attacker without using violence but i f the attack can 
only be averted by ki l l ing the attacker, the defender's act i s good 
e i ther because in doing so he f u l f i l s an obl igation imposed on him by 
God or because he acts under God's constraint (Magmu* III, fol. 29a). 
Ibn Mattawayh emphasizes that th is only re fers to se l f-defence 
against an attack by a l iv ing being without a complete mind (#ayr al-
mukallaD. 
Pain Inflicted by Children and Aniñáis 
We have s e e n " that -=Abd al-Gabbär considered bad the act of someone 
who in h is s l e e p or absentmindedly harms someone e l s e C B S > . Although 
the act i s not done intentional ly cAbd al-GabbSr nevertheless 
considers i t bad because i t involves harm but no blame i s attached 
because the harm i s done unintentionally. Another reason why no blame 
i s attached for some bad acts i s that they are done by l iv ing beings 
that cannot know that some acts are bad. These are l iving beings 
without complete minds, such as children, insane adults and animals. 
In Mu c taz i l i te thought God imposes obligations but only on adults of 
sound mind and not on children, insane adults and animals. 
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cAbd al-Gabbâr reports that some speculat ive theologians 
believed that ac t s that are bad if adults of sound mind do them are 
not bad if they are done by l iv ing beings on whom God has not 
imposed obl igat ions (.leysa bi-mukellef) (.Mugni XIII, 304: 4-6) . CAL 
al-öabbär re jec t s the opinion of these theologians. In his view, harm 
done by such l iv ing beings i s bad even though they do not know that 
doing harm i s bad. However, they do do not deserve blame for their 
acts because they cannot be prevented from acting by the knowledge 
that doing harm i s bad: they do not have this knowledge (Mugnl XIII, 
478: 9-10) . 
7. Conclusion 
cAbd al-ôabbâr makes clear that there are circumstances in which i t 
i s good to in f l i c t pain or to suffer pain. It i s good to choose to 
bear pain which leads to a profit that outweighs the pain, or which 
averts a greater harm, regardless of whether the profit or the harm 
e x i s t at that moment or are expected to happen in the future . 
Inf l ict ing pain on someone who i s an adult of sound mind i s only 
good i f he g ive s h is consent. An exception to this rule i s pain that 
i s deserved, but only if th i s pain i s inf l ic ted by someone who has 
the r ight to punish the other. Another exception to the requirement 
of consent i s pain that involves an ex i s tent profit that i s so great 
that every adult of sound mind would choose to bear i t . As for 
l iv ings beings that are not adults of sound mind, their caretaker 
should choose for them as he would choose for himself. "Abd a l -
ôabbâr considers i t bad to in f l i c t pain in ways other than those 
mentioned above, even if i t i s done by a s leeper, an absentminded 
person, a child, an insane person or an animal, although they deserve 
no blame for doing i t . The reason why such an act i s bad i s that 
someone i s harmed by i t . 
In the next chapter we wi l l see that cAbd al-6abbar, having 
explained that there are ways in which in f l i c t ing pain i s good, goes 
on to apply the method of drawing an analogy between this world and 
the divine world in order to make clear that God's acts of in f l i c t in g 
pain are good because they are done in those ways. However, th i s i s 
not the only reason why he has speci f ied which human ac t s of 
in f l i c t ion of pain are good. The dis t inct ion between good and bad 
in f l i c t ion of pain i s important for him because he bel ieves that in 
particular cases God compensates for pain, even if this pain i s 
produced by humans. However, he i s convinced that God does not 
compensate for bad in f l i c t ion of pain: someone who i n f l i c t s pain on 
someone e l s e in such a way that h is act i s bad must himself 
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compensate for this pain. In the next chapter we will see how, 
according to cAbd al-Gabbfir, this is done. 
CHAPTER SEC 
COMPENSATION OF РАШ 
We have seen 1 that cAbd al-GabbSr be l ieves that pain that i s not 
produced by humans or other l iv ing beings must be brought into 
ex is tence by God. In cAbd al-óabbSr's theology a l l ac t s of God are 
good. This implies that a l so those acts of God that enta i l suf fer ing 
for l iv ing beings must be good. A key question to be answered i s the 
purpose for which God In f l i c t s pain on humans and animals in th i s 
world. cAbd al-óabbSr's doctrine says that God's in f l i c t ion of pain 
must have a purpose, otherwise i t would be a u s e l e s s act (caba_t), 
which implies that i t i s bad. To answer the question of purpose, cAbd 
al-öabbSr r e l a t e s God's in f l i c t i on of pain to the theory that God 
imposes ob l igat ions on those l iv ing beings that can be made 
responsible for their act ions: adults of sound mind. 
1. Takllf and Luff 
The theory that God imposes obl igat ions on a l l adults of sound mind 
<cuqaJáO i s an important i s s u e In cAbd al-ôabbSr's doctrine. The 
Arabic term for God's imposing of obl igat ions i s takllf (charging). 
Takllf i s the verbal noun of the verb kallafa which i s used in the 
Qur'fin, in the statement that God does not impose the impossible on 
man3. According to cAbd al-ôabbSr's doctrine, several of God's act ions 
towards humans have a re lat ion to God's takllf: they are done with 
the purpose of informing people about which obl igat ions are imposed 
on them or to motivate them to f u l f i l these obl igat ions . ^Abd a l -
Gabbfir r e f e r s to these ac t s of God as alpäf (plural of luff). 
According to him, God's sending of prophets to the people in order to 
inform them about the obl igat ions Imposed on them Is a luff. Equally, 
he considers God's in f l i c t ion of pain a luff. For a good understanding 
of how t h i s can be a luff, I wi l l f i r s t d iscuss cAbd al-ôabbfir's 
theory of takllf. 
152 CHAPTER SIX 
Definitions of Takllf 
For a definition of takllf, cAbd al-Gabbär3 refers to Abu Häsim a l -
Ôubbâ'ï, who said that takllf means: "willing an act [to be done] that 
involves discomfort (.kulfa) and trouble (maéaqqa) to the person on 
whom i t is imposed" or "commanding and willing something that 
involves discomfort for the person who is commanded to do i t" (Mugnî 
XI, 293: 5-7). From these definitions i t becomes clear that takllf 
implies that someone (the mukallif) wants someone else (the mukallaf) 
to do something and that he t e l l s (or commands) him to do i t . An 
essential element of taklSf is that the mukallif informs the mukallaf 
about what he wants him to do. Further, what is imposed on the 
mukallaf involves discomfort for him: the act to be done is not easy 
and agreeable but, rather, difficult and unpleasant. With reference to 
God's takllf i t means i t is His will (irada) that particular 
troublesome acts are done by humans and, according to Abü HSsim's 
definition, God makes this known to them by commanding them to do 
these ac ts . 
According to Ibn Mattawayh, cAbd al-Gabbar said in al-Mufylf Ы-
'l-takllf that takllf means "making known (i*18m) and willing llrSda)". 
In this definition the term "commanding" from Abu Hflsim's definition 
is replaced by the term "making known", which i s a term that includes 
more than "commanding". The explanation for the use of "making known" 
is that cAbd al-öabbSr believes that the mukallaf can know 
obligations imposed on him not only from the revelation, in which 
God's commands are found, but also by deduction or intui t ive 
knowledge, which is created In him by God (MagmQ·1 II, 189: 7-10). 
Examples of rationnally known obligations are gratitude for a 
benefaction (.äukr al-ni^ma) (Mugnl ХГ , 161: 6-7), refraining from 
injustice and anger, returning what is entrusted to one's custody, and 
paying debts iMugnî XIII, 423: 8-9). 
Ibn Mattawayh thinks that in the definition of taklSf the term 
"making known" is to be preferred to the term "commanding" (amr) 
(MagmQ* II , 191: 4-7). Schwarz* supposes that the reason for Ibn 
Mattawayh's objection to the term "commanding" is that i t may 
conflict with the principle that a (divine) command cannot be the 
reason why acts are good: the use of the term "commanding" with 
respect to takllf may suggest that those acts that make up part of 
the takllf are good because of God's command. However, this does not 
seem to be the main reason Ibn Mattawayh objects to the term 
"commanding": he points out that "commanding" suggests that the 
obligations of God's takllf can only be known from God's revelation, 
which would imply that people who are unfamiliar with this cannot 
know that God imposes obligations on them. The term "making known", 
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however, Includes whet is known Intuitively by al l adults of sound 
mind, whether or not they believe in God. God's obligations are also 
imposed on people who do not believe in Him. 
According to the definitions given by Abu Häsim and cAbd a l -
ôabbâr, takllf means "willing something to be done". Ibn Mattawayh 
also objects to the use of the term "willing", arguing that this only 
refers to what God wants people to perform and does not take account 
of what He does not want them to perform; yet, God's takllf also 
concerns the prohibition of particular acts , which means that these 
acts are not willed by God. He further objects to the term "willing" 
because i t does not exclude constraint digs') (MagmQ* I, 1: 12-13): 
i t leaves open the possibil i ty that God constrains people to act in 
accordance with His will. The idea of constraint, however, conflicts 
with the principle of takllf. Imposing obligations implies that 
someone can choose not to do that which is imposed on him. Takllf 
therefore presupposes freedom of choice for those on whom the 
obligations are imposed. Ibn Mattawayh therefore gives the following 
definition of takllf: "making known <ісіал) to the mukallaf that there 
is profit (naf1) or harm (.darar) for him in what he, with trouble 
(maSaqqa), performs or does not perform, provided i t does not reach 
the extent of constraint (llgSV ŒagmQ* I, 1: U-15) . 
Mänkdlm's definition of taklSf bears a strong resemblance to Ibn 
Mattawayh's definition. He defines takllf as: "Making known <icJá"m) to 
the other that there is profit Inaf*) or averting of harm (daf 
darar) for him in what he, with trouble, performs or does not 
perform, to the extent that the situation does not reach the point of 
constraint (il£S·)" <Ta--Hq, 510: 4-5). 
When we compare the definitions of Ibn Mattawayh and Mânkdïm 
with the definitions of Abu Hasim and cAbd al-6abbSr, we see that Ibn 
Mattawayh and Mânkdïm do not use the term "willing", but they do use 
the term "making known" (lcläm). On this point i t may appear that 
they agree with cAbd al-öabbSr's definition. However, Mânkdïm and Ibn 
Mattawayh apparently do not understand by iclSm "making known which 
acts are obligatory and which acts are bad" - as cAbd al-ôabbâr said 
- but rather "making known that by doing certain acts a reward can 
be acquired and a punishment can be averted". Another new element in 
their definitions i s the emphasis on freedom of choice. Although, as 
we will see, ^Abd al-6abbSr shares with them the opinion that 
freedom of choice is a condition for takllf, he does not mention this 
in his definition of takllf. 
The fact that MSnkdïm's and Ibn Mattawayh's definitions of 
takllf closely resemble each other but differ from cAbd al-ôabbfir's 
definition makes one wonder whether they both adopted their 
definitions from a Muctazilite master other than cAbd al-òabbSr. As 
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they do not mention the source of their definition, and I did not 
find any information about this in other works, I am unable to answer 
this question at the moment. 
The Purpose of God's Taklïf 
In cAbd al-GabbSr's opinion God imposes obligations on all adults of 
sound mind with the purpose of giving them the opportunity to earn a 
reward (tawSb) (Mugnf XIII, 420: β). cAbd al-Gabbâr argues that God's 
purpose when He imposes these obligations cannot be that He wants 
these acts to be done or to be refrained from. If this was His 
purpose, He could achieve it in another way, by forcing humans to act 
accordingly. Only by constraint would God achieve His purpose with 
certainty. Imposing obligations is not a safe way to achieve this: i t 
is always possible that people will choose not to do that which is 
imposed on them Œugnl XIII, 420: 16-421: 1). cAbd al-Óabbar 
therefore concludes that by imposing obligations on humans, God's 
purpose must be to give them the opportunity to earn a reward. 
MSnkdlm (Taellq, 510: 11-511: 12) and Ibn Mattawayh ŒagmQc II, 193: 
1-194: 3) agree with him on this. 
Taking into consideration that God usually bestows many favours 
on His creatures without first imposing obligations, one may wonder 
what the difference is between these favours and the reward that God 
holds out. cAbd al-öabbär explains that this reward is much greater 
than God's usual favours. A divine favour may be small because it i s 
a gift (.tafadduï). It i s always good to give a gift , however small i t 
may be. This does not apply to a reward because it i s not good to 
reward someone by giving him a trifle: a reward must be more than a 
gift (Mu¿nl XIII, 392: 17-393: 4). Another difference that cAbd al-
GabbSr sees between a gift and a reward is that a reward is given 
with honour and respect for i t s receiver, and a gift is not (.Mu¿nf 
XIII, 393: 4-5). The honour and respect are given because something 
difficult has been done: i t is not considered good to reward someone 
for doing what is easy for him IMugnl XIII, 425: 14-17). 
This means that if God's purpose is to give people the 
opportunity to earn a reward, He must Impose on them something 
difficult. This difficult thing is to fulfil the obligations imposed on 
them by God. This i s difficult to do, but not so difficult that i t i s 
impossible*. cAbd al-6abbar refutes the idea that divine obligations 
cannot be fulfil led, arguing that it i s bad to impose an Impossible 
task (.Mugnl VI/1, 61: 6-9) and God does not perform bad acts. 
cAbd al-öabbär therefore believes that God is obliged to do 
certain things to enable people to fulfil that which He has imposed 
on them Œugnl XI, 292: 5-293: 3). Thus, i t is obligatory for God to 
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give people able bodies so that they can perform their task (MugnS 
XI, 292: 7-8). But this alone is not enough: people also need the 
power to use their bodies. In cAbd al-6abbSr*s opinion God is obliged 
to give people the power (qudra) to act before He imposes the 
obligations on them (.Mupil XI, 367: 16-368: 1). He argues that 
imposing obligations on someone who is not able to perform them Is a 
bad act. 
God must also provide those who are mukallaf with the knowledge 
they need in order to be able to fulfil the obligations. We have seen 
that some obligations are known by the intuit ive knowledge that i s 
created in people by God (Mugnl XI, 371: 19-372: 2). Other obligations 
are known by deduction after reflection on indications (adilla, plural 
of dalïï) that God has placed in this world. cAbd al-éabbSr therefore 
thinks that reflection inamarì and learning (maTifa) are the most 
important obligations imposed on a mukallaf (Mugnl XIII, 422: 13). 
There is a clear relation between God's obligation to make the 
obligations known to those who are mukallaf and а шика lia f s 
obligation to ref lect and learn: doing so, he acquires the knowledge 
about a l l that God has imposed on him. Another way in which God 
makes His commands and prohibitions known is by sending prophets who 
bring a message from Him about these things. They inform humans 
about the contents of the obligations and about the reward or 
punishment that God will give for fulfilling or failing to fulfil them 
(Mugnl XI, 375: 5-13). 
77ie Mukallaf 
God imposes His obligations only on those who are able to fulfi l 
them. cAbd al-öabbär concludes from this that a person on whom God's 
obigations are imposed (.mukallaf) must be able to act (qSdlr), 
knowing (са\2іл), perceiving (mudrik), living (fyayy) and willing (murici) 
(Mugnl XI, 309: 13). The abil ity to act, the possession of l ife and 
perception are closely related to each other. The ability to act i s 
given only to living beings: inanimate beings cannot act. Living 
beings must perceive because this i s their characterist ic. This means 
that one who is able to act must also be living and perceiving. A 
mukallaf shares these qual i t ies with a l l living beings, including 
those who are not mukallaf. 
*=Abd al-öabbär explains that a mukallaf must also feel desire 
or aversion for certain things. This is closely related to the purpose 
of God's takllf, which is to hold out a reward for doing something 
diff icult . I t i s not difficult to do something one has no aversion to 
or to refrain from something which one feels no desire for: i t would 
not be good to be rewarded for doing such a thing. A mukallaf must 
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therefore feel desire or aversion (.Mu¿nl XI, 367: 7-12). A aukallaf 
must also know and have a will*. He must know which obligations are 
imposed by God and he must know the particular way in which these 
acts must be performed. He must have the will to do these acts in 
the required way. Only someone with a sound mind <caqJ) is able to 
acquire knowledge about the takllf and to distinguish between that 
which does and that which does not belong to the obligations of the 
takllf (.Mufrnl XI, 371: 18-20). This means that only those who have a 
sound mind can be mukallaf (MuftnS XI, 375: 14-15); children (.Mugnl 
XIII, 430: 11-12), insane adults (Mugnl XIII, 410: 13-14) and animals 
cannot be a mukallaf. God does not impose His obligations on them and 
this implies that they cannot deserve a reward or a punishment from 
God. 
The prophets are sent to inform people of the obligations 
imposed by God. According to cAbd al-GabbSr, another of their 
functions is to motivate them to fulfil these obligations. He believes 
that God is obliged to motivate those on whom He has imposed His 
obligations (Wu¿ní XV, 22: 9-10 and Mugnl XI, 292: 16-17). An act by 
which people are motivated is called luff by cAbd al-Gabbar. He 
thinks that adults of sound mind choose to perform a particular act 
on the basis of motives that exist in their hearts . However, such a 
motive (dS^D i s not the cause of this act: i t urges (iqtadg) someone 
to choose to perform the act but does not make performance 
obligatory (laysa bi-mugib li-dälikay IMugnï VI/1, 188: 18). If the 
motive were the cause of the act, the act would have to happen as 
soon as the motive existed and the conditions for performing the act 
were fulfil led. That the motive is not the cause of the act means 
that i t is possible for the motive to exist In somebody without the 
act being actually performed. 
According to cAbd al-GabbSr the knowledge (ciJa), assumption 
(^алл) or conviction il^tiqSd) that a particular act is good is a 
motive to choose to do this act. Similarly, the knowledge that a 
particular act is bad i s a motive to refrain from doing i t (.Mugnl 
VI/1, 196: 1-5). Why then do people sometimes choose to perform bad 
a c t s e ? Abd al-GabbSr thinks that this is because they feel the need 
(hSga) for a part icular profit, or the need to avert a particular 
harm. Need i s another motive (.dS^I) to choose to perform an act: i t 
can urge people to choose to perform a particular act even if they 
know that the act is bad 9 (Mugnl VI/1, 187: 17-188: 5). However, this 
need must be real and they must know that there is no other way to 
obtain the needed thing. cAbd al-GabbSr is convinced that had the 
doer of a bad act not needed to do i t , he would have refrained from 
doing i t . Similarly, he would have refrained from doing the bad act if 
he had known that he could obtain the needed profit in another way 
COMPENSATION OF PAIN 157 
(Mugnî VI/1, 181: 7-13). According to cAbd al-ÖabbSr, the knowledge 
that there is no real need to perform a bad act prevents someone 
from choosing to do this act (tfitfnJ VI/1, 188: 2-6). 
The knowledge that an act is good is a motive to choose to 
perform this act. However, the motive to choose to perform an 
obligatory act can be reinforced by the knowledge that a profit can 
be acquired by doing i t . cAbd al-6abbSr therefore says that God 
strengthens the motives of those who are mukallaf by holding out a 
reward and by threatening them with punishment (Mugnî VI/1, 187: 3 -
4). Apart from this , there are other ways in which God motivates 
them. In cAbd al-6abbar's opinion, everything that motivates a 
mukallaf to choose to fulfil the obligations of the takllf i s a 
lutr°. 
Luff 
Taking into account the sense in which luff is used by ^Abd a l -
Gabbâr, MSnkdîm and Ibn Mattawayh, i t i s difficult to find an 
adequate translat ion for this term. I agree with Abrahamov1 ' that 
translating luff as "divine assistance" is preferable to translating 
i t as "grace", but i t can be objected that this translation suggests 
that alfäf (plural of luff) are only produced by God. However, we will 
see that a human act, for instance performing the $al3t, can also be 
a luff in the sense that i t motivates people to fulfil the 
obligations imposed by God. Luff may therefore be translated as 
"assistance in fulfilling the obligations of God's takllf', but this 
translation is not workable because i t is too long. I therefore 
nevertheless prefer to t ranslate luff as "divine assistance", taking 
into consideration that most alfäf come from God. 
For his definition of luff cAbd al-uabbir refers to the 
"masters" (.ëuyükunS), who defined luff as "that which motivates [a 
person] to perform an act of obedience so that at i t s occurrence this 
act i s chosen or i s most likely to be chosen" (.MugnS XIII, 9: 3-4). A 
Juif is an act done by God or a human being that motivates someone 
to perform an act; i t is not the motive i tself : as we have seen, a 
motive {da'1!) is knowledge that exis ts in a person's heart. Like the 
motive, the luff does not cause an act, but i t urges someone to 
perform i t 1 2 . I t i s possible that someone knows a luff but does not 
choose to do that which the luff motivates him to do. Thus, I think 
that the description that cUtman'3 gives of luff as "the act of which 
God knows that man obeys at i t s occurrence" is not precise, because 
i t rules out the possibil i ty that a luff does not resul t in an act of 
obedience. 
cAbd al-Öabbar's definition of luff does not explicitly re la te i t 
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to God's takllf. But although cAbd al-Gabbar admits that the term can 
be used in a general sense, he declares that the "masters" applied 
this term with respect to God's takllf iMugnî XIII, 9: 10). They used 
luff in the sense of that which motivates a mukallaf to choose to do 
an act of obedience to God, although some said that they also used 
the term luff with respect to immorality (mafsada) and referred to 
immorality as that which motivates someone to choose to perform a 
bad act (luff fi 4-qabI3?) (MugnS XIII, 9: 13). cAbd al-éabbSr adds 
that i t is out of the question that a luff fi Ί-qabîh is an act of 
God: i t i s bad to motivate someone to choose a bad act and God does 
not perform bad acts (Mugnî XIII, 23: 6-7) 1 Λ . 
Not only God but also humans can do an act that motivates 
others to fulf i l the obligations imposed on them by God. cAbd al-
öabbär gives the example of a prophet. I t is a luff from the side of 
God to send a prophet with a message from Him. When this prophet 
teaches the rel igious law and holds to i t s prescriptions, the 
prophet's action is a luff, as well (Mugnl XV, 22: 5-6). The l a t t e r 
luff is an act done by a human being. This makes i t clear that i t i s 
not a condition that a luff be done by God. 
cAbd al-ÖabbSr distinguishes three sor ts of luff: f i rs t ly , a luff 
that is done by God, secondly, a luff done by the mukallaf for whom 
i t is meant, and thirdly, a luff not done by God nor by the mukallaf 
for whom i t i s meant (Mu¿nl XIII, 27: 4-6). As we have seen, adhering 
to the prescriptions of religious law, for instance performing the 
$alät, i s a luff. This luff is an example of the second sort of luff: 
i t i s done by the person for whom the luff is meant. cAbd al-öabbär 
also gives an example of a luff that is not done by God nor by the 
person for whom the luff is meant: when a prophet teaches the 
religious law his teaching is a luff meant for people other than 
himself. However, cAbd al-öabbfir observes that although the luff is 
not meant for the prophet, the prophet himself also profits from i t 
as he is also motivated by what he teaches (Mu¿ní XIII, 46: 12-15). 
MSnkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh agree with cAbd al-Gabbfir about the 
meaning of the term luff (MagmQc II , 32β: 3-4, 335: 3 and Tacllq, 519: 
1-2). Ibn Mattawayh also mentions the possibil ity of a luff that 
motivates someone to do bad acts (.Ma$mQc I I , 335: 5-6). M&nkdXm does 
not mention th i s , perhaps for reasons of brevity, nor does he 
explicitly reject i t . Ibn Mattawayh distinguishes the same three sor t s 
of luff as cAbd al-éabbSr: a luff is ei ther the act of God, or the 
act of the mukallaf himself, or the act of someone other than the 
mukallaf (Magmu* II , 327: 6-15). Mänkdlm, however, makes a different 
division. He f i r s t distinguishes two sorts of luff: f i rs t ly , luff that 
is an act of God and, secondly, luff that i s an act of someone other 
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than God. He divides the latter sort of luff into firstly, luff that 
is "done by us" (min fi^llnS) and, secondly, luff that is "done by 
someone other than us" (.min flcl ¿ayrlnS) (Ta'llq, 519: 5-8). He 
probably means: luff done by the mukallaf for whom the luff i s meant 
and luff done by a person other than the mukallaf for whom the luff 
Is meant. 
2. Why God Imposes Pain 
According to cAbd al-öabbär pain from God Is an important luff. In 
the Mugnï the discussion of pain follows Immediately on the 
discussion of Juif In general. When cAbd al-öabbar discusses pain 
Inflicted by God, he not only discusses illnesses and other sorts of 
physical pain but he also includes sorrow caused by acts of God, such 
as sorrow about the death of a loved one. In his view this sorrow is 
caused by God because God made the beloved die (.Mugnl XIII, 106: 10-
12). cAbd al-GabbSr does not explain how a mukallaf i s motivated by 
pain or sorrow from God, but as he refers to pain as Including a 
warning, he probably thought that pain and sorrow warn people of a 
painful punishment in hell if they fail to fulfil the obligations 
imposed by God. 
Is Illness a Punishment from God? 
cAbd al-öabbfir rejects the idea that illness is a punishment from 
God, as was believed by several different groups whom cAbd al-6abbSr 
refers to as "the adherents of the transmigration of souls" (ashSb 
al-tanSsujt). According to him, they believed that humans suffer 
because of their bad acts In their previous l i fet ines. They 
maintained that pain that comes from God is good because it i s 
deserved as a punishment16. They believed that pleasure can also be 
deserved and that both reward and punishment are given in this world. 
Because of this, they denied that there is a hereafter. In their view, 
cattle and birds were also mukallaf, and they said that God has sent 
a prophet to each sort (¿Ins) of them. Consequently, many of them 
said that reflection and learning do not belong to the obligations 
Imposed by God (Mugnl XIII, 379: 14-381: 3). eAbd al-ôabbar mentions 
the ¡(urramiyya as one of the groups who adhered to this doctrine 
(Mugnl XIII, 380: 7). However, mentioning this name does not make 
clear whom he refers to because Kurramiyya was a name that was used 
for several extremist ál=ite religious movements that existed mainly 
In IrSn , e . 
Although Abü CA1I did not believe in the transmigration of 
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souls, he did believe that many il lnesses are a punishment from God. 
In his opinion, they can be a divine punishment that God infl icts in 
advance, like the fyadd punishments, ¡jadd punishments are only given 
to Muslims, and Abu CAH thought i t possible that i l lnesses which 
unbelievers suffer from are a punishment inflicted on them instead of 
fyadd punishments (Mugnl XIII, 431: 4-15). He made an exception for 
i l lnesses suffered by living beings that cannot have deserved 
punishment, such as prophets and animals. Prophets cannot have 
deserved punishment from God because they do not commit great sins 
(kabS'irt (Mugnl XV, 300-303). Abu CA1I therefore believed that the 
prophets' i l lnesses are a t r i a l imposed on them by God. Although he 
believed that God compensates for undeserved i l lnesses, he did not 
consider them as a lut f but rather as a t r i a l (mlhnaV (Mugnl XIII, 
431: 2-4, 104: 8-9, 105: 5-6). (The difference between luff and t r i a l 
is that a luff can motivate not only the person who suffers but 
other mukallefun as well, whereas a t r ia l only concerns the person 
who suffers.) 
Abu cAlï 's son Abu HSsim rejected his father 's opinion. He 
believed that i l lnesses cannot be intended as punishment. He argued 
that i t i s wrong to punish someone unless he knows what he is being 
punished for. Someone who is i l l does not know whether his i l lness i s 
a punishment, and even if he did understand that i t was a punishment, 
he would not know which offence he was being punished for. Abu HSsim 
concluded from this that each i l lness is a luff that motivates adults 
of sound mind to fulfi l the obligations imposed on him by God (Mugnl 
XIII, 431: 16-432: 19, 104: 9-10, 105: 6-17). 
cAbd al-ôabbër follows the opinion of Abu HSsim. He defends 
this opinion, arguing that prophets suffer from i l lnesses, although 
they cannot have deserved punishment from God. This means that these 
i l lnesses must be a t r i a l imUina') from God. This is an indication that 
i l lnesses are not a punishment from God (.Mugnl XIII, 407: 7-10). cAbd 
al-óabbSr agrees with Abu HSsim that the i l lnesses of people are not 
a punishment from God because someone who is punished must know 
which offence he is being punished for: if he does not know this , he 
may think that an injustice is being done to him and this may prompt 
him to do bad acts <Mu¿nS XIII, 415: 13-416: 4). cAbd al-GabbSr 
asser t s that even the i l lnesses of people who are aware that they 
have failed to fulf i l the obligations of the takllf and know that 
they deserve punishment are not a punishment. He argues that 
inflicting i l lnesses on them as a punishment conflicts with the idea 
of takllf: God threatens those who fail to fulfil the obligations with 
a severe punishment1". This means that their punishment must be more 
than only suffering i l lnesses in this world: they will be punished in 
the hereafter <.Mu¿ní XIII, 417: 9-41Ô: 9). By these arguments cAbd a l -
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Gabbär defends his opinion that i l lnesses imposed by God are not a 
punishment. 
Hadd Punishment 
cAbd al-Gabbar does not deny that there is pain in this world 
inflicted by God, or on His command, that is meant to be a deserved 
punishment. However, in these cases the punished persons know why 
they are punished13 . An example of such a punishment is a hadd 
punishment: although i t is carried out by humans, i t is considered to 
come from God because i t is done on His command. cAbd al-ôabbSr 
considers a hadd punishment a punishment from God that is given 
here and not in hell (Mugnl XIII, 417: 16). 
Can a hadd punishment also be meant as a t r i a l in the same way 
as an i l lness? cAbd al-éabbâr does not think that this is the case, 
unless someone has repented of his offence. He defends his opinion by 
pointing out that the law allows a person to escape a hadd 
punishment*0. I t is not considered good to expose oneself to a hadd 
punishment. This indicates that the hadd punishment is not a t r i a l 
because i t i s considered good to bear a t r i a l (mihna). Consequently, a 
hadd punishment i s meant to be a deserved punishment and, therefore, 
i t cannot a t the same time be a t r i a l for the punished person (Muftnl 
XIII, 433: 15-10), although i t can be a luff for people other than the 
punished person (.Mugnf XIII, 459: 1-3). 
I t i s different if the person on whom a hadd punishment i s 
inflicted has genuinely repented of his offence. In that case he no 
longer deserves to be punished IMugnl XIII, 432: 5). S t i l l , in cAbd a l -
éabbSr's opinion, the sentence must be carried out a l l the same and 
in that case the hadd punishment will, indeed, be a t r i a l imlhna) for 
this person. This means that the hadd punishment is not only a luff 
for others but becomes a luff for the punished person himself, too 
(Mugnl XIII, 408: 15-16 and 497: 16). 
From the preceding we may conclude that in cAbd al-Gabb&r's opinion 
pain that comes from God is a luff, even if i t is inflicted on people 
who deserve His punishment. The only exception to this is pain that 
i s known to be a punishment from God, such as the punishment of hadd 
offences that are not repented of. This means that in cAbd a l -
GabbSr's opinion every i l lness i s a luff. If a mukallaf suffers an 
i l lness , i t i s a luff not only for himself, but also for other people 
who live near him. cAbd al-öabbar thinks i t possible that pain 
inflicted on a mukallaf by God can motivate another mukallaf to 
refrain from doing an injustice to this person {Mu£nl XIII, 370: 14-
16). Similarly, pain suffered by a поп-лшігаііа/" can be a Juif for a 
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mukallaf. For Instance, the i l lness that a child suffers from i s a 
luff for i t s parents ÍMugnS XV, 22: 11-12). 
Children's Illnesses 
Explaining that the i l lness of a child is a luff for i t s parents, cAbd 
al-ôabbfir gives a solution to the difficult question of why innocent 
children suffer from i l lnesses . We have seen that adherents of the 
transmigration of souls explained these i l lnesses as a punishment for 
sins committed in an ear l ier l i fe . People who do not believe in the 
transmigration of souls have to find another explanation. Apparently, 
some people in ^Abd al-ôabbfir's time did not know how to explain this 
and simply ignored the problem. cAbd al-ôabbSr reports that some 
Muslims declared that children do not feel pain, or that they only 
feel pain inflicted on them by humans and not pain inflicted by God 
(.Mugnl XIII, 382: 9-383: 2). cAbd al-ôabbSr refutes the opinion of 
these people, pointing out that every adult knows that during his own 
childhood he suffered pain in the same way as in his adulthood 
(Mugnl XIII, 382: 4-8). Children become i l l Just as adults do. These 
i l lnesses cannot be produced by other living beings. From this cAbd 
al-ôabbSr concludes that children suffer from i l lnesses produced by 
God <Mu#nfXIII, 385: 15-19). 
We have seen that cAbd al-ôabbar considers each il lness a luff. 
Adults of sound mind can profit from the motivation contained in 
i l lnesses and deserve a reward by fulfilling the obligations of the 
taklSf. After having reached maturity children become mukallaf so 
that they can also profit from the luff contained in their i l lnesses . 
However, children who die before reaching maturity cannot do th is : 
they cannot deserve a reward, as they never become mukallaf. We have 
seen that according to cAbd al-ôabbSr their suffering is not useless: 
adults living near to them can profit from the luff contained in 
their i l lnesses . Yet, there must be a profit for the children as well. 
I t would be bad If God inflicted illnesses on them from which only 
other people can profit and not they themselves. The question is what 
kind of profit children can get from their i l lnesses. cAbd al-èabbSr's 
solution to this problem is found in a compensation iclwad) that i s 
given by God. 
3. The Compensation <cIwad) of Different Sorts of Pain 
cAbd al-ôabbar draws an analogy between the present world and the 
•absent" (divine) world and asser t s that God compensates for pain 
inflicted by Him. If in the present world humans damage the 
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possessions of another human being they must compensate him as 
r e s t i t u t i o n for the damage. cAbd al-ôabbâr gives the example of 
someone who spoils someone else 's garment. It is considered 
obligatory that the spoiler compensate the owner for the harm. This 
means that the owner has a claim on the spoiler for an amount equal 
to the value of the garment21 (Mugnl XIII, 367: 16-368: 4). I t should 
be noted that cAbd al-ôabbar does not take into consideration 
whether the damage is done deliberately or by accident. I t is evident 
that in both cases res t i tu t ion should be made to the owner. 
As pain is a sor t of harm, cAbd al-öabbar concludes that pain 
must also be compensated for. He makes an exception for good 
infliction of pain that meets the conditions that we saw e a r l i e r 2 2 . 
Although, in a manner of speaking, spoiling a garment is "made good" 
by compensating the owner, the act of spoiling does not become a 
good act even if the compensation is much more than the value of the 
garment. This i s , f i r s t ly , because the spoiling is not done with the 
intention of providing the owner of the garment with a profit . We 
have seen that harming someone else is only good if i t is done for 
the purpose of obtaining a profit for him <.Mu¿nI XIII, 486: 4-6). 
Secondly, the owner did not give his consent. If harm is done to an 
adult of sound mind with the intention of providing him with a 
profi t , he must give his consent beforehand. cAbd al-ôabbar gives the 
example of an employer who imposes work on an employee for agreed 
pay - the imposition of fatiguing work on the employee can be 
equated with doing harm to him and the pay can be equated with 
compensation given for the harm done to him - cAbd al-ôabbar 
explains that the act of the employer i s good, because the employee 
has previously given his consent to be "harmed" for the agreed 
"compensation". 
cAbd al-ôabbâr applies this to God's infliction of pain. However, 
i t i s clear that there is a difference between a human who 
compensates someone else for a spoilt garment and God who 
compensates for pain inflicted by Him. Spoiling someone's garment is 
a bad act , whereas God's infliction of pain must be a good act. The 
two ac ts of doing harm are therefore not really comparable. What they 
have in common i s that the person to whom the harm i s done 
"deserves" to be compensated. cAbd al-ôabbfir therefore compares God's 
compensation for i l lnesses to the "compensation" given to an employee 
for fatiguing work imposed on him Œufnî XIII, 386: 9-10). Yet, again, 
these two acts are not completely comparable. The employee has given 
his consent to be "harmed", whereas those who suffer from i l lnesses 
have not given their consent to God. When God imposes i l lnesses on 
adults of sound mind, He does not ask them whether they agree to 
bear the pain for the profit that He will give them. Yet, God's 
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Imposition of i l lnesses must be a good act. 
We have seen2 3" that cAbd al-Gabbar allows two exceptions to the 
rule that the person to be harmed must give his consent beforehand. 
One exception i s pain inflicted on children and other living beings 
without inte l lectua l facult ies by someone whose care they are in. 
Another exception i s harming adults of sound mind for a profit that 
is so great that every adult of sound mind (.'SqiD would choose to 
bear the harm for i t . cAbd al-GabbSr thinks that God's imposition of 
i l lnesses is done in accordance with the l a t t e r exception. From this 
he concludes that the compensation that God gives for pain inflicted 
by him is so great that a l l people of sound mind icuqalS'), however 
different their circumstances may be, would choose to bear the pain 
for i t . This implies that God gives a large quantity of compensation 
for i l lnesses and other sor t s of pain that He imposes on living 
beings in this world (MugnX XIII, 453: 19-454: 1, 401: 2-5, 402: 1 and 
542: 4-11). 
Why God's Infliction of Pein is Good 
cAbd al-Gabbar reports that Abu CA1I al-Gubbfi'I believed that God 
inf l icts pain because He wants to provide people with a 
compensation2·* (MupiS XIII, 390: l-β). However, his son Abu Hâsim 
disagreed with him and asserted that God's purpose was not only to 
provide a compensation but also to give a warning (.i^tibar) to the 
mukallafun (plural of mukallaf). He agreed with his father that God 
compensates for pain inflicted by Him. God's act would be an injustice 
i^ulm) if no compensation was given. However, he argued that , 
notwiths tanding the compensation, God's infliction of pain would be a 
useless act icabap if i t was not a warning20 Œu$nî XIII, 390: 9-11). 
If God's only purpose was to give a compensation, He could give this 
as a g i f t , without f i r s t inflicting pain. Abu HSsim concluded from 
this that God's infliction of pain must be done with a second 
purpose: to warn those who are mukallaf that they should fulfil the 
obligations imposed on them by God. In Abu HSsim's opinion, God's 
infliction of pain is good because of the combination of compensation 
and warning. 
cAbd al-uabbär 's opinion on this question differs only s l ight ly 
from Abu HSsim's. According to cAbd al-öabbfir, God's purpose is to 
provide a benefit (jaasJafia). By "benefit" he does not mean God's 
compensation for pain but the luff contained in pain inflicted by Him 
on His creatures . He considers the fact that pain is a luff as the 
main reason why God's infliction of pain is good and the compensation 
for the pain as a secondary reason. cAbd al-6abbSr argues that God 
is obliged to produce acts that motivate a mukallaf to fulfi l the 
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obligations of the tajsllf. If God does so by inflicting pain on this 
mukallaf or on other living beings, He does what is obligatory for 
Him and this i s why the infliction of pain is good. 
Inflicting pain without compensating for i t is a bad act. cAbd 
al-Gabbar i s therefore convinced that God compensates for the pain 
He inf l ic ts . However, he does not consider this to be the purpose for 
which God inf l ic ts pain. The compensation is only the corollary of 
God's motivating people by the infliction of pain: God gives the 
compensation in order to ensure that His infliction of pain is not a 
bad act (Mugnl XIII, 390: 14-391: 3). We see that cAbd al-öabbar does 
not disagree with Abu Häsim that God's infliction of pain is good 
because of the compensation and the warning, but his emphasis i s 
different. 
With respect to those who are mukallaf, the question may a r i se 
whether i t i s necessary for God to compensate them for pain that He 
inf l ic ts on them. Is i t not sufficient that this pain contains a 
warning (.1'tlbSry? If they take the warning to heart and fulfi l the 
obligations of the takllf, they will be rewarded in the hereafter . 
This reward can be seen as a profit that outweighs the harm, so that 
God's infliction of pain is good because of i t . cAbd al-óabbSr re jects 
this suggestion. He concedes that a mukallaf and a ηοτι-mukallaf 
differ with respect to the divine reward: a non-mukallaf cannot 
deserve this reward. However, with respect to being ent i t led to 
compensation for harm done to them he sees no difference between a 
mukallaf and a non-mukallaf: both can be compensated for harm done 
to them. cAbd al-öabbSr therefore thinks i t unlikely that only the 
non-mukallaf would be compensated while the mukallaf was not. He 
believes that both will be compensated for pain inflicted by God 
<tfu#ni XIII, 398: 6-9). 
Mankdlm's opinion is that pain inflicted by God is good "because i t i s 
a warning ii^tlbër) and a luff'. He adds that the warning is intended 
ei ther for the person in pain, or for others, or for both the person 
in pain and others (Ta'lXq, 465: 14-17). MSnkdîm considers that God 
compensates for th is pain with a quantity of compensation that i s so 
great that if somebody were given the choice between soundness and 
this pain with i t s compensation, he would choose the pain (Tacllq, 
312: 15-313: 7 and TaclSq, 494: 10-12). 
Ibn Mattawayh agrees with cAbd al-Gabbar that the f i rs t reason 
why i t is good that God inf l ic ts i l lnesses is that , by giving a 
warning ll^tibSr), God does what is obligatory (.t/Sglb) for Him with 
respect to the taklSf. The second reason is the compensation given 
for this pain Uiagmû" III, fol. 14a and b). However, with respect to 
the question of why God inf l ic ts pain on adults without their 
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consent, Ibn Mattawayh disagrees with cAbd al-Gabbfir. Ibn Mattawayh 
believes that those who are mukallaf have given God some kind of 
s i lent permission to inf l ict pain on them. He says that if they know 
God, they also know that God will certainly compensate them for the 
pain He inf l ic ts on them, and that He will make a compensation so 
great that each of them would choose to bear the pain for i t . In Ibn 
Mattawayh's view this amounts to giving permission to God to infl ict 
pain lMagmuc III , fol. 2Sa). However, i t should be noticed that what 
Ibn Mattawayh says can only apply to someone who believes that God 
compensates for i l lnesses . I t does not apply to people who think 
differently. 
We have seen that there are two other grounds on which the human 
Infliction of pain can be good: these are the averting of a greater 
harm and the assumption that the pain involves a profit or averts a 
harm. This leads to the question of whether pain inflicted by God can 
be good because i t aver ts a greater harm, or because i t is done on 
the assumption that i t involves a profit or averts a harm. cAbd a l -
èabbar rejects this . He points out that God's omniscience implies that 
assumption (çann) i s impossible for Him. It is therefore not possible 
that God's infliction of pain is good because of an assumption made 
by Him (tfiignf XIII, 356: 10-11 and 369: 1-6). 
cAbd al-GabbSr also does not consider i t possible that God's 
infliction of pain is good because a harm is averted by i t . He argues 
that this would be in conflict with God's omnipotence. Suppose that 
the harm to be averted by God's infliction of pain comes from God: i t 
would be bad if God averted this harm by a second harm because in 
that case both harms are done by the same person. In our world I t i s 
not considered good if a person inf l ic ts a harm in order to avert a 
harm to be inflicted by himself. This also applies to God Œufrnî XIII, 
369: 11-15). 
If the harm to be averted comes from someone other than God, 
cAbd al-Gabbfir explains that there are two possibi l i t ies : the harm to 
be averted is ei ther good or bad. If the harm is good, i t need not be 
averted. If the harm is bad, there are again two possibi l i t ies : the 
pain is done by a mukallaf or i t is done by a non-jnuAaiJaf. If the 
harm is done by a mukallaf, =Abd al-Gabbfir thinks that God should not 
intervene and prevent this mukallaf from inflicting the harm because, 
as a mukallaf, he has freedom of choice iMuftnl XIII, 370: 6-8). He 
must be given the choice between doing an act and not doing i t , even 
if his choice implies that he will be punished for i t . However, a non-
mukallaf does not need freedom of choice. God could prevent him from 
inflicting harm because He has the power to prevent every living 
being from doing any act: there is no need for God to inflict pain in 
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order to achieve th is . This means that God does not Inflict pain in 
order to avert a harm (.Mugnl XIII, 370: 1-6). 
Mankdîm and Ibn Mattawayh agree with ^Abd al-ôabb&r that the reason 
why pain inflicted by God i s good cannot be that by the infliction of 
this pain another harm is averted (Га-"1Го, 485: 12-4-86: 3, MagmO10 III , 
fols. 19a-21a). They do not discuss the possibility that the 
infliction of pain is good because of an assumption made by God, but 
there is no reason to think that they would not agree with 'Abd al-
éabbar that assumption is impossible for God. 
Compensation for Human Infliction of Pain 
cAbd al-öabbär believes that pain inflicted by God is compensated for 
by Him. But what about pain inflicted by humans or animals? In cAbd 
al-ôabbâr's opinion jus t ice must be done to whoever has suffered 
damage, whether this damage concerns his possessions or his body. He 
therefore thinks that , except for pain that is deserved and pain that 
involves a greater profit or averts a greater harm, each pain must be 
compensated for. The question i s , who must make this compensation. 
The manner of compensation will be discussed l a t e r 2 6 . 
In cAbd al-öabbSr's opinion living beings are accountable for 
harm that is done on their in i t i a t ive , regardless of whether this 
harm is inflicted intentionally or by accident, or whether i t i s done 
by a living being that does not know that doing harm is bad. This 
means that both тика 11af and non-mukallaf must compensate for the 
pain they inf l ict on another living being, except for pain that i s not 
inflicted on their in i t ia t ive (Mu¿nl XIII, 483: 3-5). The in i t ia t ive to 
Inflict pain determines who compensates. This implies that living 
beings must not only compensate for pain that they themselves infl ict 
on someone else , but also for pain that is inflicted by others on 
their in i t i a t ive . If someone forces someone else to infl ict pain on a 
third person, he, and not the person who actually inflicted the pain, 
must compensate this third person (Mu¿nl XIII, 492: 19-493: 1). This 
also implies that if a human being inf l ic ts pain on someone else with 
the permission or on the command of God, God is considered to have 
taken the in i t ia t ive and God will therefore compensate the suffering 
person for his pain íMu¿n! XIII, 493: 1-2). cAbd al-ôabbfir's arguments 
for this opinion will be discussed l a t e r 2 7 . 
How this i s to be applied is explained by cAbd al-6abbar using 
the example of an imSm who wrongly condemns someone to be punished 
with a iiadd punishment. In cAbd al-öabbär's opinion justice must be 
done to the wrongly condemned person. He must be compensated for his 
168 CHAPTER SIX 
undeserved pain, but by whom? Several persons are involved in a fyadd 
punishment. Abd al-6abbSr f i r s t pays attention to the executioner who 
carries out the sentence. In his opinion the executioner does not 
have to compensate for the pain he inflicted on the wrongly 
condemned person because he acts on the orders of the im&m. cAbd a l -
Gabbär considers that infl ict ing a fradd punishment is an act of 
obedience to God and he therefore thinks that the executioner did not 
act wrongly in obeying the imam carrying out the sentence. In his 
opinion, i t is the imam who must compensate the wrongly condemned 
person for his pain, supposing he made the mistake. If the mistake 
was not made by the imam but by the witnesses, they must compensate 
the wrongly condemned person for his pain (Mugnl XIII, 493: 6-10). 
The Quantity of Human Compensation 
In cAbd al-GabbSr's opinion, someone who, on his own in i t ia t ive , 
infl icts pain on another living being must compensate him with a 
compensation equal to the quantity of pain. To defend his opinion, he 
uses the example of s teal ing a garment. Someone who has stolen 
someone else 's garment must return i t to him. If this is impossible, 
he has to give him a compensation that is equal to the value the 
garment (Mu¿nl XIII, 484: 8-7). If a human being does an injustice to 
someone else, infl ict ing pain on him, his act i s comparable to the act 
of someone who s tea l s a garment. Both acts are bad and involve harm 
to the person they are done to. cAbd al-ôabbfir concludes from this 
that compensation for human infliction of pain must be equal to the 
pain. This implies that this compensation is considerably less than 
the compensation given by God for i l lnesses and other pain inflicted 
by Him (Mu#nJ XIII, 453: 19-454: 4). The reason for this is that the 
human compensation Is given as a res t i tu t ion for harm whereas God's 
compensation is given in order to make His infliction of pain a good 
act and is so great that each would choose to bear the pain for i t . 
cAbd al-ôabbfir emphasizes that giving compensation is not a 
punishment', i t i s not a fine. Compensation must be given because 
Justice must be done to someone who is harmed. A thief who 
compensates for that which he has stolen will s t i l l be punished for 
his offence, if not in this world, then In the hereafter. One should 
not think that this means that he is punished twice: f i rs t by the 
compensation that he must pay to his victim and, secondly, by a 
punishment in hel l . The compensation is not meant to be a punishment. 
Similarly, the punishment of a criminal does not abolish his 
obligation to compensate for the pain, nor is the quantity of the 
compensation reduced by the punishment. =Abd al-oabbär also rejects 
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the suggest ion that punishment by God implies that He w i l l 
compensate for the pain inf l i c ted by the criminal to be punished. He 
argues that God does not compensate for bad a c t s . Yet, the person on 
whom the pain i s in f l i c ted i s en t i t l ed to be compensated for his 
pain. This means that the criminal must compensate him (Mu£nl XIII, 
525: 3 - 5 , and 558: 9 -11 ) . 
Paying blood-money (.diya) i s one way in which murder and bodily 
injury are compensated for in th i s world. Can paying blood-money for 
murder take the place of compensation for the pain suffered by the 
victim? cAbd al-Gabbar's opinion i s that paying blood-money to the 
family of the victim does not exempt the murderer from his 
obligation to compensate h is dead victim for h is pain. As he i s dead, 
the victim cannot prof i t from money which i s paid in th i s world. Yet, 
he must be compensated for the harm done to him <MugnI XIII, 497: 
10-12 and 497: 17-19) . However, with respect to bodily injuries , ^Abd 
al-GabbSr thinks that paying blood-money can compensate for the 
harm, but only i f the required quantity of blood-money i s known, for 
instance, from the divine reve lat ion (Mugnl XIII, 498: 1-14). If the 
quantity of blood-money i s not known, the paying of compensation 
must be done in the manner to be described la ter . 
Pain that i s not in f l i c ted intent ional ly must a l so be 
compensated for. In the example of the man who was wrongly condemned 
to be punished, cAbd al-Gabbär speaks of a mistake (kafa1) by the 
imam or the w i tnes se s . His use of the term "mistake" indicates that 
the imam did not intent ional ly pass a wrong sentence, nor did the 
wi tnesses intent ional ly give wrong declarations. Yet, cAbd al-ôabbâr 
takes into consideration that Just ice must be done to the person who 
suf fers the pain: he must be compensated for h is pain, even if i t i s 
inf l ic ted in a s t a t e of unawareness, by mistake, or in s l eep üfu£nl 
XIII, 494: 19-495: 2) . 
cAbd al-öabbSr a s s e r t s that for the obl igat ion to compensate 
for pain to e x i s t , i t i s not necessary that a person must know that 
pain must be compensated for. This means that those who do not know 
this , such as children, insane people and animals, must a l s o 
compensate for the pain they in f l i c t on other l iv ing beings. 
Regardless of who i n f l i c t s pain, jus t i ce must be done to those who 
suffer this pain, whether they are human or animal. Every l iv ing 
being must be compensated for i t s pain, whether or not i t knows that 
i t i s e n t i t l e d to compensation. As for the quantity of compensation 
that must be given, i t a lso makes no difference whether the pain i s 
inf l ic ted by an adult of sound mind or by a l iving being that does 
not possess mental f acu l t i e s : in both cases the compensation i s equal 
to the quantity of pain Œugnï XIII, 461: 2 -7 ) . 
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Enabling a Living Being to Inflict Pain 
<Abd al-Gabber's opinion that animals must also compensate for pain 
they inflict on other living beings raises questions with respect to 
carnivorous animals. One might object to eAbd al-Gabbar's opinion by 
saying that they cannot help inflicting pain on other living beings 
because God has given them sharp claws and teeth and thus enabled 
them to inflict pain: i t i s therefore God who should compensate for 
the pain they inflict on other living beings. cAbd al-SabbSr rejects 
this suggestion. He argues that enabling (tamklrì) someone to inflict 
pain does not lead to an obligation to compensate for the pain he 
inflicts. 
To explain this, ^Abd al-ôabbâr gives an example from human 
experience: somebody provides someone else with a knife to slaughter 
sheep but, instead, he uses the knife to kill somebody. This does not 
imply that the man who provided the knife must compensate for the 
murder. On the contrary, i t i s the murderer who has to compensate for 
it . cAbd al-ôabbâr adds that the idea that one must compensate for 
enabling someone else to do a particular act would imply that the 
ironsmiths and the polishers have to compensate for all the murders 
and pain inflicted by the knives and swords produced by them. It i s 
clear that this is not right, hence one does not have to compensate 
for enabling someone to do harm. Further, cAbd al-ôabbâr argues that 
if this holds for the human world, it must also hold for the divine 
world, which leads to the conclusion that God does not have to 
compensate for enabling living beings to inflict pain on other living 
beings (MugnS XIII, 466: 8-16). 
Some people might object that because of His omniscience, God 
knows that when He enables a living being to harm other living 
beings, this living being will do that what it has been enabled to do 
and harm some other living being. They think, therefore, that God 
must compensate for the harm inflicted by this living being if He 
does not intervene and prevent it from doing harm (Mugnl XIII, 468: 
4-6). cAbd al-ôabbâr does not agree with them. He argues that 
enabling does not mean that God approves of the act of the living 
being. There is a difference between enabling (tamklri) and giving 
permission Cibane)318. Just because a person is enabled to inflict pain 
does not mean that he is given permission to do so, as this would 
imply approving of someone being harmed. If God gives permission, He 
will compensate for the harm He permits. As we will see later, Abd 
al-ôabbâr believes that the person who permits (and thus approves 
of) pain being inflicted is the one who takes the initiative in this 
infliction of pain, which implies that he must compensate for i t . 
cAbd al-ôabbâr also explains that enabling is not the same 
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thing as forcing. Forcing someone to do something l imi ts his freedom 
of act ion, whereas enabling does not have th i s e f f e c t . Someone who i s 
enabled to i n f l i c t pain i s free to choose between doing and not doing 
i t . cAbd al-GabbSr explains that for the same reason, Invoking a 
desire in someone i s not the same as forcing him. Invoking a des i re 
means motivating someone to perform a particular act . Motivating does 
not l imit freedom of act ion. cAbd al-GabbSr therefore thinks that one 
who i n s t i g a t e s someone e l s e to Inf l ic t pain does not have to 
compensate for th i s pain, assuming that the ins t iga t ion does not 
reach the point of constraint (Mu¿nS XIII, 476: 2 -6 ) . 
The way in which carnivorous animals are created by God, with 
claws, sharp teeth , and a des ire to eat meat i s considered by ':Abd 
al-Gabb§r as enabling and ins t igat ing them to i n f l i c t pain, but not 
as forcing them to do so . He therefore thinks that God does not have 
to compensate for pain in f l i c ted by these animals (Mu¿ní XIII, 475: 
4-476: 2). In h i s opinion, these animals are free to choose between 
in f l i c t ing pain and not i n f l i c t i n g i t . This implies that i f an animal, 
whether i t i s carnivorous or not, hurts another l iv ing being, i t must 
be considered as act ing of i t s own free wi l l (.ijctiyarì and not under 
constraint . This implies that the animal must compensate for the pain 
(WitfnlXIII, 475: 14-17 and 476: 2-20) . 
MSnkdïm does not d i scuss the question of enabling the i n f l i c t i o n of 
pain, but he agrees with cAbd al-ôabbâr that a predatory animal 
isab^ must compensate for hurting other l iv ing beings <.TaclIq, 503: 
10-14). As for Ibn Mattawayh, he agrees with cAbd al-Óabbar that God 
does not have to compensate for enabling l iv ing beings to harm other 
l iv ing beings. He argues that i f God had to compensate for crimes, 
crime would become a good act and the quantity of compensation for 
crime would be comparable to the quantity of compensation given by 
God for i l l n e s s e s . This would lead to the conclusion that i t i s bad 
to prevent a criminal from committing a crime because h is victim 
would miss a great quantity of compensation from God (.Ma¿müc III, 
fol . 41Ь)=Э. 
Allthough Ibn Mattawayh agrees with cAbd al-öabbfir that God 
does not compensate for pain inf l ic ted by predatory animals, he g i v e s 
one exception to th i s rule . He be l ieves that God compensates for pain 
inf l i c ted by predatory birds used for hawking, as long as the hawking 
i s done in the way permitted by God. He argues that God has given 
His permission for th i s and the pain inf l i c ted by these birds i s 
therefore compensated for by Him. If the hawking i s not done in the 
manner permitted by God, then e i ther the bird or the hawker must 
compensate for i t , depending on the circumstances lMo¿mQ" III, fo l . 
44a). 
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Permission or Commend to Inflict Pain 
God's command or permission ilbëfra) to humans to infl ict a part icular 
pain on other living beings implies that inflicting this pain is a 
good act as God does not give a command or give permission to do 
something bad. eAbd al-ôabb&Y explains that what makes infl ict ing 
pain with God's permission a good act is that the compensation is 
given by God. Without divine compensation the act would be bad, in 
spite of the permission given (MugnS XIII, 456: 1 0 - H P ° . According to 
eAbd al-öabbär, the compensation given by God for pain inflicted by 
humans with His permission or on His command is on a par with the 
compensation for pain inflicted by Himself. This means that God 
compensates generously for this pain (Mugnï XIII, 452: 16-17). 
With respect to pain that is inflicted on the assumption that i t 
will yield a profi t , permission or a command given by God is also 
taken into consideration if the profit fa i ls to eventuate. In that 
case, just ice requires that the living being on whom this pain was 
inflicted must s t i l l be compensated for his pain. cAbd al-Gabbär 
gives the example of a father who disciplines his son on the 
assumption that i t will lead to a profit for the son. If i t turns out 
that the desired profit does not happen, who will compensate the son 
for his pain: God or the father? cAbd al-ôabbSr believes that God 
will compensate the son, because He has commanded fathers to 
discipline their sons. However, if the expected profit resu l t s , no 
compensation is needed (MugnI XIII, 403: 16-404: 1 and 462: 1-17). 
Another case of inflicting pain by divine permission is the 
slaughtering of ca t t l e . In Qur'an 5: 3 i t is said that the eating of 
al l ca t t l e (ЬапІтаУ is permitted, with these exceptions: carrion, 
swine, animals that have been dedicated to a god other than God, 
animals that have been strangled, beaten down, fallen to their deaths 
or been gored, animals that have been eaten by savage animals 
(except those that were slaughtered by Muslims), animals that have 
been sacrificed to idols, and animals that have been used for 
divination. From this i t can be concluded that slaughtering c a t t l e is 
permitted by God. This means that i t is a good act : God does not give 
permission for bad acts lMu¿nS VI/1, 64: 11-13). 
^Abd al-ôabbSr explains that slaughtering cat t le i s good 
because of the divine compensation given to the slaughtered animals. 
He argues that the pain these animals suffer cannot be a deserved 
punishment: animals cannot deserve punishment as God has not imposed 
any obligations on them. Nor can the slaughtering be meant to avert a 
greater harm to the ca t t le , since what could be a greater harm for 
them than slaughter? It must be concluded from this that slaughter 
is good because the ca t t l e are given a divine compensation. cAbd a l -
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Gabbär thinks that with respect to the ca t t le God's permission to 
slaughter them can be equated with God's imposition of obligations on 
humans. God's permission to slaughter ca t t le offers ca t t le the 
possibili ty to acquire divine compensation, comparable with the 
imposition of obligations which offers humans the possibi l i ty to 
deserve a reward itawSb) from God (.Mugnï XIII, 459: 9-11). *=Abd a l -
òabbSr asser t s that God's permission to slaughter ca t t le is good 
because i t is a luff for the slaughterer himself and for others who 
are mukallaf <Mu¿nI XIII, 457: 13-16 and 458: 16-459: 3). The 
slaughter contains a warning (.i^tibär) for them (.MugnS XIII, 458: 4-
6). He does not explain this any further but probably means that i t 
warns people only to slaughter those cat t le which God has given 
permission to slaughter. It warns them to obey God and to fulfi l the 
obligations imposed on them. 
<:Abd al-GabbSr asser ts that God does not compensate for the 
i l legal slaughter of ca t t le . This implies that God does not 
compensate for slaughtering stolen ca t t l e . In that case, the 
slaughterer must compensate the ca t t le for being slaughtered and, in 
addition, he must also compensate the owner of the cat t le for the 
loss of his ca t t l e . Nor does God compensate for slaughtering ca t t l e 
in a way prohibited by Him. A slaughterer who slaughters in в 
prohibited way performs a bad act and he himself must therefore 
compensate the cat t le for being slaughtered <.Mu¿nI XIII, 550: 5-7). Of 
course, this means that ca t t le slaughtered in a prohibited way gets 
less compensation than cat t le slaughtered in a permitted way. This 
seems to be unfair with respect to the ca t t l e : the ca t t le cannot help 
being slaughtered in a prohibited way. However, we should realize 
that according to cAbd al-öabbär's way of thinking the opportunity 
for ca t t l e to earn a generous compensation by being slaughtered in a 
permitted way can be equated with the opportunity to earn a 
compensation for i l lnesses. Only those living beings on whom God 
imposes i l lnesses can acquire compensation for those i l lnesses : 
healthy living beings are not given this opportunity. 
In this way =Abd al-Gabbär jus t i f ies the slaughter of ca t t l e . 
However, in his time there were people who opposed the slaughter of 
ca t t le . cAbd al-6abbSr reports that they said: "If ca t t le could speak 
and understand things, they would say: "What is the wrong that I have 
done and what i s the crime that I have committed? What enmity is 
there between you and me? Why do you want me to die, although no 
harm has been done to you? Why do you satisfy your th i r s t for 
revenge (galli) on me, although I have not committed a crime against 
you?·" ÍMugnl XIII, 460: 3-6). cAbd al-ÖabbSr refers to a book on this 
subject called al-Navb 'ale '1-bahS'im (The lamentation on the 
animals)31 (Mugni XIII, 459: 4). He reports that in this book i t i s 
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said that i t cannot have been revealed that God permits to slaughter 
ca t t le : the transmit ters iruwSt) must have made a mistake, since i t 
is more likely that they made a mistake than that God (al-yakim) i s 
wrong (Mugnl XIII, 460: 12-13). cAbd al-öabbSr comments that this is 
a misconception (.¿ahi). 
cAbd al-oabbär does not explicitly discuss killing animals other 
than ca t t l e . It i s likely that he thinks that killing other animals i s 
bad unless i t is permitted by God3·2. He probably knew that in hadlt 
l i t e ra tu re i t is said that in the holy terr i tory of Mecca some sor t s 
of animals, such as mice, scorpions and crows, must be killed. On the 
other hand, the killing of certain other so r t s of animals, such as 
honeybees, ants , frogs and swallows, is prohibited3 3 . However, 
opinions differ on this subject. 
With respect to the infliction of pain that is permitted by God, 
Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh agree with cAbd al-oabbär. They, too, 
believe that God compensates for pain He has permitted humans to 
inflict (Ta^lSq, 502: 13-16 and MagmO' III, fol. 40a and b). 
Self-inflicted Pain 
If we ourselves destroy our belongings, we get no compensation for 
this loss. cAbd al-oabbär believes that, similarly, we are not 
compensated for se l f - inf l ic ted pain. He considers that the self-
infliction of pain that does not involve a greater profit or avert a 
greater harm means doing an injustice (culm) to oneself and an 
injustice is compensated for only if i t is done to someone else. To 
explain th is , cAbd al-ôabbâr compares self-compensation with self-
praise. We do not praise ourselves for acting well towards ourselves 
and, similarly, we do not compensate ourselves for doing injustice to 
ourselves Ulugnl XIII, 489: 3-15). 
It is evident that self- infl icted pain is mostly done for the 
purpose of obtaining a profit or averting a harm. cAbd al-fiabbSr 
asser t s that pain that leads to a greater profit need not be 
compensated for, whether i t i s done to oneself or to someone else. 
The profit that i s acquired, or will be acquired, replaces the 
compensation Œugnî XIII, 490: 5-6). cAbd al-ÔabbSr considers that 
exerting oneself in order to fulfil the obligations of the takllf i s a 
form of self- inf l ic ted pain. This pain need not be compensated for 
because a reward is given for i t (Mugnl XIII, 490: 3-4). 
However, if someone inf l ic ts pain on himself in order to avert a 
harm, he does not obtain a profit that can take the place of 
compensation. Will he be compensated for this self-infl icted pain? 
cAbd al-oabbär answers this question in the affirmative. He thinks 
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that in that case compensation must be given by the person who 
threatened the other person with harm, since this person forced the 
other person to inflict pain on himself. It i s not only humans or 
animals that can threaten other living beings with harm: it is also 
possible that a threat of harm comes from God. cAbd al-öabbar gives 
the example of someone who is very hungry and exerts himself trying 
to s t i l l his hunger and to avert starvation. cAbd al-öabbär believes 
that God compensates this person for his exertion, which is a form of 
self-inflicted pain. By making him hungry, God forced this person to 
inflict pain on himself (Mugnl XIII, 490: 7-9). However, the 
compensation implies that God will not reward this person for his 
exertion: deserving a reward presupposes freedom of choice, which is 
impossible if one acts under constraint (Mugnl XIII, 558: 5-9). 
It is possible that self-inflicted pain is the result of being 
threatened by a creature, for instance, a lion. cAbd al-öabbär thinks 
that If someone sees a lion in his way and hurts himself taking 
flight through a thorny bush, the lion must compensate him for the 
pain caused by the thorns because the lion forced him to act in this 
way (Mugnl XIII, 490: 11-12). cAbd al-öabbar emphasizes that this 
only applies to cases of real constraint. If the person In question is 
able to avert the harm without pain, and yet averts it by inflicting 
pain on himself, he harms himself unnecessarily. This is seen as pain 
for which the fleeing person himself took the intitiative and he 
therefore Is not compensated for i t , either by the lion or by anyone 
else (Mugnl XIII, 490: 17-491: 1). 
We have seen that cAbd al-öabbar considers it good that a 
person infl icts pain on himself on the assumption (janri) that i t will 
yield him a profit in the future. However, the expected profit may 
not eventuate. cAbd al-öabbSr is convinced that even In that case the 
Infliction of pain is good. Even if the expected profit does not 
eventuate, the pain involves a profit: at the moment that someone 
chooses to Inflict pain on himself In order to obtain a profit he 
feels gladness about the expected profit; this gladness may be 
greater than the pain. In that case, the harm need not be compensated 
for (JVi^iXIII, 491: 3-5). 
But what if the gladness Is less than the harm? cAbd al-öabbSr 
believes that in that case God will compensate for the self- infl icted 
pain (Mugnl XIII, 491: 5-8). He argues that God made the person in 
question believe that it was good to harm himself In order to obtain 
a future profit. cAbd al-ÖabbSr thinks that this self-inflicted pain 
can be equated with self-inflicted pain for which God has given 
permission. In both cases one chooses to inflict the pain because one 
is convinced that i t Is good to do so. However, *=Abd al-öabbar 
emphasizes that one Is not compensated for this pain If the self-
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infliction was unnecessary and the expected profit could heve been 
obtained in another way (.MugnS XIII, 491: 10-11). This is comparable 
to his opinion that one is not compensated for inflicting pain on 
oneself to avert a harm which could have been averted in another 
way3". In both cases the self- infl ict ion is unnecessary and is not 
compensated for. 
cAbd al-öabbär's solution, however, leaves some questions 
unanswered. He does not explain why he thinks i t i s God who made 
this person believe that i t i s good to infl ict pain on himself. Nor 
does he explain why making a person believe that he should do 
something is equal to giving him permission to do this and not equal 
to, for instance, inst igat ing him to do th is . We have seen that , in 
his opinion, an inst igator need not compensate for pain inflicted at 
his inst igat ion3*, 
Mânkdïm mentions suicide, cleaving one's own skull or cutting off 
one's own limbs as examples of injustices that one can do to oneself. 
He believes that someone who does such a thing is not compensated 
for his pain by God or by anyone else (.Ta^llq, 501: 7-9). However, he 
does not explain why he views the examples mentioned as injustices. 
We have seen that i t is good to inflict pain on oneself if this 
involves a greater profi t , or averts a greater harm, or if i t is 
assumed to lead to a greater profit or to avert a greater harm. We 
have seen that *=Abd al-öabbfir therefore thinks i t good to have a 
gangrenous limb amputated in order to prevent the gangrene affecting 
other par ts of the body. Similarly, self-amputation must be a good 
act if i t i s done for this reason. Mânkdïm does not take this into 
consideration. 
Yet, Mânkdïm admits that the self- inf l ict ion of pain can be 
good. As an example of such pain he mentions drinking an unpleasant 
medicine in order to avert pain inflicted by God. He asser t s that this 
is good even if the pain is not averted and there is no profit at a l l 
that outweighs i t . Mânkdïm believes that in that case God will 
compensate this person for the pain of drinking the unpleasant 
medicine because He forced him to do so (Ta'llq, 501: 6-11). From 
this i t can be concluded that MSnkdïm considers that a person who is 
i l l i s forced to seek a cure. Mânkdïm gives yet another example of 
self- inf l ic ted pain: someone drinks an unpleasant medicine in order to 
gain more appeti te and weight. He believes that if the expected 
resul t does not eventuate, neither God nor anyone else will 
compensate this person for his pain (drinking the medicine) because 
there was no need to drink the medicine (Tacllq, 501: 11-14-). He does 
not explain th is , but i t is likely that he considers this to be an 
unnessary sel f - inf l ic t ion of pain. 
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Ibn Mattawayh does not discuss self-inflicted pain whose 
expected profit does not eventuate, but he does discuss self-
inflicted pain by which harm is averted. He agrees with cAbd al-
öabbär that someone who inflicts pain on himself while under 
constraint i s compensated for his pain by the person or animal who 
forced him to do so <.Magmüc III, fol. 40b). 
Pain Inflicted on Someone Else in Self-Defence 
We have seen 3 6 that cAbd al-òabbSr considers that pain inflicted by 
someone on an attacker to defend himself against the attack is equal 
to pain that the attacker inflicts on himself. This means that the 
attacker is not compensated by the defender, nor by anyone else, for 
his pain because it is considered to be unnecessary self-infliction 
of pain (.MugnS XIII, 493: 3-6 and 465: 5-10). 
Mankdlm does not discuss this question, but Ibn Mattawayh gives two 
opinions on i t . One of them is the same as cAbd al-öabbSr's. The 
other opinion may be his own solution to this problem. He thinks it 
possible that the attacker is compensated by God for his pain, 
supposing that God obliges or forces the defender to avert the attack 
and that the only way to do this is by inflicting pain on the 
attacker. In Ibn Mattawayh's opinion, God compensates for the pain 
inflicted on the attacker because He obliged or forced the defender 
to perform this act of self-defence Œagmû* III, fol. 22b). Ibn 
Mattawayh does not explain this further. Why does he think that the 
defender acts under God's constraint? Does not the attacker, even if 
i t is a predatory animal, act of his own free will, so that he, and 
not God, forces the defender to defend himself? 
Exposing Someone Else to Harm 
cAbd al-GabbSr considers coldness, fire, and other natural phenomena 
to be acts of God. This means that If somebody exposes a child to 
the cold and the child dies, in his opinion the death of the child is 
an act of God. Yet, cAbd al-6abbSr believes that the person who 
exposes a child to the cold, and not God, must compensate the child 
for i t s pain. He argues that coldness belongs to those acts of God 
that always happen in the same way. The person who exposes the child 
to the cold therefore knows that the normal course of events 
(сЗааУ*7 is that this child will suffer or even die. Because he knows 
this, it is as if he himself inflicts the pain and therefore he must 
compensate the child iMuffnl XIII, 450: 4-11). This principle applies 
to all acts of God that always happen in the same way, according to 
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the normal course of events: someone who exposes someone else to 
such an act must compensate him If he Is harmed. 
This principle is also applied by cAbd al-6abbfir with respect to 
the pain that is the resu l t of a scorpion s t ing. We have seen 3 e that 
in his view only the prick of the sting is the scorpion's act but the 
normal course of events i s that pain produced by God is added to the 
pain of the s t ing . As the additional pain is something that belongs 
to the acts of God that always happen in the same way, «-Abd a l -
èabbâr thinks that the scorpion must compensate for the to ta l 
quantity of pain, included the additional pain from God. When pricking 
someone, the scorpion exposes this person to an act of God and 
therefore i t must compensate for the additional pain as well (Mu¿ní 
XIII, 450: 14-16). 'Abd al-ÖabbSr comments that in the case that the 
additional pain from God is more than is normal, God compensates for 
the extra quantity of additional pain (.MugnS XIII, 450: 16-16 and 500: 
1-3). 
MSnkdlm does not discuss the question of exposing someone else to 
harm. As for Ibn Mattawayh, he agrees with *=Abd al-öabbSr that a 
person who exposes someone else to acts of God that always happen in 
the same way must compensate for pain that is the resul t of this 
exposure (Magmü* III , fols. 44a, 47a). He also discusses the question 
of the pain that is the resul t of being stung by a scorpion. He 
describes cAbd al-ôabbâr's opinion in this question, but not clearly 
(.Magmu* III , fol. 44b). For anyone who does not know cAbd al-öabb&r's 
own explanation in the Mu¿nl, i t is difficult to grasp what Ibn 
Mattawayh means. According to him, cAbd al-öabbSr says that the 
scorpion must compensate for pain that is "necessarily caused" by his 
act; as for the additional pain, God compensates for i t because he is 
considered to have taken the in i t ia t ive . I t is only the Mugnl that 
makes clear that by the "necessarily caused" pain Ibn Mattawayh 
probably means pain that normally comes into existence If someone is 
stung by a scorpion which includes the pain of the prick and the 
normal additional pain from God; by the additional pain Init iated by 
God he probably means abnormal additional pain from God. 
Sorrow (ôamm) 
We have seen3* that by "harm" cAbd al-óabbSr understands both pain 
and sorrow (gammi. In his opinion, a person In sorrow (mugtamm') is 
someone who knows or assumes that harm happens or will happen to 
him Œugnl IV, 15: 5-6). Sorrow is the knowledge or assumption that 
harm has happened or will happen. Sorrow being knowledge or 
assumption Implies that, according to cAbd al-öabbSr, humans can 
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produce sorrow In themselves, for Instance, by acquiring knowledge 
about harm that has happened to them, but sorrow can also be 
produced In them by God. However, regardless of who produces a 
particular sorrow, what Is taken Into consideration Is who produces 
that which gives cause for this sorrow. 
If someone's father or son dies, or If someone loses something 
which he used to take advantage of, he feels sorrow about this loss. 
cAbd al-öabbär considers that such things as the death of living 
beings or the destruction of one's possesions by a flood, a fire or 
other natural disasters are acts of God. He therefore equates sorrow 
about such losses with illnesses: in both cases people suffer as a 
result of God's action. This leads cAbd al-öabbär to conclude that 
God compensates his creatures for their sorrow about misfortunes 
that are the result of divine acts, Just as He compensates them for 
their i l lnesses <Mu¿nI XIII, 137: 4-8). 
To explain this, °Abd al-öabbär gives the example of the death 
of α child. He asserts that both the child and i t s father are entitled 
to compensation from God. The child i s compensated for the pain it 
suffers when dying and the father for his sorrow about the loss of 
his child. eAbd al-öabbär emphasizes that the sorrow felt by the 
father Is not produced by God, but it i s an act of the heart-*0 
produced by the father himself: i t is the knowledge that his son has 
died. However, he would not have had this knowledge if God had not 
made the child die. His sorrow is the result of God's action and can 
therefore be equated with physical pain inflicted by God. God 
therefore compensates the father for his sorrow llfugnS XIII, 437: 11-
17, 438: З ^ У " . 
In the above case, the father's sorrow is produced by himself, 
but sorrow can also be produced In someone by God. cAbd al-öabbär 
believes that if a child's father dies, some of the child's sorrow 
about this loss i s Intuitive knowledge ("vílrn çfarurî) produced in the 
child by God. God will compensate the child for this sorrow: if He 
compensates for sorrow produced humanly, He certainly also 
compensates for divinely-produced sorrow íMu¿n! XIII, 438: 6-8). 
eAbd al-öabbär believes that the quantity of compensation that 
God gives for sorrow is commensurate with the quantity of sorrow 
rather than commensurate with the cause of the sorrow. People differ 
from each other with respect to the sorrow they feel. Adults may feel 
more sorrow than children, and one adult may feel more sorrow than 
another. cAbd al-öabbär explains this, using the example of a miser 
(bak ID. A miser feels more sorrow about losing one of his 
possessions than a generous person (gawSd). As a result, the miser 
gets more compensation for losing something than a generous person 
who loses the same thing because the miser feels more sorrow. One 
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may think that compensation should be commensurate with the value of 
the thing that is lost and think i t unfair that the miser gets more 
compensation. Nevertheless, cAbd al-GabbSr believes that God 
compensates the miser for a l l of his sorrow, however great i t may be. 
He argues that God made the miser the way he i s . I t is therefore due 
to an act of God that the miser feels more sorrow than the generous 
person IMugnlXm, 438: 13-17). 
Probably, cAbd al-Gabbär reasons that the miser has no choice 
with respect to the sorrow he feels: he cannot choose to feel less 
sorrow. We may observe that cAbd al-GabbSr thinks differently about 
predatory animals. In his opinion, God does not compensate for pain 
inflicted by them, although He mode them as they are, arguing that 
animals can choose their ac ts . Perhaps cAbd al-GabbSr takes into 
consideration that predatory animals, although they must eat other 
living beings, are free to choose how to ki l l these living beings: in 
a painless way or with great pains. 
cAbd al-Gabbär asse r t s that God does not compensate for sorrow 
that is not the resu l t of a divine act. For instance, if somebody 
feels sorrow despite the fact that none of his loved ones has died, 
God will not compensate him for his sorrow. cAbd al-ôabbnr explains 
that if somebody feels sorrow without reason (min ¿ayr sebab), his 
sorrow is considered as being produced on his own in i t ia t ive . cAbd 
al-Gabbâr equates this form of sorrow - he may be thinking of 
depression or melancholy - with self-infl icted pain and asser t s that 
a person is not compensated for i t unless i t is produced by divine 
permission fibáTia)42 Œugnï XIII, 438: 19-439: 4). He does not clarify 
what kind of sorrow he means by "sorrow produced by divine 
permission". 
cAbd al-GabbSr believes that if there is a reason for sorrow 
but people do not feel sorrow, God does not compensate them. We have 
seen that in his opinion, God does not compensate for the loss of 
possessions but rather for the sorrow about the loss. This implies 
that if there is no sorrow, no compensation will be given. For 
example, if a person's property is destroyed by fire without his 
knowing, for instance because he died before someone could te l l him 
about the loss, he is not compensated for this by God, although the 
fire i s an act of God. This is because this person did not feel 
sorrow. To clarify th is , cAbd al-öabbär equates this sorrow with 
physical pain that is not fel t by a person, although something is 
done to him that should hurt him. This person is not compensated for 
what has been done to him, because there is no pain. The same applies 
to sorrow that does not take place (Mufinî XIII, 439: 5-16). 
But should God not compensate for the loss of the property that 
is destroyed by fire without his owner knowing i t? cAbd al-öabbSr 
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does not think so. He argues that no harm has been done to this 
person: being dead he is no longer able to profit from his property. 
However, God's purpose when destroying the property of this person 
cannot have been to provide the owner with a profi t . Then why has 
God destroyed his property? cAbd al-6abbSr thinks that God's 
intention must have been to benefit someone other than the owner 
<.Mu¿nI XIII, 439: 13-17). I t is likely that he means that God's act i s 
a lut f for a mukallaf other than the owner. 
Until now, the discussion has been about compensation for 
sorrow caused by acts of God but what does cAbd al-ôabbâr think 
about sorrow that i s the resul t of human acts? We have seen that 
when discussing good and bad infliction of pain, he equates physical 
pain to sorrow. For instance, he argues that i t is good to blame a 
person although he is grieved by this and concludes from this that 
the infliction of pain is good if the pain is deserved (Mu¿ní XIII, 
344: 9-14). However, discussing compensation of pain, he does not 
discuss compensation for sorrow caused humanly. It i s not clear why 
he ignores this subject. 
cAbd al-óabbfir does discuss another aspect of the loss of 
possessions by human acts : the loss of profi t . For instance, if 
someone takes something that belongs to someone e lse , he harms the 
owner because he prevents him from deriving a profit from this 
possession. cAbd al-6abbar asser t s that if a thief s tea ls something 
he must compensate the owner not only for the stolen thing i t se l f 
but also for his loss of profit (.Mugnl XIII, 555: 4-19 and 559: 7-11). 
In ^Abd al-ôabbâr's opinion, this compensation cannot be given in th is 
world because we cannot know how much compensation must be given 
for a loss of profi t . We will see later how this compensation can be 
given. 
In Abd al-ôabbâr's opinion, loss of profit must be compensated 
even if the owner does not know about the loss of his possession. He 
disagrees with Abu Häsim a l -öubb i l on this question. Abü Hasim 
argued that if the owner is not grieved or harmed by the loss , no 
Injustice is done to him and therefore no compensation is required 
iMugnl XIII, 439: 17-19). cAbd al-Ôabbfir refutes this and argues that 
taking what belongs to someone else harms the owner, regardless of 
whether he knows this or not. The occurrence of the harm is to be 
taken into consideration and not whether the harm is known. I t i s an 
injustice (^иіл) to take the possessions of a child or a madman or 
someone who is absent, even though they do not know that their 
possessions are taken. These people must be compensated for the harm, 
notwithstanding the fact that they do not know that they have been 
harmed. However, they need not be compensated for sorrow about the 
loss of their possessions: sorrow Is a kind of knowledge and If this 
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knowledge does not exist , it Is not compensated for (.Mugnl XIII, 4-40: 
4-7). 
Mfinkdlm does not discuss the question of compensation for sorrow. As 
for Ibn Mattawayh, he describes what =Abd al-ôabbSr says in al-MufrSf 
bl-'l-takllf on the subject of sorrow that does not take place 
although there Is a reason for sorrow. It appears that In this work, 
cAbd al-ôabbâr's opinion Is the same as his opinion in the MugnS: God 
does not compensate for sorrow that does not take place, even if 
there is a reason for this sorrow (Magmu* III, fol. 37a and b). Ibn 
Mattawayh also discusses Abu Haslm's opinion about taking the 
possessions of someone who does not notice i t . In al-Mufylf bl-'l-
takllf "Abd al-Sabbàr probably did not discuss this question as 
extensively as in the Mugnl, This can be concluded from Ibn 
Mattawayh's references to cAbd al-öabbär's other book(s) and to what 
he said when teaching al-MuW Ьі-4-taklSf Œagmu* III, fol. 37b) - 3 . 
Ibn Mattawayh discusses a particular case of sorrow not 
discussed by cAbd al-ôabbàr: sorrow about being slandered. Ibn 
Mattawayh thinks that somebody who slanders somebody else does not 
have to compensate the other person if he does not know he has been 
slandered. However, as soon as he knows this and feels sorrow about 
it , the slanderer must apologize to him and compensate him for his 
sorrow UlagiaQ' III, fol. 37a). It Is also possible that the slandered 
person suffers harm as a result of the slander: the ruler, hearing 
the slander, may confiscate his property. Ibn Mattawayh thinks that In 
this case the slanderer must only compensate the slandered person 
for his sorrow about being slandered and not for the harm that Is 
the result of the slander. He argues that the ruler who confiscates 
the property acts of his own free will and that it Is therefore the 
ruler who must compensate for the confiscation iMagmO' III, fol. 47b). 
4. The Administration of Compensation 
In cAbd al-öabbSr's opinion, humans and animals must compensate other 
living beings for the pain that they inflict on them, even if these 
living beings do not know that they are entitled to compensation. We 
have seen that having knowledge Is not a condition for the obligation 
to compensate for inflicted pain, nor is It a condition for deserving 
to be compensated for pain (Mugnl ΧΙΠ, 493: 17-19). However, we 
cannot know how much compensation we must make for pain. This means 
that we ourselves are not able to fulfil the obligation to compensate 
for pain ltfu¿nl XIII, 454: 8-9). Yet, as eAbd al-ÔabbSr asserts, this 
does not imply that the obligation Is inapplicable to us íMu¿nI XIII, 
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494: 2-3). How, then, can humans and animals compensate each other 
for pain? cAbd al-éabbfir believes that God will mediate in the making 
of compensation. God is omniscient and therefore knows exactly how 
much compensation must be given for each pain. He will take the 
required quantity of compensation from the person who inflicted the 
pain and transfer this to the person who suffered the pain. cAbd al-
GobbSr thinks that this mediation i s obligatory for God: after having 
enabled a wrongdoer insilai) to wrong someone else and not having 
prevented him from doing so, God is obliged to pass a verdict on this 
wrongdoer and to administer justice (intaçafa) to him and the person 
wronged (medium) by him (Mu¿nI XIII, 472: 2-3). 
cAbd al-GabbSr regards God as the manager imudabbir) of the 
affairs of his worshippers. He argues that God has an insight into 
their interests that is better than their own insight. God's 
transferring quantities of compensation from one person to another 
without their knowing this can be compared to a trustee iwall/qayyim) 
who takes care of the financial interests of a minor*·* and 
administers justice between two or more of them until their insight 
has grown and they are able to take care of their affairs themselves 
(.Mugnl XIII, 472: 5-7 and 526: 4-8). The trustee is entitled to be a 
creditor in the name of his clients and to collect for them the money 
that others owe them. He i s also entitled to pay on their behalf the 
money that they owe to others. This collecting and paying of money i s 
what cAbd al-éabbar has in mind when he speaks of God's 
administration of Justice (Mu¿nl XIII, 526: 8-9). 
Living beings can be considered to own the compensation that 
they are entitled to receive from God for i l lnesses, sorrow and pain 
that He made them suffer íMu¿n! XIII, 485: 14-486: 2). If one living 
being infl icts pain on another, he owes this living being a quantity 
of compensation equal to the quantity of inflicted pain. cAbd al-
éabbar believes that God will substract this quantity from the total 
quantity of divine compensation that the former i s entitled to 
receive and transfer i t to the quantity of divine compensation that 
the latter i s entitled to: i t i s as if God takes a quantity of 
compensation that He would have given to the former and gives it to 
the latter instead (Mugnl XIII, 530: 8-16). 
From cAbd al-ôabbar's theory it can be concluded that he 
believes that God is a sort of bookkeeper, who keeps the accounts of 
the compensation that each creature is entitled to receive from Him 
and transfers amounts from one account to the other. Every pain 
inflicted by one creature on another is compensated for. If an animal 
hurts a human, this human will be given a part of the compensation 
that the animal is entitled to receive from God <Mu¿nI XIII, 482: 6-
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13). The same applies to animals that are hurt by humans in a way 
that God has not given permission for·*61. 
The Question of the Tyrant 
cAbd al-Gabbar's theory that God transfers compensation from one 
creature to another ra i ses the question of what happens if a 
wrongdoer (çëllm) commits many acts of injustice. Is i t possible that 
a tyrannical ruler who oppresses and terrorizes people does not have 
enough compensation to be transferred to a l l those who are wronged 
by him? Answering this question, some Muctazilite masters s tar ted 
from the principle that people who are wronged must be compensated 
anyhow. They said that if these people cannot get compensation from 
the tyrant, God will ensure that they are compensated by Him instead 
of by the tyrant, providing them with the compensation as a donation 
(tafa^uD from Him (Mu$nl XIII, 540: 1-6). 
cAbd al-GabbSr rejects this idea. In his opinion it is out of 
the question that God would provide compensation in place of a 
wrongdoer. He reasons that this would mean that God is obliged to 
make this compensation as a donation because He would fall to mete 
out just ice if He did not do so. However, being obliged to make a 
donation is a contradiction in terms. The characteris t ic of a donation 
is that one is free to make i t : one may also not make i t (Mugnl XIII, 
540: 4-541: 5). cAbd al-fiabbSr also argues that if God gives the 
compensation as a donation to the person wronged, i t is as if He 
makes a donation to the wrongdoer and then transfers this to the 
person wronged. cAbd al-ôabbâr considers i t unthinkable that God 
would make donations to wrongdoers (.Mugnl XIII, 543: 17-544: 2). 
cAbd al-Gabbar does not think that a tyrant does not have 
enough divine compensation to compensate for al l his acts of 
injustice. He argues that we cannot know how many sorrows, pains, 
misfortunes and terrifying events have happened to this wrongdoer. 
Even if we knew this , we could not know how much compensation he 
will be given by God for these sufferings (Mu¿ní XIII, 542: 7-543: 4 
and 472: 17-473: 10). cAbd al-Ôabbar considers i t unthinkable that 
God would allow a wrongdoer to commit his acts of injustice if He 
knew that this wrongdoer did not have enough compensation. He thinks 
that in that case God would somehow prevent him from committing an 
injustice, for instance, by distracting him with some preoccupation 
(ifarb min al-àawSgil) lMu¿nI XIII, 543: 9-17, 472: 12-15 and 494: 14-
16). cAbd al-Gabbar does not consider the possibili ty that God stops 
the wrongdoer by force, probably because this would conflict with the 
principles of takllf. Stopping by force would imply that the 
wrongdoer no longer has freedom of choice. However, if God d is t rac t s 
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him by means of some preoccupation, he is s t i l l free to choose to 
commit the injustice, although God stimulates him to do another act 
in place of the injustice. 
Mânkdlm does not discuss the question of the tyrant, although he 
says: "Know, that i t only is possible that God enables (ад/гала) 
someone to hurt someone else if i t is known that he [the former] i s 
entit led to receive compensation either from God or from someone" 
<TacJJq, 505: 4-5). This may refer to the question of the tyrant, but 
MSnkdim, perhaps for reasons of brevity, does not explain this any 
further. 
Ibn Mattawayh agrees with cAbd al-Gabbar that God only enables 
a wrongdoer to commit injustice to somebody else if He knows that 
this wrongdoer has enough compensation to be transferred to the 
person wronged iMagmu' III, fol. 49a). Ibn Mattawayh speaks of 
tyrannical ru ler s (saläfSn al-¿awr) who during their l ife "continue to 
confiscate i l legally the possessions of people, to violate what i s 
sacred and to liquidate people". He believes that also with respect to 
such exceptional cases, we can be certain that the wrongdoer has 
enough compensation to be transferred to those wronged. Like cAbd 
al-ôabbâr, he is of the opinion that God would prevent a wrongdoer 
from committing an injustice, if this wrongdoer did not have enough 
compensation. However, in Ibn Mattawayh's view i t is unlikely that a 
wrongdoer may not have enough compensation because the quantity of 
compensation given to him by God for i l lnesses and sorrow is vast . He 
thinks i t possible that a tyrannical ruler who has been i l l for one 
year or one month or even one day, gets so much compensation for 
this i l lness from God that i t counterbalances al l his crimes (Magmü* 
III, fol. 43b). 
Ibn Mattawayh also gives a solution of his own to the question 
of the tyrant. He thinks i t possible that if a wrongdoer does not 
have enough compensation to also compensate for crimes that are done 
on his orders, he must only compensate for crimes he has committed 
with his own hands. In that case, those who acted on his command 
must themselves make compensation for these acts , unless they acted 
under constraint (.MagmQ* III, fol. 43b). Ibn Mattawayh probably 
reasons that this wrongdoer's subordinates could have refused to obey 
him. However, his solution conflicts with the rule that someone who 
commands someone else to inflict pain on a third person must 
compensate for this pain himself. 
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The Moment of Providing Compensation 
cAbd al-Gabbar i s certain that God does not provide compensation for 
pain before i t occurs. He argues that in this world i t is not good to 
give compensation before the harm is done unless some agreement i s 
made about the amount of compensation, for instance, when an 
employee is paid a wage agreed on beforehand for work to be done by 
him. From the fact that no such agreement is made with respect to 
pain inflicted by God, cAbd al-Gabbar concludes that God gives the 
compensation af ter the harm is done and not beforehand {Mugnl XIII, 
520: 8-521: 3). This does not preclude the fact that God may already 
compensate living beings during their lifetimes for i l lnesses and 
sorrow that He has made them suffer. 
There are some particular cases of pain for which compensation 
cannot be given in this world. Living beings who suffer pain while 
dying can be compensated for this pain only after their deaths. cAbd 
al-óabbSr believes that God therefore has to revive at least those 
living beings that died in pain since it is only then that He can 
compensate them for this pain. This means that not only the 
mukallafun are revived to be rewarded or punished by God but also 
animals, children and other non-mu/raJJa/tfn that cannot have deserved 
reward or punishment (.MugnS XIII, 520: 9-10). God must also revive 
those living beings who in long-lasting i l lnesses suffered so much 
pain that their compensation is too great to be received In i t s 
ent i rety during their lifetimes IMugnS XIII, 520: 14-521: 3). 
Apart from these special cases, cAbd al-6abbSr thinks i t 
rationally possible that God already compensates His creatures during 
their l ifetimes for sorrows, i l lnesses and other pain inflicted on 
them by Him (Mugnî XIII, 520: 8-10), although i t is also possible that 
the compensation is provided in the hereafter because i t i s 
permissible to postpone the provision of compensation. Drawing an 
analogy between the existent world and the divine world, cAbd a l -
öabbär argues that the ent i re compensation for a spoilt garment can 
be made immediately, but can also be paid la ter (MugnS XIII, 494: 3 -
5). From this , he concludes that God's provision of compensation can 
be postponed unt i l the hereafter. cAbd al-Gabbfir believes that God 
determines whether a person will be compensated in this world or in 
the hereafter . As God is omniscient, He knows what is best for each 
creature. He will compensate each creature at the best moment for 
him. If i t is be t te r for a living being to be compensated In this 
world, He will provide i t in this world, during this living being's 
lifetime. If i t is bet ter for this living being to be compensated 
la ter , in the hereafter, He will provide i t in the hereafter, a f te r 
having revived this living being (.Mugnl XIII, 526: 2-527: 3). 
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In this world one may require compensation for a delay in the 
payment of a debt because of the impossibility of profiting from the 
money during the delay. In ^Abd al-öabbär's opinion this does not 
apply to God's delaying the provision of compensation because God 
does what is best for the receiver, which means that he is not 
harmed by the delay (.Mugnl XIII, 496: 17-4-97: 3). 
Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh agree with cAbd al-GabbSr that God 
provides the compensation either in this world or in the hereafter . 
Mânkdïm adds that if God provides His compensation in this world, i t 
may a l l be given at one time, or spread over several periods (.Tacllq, 
498: 8-13). He even thinks i t possible that God provides compensation 
in this world without the receiver feeling or knowing that what i s 
given to him is compensation for. pain <Гасіі"<7, 497: 9-13). <=Abd al-
óabbfir does not mention this possibility. As for Ibn Mattawayh, like 
Mânkdïm, he considers i t possible that God compensates in this world, 
without the receiver knowing that what he has received from God is a 
compensation for pain he has suffered {MagmO* III, fol. 29b). 
77ie Impossibility of Remittance 
If we are enti t led to compensation for a spoilt garment, we may remit 
this compensation and te l l the person who destroyed the garment that 
he need not compensate из. Is this also possible with respect to the 
compensation that God will provide us with? ^Abd al-öabbär does not 
think so. He argues that the possibility of remitting compensation is 
related to the possibility of claiming i t . Compensation provided in 
this world, such as for a spoilt garment, can be claimed and can 
therefore also be remitted. Compensation that is to be given or 
transferred by God in the hereafter cannot be claimed in this world. 
From this cAbd al-oabbär concludes that this compensation cannot be 
remitted. This means that, with respect to the compensation that will 
be transferred by God, one who is wronged cannot release the 
wrongdoer from his obligation to compensate him. Similarly, the 
wrongdoer cannot discharge himself beforehand. cAbd al-GabbSr 
emphasizes that if a wrongdoer gives the wronged person a sum of 
money with the intention of already compensating him in this world, 
this money will be considered to be a donation by him to the wronged 
person and not the payment of compensation. Despite his payment, God 
will take from the wrongdoer the amount of compensation that is due 
and transfer i t to the wronged person. 
This seems unfair at f i rs t sight, but ^Abd al-âabbâr explains 
i t s justice by the example of an orphan (yatSnù whose affairs are 
managed by a trustee. If the trustee decides that the payment of a 
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debt should be delayed, i t Is not possible to pay the orphan at once. 
Similarly, i t is not possible for the orphan, even if he is an 
adolescent (murShiq), to let his debtor off his debt if the t rustee 
has decided differently. In cAbd al-Gabbär's opinion this also applies 
to the compensation that i s administered by God in the hereafter 
(Afctfnj-XIII, 532: 3-533: 3). 
Mânkdîm does not discuss the question of remittance of compensation. 
As for Ibn Mattawayh, he agrees with cAbd al-6abbSr that 
compensation that is to be given or transmitted by God cannot be 
remitted. He is more explicit than cAbd al-Gabbär in his explanation, 
mentioning a blow (lafrna), an insult (.éatSnia') or slander (¿Iba) as 
examples of harm for which compensation cannot be remitted (MagmO* 
III, fol. 33b). He says that he disagrees with Abu ^Abdallah who 
reportedly said that compensation for offences that people commit 
against each other can be remitted if i t was known how much 
compensation must be paid. As for the compensation for il lnesses and 
other pain inflicted by God, he said that we cannot remit God from 
His obligation to compensate us, even if we know the quantity of 
compensation, because the amount of the divine compensation is so 
great that we are , so to speak, forced not to remit i t Ufagmü* III , 
fol. 33b). However, according to Ibn Mattawayh, most masters, and 
among them cAbd al-ôabbSr, argued that compensation for offences 
such as a blow, an insult or slander may not be remitted because we 
are considered to be placed under the guardianship of God. Ibn 
Mattawayh adds that in this respect our position resembles that of 
someone who is put under a r res t (maqbud) and is not free to give 
donations or to remit debts (.MafimO* III, fols. 33b, 34a). 
5. The Provision of the Compensation 
We have seen that in cAbd al-öabbar*s opinion, the provision of 
compensation for both divinely and humanly inflicted pain is delayed 
unt i l the hereafter if God knows that this i s the bet ter thing for 
the recipient . Mukallafun will be rewarded or punished in the 
hereafter, which means that if compensation is delayed unt i l the 
hereafter, they will receive i t together with their reward or 
punishment. 
The Difference Between Compensation and Reward 
In cAbd al-oabbär*s opinion, God's giving of compensation in the 
hereafter should not lead to a s i tuat ion where someone who has not 
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fulfilled the obligations of the takllf receives something that 
amounts to a reward from God. He therefore s t resses the difference 
between compensation and reward. A reward is given with respect and 
honour for the recipient because i t can only be earned by fulfilling 
a difficult task. Compensation, on the other hand, is given without 
honour and respect. cAbd al-Gabbâr therefore rejects the idea that in 
the hereafter God may take part of a wrongdoer's reward - after 
having committed acts of injustice he may have deserved a reward 
and transfer this to the person wronged by him. eAbd al-ôabbâr 
argues that in that case the wronged person would be given the 
honour and respect included in the reward although he was not 
entitled to them Wugnî XIII, 545: 4-7). 
The Duration of Giving Compensation 
Another difference between compensation and reward is found in their 
duration. =Abd al-óabbSr believes that the people of Paradise will be 
given their reward everlastingly, whereas the giving of compensation 
will end at the moment that the amount that is due has been given 
iMugnl XIII, 50Ö: 5-17 and 515: 19-516: 1-3). In his opinion, the 
giving of compensation is limited (munqa ϋ Ό Λ β . However, other 
Muctazilites'*'7' believed that compensation was also given 
everlastingly. They argued that i t is impossible that in the hereafter 
the giving of compensation comes to an end because, as soon as God 
stops providing a part icular compensation, i t s recipient would be 
displeased. As this displeasure is the resul t of an act of God, God 
would have to compensate the recipient for i t . This would lead to a 
never-ending obligation for God to compensate, because each time 
compensation was stopped a new displeasure would resul t that had to 
be compensated for. 
Adherents to the opinion that compensation is given 
everlastingly also argued that displeasure about the compensation 
being ended conflicts with the theory of God's takllf. According to 
this theory, pain from God - and this displeasure is equated with 
pain from God - is e i ther a deserved punishment or a warning from 
God that the obligations imposed by Him must be fulfilled in order to 
deserve a reward in the hereafter. However, after the Last Day i t is 
no longer possible to deserve a reward from God and therefore there 
will be no takllf in the hereafter. If there is no taklîf, there are 
also no grounds for God to infl ict pain as a lutf for the mukallafun. 
This means that if God causes displeasure by stopping the provision 
of compensation, this act cannot be a good act , even if He 
compensated for the displeasure Wugnl XIII, 511: S-1B). 
cAbd al-öabbSr agrees with his opponents that i t is impossible 
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that people in Paradise would feel displeasure about something. If he 
nevertheless s t icks to his opinion that compensation ends after the 
quantity that is due has been given, he must find a solution for the 
displeasure about the compensation being ended. His solution is that 
the recipient will not be aware that the provision of compensation 
has ended and that he will therefore feel no displeasure (Mugnî XIII, 
511: 20). However, this unawareness is only possible if the recipient 
is also not aware that he is receiving his compensation. How can this 
be done? Receiving compensation without being aware of i t i s 
certainly possible for those recipients of compensation who do not 
possess mental facult ies (Mugnì XIII, 512: 3-9). But what about adults 
of sound mind in Paradise who, in cAbd al-Gabbär's opinion, obtain 
their compensation together with their reward? Can they be unaware 
of receiving their compensation? cAbd al-öabbar thinks that God may 
break the compensation up into many parts and give these parts over 
a long period. If the recipients are given a small part of their 
compensation added to their reward each time, they do not distinguish 
this part of compensation from what they receive as reward. In this 
way, they will not miss the compensation when i t is no longer given 
and so they will not feel displeasure (.MufrnI XIII, 513: 3-6). 
However, I doubt that people who suffer in this world will find 
much comfort in the thought that they will be compensated in 
Paradise but without being aware that they are being compensated. 
Two other of cAbd al-ôabbâr's solutions may give more comfort. The 
f i rs t is that God may give those who are rewarded in Paradise a l l of 
their compensation in one instant before they enter Paradise (Mu¿ní 
XIII, 513: 10-12). The other solution is that after the giving of 
compensation has ended, God may continue to provide those things 
which comprised the compensation, but then as a donation (.tafafâul). 
In this way, the recipients do not have to miss those things that 
make part of the compensation and so they will not feel displeasure 
Œugnl XIII, 513: 13-17). 
Mfinkdlm pays a great deal of at tention to the question of the 
duration of the giving of compensation. He reports that cAbd a l -
ÖabbSr's patron, al-S5h.ib al-Kafl (b. 'AbbSd)*0, asserted that 
compensation is given everlastingly. However, Mfinkdlm himself agrees 
with cAbd al-öabbär that the giving of a particular compensation ends 
as soon as the amount that is due is given. He defends this opinion 
with several arguments. For instance, if compensation in this world 
were given everlastingly, i t would imply that someone who spoils 
someone else 's garment must give him a new garment every day 
(Ta^llq, 495: 1-3). cAbd al-öabbär does not mention this argument, 
probably because i t is not a very sound argument. Drawing an analogy 
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between our world and the divine world, i t would Imply that God g i v e s 
the whole amount of compensation every day, and this i s not what 
adherents of ever las t ing compensation maintain (Ta'lTq, 495: 6-496: 
ЗУ
1
*. 
As for how to avoid displeasure about the compensation being 
ended, Mânkdïm a l s o g i v e s a so lut ion that cAbd al-öabbär does not 
mention. He points out that the people in Paradise know the amount of 
compensation they are e n t i t l e d to rece ive , so when the giving of 
compensation ends they do not f e e l displeasure (Ta'llq, 496: 9 -13) . 
However, Mfinkdïm's argument i s weak. We have seen that one of the 
reasons why God administers compensation for the pain that l iv ing 
beings i n f l i c t on each other i s that we cannot know how much 
compensation must be given for pain. 
Mânkdïm a l so mentions cAbd al-èabbSr's so lut ions: g iv ing 
compensation in small parts spread over a long period, or continuing 
to provide those things that comprise the compensation, even af ter 
the amount that i s due has been given (.Ta^llq, 497: 14-496: 4). 
However, he d i sagrees with cAbd al-GabbSr about giving the whole 
amount of compensation in one instant , arguing that this would imply 
that someone who has been i l l for a year rece ives the compensation 
for th i s i l l n e s s in one ins tant , "and i t i s known that someone of 
sound mind does not choose an i l l n e s s of a year to [obtain] prof i t s 
that reach him in one ins tant , large as the amount of profit may be" 
(.Ta'liq, 499: 4 -13) . 
Like Mânkdïm, Ibn Mattawayh i s convinced that the compensation 
i s not g iven ever las t ing ly , which implies that i t ends as soon as the 
quantity that i s due has been given. He agrees with cAbd al-ôabbar 
that d ispleasure in Paradise about the end of the compensation can be 
avoided by spreading i t over a long period, so that the recipient 
does not not i ce when i t ends (Magmu* III, fo l . 30b). He also mentions 
the p o s s i b i l i t y that a f ter the compensation has ended God donates the 
same things (Ma¿mü'z III , fo l . 50a). He does not mention cAbd a l -
Gabbär's so lu t ion of g iv ing the whole compensation before entering 
Paradise but he g i v e s another so lut ion that i s not mentioned by cAbd 
al-Gabbär: a f t er the rec ipient in Paradise has received a l l of h i s 
compensation, God d i s t r a c t s him, so that he does not not ice that the 
compensation has ended and i s not displeased about i t (.Magmü* III, 
fol . 30b). 
The Compensation of People in Hell 
cAbd al-GabbSr i s convinced that people in h e l l wi l l a l so receive the 
compensation that they are e n t i t l e d to. He argues that the fact that 
these people deserve punishment does not nul l i fy their right to be 
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compensated for pain and i l lnesses they suffered. As opposed to 
reward, compensation is not given with honour and cAbd al-ôabbâr 
therefore sees no reason why i t should not be given to them (Mugnï 
XIII, 524: 3-12). He thinks i t rationally possible that God, to the 
extent that He has not given them their compensation during their 
l ifetimes, compensates them in the time af ter their revival and 
before they enter hel l . However, although this is rationally possible, 
i t would contradict what i s revealed about the Day of Resurrection. 
In the revelation i t i s said that unbelievers (.tuffar) will feel 
sorrow and grief on the Day of Resurrection. If they received their 
compensation on that day, they would not feel sorrow but happiness 
about the pleasures and profi ts that normally comprise compensation. 
Thus, although providing them with their compensation before they 
enter hell i s rationally possible, cAbd al-Gabbär considers this 
unlikely Œugnl XIII, 522: 16-20). 
The consequence is that people in hell who have not been 
compensated in this world must receive their compensation together 
with their punishment in hel l . cAbd al-öabbär explains that this is 
indeed possible, but he thinks that i t cannot consist of the same 
things that are given to people in Paradise. Rationally, giving 
pleasure can be equated with taking away pain. I t is therefore 
possible that God diminishes lkaffafa> the punishment of a malefactor 
(.fäsiq) with that amount of compensation that he has deserved for 
being obedient to God. This means that this person receives a l ighter 
punishment than he would have received if he had not been obedient. 
Similarly, someone's punishment can be diminished in proportion to the 
compensation he is ent i t led to receive. This also applies to 
unbelievers: their compensation will also be in the form of a 
diminution (takfïf) of their pain in hell (Mu¿nl XIII, 523: 1-6 and 
466: 15-16) s o . 
If a l l the diminution of punishment were given at the same 
time, the resul t could be that someone who deserves to be punished 
is no longer punished during that time. cAbd al-öabbär thinks that 
this is not r ight and therefore believes that the diminution will be 
spread over a long period, so that the punished person will not find 
complete rel ief from his or her pain íüu¿ní XIII, 518: 1-6). Like the 
compensation for people in Paradise, the diminution of punishment 
will end at a certain moment. After this , the punishment will be as 
heavy as i t was intended to be (Mugnl XIII, 524: 15-17). 
MSnkdlm and Ibn Mattawayh agree with cAbd al-öabbär that the r ight 
of the people in hell to be compensated is not nullified by their 
deserving punishment. Like cAbd al-öabbär, they think that those who 
have not yet received their compensation in this world are given 
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their compensation as a diminution of their punishment in hel l 
(Га-МГд, 626: 13-627: 4, Мв$тйс III, fol. 50a). 
Тле Compensation of Animals 
Animals and children who die before reaching maturity are not 
mukallaf and therefore they cannot deserve a punishment or a reward 
from God. As we have seen, cAbd al-GabbSr believes that if they have 
not received a l l their compensation in this world, i t is inevitable 
that God will revive t h e m s 1 , together with the mukallafun, on the Day 
of Resurrection so that they can receive their compensation in the 
hereafter. <.Mu¿nI XIII, 486: 6-13). He refers to an account that says 
that God will revive some ca t t le as a reward for the people in 
Paradise so that they can enjoy the beautiful forms of these animals, 
whereas other animals, such as snakes and scorpions, will be revived 
as a punishment for the people in hell <Mu¿nI XIII, 514: 8-10). 
One question is what the animals revived on the Day of 
Resurrection will be given as compensation. This was a problem for 
Abu cAbdallâh al-Basrl who, as cAbd al-öabbär reports , assumed that 
compensation consists of the same things as reward: things that 
people have a desire for. This would imply that the revived animals 
receive a compensation that consists of what humans have a desire 
for. However, animals may not like these things. Is i t permissible 
that they are given things they have no desire for? cAbd al-Gabbar 
thinks i t i s permissible because, in his opinion, a compensation need 
not consist of things that the recipient has a desire for: i t is 
sufficient if the compensation consists of profitable things. cAbd a l -
GabbSr also considers i t possible that God creates in these animals a 
desire for the food that i s given to them in the hereafter so that 
they eat what people like to eat , although in this world they have a 
desire for different things Wugnl ХШ. 521: 4-18). 
Another question with respect to revived animals is what 
happens after an animal has received the whole amount of i t s 
compensation. The compensation is not given in combination with a 
reward. We have seen before that animals probably do not know that 
what they are receiving is a compensation, but as they will not 
receive something else - they are not rewarded - they will certainly 
notice if the giving stops and feel displeasure about this . We have 
seen that according to the doctrine of God's imposing of obligations 
there will be no pain (or displeasure) in the hereafter, except for 
pain that i s a deserved punishment. Then how can i t be avoided that 
an animal feels displeasure when the giving of i t s compensation ends? 
cAbd al-öabbär 's solution to this problem is that God continues 
to give the animal the same things, but then as a donation iMugnl 
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XIII, 514: 10-14). Another solution he gives is that God ends the life 
of the animal in a painless way by saying "Be dust", and then it 
stops living. "=Abd el-6abbSr adds that in that case God's act would 
not be a useless act (cabaJ) because the death of the animal can be 
a cause of joy for someone in Paradise (MugnS XIII, 514: 17-515: 3). 
He does not specify which kind of joy he has in mind. MSnkdim 
explains that people in Paradise may be gladdened by the forms of 
animals whose lives have ended in this way (TaclSq, 496: 15-17). 
MSnkdim agrees with cAbd al-ôabbSr that animals are revived on the 
Day of Resurrection in order to receive their compensation in the 
hereafter, He quotes a fradït in which the Prophet said: "On the Day 
of Resurrection God does justice (intanafa) between wrongdoer (çëlim) 
and wronged (maçlum), and even between the hornless (gamma1) and the 
horned (.qarnaV (.Ta'lîq, 505: 4-9). Like 'Abd al-GabbSr, MSnkdim deems 
it possible that at the moment an animal has received the whole 
amount of its compensation, God ends its life in a painless way to 
gladden the people in Paradise. He thinks that not only the forms of 
the dead animals may be a joy for people in Paradise but also that 
they may be gladdened by the realisation that, unlike the 
compensation of an animal, their reward is given everlastingly. People 
in hell who see the end of an animal's life may wish that their lives 
had ended because they know that their punishment will go on for 
ever (Ta'llq, 496: 18-497: 6). MSnkdim refers to a verse from the 
Qur'Sn about the Last Day that says: "and the unbeliever shall say: 0 
would that I were dust" (Qur'Sn 78: 40). 
Like cAbd al-öabbSr, MSnkdim also thinks it possible that God 
does not end the lives of animals after they have received all their 
compensation. He points out that this agrees with the opinion of 
people who say that after the Day of Resurrection (al-fyaér) there 
will be no death (Ta'ISq, 497: 7-8). MSnkdim does not specify who 
these people are. 
Ibn Mattawayh, too, agrees with cAbd al-GabbSr that animals may 
be revived in order to receive their compensation in the hereafter 
and that God may end the life of an animal in the hereafter in a 
painless way after it has received the whole amount of its 
compensation. He considers that this may gladden the people of 
Paradise and sadden the people of hell ŒagmQc III, fols. 30b-31a). 
Discussing the question of what the animals in the hereafter receive 
as compensation, Ibn Mattawayh gives more details than cAbd al-
GabbSr does. He says that there is no reason why water could not be 
given as compensation to an animal IMagmO* III, fol. 32a). He explains 
that eating other living beings is not possible in Paradise because 
it involves pain, which is impossible in Paradise because there is no 
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taJslIf anymore. He thinks that the predatory animals In Paradise will 
therefore not desire to eat other living beings. God will create in 
them the wish for other profitable things Wagmu* III, fol. 32a). 
The Compensation of Children Who Have Died Before Reaching Maturity 
cAbd al-Gabbär does not explicitly discuss how children who have died 
before reaching maturity receive their compensation from God. From 
what he says about the compensation of other поп-яukallafun such as 
animals, i t can be concluded that he believes that, similarly, children 
who have not received their compensation in this world will be 
revived on the Day of Resurrection in order to receive their 
compensation. The question is what happens to these children after 
they have received the whole amount of their compensation. cAbd a l-
ôabbâr thinks i t possible that from that moment God will for ever 
donate to them the things that they received as compensation, so that 
they will not feel displeasure when the giving of compensation ends 
(MugnlXIll, 5 H : 3-4). 
cAbd al-öabbar reports that some people thought differently on 
this subject and maintained that in the hereafter God will give these 
children a complete mind so that they will have knowledge of God. It 
is not clear who these people are. cAbd al-Gabbar views them as 
opponents, but he does not describe their opinions completely and he 
does not mention their names. It is known that there were Hanballs 
who believed that children will be questioned in the grave after God 
has completed their mental facu l t i es 6 2 . cAbd al-<5abbar explains that , 
from a logical point of view, the Muc tazilites do not think i t 
necessary for God to complete the mental faculties of children who 
have not reached maturity and that no indication of this i s found in 
the revelation ei ther , but even if this were necessary, i t would not 
contradict the idea that children receive their compensation in the 
hereafter (Mugnl XIII, 513: 17-5U: 3). 
cAbd al-Gabbär agrees with people who think i t possible that in 
the hereafter God makes children like adolescents in this world. He 
thinks that this i s the most likely thing to happen, considering the 
fact that i t is said that the children will be the servants of those 
in Paradise (Mugnl XIII, 514: 4-7). cAbd al-ÖabbSr probably refers 
here to the Qur'an 52: 24, 56: 17-18 and 76: 19, where i t is said that 
in Paradise young boys move around presenting drinks to the 
inhabitants15·31. However, whether or not children are given a complete 
mind, they probably feel displeasure if the giving of their 
compensation stops after the full amount that is due has been given 
to them. We have seen that cAbd al-öabbar thinks i t possible that 
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after this moment God will donate everlastingly that which they used 
to receive as compensation. 
Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh do not discuss what happens to children in 
the hereafter after they have received the whole amount of their 
compensation. Perhaps they thought this was a difficult question 
because in cAbd al-öabbär 's, Mânkdîm's and Ibn Mattawayh's opinions, 
a l l children who die before reaching maturity are equal regardless of 
whether their parents are believers or unbelievers. cAbd al-óabbar's 
idea that after having received the whole amount of their 
compensation in Paradise, God may continue to provide children with 
those things that their compensation comprises, implies that i t is 
possible that children of unbelievers are not punished but that they 
live in Paradise for ever. cAbd al-ôabbar does not discuss th is . 
6. Conclusion 
cAbd al-6abbâr's doctrine of God's takllf includes an explanation for 
the existence of pain and suffering. His doctrine says that God has 
imposed obligations on humans because He wants to reward them in the 
hereafter. A reward is earned by carrying out a difficult task of 
one's own free will and not under constraint. God has therefore given 
people freedom of choice so that they can choose between fulfilling 
the obligations He has imposed on them and not fulfilling them. 
Probably as a corollary of the freedom given to humans, animals are 
also given freedom of choice, although God has not imposed 
obligations on them. Freedom of choice implies that God does not 
intervene if creatures hurt each other. He therefore does not prevent 
creatures from committing crimes and inflicting pain on each other, 
giving blows, kicks and s t ings . cAbd al-ôabbâr believes that because 
God does not intervene if creatures inflict injustices on each other, 
He takes care that a l l who suffer from injustice are compensated for 
this by those who have wronged them. In the hereafter He will mete 
out Justice between wrongdoers and their victims. 
Apart from pain that is the resul t of human and animal actions, 
creatures suffer pain as the resul t of i l lnesses and plagues. In cAbd 
al-ôebbSr's opinion, this pain is brought into existence by God and 
also has a relat ion to God's takllf. He believes that God motivates 
people to choose to fulfil the obligations that He has imposed on 
them. A strong motivation is His holding out a painful punishment for 
those who omit to fulfil them. This punishment will take place in the 
hereafter in hell but can also be given beforehand in this world, for 
instance, as a fradd punishment. cAbd al-óabbir i s convinced that 
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illnesses are not meant as a divine punishment but rather are a 
warning from God to remind people that they will be punished if they 
do not fulfi l the obligations He has imposed on them and will be 
rewarded if they fulfil them. In cAbd al-éabbar's opinion God will 
give a generous compensation to a l l those creatures that He uses in 
this way - that i s , inflicting pain on them in order to give a 
warning. This compensation may be given to them in this world or in 
the hereafter in the form of a temporary provision of things they 
like or in the form of a temporary mitigation of their punishment. 
God also uses this compensation in order to mete out jus t ice between 
wrongdoers and their victims. The compensation of wrongdoers is 
diminished and the compensation of their victims is increased. 
This means that according to cAbd al-öabbär's doctrine a l l pain 
in this world is related to God's imposing of obligations <taklff). 
Pain inflicted by living beings on their in i t ia t ive is the corollary 
of the freedom of choice given by God to the creatures because of 
this takllf and pain from God is a warning for a l l adults of sound 
mind that they must fulfi l the obligations imposed by Him. This pain 
is copiously compensated for. The doctrine of tokllf enables cAbd a l -
ôabbâr to justify why God has created a world in which pain ex i s t s . 
CONCLUSION 
In t h i s s tudy we have seen tha t cAbd al-Gabbâr defends the opinion 
that God's imposition of pain and suffering on his creatures i s a 
good act. Before discussing this subject, he f i r s t explains what pain 
(a lam) i s , I t is his opinion that pain is something that comes into 
existence in a body; he rejects the opinion that we suffer because 
something is missing that we need, such as health or the intectness 
of our body. ^Abd al-Gabbâr attaches great importance to perception 
as a way to knowledge. He argues that if we feel pain, we clearly 
perceive the existence of something in our body and if we denied 
that what we perceive is an existing thing, this could lead to the 
denial of the existence of a l l perceptible things. He therefore 
asser t s that pain is something that exis ts . 
The part icular feature by which pain is distinguished from other 
things i s , according to ^Abd al-Gabbâr, that i t is perceived by means 
of that part of the body in which i t exis ts . This is a feature that 
pain shares with pleasure, which is also perceived by means of that 
part of the body in which i t exis ts . cAbd al-ôabbâr therefore 
describes pain and pleasure as forming one class of things. The 
difference between pain and pleasure is that pain is perceived with 
aversion whereas pleasure is perceived with desire. This means that 
if a person perceives something of the class of pain and pleasure 
with aversion, he suffers and that which he perceives is called pain; 
if a person perceives something of the class of pain and pleasure 
with desire, he enjoys this and that which he perceives is called 
pleasure. However, this does not imply that someone may experience as 
a pleasure that which normally is experienced as pain. cAbd al-èabbSr 
explains that pain and pleasure happen in accordance with what is 
normal for them, although in theory they can happen differently. Few 
things can Indeed be experienced at one time as pain and at another 
time as pleasure, for instance scratching an itchy place, exposing 
oneself to intense cold and warming oneself at a f i re . 
'
:Abd al-öabbär thereupon explains that pain is the resul t of 
divine or human actions: i t is produced either by God directly or by 
a living being by means of the process of generation. God can produce 
pain in a living being's body directly, without f i rs t doing something 
else. This is impossible for the living beings: they can only produce 
pain in a body by touching the body in such a way that i t is injured. 
cAbd al-öabbSr refers to the process by which humans produce pain as 
"generation" itawlSd). He describes the process of generation by which 
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pain Is produced as follows: f irst ly, pressure Is put on a living 
being's body; secondly, the pressure generates an injury which cAbd 
al-Gabbar refers to as as lesion ІыаСа) so that, as a resu l t , the 
body loses i t s lntactness or "soundness" (s¿¡]£a>; thirdly, the lesion 
generates pain. According to the Mu^tazilite doctrine of generation, 
the quantity of the cause is commensurate with the quantity of the 
resul t . This means that if the pressure increases, the lesion becomes 
larger and the quantity of pain increases. However, there are cases 
of production of pain that seem to contradict this, such as two 
needle-pricks that hurt equally although one is given by a strong 
person, who can exert more pressure than a weak person, and the 
other by a weak person. Another case of producing pain that seems to 
contradict this rule is a scorpion st ing: i t hurts severely although 
the st ing only causes a small lesion In the body of the person who 
is stung. 
cAbd al-öabbfir a s se r t s that pain that is not produced by living 
beings by the process of generation is produced by God direct ly. 
Having made this clear, cAbd al-éabbSr discusses the Judgments to be 
given on those who produce pain. Discussing this subject, he includes 
dis t ress i£emm), considering that d is t ress is comparable to pain 
because both imply harm for the person to whom they are done. 
However, although pain implies harm, cAbd al-öabbär points out that a 
person may not really be harmed by pain inflicted on him. The pain he 
suffers may involve a profit that outweighs i t or avert a greater 
harm. In those cases he benefits from that which happens to him. 
However, i t is also possible that the pain is a deserved punishment. 
Taking this into consideration, "=Abd al-Gabbär discusses the 
judgments to be given on someone who inf l ic ts pain on himself or on 
someone else and how to know whether this act is good or bad. cAbd 
al-öabbär explains that when an act i s described as bad i t means 
that i t s agent deserves blame for i t . However, in certain 
circumstances someone Is not blamed for doing harm to someone e lse , 
for instance, if the harm is done in sleep or absentmindedly, or by a 
child or an animal. cAbd al-öabbär ins is ts that nevertheless such an 
act is described as bad, on account of the harm i t involves. 
cAbd al-öabbär asse r t s that we can know by reason how to Judge 
actions. He rejects the idea that acts are good or bad Just because 
of a divine command or prohibition, although he acknowledges that 
God's revelation may disclose aspects of part icular acts that cannot 
be known by reason, for instance, that an act i s permitted by God or 
that God holds out a reward for doing i t . In order to know whether a 
particular infliction of pain is good or bad, we must consider 
whether this Infliction is done in such a way that i t is an injustice, 
or whether i t has aspects that entail i t s not being an injustice. As 
soon as we know that an infliction of pain really is an injustice, we 
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a l so know tha t t h i s a c t I s bad: an In ju s t i ce cannot be done In such a 
way that i t is not bad, or i t would not be injustice. 
cAbd al-GabbSr makes i t clear that human infliction of pain is 
not an injustice if the pain is a deserved punishment (and is 
inflicted by someone who has the right to punish) or involves a 
profit greater than the pain or averts a greater harm. Drawing an 
analogy, he then explains that God's imposition of i l lnesses and other 
sufferings is good because i t is done in a way that is good. He 
asser ts that i t is good that God infl icts pain on people who have 
deserved punishment, but he is convinced that God does not punish 
people without making them know which offence they are punished for. 
He therefore concludes that i l lnesses and sufferings inflicted by God 
are not meant to be a punishment but are related to God's imposition 
of obligations (taklîf) on humans. 
In cAbd al-ôabbâr's opinion, God's imposition of obligations on 
humans implies that He not only enables but also motivates them to 
fulfil these obligations. God's infliction of pain functions as a 
motivation for them to fulfil the obligations because i t warns them 
that if they fai l to do so they will be painfully punished in hel l . If 
they take the warning into account and fulfil the obligations, they 
will be rewarded in Paradise. This means that pain from God may lead 
to a future profit for those on whom God has imposed His obligations. 
However, other living beings, such as children who die before reaching 
maturity or animals, cannot profit from this warning because God has 
not imposed obligations on them. cAbd al-ôabbSr is convinced that God 
will compensate these living beings for pain imposed by Him. Taking 
into consideration that compensation can be given to everybody, he 
then concludes from this that God will compensate adults as well. In 
his opinion, the divine compensation will be so copious that , if 
asked, each adult of sound mind would choose to bear pain for i t . 
This means that i l lnesses are not a real harm for those who suffer 
from them but rather a profit , because of the divine compensation 
that amply outweighs the pain. 
According to cAbd al-6abbSr's doctrine, God's imposition of 
obligations on adults of sound mind implies that God gives them and, 
together with them a l l living beings, freedom to choose. God gives 
them freedom of choice because He wants to give them the opportunity 
to deserve a reward by fulfilling the obligations, and one is not 
rewarded for doing acts one is forced to. However, freedom of choice 
implies that living beings are accountable for harm they infl ict on 
other living beings. cAbd al-ôabb5r thinks that harm must be 
compensated for, whether i t is done intentionally or not. Living 
beings must therefore compensate for pain inflicted by them, unless 
God has given them permission or the command to infl ict this pain. 
Usually, compensation for pain cannot be given in this world because 
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we cannot know how much compensation must be paid. cAbd al-GabbSr 
therefore asse r t s that th is compensation must be paid in the 
hereafter and that God will take care of this , as a t rus tee takes 
care of the financial in teres ts of minors. 
This implies that God will diminish the divine compensation that 
livings beings are entit led to receive from Him by those amounts that 
they must pay as compensation for pain they have inflicted on other 
living beings. He will transfer these amounts to those who are 
entit led to these compensations. Compensation from God that has not 
been given in this world will be given in the hereafter. Adults of 
sound mind will receive this compensation together with their reward, 
if they are in Paradise, or as a diminution of their pain if they are 
in hell . Living beings on whom God has not imposed obligations and 
who cannot have deserved a reward or a punishment will be revived on 
the Day of Resurrection in order to receive their compensation. 
cAbd al-ôabbar*s explanation for the existence of pain and 
suffering in this world implies that a l l pain has a relation to God's 
imposition of obligations: i t i s ei ther a warning or a punishment 
from God, or i t is the resul t of the freedom of choice given by God 
to enable people to choose to fulf i l the obligations imposed on them. 
Because of this freedom of choice God does not prevent living beings 
from infl ict ing pain on other living beings. However, cAbd al-Gabbfir 
i s convinced that God will not allow any living to inflict pain on 
another living being, unless the pain is compensated for. Therefore 
God administers the divine and human compensation for pain. 
In this study I have not only studied the sections on pain and 
compensation in cAbd al-èabbSr's al-Mugnl f I abwSb al-tawi}îd wa-'l-
c
adl but I have also compared them with corresponding passages in 
Mânkdlm's TaalSq ëarh. al-υψθΐ al-jsamsa and Ibn Mattawayh's al-MagmQa 
ΓΙ 'l-mufyTf bl-'l-takllf, both cr i t ica l paraphrases of works by cAbd 
al-Oabbär. cAbd al-öabbSr, MSnkdîm and Ibn Mattawayh belonged to 
three successive generations who adhered to the same Mu c tazil i te 
school: the Bahsamiyya, that followed the teachings of Abu Hasim a l -
öubbä'I. Ibn Mattawayh became the leader of the Bahsamiyya in his 
time but there i s no evidence that Mankdim ever became their leader. 
In his time Abu Rasld al-NIsäbürl took over the leadership after cAbd 
al-ÖabbSr had died, and i t i s likely that after Abu. Rasld's death, 
Ibn Mattawayh became the school's leader. 
Given the fact that Mankdim and Ibn Mattawayh continued the 
teachings of the school of which cAbd al-öabbar had been the leader, 
i t is to be expected that they adopted a great deal of cAbd a l -
fiabbSr's doctrine. The comparison of the sections on pain and 
compensation makes clear that with respect to this subject they 
agreed with cAbd al-ôabbar on most points. However, on a few points 
202 CONCLUSION 
they disagreed with him. This was admissible. Some difference of 
opinion was accepted within a Muctazilite school, but only if this did 
not exceed the limits of acceptability. An example of unacceptable 
disagreement is AbQ '1-Husayn al-Basrl's disagreement with cAbd al-
Gabbär and other masters. Abu 'l-Husayn's innovations and divergent 
opinions were not accepted by the adherents to the Bahsamiyya and he 
was therefore considered to have broken with this school and started 
a new school, the Husayniyya. 
Mânkdïm's and Ibn Mattawayh's disagreement with cAbd al-ôabbâr 
was acceptable, probably because it did not imply a deviation from 
the school's teachings. A difference of opinion on what may be 
considered a main point of cAbd al-öabbär's doctrine on pain is 
Mânkdïm's opinion that pain is generated by pressure on the body and 
not, as cAbd al-ôabbâr said, by a lesion in the body. Although 
MSnkdlm disagreed with cAbd al-Ôabbâr, this did not imply that he 
opposed the school's teachings on this point: cAbd al-ôabbâr followed 
one of Abu HBsim's opinions on the generation of pain, whereas 
Mânkdïm followed another of AbQ Häsim's opinions on this subject. 
Another example of following Abu Hâsim instead of cAbd al-ôabbâr is 
Ibn Mattawayh's explanation of the endurance of pain. Ibn Mattawayh 
did not adopt cAbd al-ôabbâr's (or another master's) opinion but 
maintained Abu Häsim's opinion that pain lasts because i t s cause 
repeatedly comes into existence. 
When Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh disagreed with cAbd al-ôabbâr 
it was mostly about points of detail. They differed, for instance, on 
the correct definition of a concept. For example, Ibn Mattawayh 
disapproved of cAbd al-ôabbâr's definition of God's imposition of 
obligations (.takllf). He and MSnkdlm preferred another definition that 
describes more precisely what taklSf i s . Their disagreement does not 
concern the meaning of takllf and what constitutes i t but only i t s 
definition. Other subjects about which Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh 
disagreed with cAbd al-ôabbâr also appear to be minor points, for 
instance, the existence of pain in inanimate objects. cAbd al-Gabbâr 
said that pain can exist in an Inanimate object, although in that case 
it is not called pain as i t is not perceived with aversion. Mânkdïm 
disagreed with him and said that pain cannot exist in an inanimate 
object, whereas Ibn Mattawayh said that pain can only exist in an 
inanimate object if i t was produced by God directly, without a lesion, 
but he denied that God actually produces pain in inanimate objects. 
Another difference of opinion concerned some aspects of divine 
compensation. Mânkdïm denied that the whole amount of compensation 
can be given at the same time, as cAbd al-ôabbâr had maintained. 
It i s clear that Mânkdïm and Ibn Mattawayh did not introduce 
important innovations. Sometimes they discussed a connected subject 
that cAbd al-ôabbâr did not discuss, for instance, Ibn Mattawayh's 
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discussion of the compensation for harm and sorrow caused by slander. 
Sometimes they gave arguments that cAbd al-Gabbfir did not mention, 
for example, Mänkdlm's argument that if compensation were given 
everlastingly, i t would imply that someone who destroys someone 
else 's garment must give him a new garment each day. Mânkdïm and Ibn 
Mattawayh sometimes invented solutions other than those given by 
cAbd al-öabbSr, for instance, Ibn Mattawayh's solution to the question 
of a tyrant 's compensation for a l l those who are wronged by him. 
According to Ibn Mattawayh, a tyrant who cannot make compensation to 
all those wronged only compensates for crimes he has committed with 
his own hands and not for those committed at his command. 
Even though cAbd al-GabbSr and his two disciples do not differ 
about fundamental points, I agree with Gimaret and Madelung that 
Mänkdlm's Ta^llq sanfj aJ-usöJ ai-jramsa and Ibn Mattawayh's al-Magmüc 
fi Ч-muhït Ы-'l-taklIf should be used with caution because they do 
not completely reproduce cAbd al-öabbär's doctrine. This means that 
if we want to be certain about cAbd al-ôabbfir's doctrine on a 
particular subject we have to study the Mugnî or other works of 
which i t is certain that cAbd al-éabbSr was the author. However, th i s 
does not a l t e r the fact that Mänkdlm's Ta^llq Sarfy al-υφϋΐ al-kamsa 
and Ibn Mattawayh's al-Magmuc fi 'l-mufríf Ы-'l-taklIf are useful 
representations of the teachings of cAbd al-óabbfir's school. 
NOTES 
Notes to the Introduction 
1 See Anawati (1957, 281-284) . The t i t l e s al-Mu$nS fi abwSb al-
tawhid wa-'l-'-adl and al-Mugnl were used both as can be 
concluded from the fact that both t i t l e s are written in the 
manuscripts. See a l so el-Khodeiri (1958, 417). 
2 For the biography of ^Abd al-Gabbar, s ee Chapter Two, 47 -58 . For 
more d e t a i l s on the Mugnï, see Introduction, 7 -6 , and Chapter 
Two, 5 2 - 5 4 . 
3 See el-Knodeiri U95S, 417-418) . Until now. no manuscripts of 
volumes I, II, III, X, XVIII and XDC and the missing parts of 
volumes DC and XVII of the Muftnl have been found. Ben-Shammai 
(1974, 302-303) be l i eves that a missing part of the volumes IX 
and X e x i s t s in the Firkovich col lect ion in Leningrad. Monnot 
(1974, 25-27) mentions a fourth manuscript of the Mugnî that i s 
an or ig inal manuscript belonging to the co l l ec t ion of DSr a l -
kutub in Cairo. However, he found that i t does not contain any 
volumes bes ides some of those already found in the other three 
manuscripts. 
4 Gimaret (1979, 48-49) mentions seventeen manuscripts that are 
found in co l l ec t ions in Ankara, Berlin, Istanbul, Mi^an, Munich, 
SancS', Rome and Vienna. 
5 Collection of Ahmet III 1872 iTa'lIq, 28 -29) . 
6 Collection of Maktabat al-ÖSmi* al-kabïr, kaläm 190 (undated); Dar 
al-kutub photocopy В 277799 <.ТасЩ, 29-30). 5ee a lso Gimaret 
(1979, 49). 
7 Madelung (1965, 182-183 and 256) referred to the work as 
MSnkdlm's "Kommentar ( ta-MTq) zu Qädl cAbd al-èabbars Erläuterung 
der fünf Grundlehren" and Vajda (1985, 303) pointed out that the 
text that was known as cAbd al-öabbär's Sarh al-usul al-kamsa 
did not reproduce cAbd al-GabbSr's teachings l i t e r a l l y . 
8 Gimaret (1979, 47-57) . 
9 See Gimaret (1979, 51 -52) . This implies that MSnkdïm i s to be 
considered as the author of the work. His authorship i s confirmed 
by a manuscript that says "ta'HF instead of '"uUlqa can". (See 
note 11). That the verb "allaqa "an meant "he wrote down what i s 
taught", i s confirmed by Makdisi (1981, 114), who says about th i s 
term in re lat ion to the study of law: "The verb "allaqa, with the 
preposit ions caJá or can, was said of a student who took notes 
of the lec ture of h is mas ter-jurisconsult ." 
10 On th is work, see Introduction, 4 -5 , and Chapter Two, 55. 
11 Application of th i s t i t l e i s debatable because i t i s a l so found 
on the t i t l e page of another manuscript of the work, manuscript 
no. 194 of the l i s t of manuscripts that were filmed during the 
1974 expedition to San^ä' {Makfufat, 1976, 31). This l i s t a l so 
contains two other manuscripts of th i s work: nos 94 and 237. 
They are ent i t l ed: ¿arh al-usûl al-kamsa, 11-1-QSdS cAbd al-
óabbSr b. Ahmad, but instead of the formula ""ulllqa carf', they 
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say: " ta'lîf QawSm al-DDi Mñnkdlm Afymad b. Huçayn al-macrOf Ы-
Saèdîw." As for manuscript no. 95, which is mentioned as another 
manuscript of Mankdïm's paraphrase, Gimaret (1979, 49, note 1> 
has found that i t is not Tacllq éarh βΐ-υφΰΐ al-kamsa, but a 
different work. 
12 The record of a student 's notes was called ta^llqa, a term which 
was also used to designate the professor's own lecture notes, his 
own syllabus for the course he taught. According to Makdisi 
(19Θ1, 11&-127), works of the ta'llqa type were used as 
textbooks for the study of law from the second half of the 
third/ninth century. The taclfqa was f i r s t developed by èsfi^I 
and Hanafï Jurisconsults, and was adopted at a later date by the 
Hanbalïs and Mälikis and in other disciplines such as grammar, 
kalâm, and medicine. Makdisi (1981, 125-126) deems i t likely that 
in cAbd al-óabbàr's time Mu=tazilites made use of such ta^llqat 
for their study of the Mu^tazilite system. 
13 The manuscript of the MagmQ* that was photographed by the Yemen 
expedition, the photocopies of which are kept in the Dar al-kutub 
in Cairo, is the only complete text that is known to exist . Apart 
from this manuscript, manuscripts of only the f i r s t volume exist 
in the collection of Depot der ehemaligen Preussischen 
Staatsbibliothek in der Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, in the 
collection of the Fondation "Cnetani" in the library of the 
Academy of Lincei in Rome and in the collection of Taymür Bäaä 
in the Dar al-kutub in Cairo U4a£muc: I, 8). The Yemen manuscript 
and the manuscripts belonging to the collections in Tübingen and 
Cairo were used by Houben for his edition of volume I that , as 
we have seen, he mistook for al-Muftlf Ы-'l-taklIf by cAbd al-
Gabbâr. I t was published in Beirut in 1965. Volume I was also 
edited that year in Cairo by cAzmï, who likewise mistook i t for 
cAbd al-Ôabbâr's а1-Ми!}Ц Ы-'l-taklIf. For the edition of volume 
II Hoube ι made use of two manuscripts: the Yemen manuscript and 
a manuscript found in the National Library in Vienna (liagmü^ II , 
17). Houben died before the text could be published. After his 
death, the f i r s t draft of the text was revised and corrected by 
Gimaret. I t was published in Beirut in 1981. Volume III has been 
edited by Bemand and Peters. It will be published in Beirut but 
for several reasons publication has been delayed. Daiber (1975, 
509-510, note 2) has pointed out that in Sancä' two other 
manuscripts of par ts of al-MagmQ* f I 'l-mufyl\ Ы-4-taklSf exist 
which, according to him, were not photographed by the Egyptian 
expedition to Yemen in 1952. They are not mentioned in the l i s t 
of the manuscripts photographed by this expedition. I also found 
that these two manuscripts are not mentioned in the l i s t of 
manuscripts that were photographed by another Egyptian 
expedition to Yemen in 1974 WaktQfSt, 1976). 
14 When Houben edited the f irst volume of al-Magmü* fi Ч-тиСЦ Ы-
'1-taklSf he assumed that i t was a version of cAbd al-ôabbâr's 
KitSb al-MuhTf made by one of his students (Magmû* I, 8). 
However, he noticed the difference in style between the MugnS 
and al-Ma$mü* fi Ч-тиЬЦ bl-4-taklîf. He found that the l a t t e r 
was less complete than the former and that i t showed a greater 
freedom and independence. However, he did not draw the conclusion 
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that i t was a commentary made by Ibn Mattswayh. He thought that 
Ibn Mattawayh had merely written down cAbd al-Gabbâr's d ic tat ion 
and he therefore presented the work as cAbd al-oabbär's work. On 
the French t i t l e - p a g e of the printed text Ibn Mattawayh's name i s 
not even mentioned. Nevertheless , as early as 1902, Biram (1902, 
6-7) had referred to the Magmu* as the work of Ibn Mattawayh 
and to the МиЬ.Ц as the work of cAbd al-ôabbSr, although without 
explaining the re la t ion between them. It was Gimaret (1977, 2 0 -
31) who presented arguments that al-Magmûc fi 'l-muhl^ bl-'l-
takllf i s not the or ig inal al-MuhTf bi-'l-takllf by =Abd al-Gabbär 
but a commentary by Ibn Mattawayh in which he g ives a 
paraphrase of the tex t at the same time. 
15 Gimaret (1977, 20 -31) . 
16 On th is work see Introduction, 4 -5 , and Chapter Two, 57. 
17 The main meaning of the verb gama'a, of which gam* i s the verbal 
noun, i s "he co l lected; brought, or gathered together", but i t can 
a l so mean "he composed, arranged, or s e t t l e d a thing, or an 
affair" (Lane, 1868/93, 455). That min gam* in the t i t l e of al-
Magmuc fI '1-muhïf bi-'l-takllf means "composed by" had already 
been understood by Lu^f and cAwn, the edi tors of Ibn Mattawayh's 
al-Ta£klra fI ahkäm al-gawähir wa-4-a*rSd (.Tadkira, 14-15). 
There are other examples to be found in which "bringing 
together" (gama^a) i s used in the sense of writing or dictat ing a 
book. In h is al-Tadkira fI ahkäm al-gawähir wa-'l-acrSd, Ibn 
Mattawayh says: "I saw in what Qâdï Ί-qudät "brought together" 
(gama^ahu) in Ta'lîq al-Bagdädiyyät..."(.Tadklra, 66: 17-18). 
Another example of gamaca in the sense of "he wrote (or 
dictated)" i s to be found in cAbd al-Oabbär's Fadl al-lctizäl wa-
tabaqSt al-Muctazila, where cAbd al-ôabbâr says about Abu Fadl 
al-KassI that he wrote a good book in which he 'brought together' 
(gamaca) what i s not to be seen in other works (.Fadl 319: 1-3; 
see a l so fabaqät, 101: 8-10) . 
18 Gimaret (1977, 22) g ives some examples from volume II. Other 
examples, to be found in the volumes II and III, are: "And in 
other [books] than th i s book ial-Muhïfl, Qâdï Ί-Qudát chose ..." 
IWa-qad iktära Qädl Ί-qudät fi gayr hädä Ч-kitSb) (MuhSf III, 
fol. 37b). "But what QSdï Ί-qudat says i s dif ferent: ... what he 
says in the Mugnl i s that ..., then he withdrew that and said: ..." 
(Wa-innamä 'ktalafa kalSm Qädl 'l-qudät ... fa-'Uadl qälahu ff Ч-
Mugnï annahu ..., tumma ragaca сал pallia wa-qäla ...) (MagmO" II, 
305: 12-13) . 
19 Gimaret (1977, 29-31). 
20 Gimaret (1979, 53-57 and 1977, 24-26). 
21 Gimaret (1979, 57). 
22 This had already been realized by Vajda. Working on an annotated 
translat ion of al-Kitäb al-muhtawl, written by the Muctazila 
influenced Karaite mutakalllm Yûsuf a l -Basïr ( f i r s t half of the 
eleventh century), he compared the contents of this work with 
those of works by cAbd al-GabbSr in order to get a bet ter 
understanding of Yûsuf a l -Bes ïr 's thinking. Doing so , Vajda knew 
that the [Ta^llq] ¿arh al-υφΰΐ al-kamsa and al-MagmQc f I '1-muhSf 
bi-'l-takllf were not works by cAbd al-öabbär but rather cr i t i ca l 
paraphrases, made la ter , of these works. He pointed out that 
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because they were made la ter , the paraphrases could not have 
been known to Yösuf al-Basïr when he composed al-Kitäb al-
muhtawl, which was finished in 411/1021 <see Vajda, 1985, 592), 
shortly before the death of cAbd al-ÓabbSr in 415/1024. Vajda 
said: "Notre documentation concernant cAbd al-éabbfir comprend, on 
le s a i t , des oeuvres qui sont certes i s s u e s de son enseignement, 
mais ne reproduisent pas l i t téralement c e l u i - c i , e t prennent même 
assez souvent une a t t i tude cri t ique sur des points de dé ta i l : i l 
s 'agit du Èarh et du Magmuc au demeurant postér ieurs l'un e t 
l'autre à Yûsuf a l -Bas ïr . Par conséquent, s ' i l e s t indispensable 
de se référer à ces t e x t e s , voire d'y recourir constamment, i l 
importe de ne jamais oublier qu'i ls ne peuvent avoir s erv i , sous 
la forme où nous l e s l i sons aujourd'hui, de sources au Maître 
karaì'te. A ce point de vue, seu l le Mugnl peut ê tre actuellement 
considéré comme renfermant des t ex te s qui nous sont parvenus 
dans la rédaction que Yûsuf peut avoir eu sous l e s yeux" (Vajda, 
1985, 303). 
23 Ben-Shammai (1974, 295-301) . 
24 See Peters (1982, 90). We have seen that the method of 
comparison was a l so applied by Vajda. However, h i s intention was 
not to find the di f ferences between the three works but rather 
to ge t a bet ter understanding of Yusuf a l -Basïr 's system and h i s 
use of Mu c taz i l i te works. For this comparison, s ee Vajda (1985, 
103-114, 143-150, 198-263, 297-332 , 352-369 , 460-501 and 607 -
632). He discovered that there are d i f ferences with respect to 
the way in which the subject was dealt with by cAbd al-GabbSr, 
Manкdim and Ibn Mattawayh. 
25 Al-öusamï and Ibn al-Mur^adä mention al-Muhîf Ы-4-taklíf among 
the books that were dictated by cAbd al-óabbSr (.èarh al-cuyun, 
367: 21-36B: 1 and fabaqSt, 113: 8 -9 ) . Mânkdîm must have known 
cAbd al-Öabbär's Muhlf because he re fers to i t (ГаЧГд, 98: 18). 
It i s a l s o referred to by Yüsuf a l -Bas ïr . For Vajde"s translat ion 
of a passage of al-Kitab al-muhtawl in which Yûsuf a l -Bas ïr 
mentions the Muhlf, s e e Vajda (1985, 183). The fact that Mânkdîm 
and Yüsuf a l -Bas ïr mention the Muhlf may be seen as an 
indication that i t was considered an important work. 
26 For references made by Ibn Mattawayh to the MugnS s ee , for 
instance, Muhlf II, 224: 15, 305: 13, 370: 5 and 371: 15. We have 
seen (note 18) that in one of these passages Ibn Mattawayh 
reports that in the Mugnl cAbd al-öabbär held an opinion that 
differed from what he said la ter . 
27 To the examples of sentences in the f i r s t person that Gimaret 
has included, many more can be added that are found in volume 
XIII of the Mugnl, such as: "we have explained in another place 
that ..." (wa-qad bayyannB fi ¿ayr mawdi* anna ...) (Mugnl XIII, 
242: 14); "we have spoken at length on i t ... and now we ra i se the 
question of ..." (.wa-qad aâba'nS '1-qawl fî-hi ... wa-nabnu '1-än 
nüridu ...) (Mugnl XIII, 262: 3); "we have explained in the 
beginning of the sect ion on jus t i ce that ..."(wa-qad bayyannS fi 
awwal beb al-^adl annahu ...) (Mugnî XIII, 298: 14). 
28 Monnot (1974, 30). 
29 Of the works on th is subject , I mention only Hebblethwaite 
(1976), who g ives a short introduction to views about e v i l and 
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suffer ing in the world's re l i g ions , and Hick (1985') who describes 
the development of Christian thought on th i s problem. A good 
treatment comparing Islamic and Western theodicy i s Ormsby 
(1984). 
30 For the opinions of Muslim thinkers on questions of pain and 
suffer ing s ee Watt (1979), who discusses the Sunnite opinions 
about su f f er ing and the place of suffering in SQfism, and 
Pessagno (1984), who describes Mâturldï's opinion. For 
spec i f i ca l l y Mu c taz i l i t e opinions on this subject see Nader (1956, 
83-86) , Watt (1973, 238-242) , Gimaret (1974 and 1975), Gimaret 
(1980, 341 -360 ) , Daiber (1975, 253-281) (on Mu'ammar b. -"Abbad 
al-Sulamî), Hourani (1971, 97-102) (on ^Abd al-GabbSr) and Peters 
(1976, 269-271) (on *Abd al-Gabbär). Vajda (1985, 333-386) 
describes the opinions held by the Karaite Yusuf al-Basïr and 
cAbd al-ôabbSr. On the related question of the best of a l l 
poss ib le worlds (aJ-asJa£) see Brunschvig (1974a, 5-23) , who 
describes the Muctazi l i te view, and Ormsby (1984), who d i scusses 
a l -ôazâ l î ' s view. 
31 These volumes were edited by several ed i tors and published in 
Cairo in the years 1960-1969. Volume XX was published in two 
separate parts . For a survey of the t i t l e s of the volumes and 
the names of their e d i t o r s , s ee References, 251. 
32 For an out l ine of the s tructure of the Mugnl, s ee Peters (1976, 
34-35) . 
33 For an explanation of the meaning of the term lutf, see Chapter 
Six, 157-159. 
34 Volume XIII (al-Lutf) was edited by Abu 'l-^Alä' 'Af l f l and 
published in Cairo in 1962. Several scholars have studied parts 
of th i s volume dealing with pain. Brunschvig (1974 a) partly 
based h i s study of "Abd al-öabbär's analys is of pain on i t . Vajda 
(1985, 333-386) s tudied i t , comparing 'Abd al-Gabbâr's theory on 
the compensation of pain as i t i s expressed in th i s volume with 
the corresponding chapter in Yüsuf a l -Basír 's KltSb al-muhtawi. 
MacDermott (1978, 161-186 and 362-384) studied the discuss ions 
on pain in th i s volume in order to compare cAbd al-öabbSr's 
theory on t h i s subject with the theories of al-êayk al-Mufld and 
a l -Sarî f al-Murtadä. 
35 See Mugnl DC, 5 2 - 5 9 . In this sect ion cAbd al-6abbar confines 
himself to the way in which pain i s brought into ex is tence by 
human beings , leaving out any discussion of other aspects of 
pain. 
36 Studying the pages of the Ta^lSq iarh al-υφΰΐ el-kamsa that deal 
with the subject of the appointed time (agal), Abrahamov (1993a, 
14, note 38) noticed that they seem to summarize cAbd al-
öabbär's views. 
Ato t e s to Chapter One 
1 For instance, in the sentence: dakara '1-Mu^tazila fa-iatamahum 
(he CIbn al-RSwandïl mentioned the Mu c taz i l i tes and v i l i f i ed them) 
(Jhíisár, Arabic t ex t , 11: 9). 
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2 For Instance, in the sentence: wa-kayfa tafcalu '1-Muatazila ma 
hakähu $à~hib al-kitäb canhS (and how could the Muctazila do what 
the author of the book says about i t?) (Jntisar, Arabic text , 13: 
4·). 
3 For instance, in the sentence: wa-ammä ôaylBn fa-kSna yactaqidu 
'J-uso J al-kamsa a J Ja t í man i¿tamaeat f ¡hl fa-huwa Muctazilî (as 
for Gaylän, he adhered to the five principles and the person in 
whom they are united is a Muctazilite) iJhtl^är, Arabic text, 93: 
9-10). 
4 The opponents of the Muctazilites who adhered to the determinist 
standpoint were, in their turn, nicknamed "Qadariyya" by some of 
their opponents because they defended divine omnipotence. The 
Mu c tazili tes usually called the determinists "Mugbira" (see, for 
instance, HugnT IV, 173: 12. Hugni XIII, 227: 5, 2Û2: 7, Ta*llq, 
772: 15, 4-65: 9, Magma* I, 33: 16, Magmü* III , fol. lb) or 
"óabriyya" (see, for instance, Ta'llq, 4Ô3: 17). In modern studies 
on the history of Islamic religious groups, the name "Qadariyya" 
commonly refers to the adherents of the principle of free will in 
the period before the consolidation of the Muctazila at the 
beginning of the third/ninth century (Van Ess, 1978k, 366). A 
group of "Qadarites" round cAmr b. cUbayd la ter merged with the 
Muctazila (Van Ess, 1979 k, 370). On the use of the name 
"Qadariyya" as a nickname, see Watt (1973, 116-117) and Bemand 
(1982, 21-24). 
5 For examples of the use of the name People of Justice (.ahi al-
c
adl> see Ta'ISq (138: 5) and Tadkira (240: 6). For an example of 
the use of the name People of Unity and Justice (ahi al-tawhld 
wa-'l-^adl) see Fadl (346: 8). We see that in the l a t t e r name, 
Unity is placed before Justice. According to Madelung (1965, 18) 
they also used the name People of Justice and Unity to refer to 
themselves, but he does not give a reference. 
6 Abu Ί-Husayn al-Kayyat (ca. 220/835- ca. 300/913) is considered 
the most prominent Bagdad Mu ctazillte of his time. On him, see 
Nyberg (1957, 18-22), Van Ess (1978) and Subfcl (1985 s, I, 270-
288). 
7 Abu '1-QSsim cAbdallSh b. Ahmad Mahmud al-Balk_ï al-Kacbî was a 
pupil of al-Kayya^ and belonged to the Bagdad Muctazila. He died 
in 319/931 (JabaqSt, 88: 5-89: 18; Fadl, 297: 6-20). Fu'fid Sayyid 
gives his biography as an introduction to the edition of a l -
BalkJ's Dikr al-Mu'tazila (43-56). For his life and works see also 
Sezgin (1967, 622-623) and Van Ess (1985a). 
8 Lane (1863/93, 2036). 
9 Ibn al-Rawandi said that WSsil and the other Muctazilites had 
deviated from ikaragat min) the consensus of the community 
because of their adherence to the principle of the intermediate 
position (Intimar, Arabic text , 118: 1-3). 
10 Watt (1973, 17). 
11 Brockett (1992) points out that in the Qur'Sn the term munSflq 
has a meaning that comes near to "dissenter". In some places i t 
refers to apostates who, along with unbelievers (iuffär), will 
never be forgiven and will be punished by eternal hel l - f i re . In 
la ter Muslim thought i t s meaning was softened to mean 
"hypocrite". Although the Qur'an says that munSfiqun must be 
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ki l led, l a t e r Muslim authors differed, arguing that Muhammed had 
not ki l led them. 
12 Gimaret (1992, 787) trans lates the term fBsiq as "malefactor". I 
have adopted th i s translat ion. 
13 See Wensinck (1965 2 , 105). 
14 When cAbd al-öabbfir d i scusses the qua l i t i e s that the leader of 
the Muslim community must have, he declares that he cannot be a 
malefactor (fSsiq) because he must have the quality of Just ice 
(cadl). If he had the quality of vic iousness (.flsq), he would 
legal ly not be able to be a witness or pass judgment (Mugnï 
XX/1, 201: 16-19) . In al-ϋψΰΐ al-kamsa, cAbd al-Öabbär explains 
that the Judgment that a malefactor (.fSsiq) i s neither a be l iever 
imu'min) nor an unbeliever (.kéfir) implies that he i s not 
honoured or respected because he i s not β believer. However, as 
opposed to an unbeliever, he can marry a Muslim woman because he 
i s not an unbeliever. He i s a l so buried with Muslims and Muslims 
wi l l pray for him (tfsuJ, 82: 3-5 and 93: 13-24). cAbd al-Òabbfir 
argues that i t i s not right to cal l such a person a "hypocrite", 
as a hypocrite i s an unbeliever in his heart, although he 
pretends to be a Muslim. As opposed to a hypocrite (munäfiq), a 
malefactor ( fas iq) does not pretend to be different than he i s . 
15 Watt (1973, 209-211) . Van Ess (1991, II, 335-338) also thinks 
that they are invented by opponents of the Muctazila. 
16 For a survey of explanations for the origin of the name 
Mu=tazila, s ee Gimaret (1992, 783-784). 
17 Stroumsa (1990, 271-273) . 
18 Nyberg (1953, 422). 
19 Nyberg (1953, 423) thought that there was a po l i t i ca l re la t ion 
between the early Muctazila and the cAbbasid movement but others 
have made clear that, in th i s respect, h i s theory i s untenable. 
See Watt (1973, 214), Van Ess (1991, II, 339) and Gimaret (1992, 
783-7B4). 
20 See Van Ess (1991, II, 340-342) . 
21 Van Ess (1991, II, 342). 
22 According to Madelung (1980a and 1987b, 374) i t s author was not 
a l -Nasi ' al-Akbar but the Mu ctazi l i te ÒVfar b. Harb (d. 236/850) . 
23 For th i s date, s ee Madelung (1965, 31-32 and 1980a, 226-227 , 
note 30). His f u l l name was Abu Bakr (b.) Muhammad b. Y&zdSd. a l -
Warrfiq (Van Ess, 1991, I, 62, note 22). 
24 The verb intasala i s used in the Qur'Sn 18: 16; 19: 48-49; 4: 9 0 -
91; 2: 222 and 44: 2 1 . In Qur'fin 18: 16 and 19: 48-49 the term 
re fers to d i s soc ia t ion from unbelievers. In Qur'fin 4: 90-91 i t 
re fers to unbel ievers who d issoc iate themselves from bel ievers 
without f ight ing them. In Qur'fin 44: 21 the term means leaving 
someone, without being for or against him (see Lane, 1863/93 , 
2036) In Qur'fin 2: 222 i t refers to abstinence from sexual 
intercourse with a menstruating woman. 
25 On the meaning of a$$a~b, s e e Chapter One, 2 8 - 3 1 . 
26 On Qatfida, see Watt (1973, 109). 
27 In the Cairo and Yemen manuscripts tawfyld i s mentioned before 
cadl (Magmu* I, 443, note 3). 
28 On the a l ternat ive name "Names and Judgments", see Watt (1973, 
230). 
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29 On these f ive pr inciples s e e Watt (1973, 226-249), Madelung 
(1965, e-23) , Nyberg (1953, 425-426), Gimaret (1992, 786-787) and 
Van Ess (1966, 224-225). 
30 See Watt (1973, 215). 
31 See Watt (1973, 202). 
32 See Watt (1973, 177-178). 
33 Zayd (1985, 33) says that Abu "1-Hudayl was the author of a work 
ent i t l ed aJ-WsQJ al-kamsa, but he does not mention the source of 
h is information. However, there i s no book with th is t i t l e among 
the many works by Abu '1-Hudayl mentioned in the Flhrist (204). 
It probably was al-Nasafi who said that Abu '1-Hudayl i s the 
author of a work with th i s t i t l e . Van Ess (1991, III, 223) 
d i s c u s s e s the question and thinks i t possible that al-Nasafi 
re fers to Abu Ч-Hudayl's KitSb a2-hug£a. 
34 On al-Fuwa^I, see Watt (1973, 220). 
35 This work i s not mentioned as such by cAbd al-GabbSr in h i s FaçU 
al-l'tlz&l. He speaks of KitSb al-υψϋΐ but not of KitSb al-υψΰΐ 
al-kams(a) (See Faifl, 282: 7). 
36 On al-Qâsim b. Ibrahim, see Madelung (1965, 81-152) and 
Abrahamov (1990: 6-60) . 
37 Al-Qäsim mentions Unity, Jus t i ce , and the Promise and the Threat, 
but the remaining two principles are not the Intermediate 
Posit ion and Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong. 
Rather, they concern other subjects: the fourth principle deals 
with the Qur'Sn and the Sunna of the Prophet, and the f i f th with 
possess ions and the care of the needy (.RasS'il I, 168-169). 
38 See note 29. 
39 See note 7. 
40 Before him, h i s master al-JCayyS^ had a lso declared that pirSr was 
not a Mu=tazil ite, accusing him of anthropomorphism (Intimar, 
Arabic t e x t , 96: 4-5) . Çirâr was a d isc ip le of WSsil b. CA^S·. Van 
Ess (19Θ1, 225) considers him a Mu=tazilite, and this i s correct 
i f M ^ t a z i l i t e i s understood in the sense i t had in Çirâr's 
l i f e t ime , when the f ive principles had not yet been formulated. In 
those days someone could be cal led a Mu c tazi l i te if he declared 
that a grave sinner was a malefactor (.faslq). However, i f a l -
Kayya|'s more s tr ingent cr i ter ia are applied to фігаг, he cannot 
be considered a Mu c taz i l i te . 
41 See Madelung (1965, 77). It i s not the f i r s t example of mutual 
sympathy and rapprochement between Mu c taz i l i tes and S ï c i t e s . On 
the re la t ions between Mu c taz i l i tes and SF=ites, s ee Madelung 
(1965, 7-43 and passim), Madelung (1970), Zayd (1985, 17-38) , 
cÂrif (1987, 59 -72) and Watt (1990, 155-157). Earlier there had 
been other § I c i t e s who took an in teres t in Mu c tazi l i te doctrine, 
such as the Zaydite al-Qâsim b. Ibrahim (169/785-246/860) , a 
contemporary of Abu '1-Hud.ayl, who combined the Muctazilite and 
the Zaydite doctrines (Zayd, 1985, 31-38 and Abrahamov, 1990, 
14-15) . 
42 Al-Qäsim disagreed with the Muctazila on, for instance, certain 
aspects of the principles of the Promise and the Threat and the 
Intermediate Posit ion (Madelung, 1965, 120-124, and Abrahamov, 
1990, 48-53) . Another example of disagreement between 
Mu c taz l l i t es and S l c i t e s with respect to the l a s t three 
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principles i s Ibn al-RSwandï's Kltñb el-radd ' a ia 'l-Mu*tazila fi 
'l-w'Id wa-4-manzila bayn al-manzllatayn in which he refutes 
the Muctazil i te pr inc iples of the Promise and the Threat and the 
Intermediate Posit ion ÍFlhrist, 217). After having le f t the 
Mu'tazila, Ibn al-Rawandl came to sympathize with the SIca 
(Kraur, 1971, 905) . 
43 In later Muctazi l i te works the questions of the imâmate and the 
f i r s t four cal iphs (al-RSâldun) and the question of whether Abu 
Bakr was superior to c Al ï are brought forward as part of the 
principle of Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong (al-
amr bi-'l-ma^rüf wa-'l-nahy can al-munkar) or as part of the 
principle of the Intermediate Position ial-manzlla bayn al-
manzilatayn). See, for instance, Tacllq (749: 8-767: 16). 
44 See Fadl (350, note) . 
45 Abrahamov (1993a) has made an annotated translation of that part 
of volume XI of the Mugnl which deals with the subject of the 
appointed time of death. 
46 During the reign of Harun al-Rasïd (170/786-193/809) some 
Mu°tazi l i tes were declared to be unbelievers and some of them, 
among them Bisr b. al-Mu i :tamir, were imprisoned (Madelung, 1965, 
39). 
47 For a descript ion of the h i s tor i ca l events of the Mihna see Hinds 
(1990, 2 - 5 ) . For the motives of Caliph Ma'mün who ordered the 
Mihna see Nawas (1992). 
48 The text of th i s work has been edited by Gimaret (1979, 79-96) . 
Gimaret (1979, 78) assumes that Kitëb al-usûl al-kamsa was the 
work on which cAbd al-öabbSr's ëarh. al-usûl al-kamsa was based. 
We know that cAbd al-ôabbâr composed the la t t er work between 
360/970 and 380/990 . It i s therefore l ikely that K. al-Vsul al-
kamsa belongs among cAbd al-âabbâr's early works. 
49 On the Kwärizm-sSh Abu 'l-'AbbSs Ma'mün, see NSzim (1971 2 , 57 -
58). 
50 See a l s o Ta'llq (753: 18, 758: 1). 
51 See, for instance, Ta*llq (472, 395). It i s d i f f i cu l t to decide 
whether Mânkdïm can be called a Mu c taz i l i te . He does not adhere 
to a l l aspects of Mu c taz i l i te doctrine, for instance, he follows 
Zaydite doctrine with respect to the imâmate. He might not be 
considered a Mu c taz i l i t e i f al-Kayyfifs cr i ter ia are applied 
s t r i c t l y . We do not know whether later generations considered him 
a Muctazi l i te . He i s not mentioned in the biographical works of 
Ibn al-Murtadfi and al-HSkim al-6usaml, but the reason for this i s 
not c lear. It i s unlikely that they omitted him because they did 
not consider him a Mu c taz i l i t e , s ince in their works they mention 
other Zaydites , such as Mânkdîm's master al-Mu'ayyid b i - ' l lah 
(.Sari) al-cuyOn, 376: 3 -12) . 
52 See Chapter One, 15. 
53 Oxford (1989, XIV, 633). 
54 Frank (1966, 10) says about the Muctazila: "...there are between 
diverse authors basic and fundamental differences of view which 
are nigh absolute ly incompatible". 
55 See, for instance, Watt (1973, 217-224) , Frank (1978, 29 and 
passim) and Madelung (1987, 327-329) . 
56 See, for instance, Busse (1969, 439-441) , MacDermott (1978, 6) 
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and Kraemer (1986, 72-73) . 
57 Peters (1976, 6-7) and Frank (1978, 5 -6) . 
58 Busse (1969, 439-440) and MacDermott (1978, 6). On the 
Bahsamiyya, s ee Chapter One, 38 -40 . 
59 For a discuss ion of the meaning of the term madhab with spec ia l 
reference to law s e e , Makdisi (1981, 109 and 111) and to grammar 
see Bernards (1992, 21 -25) . 
60 On the Iksïdiyya, s ee Chapter One, 38 -40 . 
61 The Bahèamiyya i s meant here. There was a conf l ict between the 
Iksidiyya and the Bahsamiyya (see Chapter One, 36-40) . 
62 Makdisi (1981, 164 and 188) says that éayk was a t i t l e that was 
generally given to masters. 
63 See, for instance, Magmu-= (I, 1: 4, 68: 15, 343: 23 , 346: 12) where 
Ibn Mattawayh refers to Abu Häaim without the t i t l e of èayk. 
However, he re fers to Abu Ishftq with the t i t l e èayk (Magmü* I, 
329: 13). 
64 On him, s e e Sari} al-cuyun (371: 4-375: 16). 
65 Makdisi (1981, 131-133). 
66 For an example of this use of the term riyasa, s ee a lso fabaqSt 
(71: 17). 
67 Makdisi (1981, 128-129) . 
68 See, for instance, Fa<fl (251: 2 , 285: 6, 323: 21) and fabaqSt (42: 
9, 78: 7, 105: 3 , 116: 2) . 
69 On Abu 'l-QSsim a l -Bus t l , s ee Stern (1983, 300-306) and cUtmSn 
(1968, 53). 
70 See, for instance, Fa<fl (297: 1, 300: 13) and fabaqât (88: 2, 90: 
13). 
71 The Arabic term he uses with respect to this kind of group i s 
firqa. 
72 Other examples are: "al-WSsiliyya, a<j(jJb ЛЫ Hudayfa Wasil b. 
С
А{5' al-GazzâT* (Milal I, 46: 4 -5) , "al-Huäayliyya, atfiâb Abt '1-
Hudayl Hamdän b. al-Hudayl al-=AllSf" (Milal I, 49: 12-13) and 
"al-Nazzâmiyya, açfyâb Ibrahim b. Yasser CSayyâr] b. Hani' a l -
Nazzâm" (Milal I, 53: 13-14) . 
73 Al-NSsi' al-Akbar does not mention shared opinions that are 
spec i f i c to Basra Mu c taz i l i t e s . 
74 Although Maqâlât al-Islâmiyyîh, composed by al-As-=arI (260/873-
324/935) , i s not a Mu c taz i l i te text , i t s author was well informed 
about the Mu ctazila, s ince he had been a disc iple of Aba CA1I a l -
öubbS'I for a long time. In his description of Mu=tazilite 
theories , a l -As c arI usually refers to individual Mu c t ez i l i t e s . 
However, he sometimes re fers to groups of d i sc ip les of a certain 
master, such as: the açfyâb of Abü 'l-Hudayl" (Maqâlât, 189: 17 
and 192: 6) and the asAib of al-ÖubbÄl (.MaqSlSt, 195: 6) . He 
several times mentions the Bagdad Muctazil ites as forming a 
school ŒaqalSt, 175: 9, 187: 12, 189: 9, 191: 1, 353: 9, 395: 3, 
413: 9, 420: 5, 498: 5) , mentioning Bisr as the leader of th i s 
school ira4s) (MaqâlSt, 402: 7). It i s l e s s clear whether a l -
As-=arl considers the Basra Mu c tazi l i tes as forming a school. He 
re fers to them only a few times (MaqâlSt, 182: 14, 187: 12, 188: 
5, 189: 9 and 504: 16), and he does not mention an opinion held 
by a l l of them as a group, but only opinions held by a part of 
them. He uses expressions such as "factions (fawS4f) of the 
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Basra Mir-tazilites" (MaqälSt, 167: 12), "most of the Basra 
Mu c tazil i tes" (MaqSlSt, 18β: 5 and 169: 9), and "one of the 
Basrl's" (Maqälät, 504: 16). This may Indicate that al-AscarI did 
not consider the Muctazilites of Basra to be a group that agreed 
on a l l points of doctrine: he distinguished within the Basra 
Mu'-tazlla groups with specific opinions of their own. He probably 
knew that during his lifetime Abu cAlï al-Gubbâ'ï's disciples had 
divided into two r ival groups. 
75 In ^Abd al-GabbSr's FaçiJ al-l<=tlz&l wa-tabaqët al-Mwtazlla the 
f i rs t generation (.fabaqa) of "Muv:tazilites" is that of cAlï b. Abi 
Jäl ib (.Amîr вІ-тиЫпІп) (Fatfl, 214: 3). 
76 However, Gimaret (1986, 190, note 5) and Van Ess <1991, II , 313-
314) have pointed out that probably the main reason why he 
called him his teacher was that he could function as the link 
between Abu '1-Hudayl and Wâsil in the chain of transmission. 
cUtmän does not seem to have been an important theologian as he 
is not mentioned by al-Keyyä'f, al-Näsi' al-Akbar or al-As , rarI. He 
is not known to have written any work. 
77 On Abu '1-Hudayl and his teachings, see Van Ess (1991, III , 209-
296), Van Ess (1985) and Frank (1966). 
78 This remark suggests that Abu '1-Hudayl developed a theological 
system by himself, not building on the works of his predecessors. 
Yet Van Ess (1991, III , 216) thinks i t likely that he was 
influenced by the important speculative theologian Cirär b. cAmr 
(ca. 110/728-200/815) who taught in Basra, where Abu '1-Hudayl 
also spent most of his l i fe . We have seen that later Muctazilites 
like al-Balkï did not consider Çirâr a Mub:tazilite because he did 
not adhere to a l l five Mu^tazilite principles iDikr, 75: 4-5) On 
Çirâr, see Van Ess (1991, III, 33-63) and Van Ess (1981). 
79 Abu '1-Hudayl's best known disciple i s usually considered to be 
Abu Ishäq al-Nazzäm (ca, 165/782-221/836). On him, see Van Ess 
(1991, III , 296-445), Van Ess (1965b) and Van Ess (1992). However, 
many Muctazilites did not acknowledge al-Nazzäm as a Mu^tazilite 
because in some respects his doctrine deviated from Abu ' 1 -
Hudayl's doctrine <.Fa<fl, 264: 2). cAbd al-QShir al-Bagdadl (d. 
429/1037) reports that most of the Muctazilltes, including Abu 
cAlî al-GubbS'ï and Abü '1-Hudayl himself, regarded al-Nazzäm as 
an unbeliever (Farq, 80). However, even if al-Nazzäm had been 
acknowledged by a l l Muctazilites, he could not have functioned in 
the chain as the link between Abu '1-Hudayl and Abu САИ because 
he died in 221/836. I t is therefore impossible that he could have 
taught Abu CA1I al-öubbS'I, whose date of birth was 245/849. 
80 On al-éahhSm, see FaçiJ (280: 11-281: 5) and Jabaq&t (71: 16-72: 
10). Al-Sahh§m was probably a young boy when he became a 
disciple of Abu '1-Hudayl, since he is called "the youngest of the 
young students of Abu Ί-Hudayl" (a$$ar al-gllmän). The singular 
of gilmän is ¿uläm. Makdisi (1990, 235) t ranslates this term as 
"student-servitor". Young students acted as their master's 
servant. cAbd al-Gabbar says that al-Sahhâm reached the age of 
eighty, but he does not give the dates of his birth and death. 
Gimaret (1986, 199, note 52) thinks he died in about 257/871. 
Although he became known as the teacher of Abu CA1I al-GubbS'I, 
he could not have taught him for long because AbO cAlï was 
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probably no older than twenty-three when al-SahhSm died (Gwynne 
1982, 10). 
βΐ On Abü CA1I al-ÖubbS'ï, see Fafl (287: 1-296: 4), fabaqSt (80: 2-
85: 4), Flhrist (217-218), Gwynne (1982), Gtmaret (1976 and 
supplement: Glmaret, 1984), Kusaym (1968) and Gardet (1965). 
82 Probably he did not return to Basra because of the difficult 
situation in this town after the Zang revolt that had continued 
from 255/869-270/883. Basra had been severely damaged by the 
battles between the Zang and the callphal armies. It must have 
been some time before the town had recovered from this damage. 
As a result of the Zang revolt, many intellectuals took refuge in 
cAskar Mukram and other towns of KQzistan (Gwynne, 1982, 11). 
83 It i s reported that in cAskar Mukram women, too, came to these 
sessions and that Abu CA1I al-ôubbâ'ï did not neglect them but 
answered their questions (Ku§aym, 1968, 77). The interest of 
these women in Muctazilism might be the result of the missionary 
activity of AbQ ^AII^ daughter, who was well versed in 
Muctazilite doctrine and propagated i t s teachings among women 
(.Jabaqit, 109: 9-10 and Fanfl, 330: 10-11). 
84 Kusaym <1968, 77). 
85 Watt (1973, 300) gives more credit to this earlier date of 
247/861, reasoning that the later date of 277/890 implies that 
Abu Hââim became the leader of the Basra Muctazila at the age of 
twenty-five years, which is very young to become the leader of a 
theological school, and that the later date implies that i t is 
impossible that he studied under al-Mubarrad, who died in 898. On 
the other hand, both Gwynne (1982, 12) and Kusaym (1968, 306) 
stick to the later date of 277/890. Kusaym argues that if Abü 
HSsim was born in 247/861, his father Abü CA1I would have been 
only thirteen years old at the time of his birth. 
86 Kusaym (1968, 310). 
87 See Chapter One, 40-41. 
88 In many cases, we are also informed about the names of the works 
in which these opinions were found. On the basis of these 
references Gimaret (1976 and 1984) compiled a bibliography of 
the works of Abü CA1I and Abü HSsim. 
89 Gwynne (1982) made a first reconstruction of Abü cAlI*s Taf sir, 
collecting the citations of Abü cAlI's commentary on the Qur'an 
that are found in later Qur'an commentaries. Abu HSsim's theory 
of the modes (aiprSD has been described by Gimaret (1970) on the 
basis of discussion in As'arite sources. 
90 Kusaym (1968, 97-299). 
91 cAbd al-ôabb5r probably described the differences of opinion 
between Abü CA1I and Abu HSsim in his work al-KOST bayn al-
ëayjiayn (cUtmSn, 1968, 62). Sezgin (1967, 625) assumed that a 
manuscript in the Vatican collection, entitled al-I^tilSf fi usui 
al-flqh (Vat. Vida 1100), contained al-KHSf bayn al-âaykayn, 
However, i t can be concluded from the t i t le that this manuscript 
deals with legal theory and methodology. It is therefore unlikely 
that i t i s identical with al-£ilâf bayn al-èay&ayn, since this 
latter work presumably deals with the controversies between Abü 
cAlï and Abü HSsim which, as we have seen, were theological 
rather than legal in nature. That al-&ll&f bayn al-ÈayJçayn dealt 
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with theological questions can also be deduced from references 
made by Ibn Mattawayh to this work. These references concern 
theological or ethical subjects (Magmu* II , 201: 6 and Tadkira, 
245: 12). 
92 For the theory of ahwal, see Frank (1982a), Gimaret (1970), Frank 
(1971), Peters (1976, 145-148 and 324-327) and Wolfson (1976, 
167-197). See also Chapter Three, 76-80. 
93 On this work, see Gimaret (1976, 319-320). 
94 For instance, with respect to the question of whether i t is 
possible that some substances are continuous and others 
disappear: Abu 'Al i declared that this indeed is possible, whereas 
Abu HSsim declared that i t was impossible. It is reported that 
Abö cAli adopted his son's opinion la te r , but al-Saymarl refused 
to accept Abu HSsim's innovation and held to Abu 'All 's original 
opinion (MasS'H, 97: 5-12). Al-Saymari possibly took a stand 
against innovations of any kind, as he is reported to have 
opposed Abu cAlï 's plan to amalgamate the Mutazila and the è ï ' a 
in 'Askar Mukram (Fadl, 291: 12-14). I t is not known whether Abu 
'Al l did intend to do such a thing. 
95 Ibn al-NadSm also says that al-Saymarï was the same age or about 
the same age as Abu 'AH (Fihrist, 219). That this is explicitly 
mentioned may be a hint that the age of the candidates played a 
role in the question of who became the new leader of the school 
after Abu 'Al l ' s death. 
96 See Fadl (290: 14-15) and fabaqSt (96: 12). 
97 Gimaret (1980, Introduction, 13) refers to the school of Abu CA1I 
as the "Ôubbâ'ite school" to which Abu 'All and Abu HSsim and 
their followers, like cAbd al-öabbSr, Abu Rasld al-NïsSbürï, Abu 
'1-Husayn al-Basrï and Ibn Mattawayh, belonged. He came to the 
conclusion that they formed a school and called i t the öubbS'ite 
school because the adherents frequently refer to Abu CA1I a l -
èubbS'I and Abu Häsim in their works. Gimaret says: "Il faut donc 
parler d'une école gubbS'ite, comme on parle, du côté sunnite, 
d'une école a ê ' a r i t e et d'une école maturîdite". 
98 Since Ibn al-Ikéîd died in 320/932 at the age of f i f ty-six 
(fabaqSt, 100: 5-6), he must have been born in about 263/876. Ibn 
al-Nadlm gives a different date for his death and says that he 
died in 326/937 (Fihrist, 220). 
99 'Abd al-QShir al-BagdSdï (Farq, 111) and al-ëahrastSnl (Milal I, 
78: 13) refer to the disciples of Abü HSsim al-Öubbäl as the 
Bahsamiyya, whereas Ibn al-MurtadS uses the name BahSsima 
(fabaqSt, 119: 2). The names Bahâéima and Bahéamiyya were 
probably derived from BS HSsim, the Persian form of the name Abu 
HSsim. (Compare th is , for instance, with Biyazid, which was the 
Persian form of Abu YSzid). Gimaret (1986, 265, note 1) and 
Kusaym (1968, 306, note 2) say that the name HSiimiyya was also 
used for the disciples of Aba HSsim. 
100 The grammarian AbO '1-Hasan 'All b. ' I sS al-RummSnl (296/908-
384/994) was a disciple of Ibn al- lksld. It is reported that a l -
RummSnl was the author of a refutation of Abu Hué im's a l -
BagdädiyySt. He also wrote some books on Islamic law (.Fihrist, 
220-221) and a commentary on the Qur'fin, which was greatly 
admired by al-SShib b. 'AbbSd (JabaqSt, 110: 7-11). 
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101 Gimaret (1976, 30β). 
102 Busse (1969, 441, note 2) thinks that he might be Abu '1-Qâsim 
Sa'd b. cAbd al-Rahmân a l - I s fahânl , secretary (.kStib^ to the Buyid 
al-HabasI b. Mucizz al-Dawla, the governor of Basra. 
103 It was not unusual in that time for one scholar to try and 
defeat another by means of arguments in public meetings. On 
munâçara, s e e Van Ess (1976). 
104 On al-Habasï, s ee Tabaqât (110: 5) . 
105 On th is work, see Gimaret (1976, 308). 
106 The Iksïdiyya are mentioned by cAbd al-öabbär (Fadl, 328: 14 and 
329: 2). Mânkdïm (d. 425/1034) does not mention them in Ta^liq 
èari? al-υφαΐ al-kamsa, but Ibn Mattawayh (d. 469/1076) refers to 
them in al-Magmû* fi 4-mub.ît Ы-'l-taklSf. (See, for instance, 
MagmQ* I, 296: 9 and 341: 7, Magmu* II, 311: 16, and Magmu* III, 
fol. 10b, fol. 34b). They are a l so mentioned by Ibn al-MurtadS (d. 
1437) in fabaqät al-MWtazila (fabaqät, 107: 17, 114: 15 and 115: 
3). Al-Sahrastanï (d. 548/1153) does not mention them in al-Milal 
wa-'l-nlhal, but Fakr al-Dïn al-RSzï (543/1149-606/1209) does 
mention them in h is I^tlqadSt f Iraq al-muslinln wa-'l-muàrikSn 
(I^tiqSdñt, 44). 
107 One of the main points of difference between Abu c Alï and Abü 
Häsim was the deserving of blame (dammi. Abü HSsim's opinion was 
that a person can deserve blame for fa i l ing to do what i s 
obl igatory (Gimaret, 1976, 305). This became one of the points of 
conf l ict between the Iks Idly y a and the Bahsamlyya, as i s 
confirmed by cAbd al-ôabbâr (Fadl, 329: 3). It i s possible that 
the fo l lowers of Abu Häsim were referred to by the nick-name of 
"Dammiyya" because of th i s . They were not the only group to be 
called Dammiyya. There were other, non-Mu c tazi l i te , groups that 
were a l s o cal led Dammiyya (Hodgson, 1965). 
108 On al-SShib b. cAbbad, s e e Chapter Two, 5 1 - 5 2 . 
109 On h i s l i f e and works, see Flhrlst (222), Fadl (324: 3 - 1 1 ) , 
fabaqSt (105: 5 -10) , Sezgin (1967, 624) , Schacht (1971) and 
Tadkira (624-625) . 
110 His dates are not given by Ibn al-Nadlm e i ther , although he 
considers Ibn Kallâd to have been one of Abu Häsim's most 
important d i s c i p l e s (Flhrist, 222). Sezgin (1967, 624) supposes 
that he died in about 350 /961 , but he does not c i t e evidence for 
th i s date . 
111 We have seen that cAbd al-GabbSr finds i t necessary to jus t i fy 
his mentioning of Abu Hasim before older masters of h i s 
generation by referring to Abu Häsim's high l eve l of knowledge 
(Fadl, 304: 5) . 
112 See Gimaret (1979, 69). 
113 The Zaydite imam al-Muhallï i s said to have made notes of ^Abd 
al-ôabbâr's d iscuss ion of a work called ZlySdSt al-éar$ (¡jadâ'iq, 
265: 19-266: 1). This work may have concerned additions to Ibn 
¡Callad's own éarí¡> (see note 107) or to cAbd al-6abbär's ¿¡arti on 
Ibn KallSd's KitSb al-u$ül. The Zaydite imSm Abu ТШЬ Yahyfi b. 
al-Husayn al-Nâ^iq bi- ' l -haqq (d. 424/1033) made ZlySdët 
(additions) to cAbd al-óabbar's commentary on Ibn JÇallàd's ¡CitSb 
aJ-usüJ (Madelung, 1965, 180-181 and Gimaret, 1979, 70-73 and 
78). Abu Rasïd al-NïsSbürl was the author of another commentary 
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on Kitëb al-usul. The text of a c r i t ica l paraphrase of AbO 
Rasld's work was edited by Abu Rida in Cairo In 1969, enti t led FT 
'1-toward. The author Is not mentioned in the manuscript. Abu 
Rida thought that the edited text was composed by Abu Raâîd a l -
NïsSbürï himself. Gimaret, however, thinks that It is not Abu 
Raáld's work i tself , but a cr i t ical paraphrase of i t made by a 
la ter author. Gimaret also thinks i t possible that i t i s a 
commentary not on Ibn Kallâd's Kitëb al-usul, but on Ibn KallSd's 
Kitëb al-àarh (Gimaret, 1979, 73). Another part of Abu Raáld's 
Ziyëdët has been identified by Martin (1976). 
114 On Abu Ishëq, see Fedi (328: 3-10), Jabaqët (107: B-13), Sezgin 
(1967, 624) and cütmän (1968, 48-49). 
115 Ibn al-MurtadS maintains that Abu Ishfiq was the author of a book 
on the imamate of al-tyasan and al-Çusayn (Jabaqët, 107: 12-13), 
but this work is not mentioned by cAbd al-Gabbir. 
116 On Abu =Abdallah al-Basrï, see Fadl (325: 10-328: 2), Jabaqët 
(105: 11-107: 7), Fihrist (222), Van Ess (1980), Kraemer (1986, 
178-184) and cUtman (1968, 50-51). 
117 Van Ess (I960, 12). 
118 cAbd al-óabbfir mentions him among the disciples of Abu HSsim, 
after Ibn Kallad and before Abu cAbdallSh al-Basrl, but he does 
not say that Ibn Sahlawiyya was the teacher of Abu cAbdall5h 
(.Fadl, 324: 13-325: 9). 
119 Busse (1969, 443-444). 
Notes to Chapter Two 
1 For a bibliography of the sources on cAbd al-éabbSr, see cUtm5n 
(1968, 245-247) and Madelung (1985, 118). For those works of 
cAbd al-öabbSr that have been published, see Madelung (1985, 
117). 
2 ^Utman (1968, 11-41). 
3 cUtm5n collected the t i t l e s of sixty-nine works. See also below, 
note 5. 
4 cUtmfin (1968, 57-72). 
5 Works that have been at t r ibuted to cAbd al-öabbSr but which are 
not found in eUtmSn's l i s t are: al-Muktasar fi usui al-dln, which 
might be identical with Muk_tasar al-¡fasanl CTa'lSq, 122: 15) (on 
this work, see Chapter Two, 55), al-Mûglbët wa-'l-mu'attirët 
(Tadkira, 597: 17), al-UsQl al-к am sa and ТасЩ al-Ba£dëdiyyët. 
Ibn Mattawayh mentions cAbd al-óabbar's TaclSq al-Ba£dëdiyyët in 
his al-Тайкіга f S ahkëm al-$awëhir wa-4-a'rëd (Tadkira, 86: 17 
and 67: 11). I t probably was a tacllq of Abu Hâslm*s al-
Ba&dëdiyyët. On Abu Hfièim's Al-Ba¿dediyyet, see Gimaret (1976, 
308-312). 
6 Bosworth (1987, 697). 
7 Le Strange (1930, 196). 
8 Madelung (1975, 212). 
9 Bosworth (1980, 92). 
10 Bosworth (I960, 92-93) and Busse (1969, 18). 
11 Busse (1975, 280). 
12 ^UtmSn (1968, 29). 
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13 Madelung (1985, 117) warns that this statement should be viewed 
with caution. He considers i t more l ikely that 'Abd al-GabbSr was 
brought up on a traditionalist SSf i c i te creed. 
14 On the travels of Muslim scholars and students in different 
periods, see Ahmed (1968, 100-111) and Kraemer <19B6, 24-25). 
15 ^Utmän <1968, 23-24) and Madelung (1985, 117). 
16 cUtmân U968, 43). 
17 Busse (1969, 524). 
18 Busse (1969, 524-525) thinks that this might be Abu ·=Α1Ι b. 
Suwar al-Katib, who was a contemporary of Ibn al-Nadïm, the 
composer of the Fihrist. 
19 'Utman (1968, 24). 
20 On Abu Ishäq b. cAyyâs, see Chapter One, 42. 
21 Canard (1962, 278-283). 
22 On AbQ ^Abdallah al-Basrï, see Chapter One, 42-43. 
23 Naqd ai-Juma* is mentioned by al-Gusaml (èarh аі-^иуйп, 368: 8) 
and by Ibn al-MurtadS (fabaqSt, 113: 11). For other references, 
see
 cUtmSn (1968, 71). Mânkdïm's and Ibn Mattawayh's references 
(.Taclîq, 325: 3 and Magmû* I, 351: 14) to Naqd al-luma= can also 
be added to these references. The AScarite al-BSqill5nI is the 
author of K. Naqd al-naqd in which he, in his turn, refutes cAbd 
al-öabbär's Naq<f al-luma' (Gimaret, 1985a, 187, note 12). 
24 Kltäb al-'umad is mentioned by al-ôuaaml (.Sarb а2~"иуип, 368: 6) 
and by Ibn al-MurtadS IfabaqSt, 113: 11). For other references to 
it, see cUtmSn (1968, 61). MSnkdlm's reference to it (Taclîq, 46: 
3) can also be added to these references. The text of KitSb al-
cumad has not been found but Hamldulläh, the editor of Abu '1-
Husayn's KitSb al-mW'tamad, has pointed out that several passages 
from cAbd al-öabbSr's Kltëb al-cumad are found in Kltäb al-
mwtamad. Hamldullah considers i t possible that the fragment of a 
manuscript in the Vatican collection wil l turn out to be a part 
of cAbd al-Öabbfir's KitSb al-eumad (.Mw=tamad II, French text, 18). 
25 Another commentary on Kitñb al-cumad was made by cAbd al-
GabbSr's disciple, AbQ Ί-Husayn al-Basrl, before this disciple 
composed his KitSb ai-mu'tamed. This can be concluded from 
references in KitSb al-mu'tamad, in which Abu 'l-^usayn refers to 
cAbd al-ÖabbSr's KitSb al-eumad and cAbd al-öabbär's Sarh and his 
own Èarh on cAbd al-öabbär's KitSb al-'umad. See, for instance, 
Muctamed I, 324: 13-14 where a l l three works are mentioned in 
one passage. 
26 Taqrlb al-υφΰΐ i s not mentioned by al-öusaml or Ibn al-MurtadS. 
27 TahdSb al-àarb i s not mentioned by al-ôusamï or Ibn al-MurtadS. 
28 Mentioned by al-ôusamï (Sarb аі-^иуйп, 368: 1) and Ibn al-MurtadS 
(JabaqSt, 113: 8). 
29 cAbd al-Óabbár refers in the Mu$nl to his ¿агф al-gSmi' al-?a¿Ir 
(.Mugnl DC, 69: 22-23). Both al-Öusamï (èarh al-'uyOn, 368: 3) and 
Ibn al-Murtadä ifabaqät, 113: 9) mention a work that they call 
èarh al-gSmicayn. It may be that this i s a commentary on both 
AbQ HHsim's al-ÓSmi* al-$a¿Ir and his al-ÓSai" аІ-каЫг. 
30 On Abu Haáim"s al-Ò&mi' al-fa¿Ir, see Gimaret (1976, 316-317). 
31 Al-Ôuéaml (.èarh. al-'uyûn, 368: 6) and Ibn al-MurtadS ifabaqät, 
113: 10) say that Kitäb al-nihSya i s a work on legal theory and 
methodology (usui al-fiqh). For other references to i t , see 
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'Utmin ( 1 9 6 8 , 6 2 ) , who i s of the opinion that i t was dictated in 
the period of the d i c t a t i o n of the Mugnl but before the death of 
Aba r Abdal lah , which means that i t dates from the period 
3 6 0 / 9 7 0 - 3 7 9 / 9 7 9 . «=Utmän does not give arguments for his opinion. 
32 Canard ( 1 9 6 2 , 2 8 3 ) . 
33 If 'Abd a l - ö a b b S r did l eave Bagdad for th i s reason, he may have 
done the same as Abu c Abdallah before him. cAbd al-6abbär 
s u g g e s t s in h i s biography of Abu ^Abdallah that in a period of 
famine and s c a r c i t y Abu ""Abdallah l e f t Bagdad. This might have 
been in 3 3 4 / 9 4 5 , when many people died from starvation (Canard, 
1962, 2 8 3 ) . Abu c Abdal lah travelled to cAskar Mukram, in the 
province KuzistSn, but he la ter returned to Bagdad (FaçfJ, 325: 
14 -15 ) . Like h i s master , cAbd al-öabbfir l e f t for KuzistSn but, 
unlike him, he did not return to Bagdad, except for a short s tay 
many y e a r s l a t e r . 
34 Abu 'l-Qasim al-BalJçî reports that cAskar Mukram was completely 
M u c t a z i l i t e iDikr, 112) , which probably meant that the people 
adhered to some fundamental Mu c tazi l i te doctrines. Vis i tors to 
the town report on i t s inhabitants' Muctazilite leanings 
(Bosworth, 1987a) . 
35 Busse ( 1 9 6 9 , 5 2 5 ) . 
36 According to Ibn al-Murtadâ, Abu 'Abdallah died in 367/977, which 
i s e x a c t l y the same year as cAbd al-Gabbar became chief judge of 
Rayy (fabaqSt, 107: 5 - 6 ) . Ibn al-Nadlm, however, mentions 369/979 
as the year in which Abu 'Abdallah died (Flhrist, 111). 
37 Cahen ( 1 9 6 5 , 7 4 8 ) . 
38 On a l - N a s î b î n ï s e e fabaqSt (114: 4-5) . Al-Sarlf al-MurtadS was 
one of h i s s t u d e n t s (fabaqSt, 117). Al-Tawh.Idi unfavourably spoke 
of him (Kraemer, 1986 , 185-186) . 
39 Madelung ( 1 9 8 5 , 117) . 
40 In the f i f t h / e l e v e n t h century this valuable document was given as 
a p r e s e n t to NizSm al-Mulk (Mez, 1922, 166). The text has 
surv ived b e c a u s e i t was included by al-Rfifi^î al-QazwShî °Abd a l -
Karlm b. Muhammad (d. 623 /1226) in h is al-TadwItï fí akbñr Qazwîn. 
A manuscript of t h i s work e x i s t s in the col lect ion of Dar a l -
Kutub in Cairo. That part of this work in which the biography of 
cAbd a l - ö a b b S r and the t e x t of the c e r t i f i c a t e of h is appointment 
as ch i e f Judge are found has been edited by Fu'Sd Sayyid as an 
i n t r o d u c t i o n to h i s e d i t i o n of cAbd al-GabbSr's FaçfJ al-ietizBl 
va-fabaqSt al-Mu*tazila (FaçfJ, 122-126). 
41 Cahen (1971, 672). 
42 Kraemer (1986, 211 and 270). 
43 Kraemer (1986, 265). 
44 Madelung (1988, 30). 
45 Makdisi (1990, 236). 
46 Cahen (1971, 671-672), Kraemer (1986, 259-272) and Makdisi (1990, 
235-236). 
47 Makdisi (1990, 66). 
48 cAbd al-ÔabbSr s a y s : "When we came to l ive near him Cal-SShib], 
we had the good fortune to attend h i s s e s s ions on sc ience , and 
s o i t cannot be denied that because of this there was a change 
in the e x p r e s s i o n and meaning of what we dictated." (Mu¿nl УХ/2, 
2 5 9 : 1-2). cAbd a l -ôabbBr implies that al-Sähib taught him to use 
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a more eloquent s t y l e . He may have practised this in the e legant 
introduction to a 1-Muktacar f S usui al-dîn which he wrote for e l -
Sahib. 
49 Busse (1975, 289-290) . 
50 For the text of this l e t t e r , s ee Sarfy al-'uyun (369: 13-371: 1). 
51 Wa-la^alla qä'ilan yaqülu: inna mu^çam al-kitäb yadullu më yagrî 
fini min dikr ёаукіпё Abi ^Abdallah calá fyayätihi fa-awäkiruhu 
tadullu calB wafBtihi, wa-innamä tagiduhu kadälika 11-annä 
amlaynS mw=^amahu wa-huwa fyayy (Mugnî XX/2, 258: 9 -10) . 
52 See, for instance , Mugnî (IV, 79: 2 , 94: 13, 129: 6 and 262: 13). 
53 See, for instance , Mugnî (VI/1, 226: 16), Mugnî (VIII, 25: 11), 
Mugnî (DC, 164: 2) , Mugnî (XII, 26: 9) , Mugnî (XIII, 435: 4) and 
Mugnî (XIV, 38: 20, 86: 14 and 255: 8) . 
54 See, for instance , Mugnî (IV, 67: 6), Mugnî (V, 252: 17) and Mugnî 
(VI/1, 11: 18). 
55 See, for instance , Mugnî (V, 252: 8) , Mugnî (VI/1, 41: 4) and 
Mugnî a i l , 42: 1, 3) . 
56 At the end of the manuscript the year 606 (1210) i s mentioned as 
the year in which the copy of the manuscript was completed 
(.Mugnî XX/2, 262; 21) . 
57 About t h i s work, s e e Muctamed (И, French text 37). 
58 'Utmân ed i ted th i s c r i t i c a l paraphrase under the t i t l e Sarfy al-
usul al-k.amsa. On this work see Introduction, 1-4 and 8. 
MSnkdlm's Ta*Hq i s not the only ta'llq on cAbd al-Gabbâr's earl? 
aJ-usöJ al-kamsa. Another ta'llq was later made by Abu Muhammad 
Isma^Il al-FarrazSdl. Gimaret (1979, 61) places al-FarrazSdl's 
death in about 510/1116. He concluded that al-Farrazedï's ta"lSq 
i s very c l o s e to Mânkdîm's but that i t s t i l l i s a new ta'ISq. 
59 On the b a s i s of a study of severa l manuscripts Gimaret concluded 
that Sarfr al-usQl al-kamsa i s a commentary made by cAbd a l -
GabbSr on one of his ear l i er works, Kitäb al-usul al-jçamsa. 
Gimaret discovered the text of Kitäb al-usul al-kamsa, in a 
manuscript in the Vatican co l l ec t ion . Comparing th i s work with 
MSnkdlm's c r i t i c a l paraphrase of èarfy al-usul al-kamsa, he became 
convinced that th i s was the work which Sari} al-usul al-kamsa i s 
a commentary on. The text of Kitäb al-usul al-jramsa was 
published by him as part of an a r t i c l e (Gimaret 1979, 79-96) . It 
i s a r e l a t i v e l y short text that renders only the principal 
doctrinal points of the Mu^tazila without extens ive elaboration. 
Gimaret thinks that i t was meant as a sort of Mu^tazilite creed 
(caqSda) in the form of quest ions and answers that could e a s i l y 
be understood by the average reader. Kitäb al-usul al-kamsa i s 
not mentioned by al-6usamï or Ibn Murtadä (Jabäqät) among the 
works of cAbd al-6abbär, nor i s i t mentioned by cAbd el-Gabber 
himself at the end of the Mugnî. Perhaps i t was not mentioned 
because i t was regarded as a l e s s important work af ter cAbd a l -
GabbSr had dictated h is commentary iéarfy) on i t . The text of cAbd 
al-éabbfir's éarh. al-usul al-kamsa has not been discovered in any 
co l l ec t ion of manuscripts ye t . We know that i t ex i s ted because i t 
i s mentioned by cAbd al-ôebbêr among the works that he dictated 
in the same period as the MugnS (.MugnS XX/2, 258: 6). It i s a l so 
mentioned by el -6usami (éartf al-cuyun, 368: 2) and by Ibn a l -
MurtadS ifabaqät, 113: 9). 
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60 éarb. al-maqälät is mentioned by al-öusamï (Sarb al-'uyûn, 36β: 3) 
and by Ibn al-MurtadS (fabaqSt, 113: 10). This work was also 
known to Ibn SlnS because in one of his l e t t e r s he refers to 
what cAbd al-öabbSr says in it about space (fates'). Dhanani 
(1991, 202) gives a translat ion of this passage. 
61 On him, see Chapter One, note 7. 
62 Bayan al-mutaäSblh fi '1-Qur'Bn, al-Mutaéâbih for short, is 
mentioned by al-Gusamî (.Sarb. al-cuy0n, 369: 1). The text has been 
edited by cAdnân Muhammad Zarzur (Cairo, 1969). On i t s contents, 
see Peters (1976, 11-12) and 'Utmfin (196&, 58). cUtman concluded 
that i t was completed before cAbd al-ôabbSr dictated volume XVII 
of the Mugnl because he refers to i t in that volume. Bernand 
(1984) studied the exegetical method applied by 'Abd al-Gabb8r 
in BaySn al-mutaàëbih fi Ί-Qur'än. 
63 Kitäb al-i'timSd i s mentioned by al-Gu§amï (Sarfr al-^иуйп, 367: 
17) and by Ibn al-MurtadS (fabaqät, 113: 6). Ibn Mattawayh refers 
to i t ITadkira, 601: 10). 
64 On this work, see Gimaret (1976, 313-316). 
65 Chapter Two, 49. 
66 KItSb al-ta$rld is mentioned by al-Ôusamï (.Sari? al-'uyOn, 369: 
3). 
67 Ibn Mattawayh refers to i t by the t i t l e ¿arh. kaèf al-a¿rid сап 
al-aTSd íTadklra, 337: θ) but al-ôusaml ÎÈarb. al-'uyûn, 36Ô: 4) 
and Ibn al-Murtada (fabaqSt, 113: 10) refer to i t by the t i t l e 
Sarfy al-a'rSd. Ben Shammai (1974, 302) considers i t possible that 
a part of this work ex is t s in a manuscript in the British Museum. 
6B This work is not mentioned by al-ôusamî or by Ibn al-Murtada. 
69 Gimaret (1985, 247-248). 
70 Al-6usaml mentions among •'Abd al-ôabbfir's works one that is 
named al-Ôadal (.Serf? al-cuy0n, 369: 4). cUtmSn (1968, 63) 
supposes that by al-öadal al-Guàamï means Sari} adab al-¿adal. 
71 It i s not mentioned by al-óusamí or Ibn al-Murtadä, probably 
because i t was not an important work. The text has been edited 
by Muhammad cImära in Rasa'il al-'adi wa-'l-tawhîd (Cairo, 1971. 
Reprint: 1988). I t i s possible that i t is identical to «=Abd a l -
GabbSr's Muk.ta$ar al-tfasanl because Mânkdîm reports that in 
Muktaçar al-tfasanl cAbd al-öabbSr says that the principles of 
Mu c tazil i te doctrine are Unity ( tawb.Id>, Justice lcadl), 
Prophethood inubuwwBi) and Prescriptions of the Religious Law 
<.ëarS'ic) (Ta'llq, 122: 15-16). The same four principles are 
mentioned in al-Muktaçar fi υφΰΐ al-dln (.Muktasar, 197: 16-19). 
It i s unusual to have only four principles: the usual number is 
five. I t i s therefore possible that MSnkdlm is referring to the 
work that was edited by cImara under the t i t l e of al-Mukta$ar fi 
usflJ al-dln. 
72 Kraemer (1986, 272). 
73 cAbd al-èabbSr was of the opinion that repentance of sins i s an 
obligation (Mugnl ХГ , 335-337). However, he emphasizes that 
repentance must be genuine, which implies that one must feel 
regret about the sin committed and must be determined never to 
do i t again (MugnS ХГ , 371-373). He is of the opinion that one 
who genuinely repents no longer deserves to be punished or 
blamed (Mugnl XIV, 311: 4) and that punishment from God will only 
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be remitted after the sinner has truly repented and not as the 
result of someone else's intercession. cAbd al-ôabbSr therefore 
considers it wrong to intercede for those who die without 
repenting of their sins <.Ta<=lSq, 688: 14-17). In this, cAbd al-
GabbSr's position is much stricter than Abu Hakim's, who 
maintains that intercession is a good act iTa'lIq, 689: 1-2). 
74 Busse (1975, 295) and Cahen (1965, 749). 
75 Cahen (1965, 749). Fakr al-Dawla's need of money is further 
evidenced by his order to the new vizier to collect 30,000,000 
dirhams from the provinces and from officials, allegedly because 
al-SShib had neglected to collect these sums (Mottahedeh, 1973, 
43, note 35). 
76 On him, see al-WSfl Ы-4-uafaySt (XVIII, 33: 19) and Madelung 
(1965, 15). He was not only a scholar but also a poet. He wrote a 
commentary on the Qur'fin and treatises on law and history, and 
poems (.fabaqSt al-èëficiyya I, 163-164). 
77 Spuler (1952, 106). 
78 On Magd al-Dawla, see Bosworth (1986, 1028). The philosopher Ibn 
SInS stayed for a short time at his court in Rayy, probably 
around the year 404/1014 (Gutas, 1988, 99). 
79 cUtman (1968, 71-72). 
80 Busse (1975, 294). 
61 Madelung (1985, 117). 
B2 Al-èarlf al-Murtadâ Abu Ί-QSsim cAlï b. al-Husayn al-Musawï 
cAlâm al-Hudfi (355/967-436/1044) became the leader of the 
Imamites of Bagdfid after the death of his teacher al-Sayk al-
Mufïd in 413/1022. On al-Sarlf al-Murtada^ doctrine, see 
McDermott (1978, 373-394). McDermott (1978, 382) observes that 
al-Sarïf al-MurtadS's doctrine on pain and compensation is in 
general similar to that of cAbd al-баЬЬвг. 
63 'UtmBn (1968, 26). 
84 In Isfahan cAbd al-Gabbar gave lessons on ZiySdSt ai-sar$ which 
were attended by the Zaydite imfim Mu'ayyad M-'liah iffadS'iq, 265: 
19-266: 1). It is not clear to which commentary the additions 
(.ziyBdSV) were made. It may have been Ibn KallSd's famous èarii 
(see Chapter One, 41-42). 
65 nWa-kSna rablmahu 'llSh yaktacìru fi Ί-imlS' wa-yabsufu Π '1-
dars" cSarh al-'uyQn, 369: 6). 
86 Endress (1982, 287). On this method of teaching, see also Van Ess 
(1976, 24), Makdisi (1981, 112-126 and 114) and Kraemer (1986, 
56-57). 
87 See also note 155. 
88 On the function of a master's substitute, see Makdisi (1981, 189). 
89 This may be the same work as al-Adilla, of which al-ôusamï says 
it i s a work on the Qur'an (éarh al-cuyun, 369: 1). It is not 
mentioned by Ibn al-Murtada. For other references to i t , see 
cUtmân (1968, 60). The text was edited by cAbd al-Karlm cUtm3n 
and published in 1966 in Beirut. On i t s contents, see Peters 
(1976, 12-13) and Madelung (1985, 117). 
90 Peters (1976, 13, note 45). 
91 On this work, see cUtmSn (1968, 71-72). Al-Óuàaml and Ibn al-
Murtada do not mention a work with this t i t le . 
92 On this work, see cUtm8n (1968, 63-64). The text was edited by 
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Fu'ad Sayyid and published in 1974 in Tunis. 
93 cUtmSn (1968, 64). 
94 Jabaqët (XVI) and Madelung (1987, 330). 
95 This i s ^UtmSn's conclusion ("Utmän, 1968, 59-60). The work is 
not mentioned by al-Guáaml or Ibn al-Murtada. For references to 
i t , see cUtman (1968, 59). Manuscripts of this work exist in the 
collections of the Vatican (Sezgin, 1967, 625), the British Museum 
and in a private collection in Cairo (cUtmän, 1968, 60). 
96 'Utmän (196В, 26-27). 
97 His biography is given below in this chapter (Chapter Two, 62-
63). 
98 For his biography, see Chapter Two, 58-61. 
99 Bosworth (1966, 1028). 
100 For this report, see Glassen (1981, 10-11). Bosworth (1962, 70-
72) made an English translation of i t . 
101 Al-GusamI does not report on deportations of Mu ctazilites from 
Rayy and does not refer to any action of Mahmud of Gazna against 
them. Instead, he reports that cAbd al-Gabbar's former servant, 
Abu Bakr al-DInawarl, held a dispute with Abu Ί-Hasan al-Tunl in 
the presence of Mahmud after MahmQd's arr ival in Rayy (.Sari} eJ-
с
иуйп, 390: 12-15). However, al-ôusamï does report al-MahmQd's 
action against three Muctazilites of NïsSbûr when he was in 
Gazna. They were brought to him and he exiled them to Quzdâr, 
where they died (Serb аі-^иуйп, 387: 7-11) (See also Jabaqët, 
118: 7-10). It is likely that they were banished because of their 
adherence to the Muctazila, although this is not explicitly 
mentioned as the reason for their banishment. The name of their 
place of exile is read as cUzdâr (Sari} al-cuyQn, 387: 10) or as 
GuzdSr (Jabaqët, 118: 10) but evidently the place meant here is 
QuzdSr, the capital of Turan, one of Mahmüd of Gazna's early 
conquests (Le Strange, 1930, 331 and Gaube, 1994, 142). 
102 Makdisi (1973, 156), Glassen (1981, 10) and Nagel (1988, 56-57). 
103 Makdisi (1963, 301-303) and Laoust (1973, 173). 
104 Bosworth (19733·, 53). 
105 Ibn KSkuyS had to leave Isfahan together with Ibn Sina, his 
vizier and physician (Gutas, 1988, 135). 
106 NSZÌJH (1973=, 85). 
107 Bosworth (19732, 234) and Gutas (1988, 135). 
108 Bosworth (1968, 38). 
109 On ^Alä' al-Dawla b. Kâkûyâ's war with the Gaznavids, see 
Bosworth (1970, 76-81). 
110 On the life and works of Abu RaSId, see Sarh al-'uyOn (382: 8-
383: 5), Jabaqët (116: 2-13), Madelung (1985a), Frank (1980), 
Martin (1978), cUtmSn (1968, 50), Sezgin (1967, 626-627), Horten 
(1910, 6-9) and Biram (1902, 7-10). 
111 See Chapter One, 27. 
112 Madelung (1985 a, 367) considers it likely that he was born no 
later than 360/970. 
113 It is not clear whether he had this circle before or after his 
first stay in Rayy. Frank (1980, 32) is of the opinion that he 
gave it up before he returned to Rayy to take up permanent 
residence there. 
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114 See Chapter Two, 58. 
115 According to Horten (1911, 433), Abu Rasïd died in ebout 1068, 
but he does not explain why he says th is . Ahlwardt (1B87/99, IV, 
448) also gives no explanation of how he reached the conclusion 
that Abu Rasïd lived between 320/932 and 460/1068. He may have 
concluded this from the fact that the copyist of manuscript 
Berlin no. 5125 of Abu Rasïd's Kitñb al-masS'il fi Ч-kilëf bayn 
al-Basriyyîn wa- '1-BagdSdiyyïn wrote that he copied this 
manuscript from a manuscript that was copied in 460/1068. In 
another manuscript of Abu RaSId's work that is mentioned in the 
l i s t of manuscripts that were filmed during the expedition to 
Yemen in 1974, the date of 400 (1009 AD) is written as the year 
of his death ŒaktûtSt, 1976, 24, item 145). This must be wrong 
because i t implies that he died ear l ier than cAbd al-GabbSr, 
which is contradicted by the report that he attended -"Abd a l -
GabbSr's funeral in 415/1024 (or 414/1023 or 416/1025). 
116 For l i t e r a tu re on Abu '1-Husayn al-Basrl and his works, see the 
bibliography made by Madelung (1980, 25-26). To the s tudies 
mentioned by Madelung we may add a la ter ar t ic le on Abu ' 1 -
Husayn by Gimaret (1985b). 
117 Madelung (1980, 25) and Kraemer (1986, 131). 
118 Madelung (1980, 25) reached this conclusion because, when Abu ' 1 -
Husayn died in 436/1044, the prayers at his funeral were said by 
the Hanafite judge al-Saymarl, a Muctazilite jur is t who had had 
to renounce Muctazilism in order to be appointed as a judge. 
119 This i s Madelung's opinion (Madelung, 1980, 25). 
120 For the main points of his doctrine, see Gimaret (1985 b). 
121 Ibn al-Murtade uses the name al-Bahäsima, but al-Gusamï speaks 
of "our fellows" (asÇSbunS). 
122 Gimaret (1985b, 322) studied a manuscript of Abu '1-Husayn's aJ-
FS'iq fi" usui al-dln and two other manuscripts in which 
references are made to opinions of AbO '1-Husayn. He concluded 
that Abu '1-Husayn disagreed with the Mu<=tazilite masters of the 
Basrian tradit ion about a number of significant issues. For Abu 
'1-Husayn's opinions, see also Gimaret (1986, 287-289, notes). 
123 cUtman (1968, 51) describes the school of Abu '1-Husayn as a 
small school {madrasa') within the school of cAbd al-éabb5r, but 
Madelung (1980, 25) speaks of Abu '1-Husayn's school as a 
separate school that had diverged from cAbd al-öabbar's school. 
124 An edition of his al-Muctamad fi usOl al-dln is being prepared 
by Madelung (Gimaret, 1991, 14). 
125 On Ibn al-Walid, see Makdisi (1963, 407-409). 
126 On Abu '1-Qasim b. Barhän, see Makdisi (1963, 393-394). 
127 Elshahed (1983) has edited, translated and analysed a part of his 
KltSb al-kSmil fi '1-lstiqsS' fl-mB bala¿ana~ min kalâm al-qudamS'. 
128 Perhaps th is Rukn al-Dln al-KwSrizml is the same person as 
Malymud al-Maläljiml, Abu '1-Husayn's disciple and the author of 
al-MWtamad ΓΙ usui al-dSn. The l e t t e r ' s full name is Rukn al-Dïn 
Mahmud b. al-Maláhiml al-Kwarizmï (d. 536/1141) (Madelung, 1987, 
329). 
129 See also Madelung (1965, 221-222). Al-öuèamï does not give a 
biography of al-MalShiml. 
130 Madelung (1965, 222) mentions some of them by name. He says that 
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Abu Ί-Qäsim b. Sabïb al-Tihâml and ^Abdallah b. Zayd al—=Ansï 
adhered to most of Abu '1-Husayn's doctrine, whereas the imam 
Yahya b. Hamza adopted a l l of his doctrine. 
131 On' the l i fe and works of MSnkdïm, see Madelung (1965, 181-183) 
and Gimaret (1979, 57-60). His complete name, showing his descent 
from CA1I b. АЫ TSlib is mentioned by al-Muljalli (.tfedä'iq, 270: 
7-13). The name MSnkdïm is also vocalized as Mânekdlm, MSnakdîm 
or MSnkadlm. Monnot (1974, 263, note 1) explains that Mankdïm is 
the Arabic form of the Persian name Mâng-dîm which means "Face 
of the Moon". 
132 Mankdïm only refers to al-Mu'ayyad bi-'USh once in Tacllq ¿ari? 
al-ufül al-kamsa (Ta'ISq, 52: 8). He usually refers to other 
masters such as Abu ^Abdallah al-Basrï and cAbd al-öabbär. 
133 For a description of the his tor ical connections between Zaydism 
and Mu<=tazilism, see Madelung (1965, 153-222), Zayd (1985, 17-
38), cÄrif (1987, 62-72), and Madelung (1967a, 361-362). According 
to Zayd (1985, 33) the f i r s t to combine Zaydism and Muctazilism 
was al-QSsim b. Ibrahim al-Rassï (169/785-246/860) who lived in 
Egypt in the period before 199/815 unti l 212/826. He then 
set t led in Rass near al-Madlna. A thorough study on him was 
written by Madelung (1965). There is no agreement on whether he 
should be considered a Mu*=tazilite. Madelung (1965, 153) i s of 
the opinion that he was not a Mu'tazil i te, but that he "opened 
the door to Muctazilism". Zayd (1985, 33) also thinks that he was 
not a Mu c tazil l te, arguing that he has not come across a single 
passage in al-QSsim's works in which he openly admits that he 
has become a Mu c tazil l te. Abrahamov (1990, 55), however, 
concluded that "al-QSsim seems to have been a Muctazillte 
thinker". Some of al-Qasim's followers propagated Zaydism In Iran. 
In 250/864 the Zaydite al-Hasan b. Zayd became the ruler of 
Tabaristän, where he imposed è ï c i t e r i t ua l and law in combination 
with Mu«=tezilite theology. After his death in 270/684 he was 
succeeded by his brother Muhammad b. Zayd (d. 287/900), whose 
secre tar ies were two Mu c tazil i tes, Abu '1-QSsim al-Balkï and Abu 
Muslim al-Isfahfinï (Madelung, 1988, 88). A grandson of al-QSsim 
b. Ibrahim was Yahya al-Hâdï 118 '1-Haqq (245/859-298/911), whose 
theological doctrine was strongly influenced by Muctazilite 
doctrine, part icularly by the Bagdädian (Madelung, 1965, 163-168). 
Al-Hâdï founded a Zaydite lmSmate In Yemen, where some of the 
Zaydites of TabaristSn joined him (Zayd, 1985, 55-95). In 
DaylamSn and Gïlan, two provinces neighbouring Tabaristän, 
Zaydism was propagated by al-Nasir bi-'1-Haqq b. CA1I al-U^rus 
(d. 304/917), whose doctrine differed in several respects from 
that of al-QSsim b. IbrShïm. He was less interested in 
Muctazilism than al-HSdl (Madelung, 1965, 159-163). His adherents 
became known as the NSsiriyya, whereas the adherents of the 
school of al-Qfisim and al-Hâdï were referred to as the Qäsimiyya. 
Most of the Daylamites belonged to the Qaslmlyya and therefore 
had t i es with the Zaydites in Yemen. Ahmad b. al-Husayn a l -
Mu'ayyad bi- ' llSh (333/944-411/1020) and his brother Abu TSlib 
YahyS b. al-Husayn al-NS^iq bi-'l-Haqq (340/951-424/1033), two 
Caspian Zaydite imSms who studied Muctazillte theology with Abu 
cAbdallah al-Basrl , also belonged to the Qäsimiyya. Their doctrine 
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shows the influence of the Basrlan tradition of the Mu-=tazila, as 
distinct from the doctrine of al-HSdl who was closer to the 
Bagdadian tradition (Madelung, 1988, 90). One of the brothers, al-
Mu'ayyad bi-'llah, later studied in Rayy with cAbd al-Öabbär. Al-
lusami reports that it was said that cAbd al-âabbar himself also 
studied with al-Mu'ayyid M-'liah {¿art? aJ-'uyun, 376: 3-12). As 
al-Mu'ayyad bi-'USh himself was a prominent scholar, they must 
have been more like two colleagues rather than student and 
teacher. During his stay in Rayy, al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llah belonged to 
the group of scholars who surrounded al-Çâhib b. cAbbSd. MSnkdîm 
was one of his disciples. 
134 Madelung (1965, 182). 
135 See Introduction, 1-4. 
136 See Notes to the Introduction, 204, note 4. 
137 His full name was al-Qäslm b. Ahmad b. Humayd al-Muhalll al-
WSdicI al-Sancânï. He was probably the son of Ahmad b. Humayd 
al-Muhalll <d. 652/1254), the author of al-Cädälq. The t i t l e of 
his commentary is KltSb ta*llq calS Èarfy al-im&m al-maêhür Ы-
MSnkdlm alladl äaraha bihi Ч-usQl al-kamsa li-qñdl '1-qudSt eAbd 
al-ôabbar b. Afymad raÇlmahumu 'USh. Gimaret (1979, 63) has 
pointed out that there is a mistake In this t i t l e , as the 
commentary by Mfinkdïm is not on cAbd al-6abbar's Usui al-k.amsa 
but on his Earl} a J-usö J al-kamsa. 
136 That Mânkdïm was a Zaydlte becomes clear when he mentions Zayd 
as the fourth iiaSm after Muhammad, saying that the imams are 
"
CA1I b. AM jalib, then al-Hasan, then al-Husayn, then Zayd b. 
CA1I and then those who lived like them" (man sera Ы-sïratihim') 
iTa*lXq, 757: 16). 
139 Bosworth (1968, 42 and 38). 
140 Glassen (1981, 12). Another reason why the situation in Bagdad 
was difficult for the Muctazilites was that they had close 
relations with the èr=ites. Both groups lived in the same quarter 
of the city and were subject to attacks from the traditionalist 
Sunnites, who knew they had the caliph's support. In this period 
another group of SFites , the Ism8cilite FS^imids, created a 
special threat to Sunnite Islam. They had conquered Aleppo in 
429/1038 and had spread propaganda for IsmacIlism in Iran and 
Transoxanla by sending missionaries to these districts (Kennedy, 
1986, 341). The caliph, and especially his vizier Ibn al-Muslima, 
therefore pursued an a n t i - a n t e policy that was not only 
directed against Fa ^  im id propaganda but also against the S u i t e s 
in Bagdad, most of whom lived in the Karjj. quarter, where many 
Muctazilites also lived (Glassen, 1981, 45 and Makdisi, 1963, 
332). Laoust (1973) gives an account of the incidents that took 
place there. Because of the SI c i tes' difficult position, the 
Imâmite scholar Abu fiacfar al-Tüsï, who was a disciple of al-Sayk 
al-Mufld, took refuge in Nagaf in 449/1957 (Glassen, 1981, 40). 
For the SIcites things improved temporarily when Bagdad was 
reoccupied in 450/1058 by the former BQyid commander al-
Basasirl, who had the support of the Fä{imids. He executed the 
vizier Ibn al-Muslima, but in 451/1060 he himself was killed when 
Tugril-beg, who supported the caliph, occupied Bagdad (Glassen, 
1981, 43-44). After al-Basasirl's defeat the Kark quarter was 
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plundered by the mob. The large library that had been founded by 
the BOyid v iz ier SSpur in 363/993 and which had many Mu c taz i l i te 
and Zaydite books was plundered and burned. The books that 
survived were appropriated by the Seljuk v iz ier cAmïd al-Mulk a l -
Kundurl (Busse, 1969, 527). 
141 Madelung (1971, 129-130) . 
142 In 445/1053 Tugri l -beg issued an order that a l -Ascari was to be 
cursed from the pulp i t s in KurSsSn. He a l so gave the command to 
arrest and deport the four most prominent è s f i ^ i t e s of Nîsâbûr. 
One of them was the theologian Abu 'l-Ma^all al-öuwaynï, who, 
however, managed to escape and take refuge in Mecca (Bul l iet , 
1973, S3). Under Alp ArslSn, who succeeded his uncle Tugril-beg 
as su l tan in 455/1063 , the persecution of the Ascariyya came to 
an end. His v iz ier Nizâm al-Mulk supported the S ä f i c i t e s and, as 
the As^arites were mostly è â f i c i t e s , they benefited from this 
support. Nizam al-Mulk founded madrases called Nizämiyya, in both 
NísSbür and Bagdad. These madrasas, in which S S f i c i t e law was 
taught, were open to è s f i ^ i t e students only (Makdisi, 1973, 158-
161). One of the professors of the Nizämiyya in Bagdad was the 
famous al-Gazzai l , who taught Sâfi^ite law there from 464/1091 
unt i l 486/1095. 
143 Madelung (1971, 126-127) . 
144 Bul l ie t (1972, 252) . 
145 It was said that he was the prime mover in the persecution of 
Asser i te leaders in Nisäbur (Bulliet, 1972, 236). 
146 Bul l ie t (1972, 206). 
147 Madelung (1968, 30 and 91). It i s reported that he was wel l 
versed in Zaydite law and gave lessons not only in Rayy but a l s o 
in DaylamSn (Sarp al-cuyQn, 389: 1-5, and JabaqSt, 119: 14-16) . It 
i s reported that he was the author of many books, but I do not 
know whether any of h i s works has survived. 
148 On al-Mursad bi- 'USh Abu Ί-Husayn Yahyä, s e e Madelung (1965, 
184-165) . 
149 Gimaret (1979, 60-61) . A reference to al-FarrazâdJ's ta'lîq i s 
found in FI tawh.Xd (622: 18) in which al-Farrazâdï i s referred to 
as the commentator on Kitëb al-ιιφΰΐ al-kamsa. On th is passage, 
s e e Monnot (1974, 267, note 1). 
150 The Mu c taz i l i te theologian Abu CA1I b. al-Walld (d. 478/1086), a 
d i sc ip le of Abu Ί-Husayn al-Basrl, i s said not to have l e f t h is 
house in Kark, during the l a s t f i f ty years of h is l i f e for fear of 
the Bagdad mobs. Because of this, h i s students had to come 
s e c r e t l y to h i s house (Makdisi, 1963, 407-408). Ibn c Aqïl 
(431/1039-513/1129) , one of these s tudents , was forced to 
publicly renounce the Muctazilism he was accused of in 465/1072 
(Makdisi, 1963, 426-428) . This i l l u s t r a t e s the d i f f i cu l t pos i t ion 
of the Mu c taz i l i t es in Bagdad in that period. 
151 Madelung (1962) has pointed out that the name as i t appears on 
the t i t l e - p a g e of volume I of the Magmû* i s deceptive. The la s t 
part of the name, CAH b. cAbdallâh b. с0^Ьа (read: с А{іууа) b. 
Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Nagrânï, appears to be the name of the 
scribe . This was known to Houben, who edited the text and who, in 
h is introduction, mentions th i s person as the scribe of the 
manuscript of Rome lMa¿muc I, French text , 10). 
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152 The date of 1076 was mentioned by Horten (1912, 465) as the 
year in which Mattawayhi, the author of β commentary on the 
Qur'än died. This date was probably adopted by other scholars 
including Kouben (.Magmû* I, French text, 8) and Sayyid iSarh ai 
"иуйп, 369, note 124) as the year in which Ibn Mattawayh died. 
153 '-"Utmân (1966, 51) and Ben-Shammai (1974, 298, note 32) say that 
Ibn Mattawayh died in 468/1075. 
154 Madelung (1982). 
155 Wa-qSla fI tadrîs hadé '1-kltäb. Other remarks on cAbd a l -
öabbär's teaching are "he said in the lesson" Ufakä fi Ί-dars) 
(MagmQc I, 160: 23), "he pointed out th is aspect when he taught 
th is book" iwa-ilä hädä '1-wagh aàSra fi tadrîs hSdä Ч-kltéb) 
(.Magma* III, fo l . 37b) and "he pointed th i s out in the lesson and 
i t i s c learer than what i s said in the book" (wa-ilayhi aàSra fi 
Ί-dars wa-huwa a by an mimmS dakarahu f I Ί-kitäb) (MagmQc III, 
fol . 38a). 
156 Mentioning someone at the end of the fabaqa could a l so mean that 
he was considered l e s s important because, for instance, he did 
not belong to the same Mu c tazi l i te school. This, however, does 
not seem to apply to Ibn Mattawayh. 
157 Gimaret (1979, 60) says that he has not been able to find out 
who th is Ibn Mazdak was. We have seen that al-Farrazâdï s tudied 
with al-Mursad bi- 'USh AbQ Ί-Husayn YahyS (d. 477/1064). As i t 
i s unlikely that b. Mazdak i s a wrong reading of al-Mursad, he 
must have been another of al-FarrazSdï's masters. 
158 The text of this chain i s quoted in Ta-=lSq, 24, note 1, and 
Rasë'il I, 87. 
159 This i s Gimaret's opinion (Gimaret, 1979, 61). 
160 Madelung (1965, 214, note 409) and Daiber (1975, 509-510 , note 
2). In h i s study Daiber s t i l l took for granted that ^Abd a l -
óabbSr was the author of al-Ma£muc fi 'l-muplt. He therefore 
thought that QSdï 6a c far refuted eAbd al-ôabb§r's opinion on the 
imämate. 
161 Madelung (1982) points out that Ibn Mattawayh's opinion with 
respect to the imam's immunity for s in differed from Imâmite 
opinion on th i s subject , as Ibn Mattawayh did not consider 
immunity for s in to be a prerequisite for the val id i ty of the 
Imämate. 
162 See, for instance, volume I of the MagmO* iMagmQ* I, 61: 4, 78: 
16 and 143: 9). 
163 Two manuscripts of the work e x i s t in co l lec t ions in Yemen. The 
photocopies of these manuscripts are kept in the DSr al-kutub in 
Cairo. A third manuscript forms part of the co l lec t ion of the 
Bibliotheca Ambrosiana in Milan (Löfgren, 1981, 173-174). The 
text of volume I was edited by SSmI Nasr Lu$f and Faysal Badïr 
cAwn in Cairo in 1975. Volume II of the Ambrosiana manuscript, 
which deals with the subject of man, has not yet been published 
(Dhanani, 1991, 137, note 12). A commentary on the Tadkira was 
made by an unknown author. It i s called Sarif al-tadkira ГІ lafä'if 
al-kalëm (Dhanani, 1991, 346). 
164 On this work, s ee Madelung (1982) and Sezgin (1967, 627). 
165 Madelung (1982) discovered a quotation from this work in a l -
MalShiml's KltSb al-muctaa>ad f I usuJ al-dln. 
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166 Maktutät (1976, 10, item 46). 
167 Madelung (1971, 136). 
168 Madelung (1971, 135, note 68). 
169 Madelung (1971, 135-136). 
170 In 537/1142 Sultan Mascüd forced two prominent Säf i^i tes in Rayy 
to s ign documents disavowing some points of their Asserite 
doctrine. The next year al-Aè^arï was cursed from some pulpits 
in Bagdad and two As , :arites were deported (Madelung, 1971, 131-
134). 
171 This i s Madelung 's opinion (Madelung, 1987, 330). 
172 Madelung (1971, 116, notes 25 and 26) mentions the names of 
several other Kwarizmian Mu^tazilites who lived in the 
s i x t h / t w e l f t h and seventh/thirteenth centuries . 
173 Anawati (1965, 751-752) . 
174 Makdisi (1993, 384) says that Ibn AM 'l-Waffi' <d. 775/1373), in 
his work al-GawShir al-muddiyya ΓΙ fabaqSt al-^anaflyya, mentions 
only one M u c t a z i l i t e Hanafite l iving in the eighth century. 
175 McDermott (1978) has written a study on the theology of al-èayk. 
al-Mufld in which he also considers the ideas of h is disc iple a l -
Sarlf al-Murtadä. 
176 Madelung (1970, 27) , Momen (1985, 79-81) and Madelung (1987a, 
367). 
Voies to Chapter Three 
1 ^Abd al-èabbar d i scusse s the existence of pain in a chapter 
called "Chapter on es tabl i sh ing the exis tence of pains" (FasJ f I 
itbSt al-SlSm) (Mugnî XIII, 229: 17-270: 9). Dhanani (1991, 144) 
points out that itbSt in the к a läm context i s used both with i t s 
normal meaning of confirming or establ ishing that something i s 
true, and in the specia l ized meaning of confirming that something 
i s a poss ib le being, whether or not i t presently e x i s t s . Mutbat, 
as a pass ive part ic ip le , i s a technical term related to the term 
ítbñt. With respect to the term mutbat (being establ ished to 
e x i s t ) , Van Ess (1966, 198) came to the conclusion that i t i s a 
broader term than the term mawgOd (presently ex i s t ing) , as 
mutbat includes both mawgud (presently ex i s t ing) and ma'dum (not 
presently e x i s t i n g , but e x i s t i n g at other moments). Van Ess added 
that the Mu c taz i l i t e s used the term тал f I (impossible) as the 
opposite of mutbat. 
2 See a l s o MugnS (IV, 79: 6-7). Bemand (1982, 71-72) thinks that 
the Sophists to whom cAbd al-öabbSr refers were groups of 
thinkers who belonged to the early mutakalHaun and became 
attracted to philosophical speculation. 
3 Tranquility of the soul (.sukün al-nafs) i s , according to cAbd a l -
GabbSr, a cr i ter ion by which real knowledge i s distinguished from 
assumption. See Chapter Five, 148. For the meaning of nafs, s e e 
Notes to Chapter Three, 233 , note 48. 
4 See a l so MugnS (ГХ, 53 : 23-24) . 
5 cAbd al-öabbSr declares that even God can be referred to as a 
"thing" ( $ a / 0 , because He i s an object of knowledge iMugnl V, 
253: 4 -10) . On the meaning of ëay' in the works of the 
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Mu c tazil i tes, see Bemand (19Ô2, 265), Dhanani <1991, 148) and Van 
Ess (1966, 192-202), who discusses the use of ¿ay' for things 
that are not presently existent (.ma^dum). 
6 On "reflection" (ла^аг) as a way of acquiring knowledge, see 
Bemand U9Ô2, 233-236) and Peters (1976, 57-60). 
7 The thing that Is to be known is referred to as "al-madlüï' ([the 
thing] to which the indication refers) . For the method of 
reflection In order to acquire knowledge and the function of the 
indication (dalli or daläla') in i t , see Bernand (1962, 233-243), 
Peters (1976, 65-66) and Van Ess (1966, 364-367). 
δ In the Mugnl the term "dalli' is used, while in the MagmQ* the 
term "dalSla" is used. However, this Is a negligible difference, 
since, as Van Ess (1966, 365-366) and Peters (1976, 65) have 
pointed out, these terms are often used synonymously. 
9 On AbO IshSq b. cAyyäs see Chapter One, 42. 
10 It Is difficult to get a clear idea of cAbd al-Öabbär's cosmology 
as he probably discussed the theory of substances and accidents 
in the missing f i r s t volumes of the Mugnl. Dhanani (1991) studied 
the various Muctazilite theories on the atom, but he mainly 
relied on the works of Ibn Mattawayh when considering Abd a l -
öabbSr's theory. Peters (1976, 105-158) describes the 
cosmological theories of Abd al-ôabbSr based on a study of the 
Mugnl, the Tacllq and the Magmu*. For the cosmological theories 
of cAbd al-ôabbfir, see also Frank (197&, especially 39-57), where 
he describes some general cosmological notions within the Basra 
school of the Muctazila. Gimaret (1990, 43-126) gives many 
references to the cosmological theories of the school of AbO 
Hâêim in his discussion of al-AscarI"s cosmology. 
11 Frank (1984, 290-291, note 19) remarks that gawhar in kal&m 
texts means "atom", and that i t should not be translated as 
"substance". Dhanani (1991, 190, note 15) agrees with him. 
However, with respect to the Bahsamiyya, evidence contradicting 
this opinion is found in Ibn Mattawayh's use of the term gawhar 
together with the term guz'. Ibn Mattawayh uses the term guz' in 
reference to the smallest part that an object can be divided Into 
(Таакіга, 162: 3-4). This is what "atom" means. The term gawShir 
is used by him when he says that bodies consist of g-awBhlr 
(substances) and accidents (acrBd) (.Tadklra, 47: 3-9). This means 
that if a body could be freed of a l l I t s accidents only the 
gawñhir would be left . However, a gawhar cannot exist without 
accidents inhering In i t because i t s existence implies that i t 
occupies place, moves or is at res t , and has a relation to other 
substances (separation or combination). A gawhar must therefore 
have at least those accidents Inhering in i t . This may explain 
why many mutakalllmQn use the terms gawhar and guz' 
synonymously. 
12 For the meaning of the term tahayyuz, see Dhanani (1991, 191-
205). 
13 See also Chapter Four, 100. 
14 The accidents of the modes of being are considered to be 
imperceptible: their existence Is known by deduction. Only 
colours, t a s t e s , odours, warmth, coldness, pains, and sounds are 
considered to be perceptible accidents (Peters, 1976, 125). 
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15 On the different so r t s of accidents see Peters (1976, 123-128) 
and Frank (1978, 93-108). 
16 cAbd al-GabbSr describes the opinion of the adherents to the 
theory of the transmigration of souls, who believed that every 
i l lness is a punishment we deserve from God. He reports that 
"they believed that disobedience [to God] was done by him [the 
person who does not deserve to be punished] when he was 
different from this shape [the shape/body this person has now]. 
Then he was transformed (nusika) into this shape. Because of 
th is , they defended the transmigration of souls ( tanâsulù. They 
therefore believed that the living being on which God has 
imposed duties (.mukallaf) is not the person (¿airs) but a ma'nS in 
him, that migrates in the persons and the skeletons (.hayäkil)". 
17 Before her sudden death Dr. Marie Bemand kindly sent me the 
following information with respect to the meaning of the term 
ma^nS: "Ma^nS peut vouloir dire "disposition", notion empruntée au 
stoicisme. Selon les Zahirites le шасл£ est considéré comme un 
intermédiaire entre la réa l i té et la subjectivité en ce qu'elle a 
de valable grace a l'appréhension pure. Selon les Imam i tes le 
ma^nS es t le sens divin à donner aux événements, intention 
divine. C'est auss i une sorte de substrate conceptuel, ce dont le 
concept suppose l 'existence réelle. Somme toute le term de macnS 
a des sens t r è s diversif iés. Mis à part le sens grammatical 
(signification), on peut dire que le terme ma'ne se caractérise 
par une vaste ampleur conceptuelle et i l subsume des valeurs 
al lant de la r éa l i t é abs t ra i te à l'existence réel le . Au centre de 
cet te constellation on peut dire que se s i tue la notion de 
disposition qui peut a l ler Jusqu'à signifier la posi t ivi té d'une 
determination. Le macnà~ en ce sens est une abstraction réal isée 
déterminant dans un corps quelque chose de non-corporel, ainsi un 
é ta t (¿ai) (Ta'ISq, 410)". 
18 For references to some special studies on the term ma'nS in 
kaläm t ex ts , see Peters (1976, 156, note 234). 
19 Frank (1967). 
20 Frank (1967, 253). 
21 Frank (1981, 259, note 1). 
22 Daiber refers to Pretzl's Attributenlehre, 40 ff. 
23 Daiber (1975, 226). 
24 Peters (1976, 156-157). 
25 Monnot (1974, 40). 
26 Bernand (1982, 370). 
27 Bernand (1982, 77-78). 
28 Frank (1967). 
29 Frank (1967, 250, note 15). 
30 Daiber (1975, 226). 
31 Monnot (1974, 40). 
32 The description of God as a ma'nS may have been derived from 
Christian doctrine. Wolf son (1976, 128) points to the use of the 
term ma^nS in the discussion on the Christian doctrine of the 
Trinity. In the presentation of this doctrine i t is said that the 
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are each a hypostasis or 
person (аолйл) or a thing (.ma'nS). 
33 On this passage see Frank (1967, 249). Frank considers this 
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passage character is t ic of all these cases in which ma^nB is used 
as the equivalent of "accident". 
34 On being "willing" by virtue of a ma'nä, see Peters (1976, 215). 
35 cAbd al-öabbär points out that the knowledge of the s t a t e we 
find ourselves in need not be acquired by the method of 
deduction. It i s therefore comparable to the knowledge of 
perceptible things. 
36 For a discussion of this question, see Bemand (1962, 14-8-151). 
She says that , as opposed to cAbd al-Gabbâr, some mutakallimun, 
including Abu '1-QSsim al-Balkl and his school, held the opinion 
that perception is a macnâ that brings about knowledge. This 
opinion was rejected by cAbd al-öabbär (Bernand, 1982, 160). 
37 For a discussion of this subject see Bernand (1982, H8-151). 
36 Bernand (1962, 151, note 529) proposes to read nla-kSna min ¿ins 
al-fi^T' instead of »la-k&na ¿ins aJ-fi-"?'. 
39 On cAbd al-GabbSr's theory of perception and his opinion that 
perception is not а шасла", see Peters (1976, 175-180). 
40 "The most obvious (al-awlS) according to us [cAbd al-öabbär] is 
that i t [the unawareness] i s not a macnS, as no s ta te can be 
discerned for an unaware person, except that he is not knowing 
(^ЯІія) or not convinced (¡au^taqid) of what he is said to be 
unaware of" Œu£nS VI/2, 63: 18-64: 1). 
41 This passage is part of cAbd al-öabbär's discussion of 
perception, in which he declares that we do not perceive by 
virtue of perception. (See Mugnl IV, 50:2). 
42 This i s confirmed by cAbd al-öabbär in more than one place. See 
also Mugnl (IX, 164: 19). 
43 See Peters (1976, 149, note 206). 
44 On this subject see Peters (1976, 167). 
45 See Peters (1976, 273-276). 
46 Frank (1978, 111-112, note 3). 
47 See Chapter Three, 73. 
40 cAbd al-öabbär does not refer to that which transmigrates as 
"soul". I t is not clear how he thinks about body and soul. He 
uses the terms ruh and nafs in his anthropology. In his opinion, 
ГЩІ ( spir i t ) i s a substance that belongs to the genus "wind" 
(rify). Peters (1976, 164-165) has concluded that rO(j is nothing 
else but breath that goes in and out the body. As for the term 
nafs (soul), he has found that cAbd al-öabbär sometimes uses i t 
as an equivalent to the term qalb (heart), but that he denies 
this in other places and s ta tes that i t indicates the to ta l i ty of 
the living being. In other contexts i t is not clear what exactly 
cAbd al-öabbär means when using the term nafs (Peters, 1976, 
165-166), but he does not use the terms rufy or nafs in reference 
to that which transmigrates from one body to another. 
49 Gimaret (1986, 236, note 14). 
50 Ma^nS, in grammatical texts, can mean "incorporeal thing". The 
grammarians al-Zamaiiarl and Ibn Ginnl both use the term Ism 
ma^nS for a noun that refers to an abstract thing, as opposed to 
the term Ism cayn that they use for a noun that refers to a 
concrete thing. See Versteegh (1977, 186). 
51 The vagueness of ma'nS has been observed by Van Ess (1991, III, 
76), who says of the term as i t was used by Mu'ammar (d. 
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215/830): "Das Wort war nicht unbedingt neu, und es klang 
v i e l l e i c h t schon damals so vage, wie es später immer gewesen i s t 
- e in Passepartout, den man dann brauchte, wenn man etwas 
umschreiben wol l t e , von dem man nicht genau wuBte oder sagen 
wol l te , was e s war, und von dem nur fes ts tand, daß e s a) etwas 
hervorrief oder begründete und b) keinen dinglichen Charakter 
hatte". 
52 MSnkdlm does not use the term cilla in this and in similar 
passages . He says: "When we become 'feel ing a des ire ' (muétahS), 
while [at the same time] i t i s poss ible that we do not become 
'feel ing a des i re ' - the s i tuat ion being the same and the 
condition (Serf) being the same - there must be a spec i f ier 
(inuirassis) for us. As a resul t of i t s [the speci f ier 's ] presence, 
we become 'feel ing a desire' . If this was not so , get t ing th i s 
quality (fifa) would be not more appropriate for us than 
[get t ing] some other [qual i ty] . This thing (amr) [the spec i f ier ] 
must be the ex i s tence (wugQd) of a ma^nS, and th is i s the 
desire" (TaclXq, 93: 2 -5 ) . In a similar way, he explains that we 
become "willing" (murSd) by virtue of the existence of a macnS in 
us that i s the wi l l (.Irada'), but he does not use the term ^illa 
(Ta'llq, 432: 16-433: 3) . 
53 "...there are macanl in the objects (a£s&n); they are juxtaposit ion 
(IgtimS*), separation (iftirëq), movement (fyaraka) and res t 
(sukOri), ... these macini are temporal (muÇdat)" (Ta'llq, 95: 14-
15), In another place he refers to these four modes of being as 
accidents (а'гВф (Ta'llq, 93: 16-19). 
54 "And our opinion i s that he i s able [to act] (qSdlr) by virtue of 
one of the ma^Snl... What proves th is i s that one becomes able to 
act (qSdírí, while at the same time i t i s poss ible that he 
becomes not so - having in both cases the same s t a t e (fräla) of 
'being l iv ing ' - so he must be spec i f ied by something (fa-18 
budda min ikti$8$îhl bi-amrí and this i s the exis tence (wugOd) of 
а яа
с
ла" (MagmQc II, 2 1 : 14-22: 2). In th is passage Ibn Mattawayh 
does not say that th i s та*па i s the power (qudra) to act, but he 
does say th i s la ter in the same chapter (Ma¿mQc II, 24: 15 and 
17). 
55 Ibn Mattawayh d i scusses the ex is tence of the modes of being 
(akw&ri)'. movement, r e s t , juxtaposit ion and separation. He explains 
that a body moves in a certain direction by virtue of a macnS 
and th i s ma^nä Is movement. Referring to movement and the other 
modes of being, Ibn Mattawayh mostly uses the term ma'nS Instead 
of the term carad (accident). 
56 See Chapter Three, 86 -67 . 
57 For h i s answer to th i s question, see Chapter Four, 115-119. 
58 AbD IshSq's saying that l i f e disappears from that part of the 
body where pain e x i s t s ra i s e s the question of how he saw the 
re lat ion between l i f e and soundness. cAbd al-óabb&r does not 
explain t h i s , nor do we find an explanation in the other passages 
on Abü IshSq's thinking that wi l l be quoted later . It i s poss ible 
that Abu IshSq thought that i f there i s an injury, l i f e 
temporarily disappears from that part of the body. 
59 For an explanation of what i s understood by "soundness" <si/i£a), 
see Chapter Four, 96-97 . 
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60 Gutes (1968, 75, note 10). 
61 See Ullmann (1978, 57-58). Ullmann (1978, 10) has pointed out 
that medicine in the medieval Islamic world was strongly 
influenced by the writings of Galen. Galen wrote numerous medical 
t r ea t i ses in which scattered remarks about pain occur. His book 
On the Diseased Parts (De locis offectis) includes some chapters 
in which he systematically analyzes pain (Siegel, 1970, 1B4). 
Siegel (1970, 186) came to the conclusion that "Galen was 
convinced that a localized disturbance of the humoral balance was 
the common cause of pain." Galen's writings were known to Ibn 
Sina (370/980-428/1037), a contemporary of cAbd al-Ôabbfir, who 
spent a short time (between 403/1013 and 405/1015) in Rayy in 
the period after cAbd al-Gabbfir's judgeship (Gutes, 1988, 261). 
Ibn SInfi reports on Galen's opinion concerning the cause of pain. 
The strange thing is that his report is different from the 
conclusion Siegel reached. According to Ibn SInfi, Galen said that 
the cause of pain is a "separation (tafarruq) of connectedness 
(.ittisäl) and nothing else". He explained that Galen was of the 
opinion that a l l pain can be attributed to a disconnection of 
par t ic les (agzS1) or to an accumulation (¿am") of par t ic les in one 
place. This accumulation of part icles iaplies that they are drawn 
away from their original places and this causes a disconnection 
of par t ic les in those places ial-Q8nun fi '1-\1ЬЬ I, 108). Ibn Sina 
comments: "He persisted In this , so that in some of his books he 
even al leges (awhama) that a l l the sensory organs hurt in that 
way, I mean, that they hurt because of a separation (tafrlq) or 
an accumulation {¿аа*У\ Ibn SlnS does not mention the name of 
the writings in which he found this Information. Regardless of 
whether he was correct In at t r ibut ing this theory to Galen, i t i s 
a theory that comes much nearer to cAbd al-ôabbar's theory on 
pain than Ibn Sine's own theory of the disturbance of the humoral 
balance. Ibn Sina explains that pain is caused ei ther by the 
occurrence of a bad blending of the humours that suddenly 
changes the existing blend imizäg) or by something that disrupts 
the connectedness {ittisSl) of the body (QanQn fi Ч-fibb, I, 108). 
He does not agree with Galen that all causes of pain can be 
traced back to a disconnection. As for himself, he prefers the 
theory of the sudden change of mixture. In his opinion, pain 
means experiencing the incompatibility of the changed mixture 
(.mlzSg) of humours. He thinks that every incompatible ImunäfD 
thing that i s fel t hur ts because of i t s Incompatibility. Ibn 
SInS's theory of the cause of pain resembles Abu Ishaq's opinion 
that a human being suffers because the "soundness" of his body 
disappears and i t s balance is disturbed. 
62 The wrong reasoning to which Ibn Mattawayh refers appears to be 
the question of the two needle-pricks; one is given by a strong 
person and the other by a weak person, but nevertheless the 
pricks are equally painful. This seems to contradict the 
Mu c tazili te theory that a strong person has more power to act 
than a weak person and that , as a result , a prick given by a 
strong person should cause more pain than a prick given by a 
weak person. So, how can the fact that they hurt equally be 
accounted for? (For cAbd al-ôabbar's discussion of this question, 
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see Chapter Four, 103-107) . According to Ibn Mattawayh, i t was 
the imposs ibi l i ty of giving an adequate answer to this question 
that led Abu Ishâq to conclude that pain i s not a ma'nâ at a l l 
(Magmuc III, fol.' 7a; s ee a lso: Tadkira, 310: U - 3 1 1 : 1). cAbd a l -
Gabbär reports a second reason why Abu Ishâq denied that pain i s 
а ша
с
ла". He says that Abu Ishâq disagreed with the opinion held 
by the school of Abu Häsim that pain and pleasure are one and 
the same thing. <On this theory, see Chapter Three, B8-90). Abu 
Ishâq rejected th i s theory, saying that i t would allow the 
p o s s i b i l i t y that someone enjoys being dismembered {Mugnl IV, 29: 
4-20) . 
63 A deta i led re futa t ion of Abu Ishäq's opinion i s given by •'Abd a l -
Gabbär in volume XIII of the Mugnl, where he puts forward many 
arguments refut ing th i s opinion, not adressing AbQ IshSq direct ly 
but presenting h is arguments in the usual form of a dialogue: "If 
he says . . . . , he i s answered...." (.Fa-in qSla..., qlla la-hu...) (.Mugnl 
XIII, 262: 3 -269: 17). 
64- He adds that denying that pain i s a macni would lead to a denial 
that a substance (gawhar) i s perceptible (Magmu* III, fol . 3b). 
With respect to t h i s sentence, I propose that the word "lam" be 
dropped from the c lause "tumma lam yugcal dSllka sababan 11-nafy 
al-gawhar mudrakan", as the negation f i t s badly with the purport 
of Ibn Mattawayh's argument. The dropping of "Іал" g i v e s the verb 
an imperfect tense <.yugcalú>, which links up well with the 
imperfect tense of the other verbs in the sentence. 
65 See a l so Brunschvig (1974, 78-79) . 
66 The term gins may a l so be translated as "genus" but, as Frank 
(1984, 290, note 19) has pointed out, the term gins as i t i s used 
by the Basrian mutakallimün of this period i s not equivalent to 
the English "genus". Frank (1985, 78, note 19) explains that the 
Basrian Mu c taz i l i t e s used the term gins primarily to speak of the 
lowest , e s s e n t i a l c l a s s e s of beings, though they a l so commonly 
used i t for more ex tens ive c l a s s e s . For Instance, cAbd al-Gabbâr 
refers to the four "modes of being" (movement, r e s t , 
juxtaposit ion and separation) as forming one ¿Ins. He also says 
that speech ikalBm) and "articulated" sounds (asw&t muqatta^a) 
form one gins {Mugnl VII, 22: 1-2). On the other hand, he a l so 
speaks of the gins of sound in general, which comprises a l l 
poss ib le sounds including speech and "articulated" sounds (Mugnl 
VII, 23: 6 and 41: 18-42: 2 , Peters (1976, 292-312) . 
67 Scratching a scabious place had already been used as an example 
by the Greek philosophers. Alexander of Aphrodisias ( f l . about AD 
200) says that when Ar i s to t l e discussed the poss ib i l i ty of 
fee l ing happy and sad at the same time he mentioned, among other 
things, the example of a man who su f f er s from scabies and 
scratches the af fec ted part of his body, so that he enjoys the 
scratching, but i s sad at the same time, because he f ee l s the 
need for more scratching (Badawi, 1968, 146). 
66 One may wonder why i t i s that the c las s of pain and pleasure 
does not have a name. cAbd al-äabbär's explanation i s that 
speakers of Arabic labi al-luga) give denominations lcibärSt) to 
things (ma'SnS) according to their most s tr iking feature. They 
therefore gave pain a name but not the c la s s i t belongs to 
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(Mugnï XIII, 256: 1-7). 
69 Peters (1976, 98) t ransla tes cSda as "usage", explaining that 
"this 'usage' i s concerned not with the acts of human beings, but 
with God's acts ; i t is the normal course of events in this world, 
which is changed by God alone. For such a deviation of the 
normal course of events in the time of Ibrahim, who is not burnt 
by fire, see Qur'Sn 21; 69. cÂda corresponds, qua contents, with 
what we call the laws of nature." For an explanation of the 
concept of cäda, see also Antes (1970, 40-44), Wolfson (1976, 
544-551, Schwarz (1976, 251-252, note 87), and Gimaret (19Ô0, 
262). 
70 One of the c r i te r ia for a miracle performed by a prophet is that 
i t must break with the normal course of events (aJ-ca"da). See 
MugnS XV, 171: 13 and Peters, 1976, 96, note 316). 
71 Ibn Mattawayh reports that , as opposed to cAbd al-ôabbSr, Abu 
cAlï al-Gubbä'I and his son Abu HSsim were of the opinion that 
living beings must feel ei ther desire or aversion, so that they 
are never without either of them. Abu cAlï therefore believed 
that everything that i s perceived by the senses is perceived with 
either desire or aversion (Tadkira, 321: 8). Ibn Mattawayh does 
not mention the reasoning of Abu cAlï with respect to this 
question. I t appears that his son Abu HSsim agreed with him on 
this point. Ibn Mattawayh reports that Abu HSèim believed that 
life enta i l s (mudammiri) aversion and desire (Tadkira, 321: 9-10). 
This means that as long as a person is alive, he must feel 
desire or aversion, Just as he must always perceive that which 
can be perceived by him. (See Chapter Three, 78-79.) When cAbd 
al-ôabbSr discusses the question of whether life entails aversion 
and desire, he does not mention what Abu Haáim's opinion on this 
question was. He only says that Abu HSsim gave information about 
i t (nabbaha "=alS dallka') and that Abu 'Abdallah explained i t 
(carraia Ы-'l-qawl bihD, so that i t is not clear which opinion 
was Abu HSsim's and which opinion was Abu c Abdallah's on this 
question (Mugnl XIII, 243: 14-19). 
72 Peters (1976, 125-126). 
73 See also Tadkira, 308: 12-13 and 315: 3-5. 
74 This question is discussed by Ibn Mattawayh in al-Tadkira fS 
ahkSm al-gawahlr wa-'l-acrSd. He declares that i t is impossible 
to perceive one and the same thing with aversion and desire at 
the same time. He explains that when aversion and desire concern 
one and the same thing, they are each other's opposites and 
exclude each other (Tadkira, 328: 1-5). 
75 In al-Tadkira fi aùkâm al-gaw&hir wa-'l-a'rSd, Ibn Mattawayh says 
that we can experience pain and pleasure at the same time, but 
he does not give arguments for this (Tadkira, 320: 10-13). 
Notes to Chapter Four 
1 See Peters (1976, 127). 
2 On the concept of dldd (opposite), see Peters (1976, 142-143). 
3 Generally, sabab and cilla are both translated as cause, although 
they are different terms. Sabab is used in relation to the 
production of acts, whereas ciiia is used in relation to the 
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changing quali t ies of persons or bodies. Frank (1967, 251) and 
Peters (1976, 209) note that , as opposed to a sabab, a cilla 
produces i t s effect directly and necessarily. In order to 
distinguish between "cause" as a translation of cilla and "cause" 
as a translation of sabab, some scholars speak of "secondary 
cause" when they refer to sabab. However, the addition of 
"secondary" is not necessary in discussions of generation because 
i t is evident in this context which kind of cause is meant. 
4 See Peters (1976, 60-61). 
5 The term tavallud is also used. Tawlld is usually used with 
respect to a person who acts , whereas tawallud is used with 
respect to the resul t of an act. On the Muctazilite theory of 
generation (tawlld) see Bernand (1982, 233-240), Daiber (1975, 
393-402), Van Ess (1966, 290-295), Fakhry (1991, 37-38), Frank 
(1982, 324-326), Gimaret (I960, 36-47), Gimaret (1990, 401-409), 
al-=Irâqï (19836, 51-60), McDermott (1978, 169-177), Nader (1956, 
198-204), Peters (1976, 60-61 and 206-209) and Schwarz (1976, 
250-251, note 85-86). Hecker (1975) gives an explanatory 
translation of volume IX (.Kitäb al-tawlSd) of the Mugnl, that 
deals with generation. 
6 See Peters (1976, 205), Gimaret (1980, 40/41, note 22) and Mensla 
(1991, 325). Gimaret (I960, 41-42, note 22) points out that the 
general term for something that is produced in a direct way is 
mubtada'. Mubtada' i s the opposite of mutawallid. There are two 
categories of direct production: mubSàaratan and calS wa¿h al-
iktirSc. Mubëëaratan means that an act is produced directly in 
the subst ra te in which the power iqudra) to act inheres, whereas 
caJá wagh al-iktlrS"1 means that an act is produced directly in 
another substrate without the use of one's own substra te . Human 
beings can produce only direct acts in the way that i s called 
mubSéaratan. Peters (1976, 268, note 223) points out that cAbd 
al-öabbär's theory implies that mubSàaratan cannot be used in 
reference to God's acting. 
7 Peters (1976, 203) explains <=alë wagh al-ijctirS^ as "direct 
producing outside the acting subject". 
8 cAbd al-óabbSr uses the term slfyfya in more than one sense. In 
reference to ideas and statements, he uses i t in the sense of 
correctness or possibili ty, indicating that what i s said is 
correct or logically possible (Peters, 1976, 80-81). 
9 See also Ta^llq (154: 15). 
10 See Peters (1976, 132-134). 
11 On the four humours, see Chapter Three, 84-85. 
12 In the text a word may be missing, probably the word yuwallid 
after al-darb. 
13 Wa-'l-slhCa cibara ean ta'lTf yûgadu fi mafyall al-fyayät. In the 
Tadkira he gives almost the same definition: "soundness i s 
composition that [temporarily] exists in the subst ra te of l i fe" 
(wa-4-siJìh.a ta'lïf yafysulu f I mahall al-tjaySi) (.Тайкіга, 322: 16). 
14 In the Mugnl two forms are found: wane and wahy. In Mugnl (ГХ, 
52-56) i t is written with an allf at the end of the word. In 
MugnS XIII (for instance, 261) it i s written with a ye' maqsura; 
in both cases the pronunciation is "wahi". However, in Mugnf 
(XIII, 231: 4) the aansüfc form wabyan is found which indicates 
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the pronunciation as "vahv". 
15 Kazimirski ( I860, II, 1616-1619). 
16 Brunschvig (1974, 76). 
17 Peters (1976, 134). 
IB Hecker (1975, 135 f f . ) . 
19 Hecker (1975, 563) . 
20 Wa-'l-wahS tnna-mS yurldu bini 'l-lftiraq allodi tantafî cîndahu 
Ί-φϋ?1?β aliati taÇtSgu ilayhS 'l-l)ayât duna Ч-lftlrSq a liad I IS 
yu'attir hëdS 'l-ta'tir. Hecker (1975, 171, note 144) proposes to 
correct tantaql as i t i s written in the edit ion to tantafl, which 
i s indeed a good so lut ion . 
21 I agree with Hecker (1975, 171, note 158) that Mu£nl (DC, 54: 15-
16) should be read as ua-lllS lam yuwallld dällka instead of wa-
'1-alam yuwallld dällka. 
22 For the "modes of being", s e e a lso Chapter Four, 100. 
23 Chapter Three, 72. 
24 Chapter Three, 72. Another example of the mixing of philosophical 
and physical aspects i s the concept of perceptible шасла. The 
term macnS der ives from the philosophical d iscussion of q u a l i t i e s 
of beings, whereas the term "perceptible" refers to perception, 
which i s something physical. 
25 See, for instance, Magmuc (III, fol. 7a). 
26 Fa-'lladI yaclfyiiu an yug'ala sobaban 11-1-alam huwa 'l-tafrlq al-
hS$ll f I badan al-fyayy wa-huwa 'lladl nu^abbiru салЛи Ы-Ч-wahS. 
27 Brunschvig, (1974, 75). 
28 For the re lat ionship between substance and mode of being, s e e 
Peters (1976, 120). 
29 Gimaret (1976, 313) assumes that al-Öëmlc was a work that 
discussed theolog ica l problems In a systematic order. 
30 Ibn Mattawayh confirms that Abü Hááim's opinions about the 
generation of pain differed. He reports that Abu HSsim's opinion 
(madnab) i s that the cause isabab) of pain i s the les ion (wahal, 
but that In some places he said that the pressure (Intimad) 
generates i t iMagmu* III, fo l . 6b). 
31 On th is work, s ee Gimaret (1976, 298-304) . 
32 I propose to read badan al-fyayy as i t i s found in the manuscript 
(.MugnlXIIl, 233 , note 2) . 
33 Abu Has i a d i s c u s s e s the question of pain produced by a weak and 
a s trong person, although he does not refer to two needle-pricks 
but to "cutting" (taqtJ*) in general Oiugnl EC, 54: 24-55: 15). 
Hecker (1975, 143) trans la tes taqtT1 as "dismemberent" but th i s 
Is not meant here. 
34 6uz' means "atom", the smallest poss ib le part into which material 
beings can be divided. However, an atom i s a substance (Peters, 
1976, 121-122) . Because a separation i s not a substance but 
rather a mode of being, the meaning of guz' in th i s context 
cannot be atom. I therefore decided to translate ¿иг' as 
"part icle" in th i s context. 
35 The principle that one act cannot be produced by two agents 
acting together i s an important principle because i t forms the 
bas is for the M u c t a z i l i t e s ' rejection of the opinion of the 
Mugbira, who declared that something can be the act of God and 
man together. Mugbira was a name used by the Mu c taz l l i tes for 
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their opponents on the subject of predestination (Watt, 1973, 
116, Hourani, 1971, 2 3 - 2 4 , note 17, and Gimaret, 1980, 62). These 
opponents adhered to the opinion that God determines the ac t s of 
man. In the time of cAbd al-öabbär and his pupils this doctrine 
was held by the Aspérités who introduced the concept of kasb, 
which means that God creates an act but that this act i s 
"acquired" by man. Gimaret (1980) has written a detailed study on 
Mu , :tazil ite and Sunnite thought on the subject of human ac t s and 
the arguments theologians used to defend their posi t ions . For the 
Mu c taz i l i te argument that an act can only be done by one act ing 
subject , s e e Gimaret (1980, 287-298) . 
36 The idea that the quantity of pain i s re lated to the quantity of 
aversion i s a l s o found in the Mugni, where ^Abd al-öabbär says 
that l iv ing beings d i f fer from each other with respect to the 
quantity of pain they fee l because one l iv ing being may have a 
greater aversion to what he perceives than another. However, as 
opposed to Ibn Mattawayh's opinion, cAbd al-óabbàr's remark 
concerns the d i f ferent quant i t ies of aversion f e l t by di f ferent 
persons, and not by the same person. He explains that someone 
who can bear suf fer ing does not have as much pain as another 
person, jus t as one person i s not sorrowed by that which another 
i s sorrowed by. He adds that one can be trained to endure things 
more eas i l y Œu$nl XIII, 251: 7-13) . 'Abd al-Öabbär i s probably 
referring to people l ike mystics who have trained themselves to 
bear pain, such a s , for instance, the Persian mystic Abu Sa c ïd b. 
AM '1-Kayr (967-1049) , a contemporary of cAbd al-Gabbär who 
underwent d i f f i c u l t a sce t i c pract ices (Schimmel, 1975, 241-242) . 
37 In the Tadkira f I afykam al-gawShir wa-'l-a^rSd, Ibn Mattawayh 
reports that the question of the two needle-pricks and Abu 
H&sim's answer was the very reason why Abu Ishâq concluded that 
pain i s not а яа с ла but rather the disappearance of soundness 
izawSl aJ-si{ina) ITadkira, 310: 14-311: 6) (see Chapter Three, 8 4 -
85). 
38 See Chapter Three, 7 2 - 7 3 . 
39 See Peters (1978, 125-126). 
40 On permanent pressure, s e e Frank (1978, 79) and Peters (1976, 
136). 
41 A comparison of t h i s text with the text of Mufnl XIII, 237: 3-4 
makes i t clear that the edit ion should be corrected to wa-kBna 
bSqiha ka-h5ditih8 f I dSllka '1-wagh. 
42 In the text fa-kallafa should be corrected to fa-kayfa. 
43 Reading in Mugnl XIII, 338: 5 muntaflya instead of muntaqila, in 
accordance with Mu¿n¡ XIII, 238: 10. 
44 See Chapter Four, 108. 
45 With respect to Mugnl XIII, 238: 3 the editor g ives as poss ib le 
readings: al-kSrig or al-gäril). The meaning of both readings i s 
not c lear , but i t i s poss ible that the correct reading should be 
gawSrii), as fiel al-gawaril¿ i s the s ingular of afc81 al-gawërilj. 
It i s a technical term that means "the acts of the limbs". The 
acts of the limbs are one of the subdivis ions in which the a c t s 
man i s able to perform are divided. They comprise: the modes of 
being, pressure, composition, sound and pain. The other 
subdivis ion cons i s t s of "the acts of the hearts" iaf'Sl al-qulub) 
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(Peters, 1976, 127). 
46 See Chapter Three, 86-89. 
47 cAbd al-GabbSr reports that Abu =AH was of the opinion that God 
does not act through generation because this would imply tha t 
God needs a cause (sabab) when He wants to produce things tha t 
we produce through generation. As Abü cAlï took i t for granted 
that God cannot have needs, he concluded that God only ac t s 
directly Wufril DC, 94: 1-7 and Magmu* I, 417: 9-12). I t i s not 
clear how Abu cAlî explained the punishment by fire in Hell. cAbd 
al-ôabbSr argues that in Hell God produces pain through 
generation when He punishes sinners by fire. He explains tha t 
there i s a good reason for God to use f i re : pain produced in t h i s 
way is more terrifying than pain produced by God directly. The 
people in Hell suffer more when they see the fire touching them 
(Mugnl K , 112: 10-14). 
48 It may seem strange to us that cAbd al-öabbfir says tha t 
additional pain is brought into existence by God and that he does 
not mention the venom that i s injected in the wound by the 
scorpion. However, even if the additional pain is the resu l t of 
the venom, cAbd al-óabbfir would probably consider the working of 
the venom as an act of God simular to the working of f i r e . 
However, there i s , according to ^Abd al-èabbSr, a difference 
between pain that is the resul t of a venom and pain produced by 
God by means of f i re: f i re works by putting pressure on the body 
of a living being and this pressure produces a lesion (a burn) 
which in turn produces pain. The venom, however, does not work in 
this way because i t does not cause an injury. 
49 On cAbd al-öabbSr's opinion on this question, see Brunschvig 
(1974, 80-61). On the opinions of Abu cAlï, al-Balkï, Abu Häsim 
and al-As carI on this point, see Gimaret (1990, 130). 
50 Brunschvig (1974, 81). 
51 On Mankdïm's opinion about the Punishment of the Grave, see 
McDermott (1978, 271), who considers the TaclSq as cAbd a l -
éabbSr's work. 
52 According to cAbd al-Ôabbfir, the work in which Abu HSsim 
expressed his new opinion is called Naqd al-fatal* (Mu¿nl XIII, 
252: 8), but Ibn Mattawayh says that i t is called al-Naqd calä 
açfySb al-fabS'i* (Tadkìra, 321: 19-322: 1). Gimaret (1976, 327) 
assumes that al-Naqd calä a$hEb al-fabsl* is the same work as 
Naqd al-fabä'i* and that i t belongs to the works that Abu Has im 
wrote or dictated in the last period of his l i fe . 
53 Peters (1976, 244). 
54 In Ibn Mattawayh's other work, al-Ta¿klra fi abkam al-¿awahir wa-
'l-acr&<p, he expresses his opinion on this question more c lear ly . 
He declares that pain can exist in Inanimate bodies, but only If 
i t is produced by God in a direct way (ІМі<й'ал> and not if i t 
is produced through generation ( c aJí wa¿h al-tawlld). He r e j ec t s 
the idea that pain can be generated in an inanimate object, 
arguing that the condition for the generation of pain is the 
disappearance of soundness, and that soundness applies only to 
living bodies (Tadkira, 322: 14-18). Surprisingly, he adds tha t 
cAbd al-ôobbfir (Qâdî Ί-QudSt) confirmed that generated pain 
cannot exist in a l i feless substrate . However, I have not found 
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such в statement in volumes Π and XIII of the Mugnl. In the 
Mugnl cAbd al-óabbár refers to Abu Häsim's opinion on the 
generation of pain in inanimate objects without objection, but he 
does not give his own opinion on this subject. Is Ibn Mattawayh 
referring to an opinion that cAbd al-öabbär formed later? 
Notes to Chapter Five 
1. On the knowledge by which God is known, see Peters (1976, 224). 
2 On al-àShid and al-¿S'ib, see Peters (1976, 407-409). 
3 On the method of using evidence found in the present world for 
drawing conclusions about the absent world, see Bernand (1982, 
243-2S1). Frank (1992, 31) expressed as his opinion that 
systematic at tention should be given to the rules and conditions 
for thinking rat ionally about, and for drawing valid inferences 
with regard to, the absent world on the basis of what is 
phenomenally available, as they are set forth in the texts of the 
speculative theologians. 
4 On the method of drawing an analogy between the absent world 
and the present world, see Gimaret (1980, 281-283). 
5 For the translation of qablh as "bad" see Chapter Five, 122. 
6 When cAbd al-eabbär in this context speaks of pain he means pain 
that is experienced as pain because i t is perceived with 
aversion. Although pain may lead to a profit , this does not mean 
that in that case i t is experienced as a pleasure. It does not 
stop being pain. 
7 Hourani (1971, 29, 39, 48) translates qablh as "evil" and fuJa as 
"wrongdoing". He considers ¿arr and fasäd as synonyms of qablh 
(1971, 49). 
β Frank (1985, 73). 
9 Fakhry (1991, 32). 
10 Peters (1976, 67). 
11 Mohammed (1985, 65). 
12 Hourani (1971, 49). 
13 In a la ter a r t ic le (1972, reprint 1985) Hourani (1985, 104) says: 
"
cAbd al-JabbSr shows some hesitation about lying, whether i t 
belongs to absolute or prima facie evils. In principle he holds i t 
an absolute evil, but he has to face hard cases raised by his 
Ash carite opponents. Would i t be evil to t e l l a l ie to save the 
life of a Muslim, for exanple by saying he is not at home to 
someone coming to his house with evident intent to murder him? 
cAbd al-JabbSr says one can always escape from such a dilemma 
by insinuations or silence, and never needs to t e l l a direct l ie 
íMüffhnS, Vl.ii, 342)". 
14 For a French translation of this passage, see Monnot (1974, 195). 
15 cAbd al-fiabbSr declares that a person deserves praise {madh) for 
doing what is obligatory (.Mu&nl ХГ , 16: 11). When Hourani (1971, 
39) gives a table of the ethical categories of acts according to 
cAbd al-6abb8r, he adds that the doer of an obligatory act does 
not deserve blame or praise. This does not accord with what cAbd 
al-6abbSr says in the MugnS ОСГ , 16: 11 ). In the table of e thical 
values that he made in a later art icle Hourani (1985, 101) has 
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omitted this addition. 
16 The terms permissible (шиЬа"£> and obligatory (wSgib) are also 
used In law. However, Mohammed (1984, 57) warns that we should 
not be misled by the apparent similarity between cAbd al-öabbSr's 
terms and the terms used in the SarFa, as cAbd al-ôabbfir's 
terms do not refer to legal matters. 
17 It is difficult to give an adequate translation of the term wagh. 
'Abd al-ôabbâr uses the term In different ways. Sometimes he 
uses wagh as a technical term, for instance, in the discussion of 
the moral Judgement on acts, but at other times he uses it with 
respect to the qualities of things. Hourani (1971) translates 
wagh (pi. wuguh) as "aspect" (27, 31, 32 a.o.), "respect" (63), 
"ground" (69, 121), or "reason" (96). Frank translates it as 
"manner" (197β, 132-135 a.o.), "mode" or "manner" (1985, 71), and 
"way" (1985, 72). Gimaret (1980, 20-25 a.o.) translates it in 
French as "modalité". Brunschvig (1974a, 15) gives the French 
translation "aspect". These translations do not render the exact 
meaning of the term wagh. Because of this, most translators add 
an explanation if the meaning is not clear from the context. For 
instance: "the manner or the character (wagh) of the occurrence 
of the act" (Frank, 1978, 132) or "all the reasons (JamFa 1-
wujûh) for which acts are done." (Hourani, 1971, 96). 
18 Hourani (1971, 38, note 24) chose to translate sBhl as 
"unconscious", but cAbd al-6abbfir does not mean only the state of 
being knocked out, but every state in which someone Is unaware 
of his actions. Therefore, I think that "absentminded" may be a 
better translation. 
19 This question and the different opinions held on it are discussed 
by Hourani (1971, 41-42) and Mohammed (1984, 52-53). 
20 In Magmu* I, 230: 25 the word yaqacu should be corrected in naf*. 
This was observed by Vajda who translated Magad" (I, 230: 24-
231: 2) into French. He reported that the Karaite Yüsuf al-Basir 
In his work al-KitSb al-MuhtawI (finished in 411/1021) held the 
same opinion as Abu cAbdallah al-Basrï and eAbd al-6abbar with 
respect to the acts of sleepers and absentminded people (Vajda, 
1985, 303-304). 
21 According to Watt (1990, 177) the Muctazilites applied the name 
Mugbira to all who denied their doctrine of human freedom to 
act, which means that most Sunnites, from Traditionalists to 
Ascarites, are included in this term. 
22 The opinion of the "Compulsionlsts" that acts are good or bad 
because of a divine command or prohibition has been described as 
"ethical voluntarism" (Fakhry, 1991, 46-52). Fakhry (1991, 31-45) 
describes the ethical doctrines of the Muctazilites as "ethical 
rationalism". 
23 On the meaning of Bail* according to the Ascarites and the 
Muctazllites, see Gimaret (1988, 313-318). 
24 See Chapter Five, 142-143. 
25 For a French translation of Mugnl Г , 15: 20, see Vajda (1985, 
244-249). 
26 'Abd al-ôabbfir uses both the terms clarar and macarra (pi. 
иасИгг). The terms are synonyms, but clarar is mostly used for 
harm in general, whereas macarra usually refers to a particular 
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harm. 
27 See, for Instance, Ta'llq <464: 10 and 492: 4), where he speaks of 
the sorrow of someone who Is blamed. 
28 In this chapter he discusses the difference of opinion between 
AbO 'Al l al-GubbS'I and Abu Hasim about what sorrow is (Magmü* 
III, fol. 5a and b). He reports that Abu HSsim said that sorrow is 
a conviction, whereas Abu CAH declared that sorrow is not a 
conviction but a different ma^nä, although for i t s existence i t 
needs the simultaneous existence of a conviction (Magmu* III, 
fol. 5a). 
29 Bernand (1962, 137-180) explains cAbd al-Gabbar's theory of 
necessary knowledge in her study on ^Abd al-Gabbâr's theories of 
knowledge. See also Abrahamov (1993). 
30 Because of what cAbd al-ôabbâr says in the preceding passage, I 
propose to read Mugnl (XIII, 307: 2) as "Já yaguz an Ιέ yu'lama 
qubfyuhxl' instead of "IS yaguz an ywlama qubftuhit' because the 
l a t t e r reading is not in agreement with what cAbd al-GabbSr has 
said before. 
31 See Chapter Five, 144. 
32 See Mugnl XIII, 306: 13, reading kawf instead of fyawf. 
33 MSnkdïm makes an exception for harm done in self-defence and 
harming someone else by exposing him to "acts of God" (fire, 
frosty weather and the like). For harm done in self-defence, see 
Chapter Five, 147-146. For exposing someone to God's acts, see 
Chapter Six, 177-178. 
34 The meaning of the term cabat i s discussed by Hourani (1971, 75-
76), Peters (1976, 89-90) and Frank (1978, 133-134). 
35 Frank (1978, 144, note 48) points out that ^abatan should be read 
for gny' in line 5; ll-l-'abat for llgyb in line 6; and al-aabajt 
for 'l£yb in line 6. 
36 For instance, see Mugnl XIII, 395: 6-14 and Mugnî XI, 64: 8-9. 
37 See Chapter Six, 164. 
38 'Abd al-ôabbSr does not mention them by name but refers to them 
as "our masters" (.êuyukunS). 
39 The motive <.dScD and the inner voice (kafir) have a function in 
the process of the acquisition of knowledge. They urge us to find 
out what t ruth is (Bernand, 1982, 181-199). I have chosen to 
t ransla te kSfir by "inner voice", in view of Peters ' (1976, 64-65) 
explanation: "I believe that we justly compare this jrfffir with 
what we know as God's voice in our heart , our conscience". 
40 The h.add offences and punishments are: 1. stoning or scourging 
for i l l i c i t intercourse (.zlnS); 2. scourging for falsely accusing a 
married woman of adultery (.qadf); 3. scourging for drinking wine 
or other intoxicating drinks; 4. cutting off hands for theft; 5. 
various punishments, Including crucifixion, for various forms of 
robbery (Juynboll, 1930, 304-312, and Baradie, 1983, 96-129). 
41 We have seen (Chapter Five, 137) that there are some exceptions 
to this rule , for instance, with respect to humans who are not in 
full possession of their mental faculties. Their caretaker may 
take the decision for them to bear a pain. Another exception, 
mentioned by cAbd al-6abbâr, is when the profit i s so great that 
everyone would choose to bear the pain for this profi t . 
42 See Chapter Six, 161. 
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43 See Chapter Five, 136-140. 
44 Peters (1976, 34) supposes that a part of the missing volumes 16 
and 19 must have dealt with "the Promise and the Threat", but 
from cAbd al-Gabbâr's use of the past tense of the verb "explain" 
(I explained/bayyanfu) we may conclude that he discussed i t in a 
volume ear l ie r than volume XIII. This does not exclude the 
possibili ty that the main discussion of this subject was 
contained in volumes XVIII/XIX as in Mugnl XIII, 365: 20 ^Abd a l -
GabbSr refers to al-Wa^Id (the Threat) in the present tense: "we 
twill] study (.nataqaççâ) ... in the Va'Icf'. 
45 For mention of tranquill i ty of soul see cAbd al-òabbSr's remark 
about the Sophists in Chapter Three, 70. In her detailed study on 
cAbd al-öabbar's theory of knowledge, Bemand (1982, 291-300) 
explains how the concept of the "tranquill i ty of the soul" was 
applied by the Mu c tazili tes. See also Peters (1976, 48-50). 
46 For more deta i l s on the meaning of the terms l^tlqâd, с і І л and 
çann, and the role of sukun al-nafs, see Peters (1976, 41-56) and 
Bemand (1982, 279-300). 
47 The works to which cAbd al-öabbär refers are Abu Häsim's al-
Abwab and his al-Ba¿dSdiyySt (not al-Ta'dëdiyyât as is written 
in the edition). 
48 Hourani (1971, 75) mentions the question of the drowning person 
but speaks of the rescuer's broken hand and the compensation 
that the drowning person gives to the rescuer. It is not clear 
which passage in the Mu¿nS Hourani based this on. 
49 This example is also given by cAbd al-6abbSr in another passage 
in which he explains that doing harm is bad in those cases in 
which i t is a useless act Sabati (Mugnî XIII, 312: 8-10). 
50 See Chapter Five, 133-134. 
51 Hanafite lawyers say that i t is permissible (лшЬаф) to ki l l 
someone e lse in self-defence, provided that the attack cannot be 
averted in another way (Schacht, 1978, 768). 
52 We should remember that cAbd al-ôabbâr does not discuss the 
legal aspects of acts . Whether or not the thief of a loaf of 
bread should be punished according to law is a different 
question that he does not discuss here. 
53 Although I did not come across any passage in the Mugnl in which 
cAbd al-ôabbâr explicitly speaks as a judge, passages like the 
one discussed here may evidence his experience with juridical 
cases. 
54 See Chapter Five, 125-126. 
55 It i s obvious that this harm is good if i t involves a greater 
profit for the harmed person or averts a greater harm to him, 
even though the harm i s not done with this intention. 
Notes to Chapter Six 
1 See Chapter Four, 112-114. 
2 See Qur'Sn 6: 152, 7: 42, 23: 62, 2: 286, 65: 7 and 2: 233. 
3 cUtman (1971, 17-44) gives a detailed description of cAbd a l -
ôabbâr 's doctrine of taklSf basing i t on the texts of the Mugnl 
and Ibn Mattawayh's Magm0c, the l a t t e r of which he assumes was 
composed by 'Abd al-ôabbâr. 
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4 Schwarz (1976, 237). 
5 This i s what Is said in the Qur'Sn. For the places where this is 
said see Chapter Six, note 2. 
6 cAbd al-èabbSr points out that not only humans but also angels 
have these qual i t ies but, although God has imposed obligations on 
the angels, too, they are not described as тика Ha f iMugnl XI, 
309: 17). The qualification mukellaf applies only to a human 
being. 
7 Hourani (1971, 63) points out that by declaring that the motive 
does not cause the performance of an act, cAbd al-Gabbar avoids 
the position that the acts of man are determined by God creating 
motives in the hearts of people. 
8 On this question and how cAbd al-öabbSr answers i t , see Hourani 
(1971, 92-97). 
9 The theory that bad acts are done because of a particular need 
for something can be used as an argument that God does not 
perform bad acts . cAbd al-6abbar says that God, unlike human 
beings, i s without need or desire (.Mugnî Г , 25: 20-21 and 30: 8-
9; Mugnl V, 247-248). One of the reasons why all God's acts are 
good is that He is without needs (MugnIVI/ï, 177). 
10 On luff, see also Schwarz (1972, 427), who explains that cAbd a l -
òabbSr's theory of luff does not conflict with his theory of 
constraint (.il¿Sr>. Luff induces human beings to do an act, but 
does not necessarily entai l the action. Abrahamov (1993b) gives 
an annotated translation of the chapter on luff in Mânkdïm's 
Ta'llq èarfy aJ-usOJ al-kamsa (Ta'llq, 518-525). 
11 Abrahamov (1993b, 43, note 16). 
12 Subhï (1983*, 64-67) points out this aspect, explaining that the 
Mu=tazilites were of the opinion that a luff does not force the 
mukallaf to perform an act of obedience to God but only 
motivates him to perform this act. 
13 «-Utmfin (1971, 386). 
14 See also Abrahamov (1993b, 56, note 62). 
15 cAbd al-Gabbar reports that these people believed in God's 
imposing of obligations, but they maintained that at f i rs t God 
imposed easy obligations. Then, when the human beings were 
disobedient to God, He punished them by imposing difficult 
obligations on them. They said that therefore, nowadays, the 
takllf i s diff icul t , as a punishment for humans. They also 
believed that humans can be without obligations imposed on them 
by God if they are completely obedient to God. In that case, for 
them the acts of devotion are permitted but not obligatory. If 
they perform them, they are an expression of their thanks to God. 
16 Madelung (1986). 
17 cAbd al-ôabbâr says that i t is reported that AbO ·=Α1ί changed 
his opinion to that of Abu HSsim Ши$пІ XIII, 104: 11). 
18 In the Qur'Sn It is said that the punishment in the hereafter 
will be heavier than the punishment In this world (Qur'Sn 39: 26 
and 68: 33). For verses of the Qur'Sn In which i t is made clear 
that there is a great difference between reward and punishment 
in the hereafter, see Qur'Sn 22: 19-24, 56: 11-56 and 78: 21-36. 
Apart from this , several descriptions are given of the horrors of 
the punishment in Hell (for instance, Qur'Sn 40: 71-76 and 4: 56) 
NOTES TO PAGES 151-197 247 
and the d e l i g h t s of the reward in Paradise (for instance, Qur'Sn 
36: 5 5 - 5 7 , 52: 17-27, 55: 46-78 and 76: 5-22). 
19 An example of punishments given by God in the present world i*-
to be found in the Qur'Sn where i t i s said that the people от 
TamOd and Madyan were ki l led by an earthquake after they had 
been warned by a prophet (Qur'Sn 7: 70 and 7: 91). The Qur'Sn 
says that God only punishes a f ter He has warned by means of a 
prophet (Qur'Sn 17: 15). eAbd al-GabbSr refers to th is verse in 
order to argue that children, and even the children of 
unbel ievers, do not deserve punishment from God. See Mukta$ar, 
251 and Heemskerk (1992, 60). 
20 On escaping a punishment, s e e Chapter Five, 141. Evidently, the 
punishment of someone who escapes the punishment for a hadd-
offence w i l l be given in the hereafter, unless he repents. 
21 cAbd al-GabbSr uses the Arabic verb isiafyaqqa that i s used in 
the sense of "deserving", too. He speaks of istifyqäq ^iwäd 
(having a r ight to be compensated) along with Istl^qSq tawâb 
(deserving a reward), but points out that deserving compensation 
i s not qui te the same as deserving a reward, because in order to 
get a reward one has to perform d i f f i cu l t ac t s . 
22 See Chapter Five, 135. 
23 See Chapter Five, 137-138. 
24 This i s confirmed by Ibn Mattawayh, who reports that Abu CA1I 
was of the opinion that God i n f l i c t s pain because of the 
compensation <Ма$тОс III, fol. 3b). However, i t should be noticed 
that Abu ^АИ had a different notion about God's compensation. As 
opposed to cAbd al-öabbSr, he was of the opinion that 
compensation w i l l be provided ever last ingly (Mu¿nl XIII, 508: 3 -
4). For th i s reason, he rejected the suggest ion that God may 
provide this compensation as a g i f t , without f i r s t i n f l i c t i n g 
pain. In h i s opinion, the compensation must be deserved by f i r s t 
suf fer ing pain, as a reward must be earned by doing what i s 
d i f f i c u l t . Probably, the Ik_sldiyya adopted Abü c All ' s opinion. Ibn 
Mattawayh reports that they said that at the moment that God 
i n f l i c t s pain He wants to provide a compensation (MagmO* III, 
fo l . 34b). 
25 cAbd al-öabbSr observes that Abu Häsim said that Abu 'Al l shared 
this opinion, but that he himself could not discover th i s in Abu 
c Al ï ' s books, although he did find that Abu CA1I thought i t 
poss ible that pain i s a benefit (ma$laJ?a) Ши$Ш XIII, 390: 11-
13). The way in which cAbd al-äabbär checks the correctness of 
Abu HSsim's report on Abu CA1I shows his cr i t i ca l use of sources . 
26 See Chapter Six, 162-184. 
27 See Chapter Six, 172-174. 
28 On giving permission, s ee Chapter Six, 172-174. 
29 Ibn Mattawayh here broaches a d i f f i cu l t question. If God 
compensates generously for a l l sor t s of harm caused by Him, such 
as i l l n e s s e s , hunger, cold, and sorrow, i s i t then good that we 
make an end to this suffering? If we cure the i l l n e s s e s of those 
who su f f er , g ive them food and warmth, and comfort them, we put 
an end to their suffer ing. This implies that God no longer has a 
reason to compensate them. They wi l l miss the compensation that 
God would have given them if the suffering had continued. Ibn 
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Mattawayh does not d i scuss this question, but he might have 
argued that not helping someone e l s e i s detrimental to one's own 
welfare because God has ordered us to be good to other people 
(Qur'än 4: 36). Someone who i s indifferent to the suffering of 
other people may be punished for this in the hereafter. 
30 Reading Mugni XIII, 456: 13, fa-ga'alnShu as written in the 
manuscript, and not fa-ga*alnShä as suggested by the editor. cAbd 
al-óabbSr declares that the slaughter of ca t t l e i s good because 
God wi l l compensate the c a t t l e for being slaughtered. He explains 
that th i s compensation i s the reason why the slaughtering i s 
good: if God did not compensate the c a t t l e , the slaughtering 
would not be good, even though He had permitted i t . If we know 
that God compensates for slaughter of c a t t l e , we know that th i s 
act i s good, even if we do not know that He permits i t . tfu in fa-
ga'alnShu r e f ers to al-^iwad. La-sabab does not make sense in 
this sentence . It should be read as IS, so that the sentence 
becomes " fa-gacalnähu da là la tan caJa" Qusnlhi li-annahä Ы-nafslhS 
IS yOgibu frusnahu (So we made i t [the divine compensation] an 
evidence that i t [the s laughter] i s good because i t [the 
permission] i t s e l f does not necessar i ly cause that i t [the 
s laughtering] i s good)". 
31 Ibn Mattawayh says that i t s author was Abu c ï s S al-Warrâq 
(Magmü* III, fo l . За). Ibn al-Nadïm indeed mentions among the 
books of Abu c ï s â al-Warräq a book called KitSb al-garlb al-
maèrlqì fi Ч-nawb calS Ч-bayawSn (.Fihrlst, 216). Abu «=IsS a l-
Warräq i s reported to have belonged to the Mu ctail la f i r s t , but 
later he was accused of being a Manichean. He i s said to have 
died in 247/661 but Madelung (1907b, 375, note 7) points out 
that th i s must be wrong, s ince he wrote his famous KitSb aJ-
maqSlSt a f ter 250/B64. 
32 On which animals are allowed to be slaughtered or ki l led, s ee 
Eisenstein (1990, 14-17) . 
33 Eisenste in (1990, 15). 
34 See Chapter Six, 174. 
35 See Chapter Six, 171. 
36 See Chapter Five, 147-148. 
37 For the meaning of cSda, s ee Notes to Chapter Three, 237, note 
69. 
38 See Chapter Four, 114-115. 
39 See Chapter Five, 129-130. 
40 On ac t s of the heart (afcSl al-qulub), s e e Chapter Four, 94 . 
41 In the text of Mugnl XIII, 438: 4, the word al-imSna should be 
corrected to read al-imata. 
42 In MugnS XIII, 439: 1-2, atSJ?a should be corrected to read abSha 
and al-itSba, al-lbaha. 
43 On teaching a subject by reading a book and commenting on i t , 
see Introduction, 2 , and Chapter Two, 55. 
44 The idea that God can be compared to a trustee who takes care 
of the i n t e r e s t s of minors was used by some Mu c tazi l i te masters, 
who are not mentioned by name, to defend their opinion that God 
can i n f l i c t i l l n e s s e s on h is creatures without their consent. They 
pointed out that God has created humans and animals. He g ives 
them l i f e , food and a l l kinds of benef i t s . Therefore, the re lat ion 
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between God and His creatures can be compared with that between 
a guardian and an orphan. The guardian knows better than the 
orphan himself how to take care of the orphan's Interests. This 
holds even when the orphan Is an adolescent (.murShiq). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the orphan is no longer a child, 
his guardian knows better than he himself which things will 
profit and which will harm him. Reasoning in this way, and 
comparing God with the guardian of an orphan, these Muctazilite 
masters declared that i t i s good that God inflicts pain on His 
creatures without asking their consent because, as their 
guardian, He knows best what is good for them. They did not say 
that i l lnesses are good because they are a luff. Although cAbd 
al-öabbSr differs with them about this last point, he agrees with 
them that God can be seen as the guardian of his creatures 
(.Mugnl XIII, 454: 17-455: 9). 
45 If a human hurts an animal in a way that God has permitted, God 
will compensate the animal for Its pain. See Chapter Six, 172-
173. 
46 The term munqafl'1 is used, for Instance, In the t i t l e of the 
chapter of the MugnS that deals with this subject. This t i t l e i s : 
FasJ f I baySn al-dalñla calS anna 'l-eiwad munqafl' (Chapter on 
the evidence that the compensation is limited) (Mugnl XIII, 506: 
1-2). 
47 cAbd al-ôabbâr says that Abu CA1I al-öubbS'I and many other 
masters believed that the divine compensation is provided 
everlastingly (see Notes to Chapter Six, note 24). Mänkdlm and 
Ibn Mattawayh say that Abu '1-Hud.ayl and a group of Muctazilites 
of Bagdad were of this opinion (.Tacllq, 494: 15-18 and Ma¿mOc 
III, fol. 28a). 
48 He was the Seljuk vizier who appointed cAbd al-ôabbar as his 
chief Judge. On al-SShib b. cAbbfid, see Chapter Two, 49-50. 
49 In the text of Ta^lSq, 495: 19, al-ΐυφθφ should be corrected to 
read al-mu*awwad. MSnkdlm declares that if divine compensation 
was given everlastingly, the state of someone who is compensated 
would sometimes be equal to the state of someone who i s 
rewarded. 
50 In the text of Mugnl XIII, 523: 1, taÇqlqan should be corrected 
to read ta&flfan. 
51 cAbd al-öabbar does not say that the animals will be judged on 
the Day of Resurrection. Several Moslim theologians believed this 
because of Qur'Sn 6: 38, where it Is said that the animals will 
be gathered to their Lord (Bousquet, 1958, 39-40). 
52 Smith (1981, 174). 
53 Smith (1981, 178). She also quotes a tradition in which the 
Prophet said that children will be the servants of the 
Inhabitants of the Garden (Smith, 1981, 175). 
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SAMENVATTING 
In 1951 werden door een Egyptische wetenschappelijke expedi t ie in 
Jemen diverse oude Arabische handschriften ontdekt en vervolgens 
gefotografeerd. Hieronder bevonden zich handschriften van drie werken 
die aanvankelijk werden toegeschreven aan cAbd al-6abbSr, een 
geleerde uit de 10e/ l le eeuw die behoorde tot een Islamitische 
theologische school, die hij zelf aanduidde als "De mensen van Eenheid 
en Rechtvaardigheid". Dit was een alternatieve naam voor de Mu°tazila, 
een Islamitische theologische school die ontstond in de 8e eeuw. 
Kenmerkend voor de aanhangers van deze school i s dat zij met 
logische bewijsvoeringen hun leerstellingen verdedigden waarvan de 
twee belangrijkste werden aangeduid als de Eenheid (van God) en de 
Rechtvaardigheid (van God). Zij gingen daarbij in de eerste plaats uit 
van het zelfstandig redenerend menselijk verstand, maar gaven 
daarnaast een grote waarde aan de goddelijke openbaring. 
Hoewel de Muctazilieten zich van andere theologische richtingen 
onderscheidden doordat zij het onderling eens waren over een aantal 
leerstellingen, bestonden er binnen de Muctazila meerdere scholen met 
eigen opvattingen over specifieke kwesties. Twee hoofdrichtingen 
binnen de Muctazila waren de school van Bagdad en de school van 
Basra. De Mu=tazilieten vonden zelfstandig redeneren een vereiste 
voor iedereen en keurden het af als een leerling opinies overnam 
alleen maar op gezag van zijn leermeester, zonder diens argumenten te 
kennen. Binnen de Mu=tazila werd het daarom geaccepteerd als een 
leerling er een eigen mening op na hield, maar als de leer van een 
leerling te veel ging afwijken van de leer van zijn meester kon dat 
in een enkel geval aanleiding geven tot conflicten en deze konden een 
afsplitsing tot gevolg hebben. Zo ontstonden er na de dood van Abu 
cAlï al-óubbS'I in 915 twee scholen binnen de school van Basra. 
Vanwege zijn afwijkende opvattingen werd Abfl 'All's zoon Abu Has im 
niet door alle volgelingen als hun nieuwe meester erkend. De 
aanhangers van Abu cAlï wezen AbQ Häsin af en hielden zich bij AbQ 
cAH's leer. Zij vormden een school die later de Iksïdiyya werd 
genoemd. De aanhangers van Abu Häsim accepteerden diens 
vernieuwingen en werden de Bahènmiyya genoemd. 
Nadat Bagdad en Basra lange tijd de belangrijkste 
Muctazilitische centra waren geweest, ontstond er in de tweede helft 
van de tiende eeuw een belangrijk centrum in Rayy (dicht bij het 
huidige 7 e n e r f i n ) waar cAbd al-öabbfir, die behalve Muctazilisme ook 
Sâficitisch recht had gestudeerd, van 977-995 de functie van 
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opperrechter bekleedde. Hij gaf daarnaast onderricht in de 
Muctazilitische leer waarbij hij de leer van AbO HBsim volgde. Hij 
werd beschouwd als de leider van de Bahsamlyya tot zijn dood op 
negentigjarige leeftijd in 1024 (of 1023 of 1025). Voordat hij 
opperrechter werd was hij al begonnen een twintigdelig werk te 
dicteren aan zijn leerlingen. Het werk dat de totale Muctazilitische 
leer omvat werd na twintig jaar voltooid toen cAbd al-GabbSr al 
opperrechter was. Een groot deel van dit twintigdelige werk, dat de 
t i t e l al-Mugnl draagt, werd teruggevonden in de manuscripten die de 
Egyptische expeditie in Jemen fotografeerde. 
Onder de in Jemen gefotografeerde manuscripten bevonden zich 
nog twee werken die cAbd al-óabbSr's naam op het t i telblad 
vermeldden, maar daarnaast de naam van een tweede persoon. Men nam 
aan dat cAbd al-öabbar ook de auteur van deze twee werken was en 
dat de tweede persoon een leerling was aan wie =Abd al-6abbSr het 
werk gedicteerd had. Later werd echter duidelijk dat deze leerlingen 
meer hadden gedaan dan alleen de woorden van cAbd al-öabbar 
weergeven. Het bleek dat zi j de inhoud van een werk van cAbd a l -
èabbâr met hun eigen woorden weergaven, daar krit ische opmerkingen 
bij plaatsten en er soms ook eigen opvattingen en argumentaties aan 
toevoegden. De twee werken waar het om gaat zijn TacUq èarfy al-υψθΐ 
al-kamsa van Mânkdlm Saádlw en al-Magmu* fi 'l-muÇIf Ы-'l-taklIf van 
Ibn Mattawayh. 
MSnkdïm was een Zaydiet en een afstammeling van CA1I b. Abï 
Jal ib . Hij heeft ooit een poging gedaan het leiderschap over de 
Zaydieten te veroveren, maar di t mislukte. Hij s t ie r f in Rayy in 1034. 
Hij volgde de school van cAbd al-öabbar, maar na diens dood ging het 
leiderschap van de school naar een andere leerling van cAbd a l -
öabbar: Abu Rasld al-Nïsabürï. Het i s onbekend wanneer Abu Rasïd 
stierf , maar het is vri j zeker dat daarna het leiderschap van de 
school overging op Ibn Mattawayh. Over het leven van Ibn Mattawayh 
is n ie ts bekend. 
In mijn studie probeer ik vast te s tel len in welke mate MSnkdïm 
en Ibn Mattawayh eigen opvattingen hebben ingevoegd In Tacllq èari? 
al-usül al-kamsa en al-Ma¿mQc f S 'l-mufrlf Ы-'l-takllf. Ik doe dat 
door de inhoud van deze twee werken te vergelijken met de MugnX. 
Omdat de werken te omvangrijk zijn om In hun totaal vergeleken te 
worden, heb ik me beperkt tot één onderwerp dat in al le drie 
behandeld wordt. Dit is het onderwerp pijn. Pijn is niet alleen maar 
iets theoretisch, maar een verschijnsel dat ieder mens ui t eigen 
ervaring kent. Daarnaast i s het een onderwerp met vele invalshoeken. 
Van rel igieus standpunt uit doet zich de vraag voor waarom God een 
wereld geschapen heeft waarin pijn bestaat en waarom Hij toelaat dat 
schepselen elkaar pijn doen. Hoe valt dit te rijmen met God's almacht 
en goedheid? 
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Voordat ^Abd al -Gabbar zich in de Mugnl bezighoudt met deze 
vraag, bespreekt hij eerst wat pijn precies is en hoe pijn tot stand 
komt. Naar zijn mening i s pijn ie t s met een eigen bestaan. Wij lijden 
doordat we de aanwezigheid ervan in ons lichaam waarnemen en niet 
doordat we ie t s missen in ons lichaam waaraan we behoefte hebben, 
zoals gezondheid. Pijn wordt op een geheel eigen manier waargenomen. 
We hebben er geen speciaal zintuiglijk orgaan voor nodig, zoals dat 
wel het geval is met zichtbare dingen, waarvoor we ogen nodig hebben. 
Pijn kunnen we waarnemen met ieder levend deel van het lichaam. De 
pijn die zich in een bepaald lichaamsdeel bevindt nemen we waar met 
datzelfde lichaamsdeel. 
Volgens <:Abd al-Gabbär i s dit kenmerkend voor pijn en 
onderscheidt pijn zich hierdoor van alle andere bestaande dingen. 
Echter, genot wordt ook waargenomen met dat deel van het lichaam 
waarin het zich bevindt. cAbd al-öabbSr beschouwt pijn en genot als 
hetzelfde soort verschijnsel, Het verschil tussen hen beide is s lechts 
de emotie waarmee hun waarneming vergezeld gaat. Nemen we het 
verschijnsel waar met afkeer, dan lijden we en noemen we het pijn; 
nemen we het waar met verlangen, dan genieten we en noemen we het 
genot. cAbd al-éabbSr legt dit ui t aan de hand van het krabben van 
de huid. Normaal doet dit pijn, maar iemand die hevige Jeuk heeft 
ervaart het a ls een genot. 
Vervolgens besteedt cAbd al-öabbSr aandacht aan de manier 
waarop pijn tot stand komt. Hij wijst erop dat we pijn niet 
rechtstreeks kunnen doen ontstaan, zelfs niet in ons eigen lichaam. 
We kunnen onze armen en benen bewegen "van binnen uit" zonder dat 
daar andere handelingen voor nodig zijn, maar we kunnen pijn niet 
"van binnen uit" laten ontstaan. Daar is meer voor nodig. Als we pijn 
willen laten ontstaan in iemands lichaam, moeten we op een speciale 
manier druk uitoefenen op dat lichaam (bijvoorbeeld met een mes), 
zodat er een verwonding ontstaat . Deze verwonding veroorzaakt op zijn 
beurt de pijn. cAbd al-éabbar noemt deze manier van ie ts tot stand 
brengen door eerst ie ts anders tot stand te brengen "verwekking". 
Door het begrip "verwekking" kan cAbd al-öabbSr duidelijk maken 
dat, ook al wordt de pijn door een verwonding veroorzaakt, er toch 
iemand aangewezen kan worden als diegene die de pijn tot stand heeft 
gebracht. Hij verklaart dat diegene die de procedure van "verwekking" 
op gang brengt beschouwd dient te worden als diegene die het 
eindresultaat tot stand brengt. In het geval van pijn is diegene die 
drukt uitoefent diegene die de pijn doet ontstaan. De pijn is het 
resul taa t van zijn handelen. Een van de bewijzen die cAbd al-ôabbfir 
hiervoor aanvoert is dat de pijn evenredig is aan de verwonding, die 
weer evenredig is aan de druk. Hoe meer druk, hoe meer verwonding, 
hoe meer pijn. cAbd al-öabbfir weet een verklaring te geven voor 
gevallen van pijn doen die dit schijnen tegen te spreken, zoals het 
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feit dat hoe hard een sterk iemand ook op een naald kan drukken, zijn 
prik toch niet meer pijn doet dan de prik van een zwak iemand. 
Ieder weet uit eigen ervaring dat er ook pijn bestaat die niet 
het gevolg is van druk van buiten af op ons lichaam. We kunnen 
vreselijke hoofdpijn of rugpijn hebben, zonder dat we iets van druk 
op ons lichaam of een verwonding gemerkt hebben. Naar de mening van 
cAbd al-öabbSr wordt dit soort pijn door God rechtstreeks in ons 
lichaam tot stand gebracht. Dit betekent dat niet alleen schepselen 
elkaar pijn doen, maar dat ook God in de lichamen van zijn schepselen 
pijn doet ontstaan. Dit brengt ons bij de belangrijke vraag waarom 
God zijn schepselen doet lijden. God laat hen niet alleen fysiek 
lijden door ziekten en andere zaken, maar ook geestelijk, bijvoorbeeld, 
door hun geliefden te laten sterven of door hun bezittingen te gronde 
te laten gaan. Hoe kan dit in overeenstemming zijn met God's goedheid 
en almacht? 
Men kan zich afvragen of wij mensen over Gods handelen kunnen 
oordelen. Gelden er voor Gods handelen dezelfde regels als voor 
menselijk handelen? cAbd al-èabbâr is van mening dat dat inderdaad zo 
is. Hij is ervan overtuigd dat een handeling die in onze wereld als 
slecht bestempeld wordt ook als slecht bestempeld zou worden als 
deze handeling door God verricht werd. Om aan te tonen dat God goed 
handelt wanneer Hij zijn schepselen doet lijden, bespreekt cAbd al-
éabbar daarom eerst de verschillende manieren waarop mensen elkaar 
pijn doen, waarbij hij uitlegt dat het soms goed is een ander pijn te 
doen. 
*=Abd al-6abbar is van mening dat een handeling slecht is als 
een ander daarvan schade ondervindt. Dit betekent dat hij de 
handeling van iemand die zonder het te willen, onbewust, een ander 
pijn doet als slecht bestempelt. Ook de handeling van een kind of een 
dier dat een ander schepsel pijn doet bestempelt hij als slecht, ook 
al hebben kinderen en dieren geen besef van goed en kwaad. Wat telt 
bij hem is de schade die de ander ondervindt. 
cAbd al-öabbSr erkent dat het in de meeste gevallen slecht is 
om een ander pijn te doen, omdat de ander daarvan schade ondervindt. 
Echter, er zijn gevallen waarin de pijn uiteindelijk de ander een 
voordeel oplevert dat groter is dan de pijn. Een arts kan iemand 
genezen door hem een pijnlijke behandeling te geven. In dat geval 
verricht de arts een goede handeling ook al houdt deze in dat hij de 
ander pijn doet. cAbd al-óabbSr tekent hier echter bij aan dat het 
pijn doen van een ander om hem een voordeel te bezorgen alleen goed 
is als die ander van te voren zijn toestemming heeft gegeven. Hij 
maakt een uitzondering voor wezens zonder volledig verstand, zoals 
kinderen. Hun verzorger mag hun pijn laten doen zonder hun 
toestemming, echter alleen in die gevallen waarin hij die pijn ook aan 
hemzelf zou laten doen. Een andere, theoretische, uitzondering maakt 
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'Abd al-GabbSr voor pijn waar zoveel voordeel tegenover s t a a t da t 
ledereen, zelfs de r i jkste persoon, ervoor zou kiezen om voor dat 
voordeel de pijn te ondergaan. 
cAbd al-öabbar wijst erop dat het ook goed is om met een kleine 
pijn een groot onheil af te weren. Iemand die zichzelf redt ui t de 
klauwen van een leeuw door een doornbos in te rennen, verwondt zich 
aan de doornen. Deze zelfverwonding is echter goed omdat daarmee het 
onheil van verscheurd te worden door een leeuw afgeweerd wordt. Een 
andere wijze van pijn doen die cAbd al-öabbär als goed bestempelt i s 
pijn die een verdiende straf i s . Hij is echter van mening dat wij in 
de meeste gevallen niet het recht hebben een ander te straffen. Dit 
recht is voorbehouden aan God. cAbd al-Gabbär geeft daarom als 
voorbeeld het berispen van iemand die een grote zonde begaan heeft. 
Het i s , volgens hem, goed deze berisping te geven ook al doet men de 
zondaar daarmee verdriet . 
Deze overwegingen betrekt cAbd al-öabbär op God. Hij is van 
mening dat God de mensen a l ler le i plichten oplegt met het doel hun 
de mogelijkheid te geven een beloning in het hiernamaals te 
verdienen. Deze verplichtingen gelden voor iedere volwassene met 
gezond verstand, of hi j nu Moslim is of niet . Omdat het niet goed zou 
zijn iemand te belonen voor ie ts dat hij onder dwang doet, geeft God 
de mens, volgens cAbd al-Gabbâr, vrijheid van keuze. Men kan ervoor 
kiezen of men Gods verplichtingen zal vervullen of niet , De vrijheid 
van keuze houdt echter in dat God niet ingrijpt als de ene mens de 
ander kwaad doet. Wie er voor kiest om de verplichtingen die God hem 
heeft opgelegd niet te vervullen zal geen beloning verdienen maar 
door God ges t raf t worden. Kinderen, geestelijk onvolwaardigen en 
dieren kunnen de door God opgelegde verplichtingen met hun verstand 
niet bevatten en daarom gelden ze niet voor hen. Zij kunnen daardoor 
geen straf verdienen, maar komen evenmin voor beloning in aanmerking. 
cAbd al-öabbär geeft toe dat in sommige gevallen pijn die van 
God komt goed is omdat hij a ls straf bedoeld i s . Hij wijst er echter 
op dat de s t raf verdiend moet zijn en dat aan de bestrafte 
meegedeeld moet worden voor welk vergrijp hij gestraf t wordt. Dit 
betekent dat ziekten waaraan kinderen en dieren lijden niet a ls s t raf 
van God bedoeld kunnen zijn, want kinderen en dieren kunnen volgens 
hem geen s t ra f verdiend hebben. Alleen volwassenen met een gezond 
verstand kunnen s t raf verdiend hebben, maar volgens cAbd al-öabbSr 
s t ra f t God hen niet in deze wereld, tenzij Hij van te voren bekend 
gemaakt heeft dat Hij een bepaald vergrijp met een bepaalde straf zal 
bestraffen. De £a dd- s tra f f en die in de Koran genoemd worden en 
namens God worden uitgevoerd worden zijn daar een voorbeeld van, 
maar ook de goddelijke gerichten waarover in de Koran wordt 
gesproken. 
Hieruit concludeert cAbd al-ÔabbSr dat ziekten geen straf van 
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God kunnen zijn. Waarom laat God zijn schepselen dan pijn en verdriet 
lijden? Volgens cAbd al-Gabbar hebben pijn en verdriet van God 
afkomstig een functie met betrekking tot de plichten die Hij de 
mensen heeft opgelegd. Hij redeneert dat het opleggen van 
verplichtingen alleen maar goed is, als er ook voor gezorgd wordt dat 
men in staat is ze te vervullen. Met betrekking tot God concludeert 
hij hieruit dat God verplicht is om de mens te helpen zich aan de 
verplichtingen te houden. Om die reden heeft God profeten gestuurd 
om de mensen te wijzen op de beloning en straf in het hiernamaals en 
zodoende de mensen te motiveren zich aan de verplichtingen te houden. 
Daarnaast motiveert God de mensen door ze steeds opnieuw hieraan te 
herinneren. Met dat doel doet God pijn in hen ontstaan. Op deze 
manier waarschuwt hij hen dat zij pijnlijk gestraft zullen worden als 
zij zich niet houden aan de verplichtingen en dat zij een beloning 
krijgen als ze zich er wel aan houden. 
Maar hoe zit het met kinderen die sterven voordat zij volwassen 
zijn geworden, met verstandelijk gehandicapten en met dieren? Zij 
lijden ook door ziekten, maar kunnen geen profijt trekken van de 
waarschuwing omdat de verplichtingen niet voor hen gelden en zij 
geen beloning of straf kunnen verdienen. Volgens cAbd al-Gabbar is 
hun pijn toch niet zinloos, want zij bevat een waarschuwing voor de 
volwassenen in hun omgeving. Zelf hebben de kinderen en dieren echter 
ook voordeel van deze pijn. Volgens cAbd al-Gabbar krijgen alle 
wezens van God een royale compensatie voor de pijn die Hij hen doet 
lijden. Dit geldt niet alleen voor kinderen, verstandelijk 
gehandicapten en dieren, maar voor alle wezens, inclusief de 
volwassenen met een gezond verstand. 
cAbd al-Gabbar gaat er van uit dat God hun in vele gevallen 
deze compensatie pas in het hiernamaals zal geven. Stervenspijn kan 
alleen maar in het hiernamaals gecompenseerd worden. Wat de andere 
pijn betreft, zal God, die alwetend is, doen wat het beste voor de 
betrokkene is. Soms zal de compensatie al in deze wereld verstrekt 
worden. Ieder zal echter een deel van zijn of haar compensatie moeten 
afstaan aan andere levende wezens om daarmee aan hen de pijn te 
vergoeden die hij of zij hun gedaan heeft. God, die de levende wezens 
de vrijheid heeft gegeven elkaar pijn te doen, zal naar cAbd al-
öabbSr's overtuiging niet toestaan dat één pijn ongecompenseerd 
blijft. Echter, de compensatie voor pijn die de levende wezens elkaar 
doen is veel minder dan de compensatie die God voor pijn geeft. In 
het geval van de goddelijke compensatie gaat het om een voordeel dat 
maakt dat het ondergaan van deze pijn goed is, terwijl het in het 
geval van de menselijk compensatie slechts om een schadevergoeding 
gaat. Deze schadevergoeding is gelijk aan de hoeveelheid pijn. God 
weet hoe groot de schadevergoeding moet zijn. Hij trekt deze 
hoeveelheid af van de compensatie waarop de aanrichter van de pijn 
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recht heeft en voegt deze hoeveelheid toe aan de compensatie die het 
slachtoffer van Hem zal ontvangen. God houdt, a ls het ware, de 
compensatie-rekeningen bij en boekt bedragen over van de ene 
rekening naar de andere. 
In het hiernamaals krijgen volwassenen met een volledig verstand 
hun compensatie in combinatie met hun beloning of straf, in het 
l aa t s te geval als strafverl ichting. Voortijdig gestorven kinderen en 
dieren die recht op compensatie hebben zullen, naar cAbd al-6abbär's 
mening, op de Laatste Dag tot leven worden gewekt om hun compensatie 
in het hiernamaals te kunnen ontvangen. Hij benadrukt echter dat de 
hoeveelheid compensatie niet oneindig i s . Het gaat om een bepaalde 
hoeveelheid, overeenkomstig met de geleden pijn. Verdriet over het 
stoppen van de compensatie moet echter voorkomen worden want di t 
verdriet zou weer gecompenseerd moeten worden, waardoor er geen 
einde aan het compenseren zou komen. God zal er daarom op 
verschillende manieren voor zorgen dat er geen verdriet over het 
stoppen van de compensatie ontstaat . 
Op deze wijze geeft cAbd al-èabbar een verklaring voor het 
lijden in deze wereld. Hieruit kan geconcludeerd worden dat volgens 
hem het lijden in deze wereld nauw verbonden is met de verplichtingen 
die God de mensen heeft opgelegd. Het door God opgelegde lijden heeft 
tot doel de mensen te motiveren deze plichten te vervullen en zo een 
beloning in het hiernamaals te verdienen. Vanwege deze plichten 
hebben de mensen vrijheid van keuze gekregen, zodat zij kunnen kiezen 
tussen het wel of niet vervullen ervan. Als mensen elkaar pijn doen 
zonder dat God ingrijpt i s dat dus een gevolg van het opleggen van 
de verplichtingen door God. Echter, God zal er zorg voor dragen dat 
geen enkele pijn ongecompenseerd blijft , tenzij het een verdiende en 
met recht uitgevoerde s t raf i s . 
Uit de vergelijking van TaclSq ëar$ al-υφΰΐ al-kamsa en al-Magmu* ΓΙ 
•І-тиСЦ Ы-Ч-taklIf met al-Mufriï wordt duidelijk dat Mânkdîm en Ibn 
Mattawayh cAbd al-èabbSrs leer van pijn en compensatie voor het 
groots te deel hebben overgenomen. Soms brengen zij echter andere 
opvattingen naar voren. Mânkdîm heeft bijvoorbeeld een andere mening 
dan cAbd al-öabbar over de "verwekking·· van pijn. cAbd al-ôabbâr zegt 
dat druk een verwonding verwekt en dat de verwonding op zijn beurt 
pijn verwekt, terwijl Mânkdîm zegt dat druk pijn verwekt. Ook al heeft 
Mânkdîm hierover een andere opvatting dan cAbd al-Gabbär, toch wijkt 
hij niet af van de leer van de Bahsamiyya. Abu Hfisim heeft in zijn 
verschillende boeken diverse meningen over de verwekking van pijn 
naar voren gebracht. Een ervan was dat pijn verwekt wordt door druk 
en een andere dat druk een verwonding verwekt en de verwonding op 
zijn beurt pijn verwekt. Mânkdîm volgt dus de ene opvatting van Abu 
Häsim en *-Abd al-ôabbâr de andere. Ook Ibn Mattawayh volgt in een 
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enkel geva l de mening van Abü Häsim In p l a a t s van die van cAbd a l -
Gabbar. 
Wanneer Mankdïm en Ibn Mattawayh een eigen opva t t ing naa r 
voren brengen gaa t he t mees ta l om zaken van ondergeschikt be lang , 
zoals een betere definit ie van een bepaald begrip, een andere 
argumentatie of een eigen standpunt over een bepaalde kwestie 
waarover veel onenigheid bestond, zoals de vraag of pijn ook kan 
bestaan in levenloze voorwerpen. cAbd al-öabbSr antwoordde hierop 
bevestigend, maar voegde eraan toe dat in dat geval het verschijnsel 
niet pijn genoemd kan worden. Mankdïm was echter van mening dat pijn 
niet kan bestaan in levenloze voorwerpen. Ibn Mattawayh had weer een 
andere mening. Hij zei dat in theorie pijn in levenloze voorwerpen kan 
bestaan, maar dan alleen als God de pijn daarin rechtstreeks zonder 
verwonding zou doen ontstaan. 
Zo blijken er meerdere kwesties te zijn waarover Mankdïm en Ibn 
Mattawayh een eigen mening hebben. Dit betekent dat de opvattingen 
die in Ta'llq àarÇ aJ-usûJ al-kamsa en al-Magmüc fï Ч-mufyíf bi-'l-
takllf aangetroffen worden niet zonder meer gepresenteerd kunnen 
worden als opvattingen van cAbd al-Gabbâr, tenzij Mankdïm en Ibn 
Mattawayh in de derde persoon over hem spreken. In de overige 
gevallen kan het hun eigen opvatting zijn en deze kan afwijken van 
die van cAbd al-Gabbfir. 
Mankdïm en Ibn Mattawayh waren volgelingen van cAbd al-GabbSr 
en aanhangers van dezelfde Mu=tazilitische school. Dit betekent dat, 
ook al i s cAbd al-óabbSr niet zelf de auteur van Tacllq èarfy al-υψαΐ 
al-k.amsa en al-Magmu* fi '1-тиі}Ц Ы-'l-taklIf, deze werken waardevol 
zijn omdat zij de leer van de school van cAbd al-öabbSr weergeven. 
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